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CONFIDENTIAL.

EASTERN PAPERS.

PART VII.

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES

OF THE

LATIN AND GREEK CHURCHES

IN

TURKEY.

16

June to November 1855.

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Correspondence respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey.

(EASTERN QUESTION.)

Part VII.

No. 1.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 785. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, June* 24, 1855.

ON Friday last Count Walewski addressed two despatches to M. de Bourqueney, in answer to the last communications made by M. de Hübner. In the first Count Walewski objects to the instructions sent by Count Buol to the Austrian Minister at St. Petersburgh, alluded to in my despatch No. 756 of the 19th instant, as contrary, in part of their contents, to the engagements taken by Austria towards the belligerent Powers; in the second he animadverts in strong language upon the instructions addressed by Count Buol to the Internuncio, to which I allude equally in my above-mentioned despatch.

These despatches of Count Walewski were accompanied by a confidential letter to M. de Bourqueney, in which his Excellency desires the French Envoy to call the serious attention of Count Buol to the present state of the relations of Austria with the Western Powers. He remarks, that facts are stronger than assurances, and that while Count Buol is assuring Great Britain and France of his desire to maintain the Treaty of the 2nd of December, the acts of the Austrian Government evince a very different spirit. He remonstrates against the publication of Count Buol's despatch of the 20th ultimo, in the "Indépendance Belge," which he observed could not have occurred without the connivance of the Cabinet of Vienna, but which is calculated to show to Europe the differences of opinion which exist between Austria and the belligerent Powers. He animadverts again upon the instructions to the Austrian Ministers at St. Petersburgh and Constantinople, to which I have alluded above; and he adds, that facts such as these are almost in themselves evidence of the non-existence of the Treaty. He cannot therefore conceal from Count Buol that the time is come when, if he is desirous of maintaining the Treaty, he must take some further means of showing it; and he hints that Count Buol might summon a meeting of the three Powers to consider how the Vth Article could be carried out.

If Count Buol refuses to take some step of the kind, it can only be upon the plea that it is through the belligerent Powers that peace has not been made —an insinuation which the French Government will always repel.

Count Walewski then says, that great and sincere as is the desire of France to maintain the most friendly relations with Austria, he cannot conceal from himself that those relations are seriously menaced, and in case of a rupture

Austria must be prepared to see the allies make peace hereafter without her participation.

I should observe, that I have not seen Count Walewski's despatches, and am merely recounting what his Excellency stated to me to be their purport.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 2.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 786. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, June 24, 1855.*

COUNT WALEWSKI received this morning despatches from M. de Bourqueney, which state that although the language of Count Buol continued to be satisfactory, the acts of the Austrian Cabniet were at variance with that language. The reduction of the Austrian army was imminent. A dislocation of the troops was determined upon. The Emperor Francis Joseph had received at Cracow a complimentary visit from a Russian General, sent thither by the Czar. M. de Bourqueney had called Count Buol's attention to these facts, and he had been told that a reduction of the army was necessary to prevent the bankruptcy of the State, and the dislocation of the troops had been called for to put a stop to disease and to prevent a dearth of provisions; and as to the visit of the Russian General, Count Buol observed that that officer had only remained four-and-twenty hours in Cracow, and that all he could say further was, that if the Emperor Alexander had come to Warsaw, he should not have advised the sending an Austrian officer to compliment him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 3.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 203.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 26, 1855.*

I INCLOSE a copy of a despatch* from Baron Manteuffel to the Count de Bernstorff, who, after reading it to me, had the goodness to leave a copy of it in my hands.

I told Count Bernstorff that Her Majesty's Government had long been desirous to re-establish the relations of cordiality and confidence that had subsisted between England and Prussia, and that they would, therefore, receive with satisfaction this communication from the Cabinet of Berlin; and although at this moment there did not appear any prospect of the proposition being practically useful, yet that in the course of events Prussia might resume the position she had a right to occupy, and might then render important services to the cause of peace and general reconciliation. Such an event, I said, would be accelerated by Prussia now taking a more active part with the Western Powers, and in her own interest, and in that of Germany, exhibiting a determination to resist the aggressive policy of Russia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 4.

Baron Manteuffel to Count Bernstorff.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Bernstorff, June 26.)

M. le Comte, *Berlin, ce 15 Juin, 1855.*

LA clôture des Conférences de Vienne, sur laquelle le Cabinet d'Autriche nous a communiqué le Protocole ci-joint en copie, fait entrer la question d'Orient dans

* No. 4.

une nouvelle phase. Nous appellons de nos vœux sincères une entente désirable et pratique sur des bases qu'en général nous avions reconnues comme conformes aux intérêts de l'Europe, bien que, par les germes d'interprétations divergentes qu'elles renfermaient, elles ne nous eussent pas paru de nature à y rattacher, pour notre part, des engagements contractuels. Le Roi notre auguste Maître n'en a pas moins apprécié à leur juste valeur les efforts que chacune des Puissances intéressées a fait dans la limite de ses devoirs particuliers, pour concourir à l'œuvre de paix qu'il s'agissait d'accomplir, ou du moins de préparer. Bien des espérances, on ne saurait se le dissimuler, qui trouvaient leur centre dans les Conférences de Vienne, ont dû s'évanouir pour le moment avec leur clôture. Les événements militaires qui, à la vérité, n'avaient jamais été interrompus par les négociations, reprennent leur cours avec un acharnement redoublé, et les chances de la paix semblent plus que jamais subordonnées aux succès de la guerre. Je n'ai pas besoin, M. le Comte, de vous exprimer les profonds regrets que le Roi notre auguste Maître éprouve de cette tournure de la situation générale, car vous savez avec quelle persévérance Sa Majesté se voue à la noble tâche de faire valoir partout des vues de paix et de conciliation.

Aussi le Roi ne renonce-t-il pas à l'espoir, qu'au milieu du mouvement de la guerre, ce besoin de la paix qui a sa source, tant pour les peuples que pour les Gouvernements, dans les instincts mêmes de notre époque, ne tardera pas à se faire jour, et que les efforts réunis et sincères de tous les Cabinets parviendront à y satisfaire sur la base de la justice et de la modération. Sa Majesté compte sous ce rapport avec confiance sur la sagesse éclairée du Cabinet de Londres, et éprouverait une satisfaction particulière, si le développement ultérieur des événements lui fournissait une occasion de se faire l'intermédiaire des dispositions réciproquement pacifiques; et si les négociations qui s'y rattacheraient donnaient lieu à une conformité de vues entre le Cabinet de Berlin et celui de Londres, qui permet à Sa Majesté de s'associer bien efficacement aux efforts communs des Puissances, pour rendre à l'Europe entière les bienfaits de la paix.

Veuillez, M. le Comte, toutes les fois que l'occasion s'en présente, vous prononcer dans le sens des observations qui précèdent, et recevez, &c.

(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 5.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 27.)

(No. 790.)

My Lord, *Paris, June 25, 1854.*

COUNT HATZFELDT has made to Count Walewski a communication of the same nature as that which appears to have been made to your Lordship by Count Bernstoff, with reference to the maintenance of friendly relations between Prussia and the belligerent Powers; and Count Walewski informs me that he answered M. de Hatzfeldt verbally in much the same terms as those employed by your Lordship in your despatch to Lord Bloomfield No. 195 of the 19th instant.

There was, however, Count Walewski added, a passage in M. de Manteuffel's despatch, to which he had alluded with Count Hatzfeldt more particularly—that in which the possible mediation of Prussia is hinted at. This, Count Walewski said, he had declined in the most positive terms.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 6.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 27.)

(No. 801.)

My Lord, *Paris, June 26, 1855.*

I HAVE communicated to Count Walewski, as desired by your Lordship's despatch No. 621 of the 22nd instant, the amended draft of the despacth which your Lordship proposes to address to Mr. Magenis, respecting the Treaty which

Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to enter into with the King of Sweden and Norway, with the view of checking the ambitious designs of Russia in the north. Count Walewski approves of the instructions which it contains, and will send similar orders to the French Minister at Stockholm.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 7.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Magenis.

(No. 21. Secret.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 28, 1855.

WITH reference to the attempts which have of late years been made by Russia to obtain a footing in Norway, which attempts Russia, so far from abandoning, is evidently intent upon pushing forward at the first convenient opportunity, as is sufficiently proved by the coercive measures she has put in force against Norway, in consequence of the refusal by the latter to accede to the repeated demands of Russia for the concession of more extended fishing rights on the coast of Norway; with reference also to the fortifications commenced with so much secresy, and upon a scale so vast at Bomarsund, which leave no doubt that the ambitious designs of Russia are as menacing to the safety and independence of Europe in the north as they have been proved to be in the south, and that in a few years her power, if unchecked, would become most dangerous.

Her Majesty's Government taking these facts into consideration, and being earnestly desirous to prove the friendly feelings by which Her Majesty is animated towards her ally, the King of Sweden and Norway, and to render to him any assistance in resisting the demands which, at the conclusion of peace, will no doubt again be addressed to him by Russia, will be prepared to enter into an agreement by which the King of Sweden and Norway shall declare his intention to make no concession to Russia, whether of fishery rights or pasturage rights, or of territory; and the Queen of Great Britain shall engage, should any attempt be made by Russia to obtain any such concessions by force, to come to the assistance of the King of Sweden and Norway with such an amount of naval force as may be necessary for the purpose of repelling any aggressive act on the part of Russia.

Her Majesty's Government have been in communication with that of France on this subject; and they have been informed by Lord Cowley that corresponding instructions will be sent to the French Minister at Stockholm.

The course which the two Governments have decided to pursue is, that their respective Ministers shall sound the ground in the first instance, and ascertain whether such a proposal as that which I have sketched out would be agreeable to the King of Sweden; and should it prove to be so, the Ministers will make it formally to the Swedish Government, and embody it in a Treaty.

If the King of Sweden should wish both the proposal and the Treaty to be kept secret, there would be no objection to comply with His Majesty's wish, though the manifestly aggressive intentions of Russia would fully justify His Swedish Majesty in resorting openly to this measure for his protection.

Indeed it is fortunate for the safety of Sweden that this opportunity should have offered itself for concluding such an important Treaty with the maritime Powers. If England and France had been at peace with Russia, however much their suspicions might have been awakened, and however threatening to Sweden might have been the course taken by Russia, they might have felt some hesitation in entering with Sweden upon a negotiation for a Treaty directed against Russia: whereas being now at war with Russia, they are fairly entitled to take any measures to provide against future schemes of aggrandizement on her part.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 8.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Magenis.

(No. 23.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 28, 1855.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, stating that the French Government approve the instructions which I have addressed to you in my despatch No. 21 of this day's date, in regard to the designs of Russia in the north of Europe, and that similar instructions will be sent to the French Minister at Stockholm.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 9.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 824.)

My Lord, *Paris, June* 29, 1855.

COUNT WALEWSKI informed me yesterday that he had received confidential, but, he thought, certain intelligence that the Russian Government was about to make fresh propositions to the allies, through the Cabinet of Berlin.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 10.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 825. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, June* 29, 1855.

COUNT WALEWSKI stated to me yesterday that he was about to send to London, for the appreciation of Her Majesty's Government, the draft of a despatch which he proposed to address to M. de Bourqueney, having for its object to establish the true state of the relations existing between Austria and the maritime Powers, and to prove that Austria was by no means exonerated from the engagements which she had contracted on the 2nd of December.

I said to Count Walewski, that I rather thought that in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, Austria should now be left to herself, as the best means of preserving the slender thread which still bound her to Great Britain and France.

His Excellency rejoined that he had no intention to insist on the adoption of his despatch; that he should certainly not send it, unless your Lordship addressed one identical, or at all events analogous to it, to the English Representative at Vienna; but that he thought that some step of the kind should be taken, either now or later, if it was only to place on record the opinions of the two Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 11.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 834. Confidential.)

Paris, June 30, 1855.

My Lord,

M. DE BOURQUENEY gives an account, in a despatch received this morning, of his conversation with Count Buol, in acquitting himself of the instructions which I informed your Lordship, in my despatch No. 785 of the 24th instant, had been sent him, to call the attention of the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the perilous state of the Treaty of the 2nd of December, in the presence of the communications made by the Cabinet of Vienna to St. Petersburgh and the Porte, and of the publication in the Brussels papers of Count Buol's despatch of the 20th ultimo to the Austrian Representatives in Paris and London.

M. de Bourqueney fancies that the language he was desired to hold had made a certain impression upon Count Buol, who said that he would renew the conversation with him on the following day, though he could conclude nothing before the return of the Emperor Francis Joseph to his capital on the 10th proximo.

Count Buol excused himself for the publication of the despatch, by saying that he had authorised it in consequence of hearing that Her Majesty's Government had determined on laying it before Parliament. I remarked, that in these days of telegraphic communication, there was no excuse for taking serious steps on surmises or hearsay.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 12.

Mr. Paget to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 32.)

The Hague, June 29, 1855.

My Lord,

DURING the visit of the King of the Netherlands to Luxemburg, His Majesty was presented by the King of Prussia with the regiment, the 10th Hussars, formerly commanded by the late King William II; and Colonel Oltberg, an aide-de-camp of General Wedel, and recently named Governor of the Fortress of Luxemburg, has, within the last few days arrived at the Hague, charged by His Prussian Majesty with the presentation to His Netherlands Majesty of the commission to command the said regiment.

General Hert is to leave the Hague to-night for Berlin, to convey His Majesty's thanks to the King of Prussia.

It is a matter of some surprise to the French Minister that Colonel Oltberg, who was attached to the suite of General Wedel in his mission to Paris, where he was treated with every civility, should not have paid him the courtesy of calling at the French Legation since his arrival at the Hague, and should have made this omission the more remarkable by his having visited the Russian Minister, M. Lomonosoff.

It appears that Colonel Oltberg, assuming a tone of pity and commiseration, has been holding forth, since he has been here, on the disasters which await the allied armies in the Crimea, predicting amongst other things their decimation by disease, &c., during the summer campaign.

I should not have thought these circumstances worth mentioning to your Lordship were they not another instance of the animus which, in little things as well as in great, is invariably to be found amongst all the agents of the Prussian Government towards the allies. Unfortunately such opinions meet with but too much sympathy in this capital. Either from personal civility received at the hands of the late Emperor, the distribution of orders and decorations, the influence—perhaps dread—of the Queen Mother, there is scarcely an individual attached to this Court, or moving in the higher classes of society, who may not be called a Russian partizan.

A feeling of self-preservation will ever prevent any Government of this country from exposing their national interests by acts which might be taken as a departure from their neutral position, but it is at the same time beyond a doubt that any success which might attend the Russian arms, and any disaster which the allies might have to deplore, would be hailed with feelings of satisfaction by, I may almost say, the whole of the class I have alluded to.

Recollections of events connected with the separation from Belgium is perhaps also in some instances a reason for this ill-will.

I do not know that I ought to apply the above observations to His Majesty personally. It is difficult to ascertain what are his real sentiments, and I am frequently told that they are in favour of the cause of the Western Powers; but I cannot believe them to be very strong when I listen to the language of his courtiers.

Amongst the commercial classes also the same unfriendly feelings, although deriving their origin from different sources, exist to a certain extent towards England and France.

Many of these have considerable sums vested in the Russian funds, others by the blockades established of the Russian ports see their commercial speculations put an end to.

They lose sight of, or have never understood, the real merits of the question at issue—who was the originator of the war, and by whose obstinate persistence in refusing to accede to just and honourable terms, its continuation is to be attributed.

They are incapable or unwilling to appreciate the efforts made by the allies in the first instance to prevent the war, and then to conclude a peace. They would almost appear to be aware of one fact only—that they are unable any longer to direct their commercial enterprises to Russian ports, and that the obstacle in their way is the presence of the fleets of England and France.

What, however, they desire most of all—and this is natural enough—is peace; and could this be obtained, whether by a reverse to the allies, or by the annihilation of all the Russian armies and strongholds, provided their Russian stock did not suffer, either event would probably be a matter of great indifference to them.

If any sympathy exists in this country towards the Western Powers, it is to be found in what is called the democratic or liberal party, of which M. Thorbecke is the head. Your Lordship will perhaps recollect a fact mentioned in Sir Ralph Abercromby's despatch No. 188 of the 24th of November last, that M. de Zuylen Van Nyveldt, who was Minister for Foreign Affairs in M. Thorbecke's last administration, addressed some questions to M. Van Hall in the Second Chamber of the States-General, as to the nature of the neutrality which this Government intended to observe, and expressed it as his opinion that while involving the country in no active part on either one side or the other, they would openly declare their sympathy with the Western Powers, as defending the cause of justice and civilisation against intolerance and barbarous aggression.

This language from a late Minister for Foreign Affairs, and who would probably be so again in the event of his party coming into power, is sufficiently strong; but it must be observed that the speaker was perfectly aware at the time of the remote responsibility which attached to his words, by the improbability of his being placed in a position to act up to them; and I think it yet remains to be proved whether, if M. Thorbecke and his friends were to return to power, which at present nothing appears to render likely, they would take a line of policy in any way different from that followed by the present Government.

The Grösten van Prinsterer or Ultra-Protestant party, of which only a few members are in the Chamber, corresponds very much with the Kreuz party in Prussia, and I need, therefore, say nothing with regard to their opinions on the present struggle, or in favour of which side their good wishes are enlisted.

As far as his Excellency M. Van Hall is personally concerned, I can only repeat what I have before mentioned to your Lordship, that I have always found him perfectly fair, straightforward, and impartial on all the occasions on which I have had to speak to him officially. His own private feelings I take to be, in a great measure, those of his party, although perhaps not so strongly

pronounced; but so long as his Excellency in the official transactions betwee the two countries continues to act up to the same judicious line of conduct which has hitherto guided his dealings with us, I think that Her Majesty's Government would have only cause for regret at a change of Ministry in this country.

In commercial policy M. Van Hall is liberal and far-seeing, and during his administration considerable reductions have been effected in the tariff. He is a great admirer of England and of English institutions. He thoroughly understands the spirit and temper of his own country, and is, of all men in it, the one best calculated to lead it on gradually in the paths of progress and amelioration, and at the same time to resist all violent attempts at subversive and unnecessary and uncalled-for innovations, which a less enlightened and more democratic mind might unintentionally encourage or designedly foster.

I trust your Lordship will excuse the length at which I have ventured to trespass on your time, but I thought that I might have no better opportunity of stating what appear to be the views and feelings of this country with regard to the events which are now passing, and towards the parties engaged in them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. PAGET.

No. 13.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 261.)
My Lord, *Berlin, June 28, 1855.*

BARON Manteuffel has left Berlin, and will not return until after the usual period of the departure of the messenger for Calais.

His Excellency received last night from Count Esterhazy a confidential communication of the views of the Austrian Government respecting the communication to be made to the German Diet on the subject of the closing of the Vienna Conferences, and it does not appear probable that the Prussian Government will be in a hurry to reply to it.

Intelligence has arrived here that Baron Prokesch is to resume his duties at Frankfort, and that Count Rechberg is to prepare to accompany the Emperor Francis Joseph to Italy.

The return of Baron Prokesch to the post of President of the Diet has given much dissatisfaction here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 14.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 270.)
My Lord, *Berlin, June 30, 1855.*

I AM unable as yet to send to your Lordship a correct analysis of the communication which was made to this Government by the Austrian Minister on the 27th instant, as reported in my despatch No. 261 of the following day.

It commences, I am told, with an historical account of what passed at the Vienna Conferences, and is written in a mild and moderate tone. It proposes that the resolution of the German Diet of the 9th of December, which recognizes the stipulations of the Treaty between Austria and Prussia of the 20th April, 1854, and the defensive engagements therein agreed to by which Austria is guaranteed from any attack on her territory that may be a consequence of the complication in the East, and that the further resolution adopted by the Diet on the 8th of February last, stipulating the "kriegsbereitschaft," shall be duly maintained. It states that Austria still will continue to watch over the interest of Germany in the East; it calls for the protection of her military

position in the Principalities, and the continuance of the state of preparation for war in which the German armies have placed themselves.

The four bases of the late negotiations are alluded to, but I do not understand that more is urged on the consideration of the Prussian Government with reference to them than that the spirit of these points shall be looked upon as an equitable ground for future negotiations.

Baron Manteuffel is not expected from the country for a couple of days, and the answer cannot consequently be sent to Vienna before the end of next week.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 15.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 271.)
My Lord, *Berlin, June 30, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith a copy of a despatch addressed by Baron Manteuffel to the Prussian Representative at Vienna of the 9th instant, inclosing, for communication to Count Buol, copy of the Prussian note to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh in reply to the communication made at Frankfort through M. de Glinka, and inviting the Austrian Cabinet to address a reply on this subject to St. Petersburgh in the same spirit as that adopted by Prussia.

Your Lordship will perceive in Baron Manteuffel's despatch to Baron Werther that the Prussian Government does not respond to the invitation of neutrality submitted in M. de Glinka's communication, but that they call to the remembrance of the Russian Government the engagement entered into with Austria and the German Diet in the Convention of April 20, which they declare to be binding, and which it is given to be understood, although vaguely and not decidedly expressed, are incompatible with a declaration of neutrality.

Baron Manteuffel, in his communication to the Austrian Cabinet, seeks rather to induce that Government to follow in the wake of Prussia, than to evince any disposition to yield to the Austrian policy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

P.S.—Since writing the above I understand that the despatch to Baron Werther of the 6th instant has been ill received at St. Petersburgh, and that Count Nesselrode has manifested dissatisfaction at its contents.

B.

Inclosure 1 in No. 15.

Baron Manteuffel to Baron Werther.

M. le Baron, *Berlin, le 6 Juin, 1855.*

MES communications antérieures n'ont pu vous laisser de doute sur le point de vue duquel le Cabinet du Roi envisage la déclaration renfermée dans la dépêche de M. le Comte Nesselrode à M. de Glinka du $\frac{1}{13}$ Avril. Cette dépêche, en relevant la connexité des deux premiers points qui ont formé l'objet des délibérations de la Conférence de Vienne avec les intérêts particuliers de l'Allemagne, constate que le Cabinet Impérial considère l'entente établie à ce sujet comme un résultat utile et durablement acquis lors même que les Conférences dans leur ensemble n'aboutiraient pas à une transaction formelle. Les Protocoles auxquels la dépêche du $\frac{1}{13}$ Avril se réfère ayant parvenus depuis à notre connaissance, nous avons été mis en mesure d'examiner les principes dont on est convenu pour former la base du régime futur des Principautés et du règlement de la navigation du Danube. Nous n'avons pu que les trouver en général conformes aux intérêts Allemands, et sauf naturellement notre droit de

concourir, comme Puissance Européenne, à leur mise en exécution, nous n'hésitons pas à prendre acte de la déclaration Russe, qui, indépendamment de l'issue des négociations de Vienne, leur assigne un caractère de stabilité et de durée. Si à ce sujet le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg subordonne ses résolutions à ce que l'Allemagne reste étrangère à la lutte et continue à garder sa neutralité, nous ne saurions donner à cette condition une autre interprétation que celle qui est conforme aux obligations éventuelles et réciproques contractées entre la Prusse, l'Autriche et la Confédération Germanique par le Traité du 20 Avril, 1854, et ses Articles Additionnels—obligations que la Cour de Russe connaît et qu'elle ne saurait avoir eu l'intention d'invalider dans leur portée éventuelle.

Le Roi, vous le savez, M. le Baron, attache le plus grand prix aux garanties que les stipulations susmentionnées offrent non seulement au territoire de la Confédération, mais encore à la totalité des possessions des deux Grandes Puissances qui en font partie, et même à l'attitude de l'Autriche dans les Principautés ; et autant que Sa Majesté s'est toujours opposée et continuera à s'opposer à toute extension de ses obligations contractuelles qui ne fût entièrement conforme à les convictions et réclamée par les véritables intérêts Européens ou Allemands de la Prusse, autant elle tient à ne pas laisser de doutes sur l'existence même de ces obligations et sur la ferme décision de les remplir scrupuleusement le cas échéant. C'est de ce point de vue que les dispositions conciliantes manifestées par les Plénipotentiaires Russes dans les Conférences de Vienne, ont été pour notre auguste Maître l'objet d'une juste satisfaction. Elles ont confirmé Sa Majesté dans la confiance que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, pénétré de la grave responsabilité qui se rattache à ses résolutions, saura éviter toute complication qui serait de nature à l'augmenter encore. Quant à la dépêche du $\frac{18}{30}$ Avril, Sa Majesté lui assigne une place dans le même ordre d'idées. Le Roi se refuse à la croire dictée par une arrière-pensée contre l'Autriche. Il aime au contraire à être persuadé que la Cour de Russie tiendra compte de la position difficile et exceptionnelle de cette Puissance et assurera par là dans un intérêt de paix générale sa véritable valeur pratique à la pensée qui a présidé à la dépêche du 30 Avril à M. de Glinka, et que nous nous plaisons à reconnaître comme une pensée de sage modération et de conciliation sincère.

Veuillez, M. le Baron, vous prononcer dans le sens de ces observations envers M. le Chancelier de l'Empire, et lui laisser, s'il le désire, copie de la présente dépêche.

(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 15.

Baron Manteuffel to Count Arnim.

(Translation.) *Berlin, June 9, 1855.*

COUNT ESTERHAZY has had the goodness to communicate to me the inclosed copy of a despatch from Count Buol of the 31st ultimo. Under the same date I have begged your Excellency to return my best thanks to the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the highly interesting confidential communication of the 24th, made in the interim. The Austrian proposals having in the meantime been declined by the Western Cabinets, and a final sitting of the Conference having taken place, we may be allowed to look forward to further detailed communications by the Austrian Cabinet on the course of these proceedings.

The remarks which the inclosed despatch contains, in reply to mine of the 23rd ultimo, and which refer specially to the Russian despatch of the 30th April, proceed from a point of view that I cannot, however, entirely adopt. If, first of all, it is therein meant to be implied that Russia desired, unknown to Austria, to influence the views of the other members of the Confederation, I beg to observe that M. Von Glinka made his communication to the Austrian Representatives at the Diet, as well as to his other colleagues. There is also just as little proof of Russia's intention to present to the Confederation a basis for deliberations in opposition to the views of Austria. Russia has, in fact, made no communication at all to the Confederation; but if such had been the case, it is scarcely probable, from the purely enunciative character of the despatch, that

a deliberation could have been founded upon it. On the other hand, I feel especially bound to remark, that if at that time the Russian communication in question appeared to give us no cause for a manifestation in the German Diet, and we in this respect willingly complied with the wishes of the Austrian Cabinet, we nevertheless could not thereby pledge ourselves to give no kind of effect whatever to the communication.

The contents of the Russian despatch have, on the contrary, formed the subject of our serious consideration, especially since the Vienna Protocols to which it refers have come to our knowledge; and His Majesty has ordered a despatch upon the subject to be forwarded to his Minister at St. Petersburgh, which, by the express command of His Majesty, I beg your Excellency confidentially to communicate to Count Buol by reading to him the inclosed copy of the same.

His Majesty also thinks he has some claim to be considered the ally of Austria, though Count Buol's despatch applies this appellation to the two non-German Cabinets of London and Paris alone, in contradistinction to Prussia. His Majesty will at least always be led by this thought, and will therefore willingly endeavour, especially on the subject of this position with reference to the other European Powers, to come to an understanding with Austria.

It appears to us that the manner in which the Russian despatch of the 30th April is characterised in the annexed, and in which cognisance is taken of it, are in no respect opposed to the true interests of Austria, and we should find the most welcome confirmation of this view, if the Austrian Cabinet would also think fit on its part to send a reply to St. Petersburgh on the whole similar to ours, but in which of course its own peculiar position would be taken into account.

The obligations that bind Prussia, Austria, and the rest of Germany together, are therein most distinctly represented to the Russian Cabinet as continuing to exist, and the latter is invited to show itself as disposed as possible to listen to the anticipated overtures of Austria. But on the other hand the value to Germany of the concessions made by Russia with reference to the two points is also recognized; it is signified that therefore a stronger reason exists for Germany not to leave the position she has hitherto maintained.

Your Excellency will have the goodness to couple the above observations with the verbal communication of the inclosed despatch, and to report to us the remarks that they may give occasion to Count Buol to express.

Receive, &c.

(Signed) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 16.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 2.)

My Lord, *Vienna, June 26, 1855.*

I YESTERDAY took an opportunity of communicating to Count Buol the substance of your Lordship's despatch to the Earl of Westmorland No. 232, Confidential, of the 19th instant, relative to the attitude it will be necessary for Austria to hold if she concurs with the Governments of England and France in desiring that the alliance established by the Treaty of December 2 should be maintained.

Count Buol showed much satisfaction at the desire expressed by your Lordship for the continuance of the alliance, and said that your Lordship might rest assured that the attitude of Austria towards Russia would undergo no change, and that in his language to the Diet he should endeavour to make this evident. He intends to make communications to the Diet on this subject, which he trusts will satisfy your Lordship that he is no less anxious than Her Majesty's Government to avoid any appearance of a weakening of the alliance.

With respect, however, to not reducing the army, that was a different question. Austria had undertaken to defend the Principalities against attack from the side of Russia, and had declared to Russia that she would continue to hold them. Count Buol said we may be perfectly satisfied that she will keep

her engagements, but he will not admit that we have any right to discuss the number of men which Austria might think necessary for the purpose.

I said I apprehended that the hope expressed by your Lordship, that the Austrian army should not be reduced, nor the troops moved from their present cantonments to positions indicating a change of policy, was not meant to be confined to the troops occupying the Principalities, but was equally to be applied to the Austrian forces in other parts of the Russian frontier; that any considerable reduction of the number of troops in Gallicia, or any change in their position, such as above described, would not only be universally believed to be caused by a change of policy on the part of Austria, and so give increased courage to the partisans of Russia in Germany, but would also cause material injury to the military operations of the allies, by relieving Russia from apprehension of the course which Austria hereafter might adopt.

To this Count Buol replied, that it was impossible for Austria to continue to keep up for an indefinite period all the preparations for immediate war, and that her finances would not allow it. That, as for relieving Russia from apprehension, he did not think much stress should be laid on that consideration; for, whether the army is reduced or not, Russia is perfectly aware that it is not the intention of Austria to go to war at present, and that she does not change her policy from day to day. I regretted the unsatisfactory tone of Count Buol's language with reference to the army, and said that I was instructed not to conceal from him that if he declined to adopt the course indicated, the responsibility of the estrangement which might follow would rest upon Austria alone.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 17.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 3.)
My Lord, *Vienna, June 26, 1855.*

ACCORDING to your Lordship's instructions, I yesterday communicated to Count Buol your despatch to the Earl of Westmorland No. 227 of the 13th instant, upon the subject of his despatch to Count Colloredo, expressing his regret at the closing of the Conference, and his surprise at the objections made by the Cabinets of London and Paris to the proposition he had brought forward at the Conference of the 4th instant.

Count Buol said he would not now discuss the various points touched upon in your Lordship's despatch (of which I left a copy with his Excellency), as no benefit could be derived from his doing so; but that he could not help remarking that your Lordship appeared to wish to dispute his right to propose to the Conference a project which had not received the assent of the allies.

I replied that I did not discover in your Lordship's despatch any disposition to contest his liberty of action; but that as his proposition had been formally rejected by the Governments of England and France previously to its being brought forward, it was not easy to perceive how he should feel surprised at its not being entertained on being ultimately proposed to the Conference.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 18.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 4.)
My Lord, *Vienna, June 26, 1855.*

I HAD the honour to receive, on Saturday, your Lordship's despatch to the Earl of Westmorland No. 226 of the 13th instant, detailing the conversation you had had with Count Colloredo on the subject of Count Buol's despatch, stating that he considered the reserve made in the Protocol of December 28, to be in full force, and that the events of war must bring about a solution of the third point.

In obedience to your Lordship's instructions, I yesterday communicated your despatch to Count Buol, and left a copy of it in his Excellency's hands.

Count Buol fully admitted the correctness with which your Lordship stated the substance of his despatch to Count Colloredo, and regretted the opinions you expressed should differ so widely from his own. He had no desire to enter at present into a discussion which would certainly not advance the prospects of peace which both parties had at heart; but he would probably, at a future period, have some observations to make upon your Lordship's arguments.

In the meantime he would content himself by stating that he was very far from denying the "inconvenience" there would be to Austria in taking an active part in the war, but that no amount of inconvenience would ever prevent this country from acting scrupulously up to her engagements.

Count Buol disputed the assumption that the only other ground on which Austria can decline an active alliance with England and France is, that she considered the allies themselves to blame for the rupture of negotiations, and said he had never in any way intended to convey an expression of blame, however much he might regret that Her Majesty's Government had not agreed with him in the solution he had proposed of the third point.

The difference between the two Governments was one in which each might give to the other perfect credit for good faith; and while he did not hesitate to believe that Her Majesty's Government considered the Austrian proposals inefficient for the object in view, he thought that on our side we might believe that he imagined his proposals would have accomplished the ends we were pledged to endeavour to attain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 19.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 6.)
My Lord, *Vienna, June 27, 1855.*

BARON DE BOURQUENEY having received and communicated to the Austrian Government a despatch similar to your Lordship's despatch No. 223 of the 12th instant to the Earl of Westmorland, I waited this morning upon Count Buol, and read to him your despatch, stating that now that the Conferences had closed, Her Majesty's Government wish to place upon record that they consider the belligerent Powers to have resumed their freedom of action in regard to any future negotiation.

Count Buol said he perfectly agreed with the views expressed by your Lordship in this despatch, and that all parties are entirely free as far as any engagements taken at the Conferences were considered, but that he is not of that opinion with respect to the understanding come to previous to the Conference, and he hopes that your Lordship will also concur with him in thinking that the basis on which peace must ultimately be made is that which was then agreed to.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 20.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 9.)
My Lord, *Vienna, June 27, 1855.*

I HAVE executed the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 234 of the 19th instant, and have informed Count Buol that Her Majesty's Government apprehend that the excesses of the Austrian troops in the Princi-

palities had not ceased, and that disorder on the part of the soldiers had not been punished.

Count Buol at once said that he must tell me, as he had already told the Earl of Westmorland, that this was a question which he would not even discuss; and that while he did not receive complaints from the Turkish Government nor from the Princes of Wallachia and Moldavia, he could never admit the right of Great Britain to make representations on the subject of the discipline of Austrian troops in a province which did not belong to her.

I observed to Count Buol that the Austrian army occupied the Principalities for a definite object, which is the subject of a Treaty between Austria and Great Britain, and that I did not see how he could dispute the right of Her Majesty's Government to remonstrate against occurrences which are manifestly injurious to our cause, by producing a general disaffection among the inhabitants of the Principalities, which tends to make them look with greater favour towards Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 21.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 13.)
My Lord, *Vienna, June 28, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour transmit herewith for your Lordship's information, in translation, a General Order, dated Lemberg, the 25th instant, by which His Imperial Majesty dismisses to their homes the reserves called out for placing upon a full war-complement the 3rd and 4th Army corps.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure in No. 21.

General Order.

(Translation.)

I SEIZE with pleasure the earliest possible opportunity afforded me of giving back to their homes and their families, at the same time that I express my fullest satisfaction with them, the reserves that have been called out for placing upon the full war-complement the 3rd and 4th Army corps.

Notwithstanding that for the most part these reserves had already entered into the relations of civilians, were married men and fathers of families, yet one and all they answered with the greatest possible alacrity the call made upon them, they fulfilled their duties with punctuality, and by the exemplary manner in which they bore themselves and performed the services required of them, they, to the utmost degree, answered the purpose for which they were embodied. They will now bring back to the performance of their duties as civilians the same spirit of fidelity and honour which they have been used to display as soldiers.

(Signed) FRANZ JOSEPH.

Lemberg, June 24, 1855.

No. 22.

Sir John Milbanke to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 3.)

(No. 45.)
My Lord, *Munich, June 26, 1855.*

I HAVE just returned from an interview with Baron Von der Pfordten, at which I communicated to his Excellency the contents of your Lordship's

despatch, marked "Circular," of the 19th instant, relative to the closing of the Conferences at Vienna.

Baron Von der Pfordten did full justice to the ability with which the views of Her Majesty's Government on this most important question were expressed; but he did not seem at all inclined to concur in the reasoning applied to the recent project of pacification submitted to the English and French Governments by the Cabinet of Vienna. He could not at all comprehend, he said, why those propositions which originated with the French Government should have been rejected by the Western Powers, at a moment when there was at least some chance that good might come of them, and when it was notorious that they had found favour in the sight both of M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Lord John Russell, who had gone so far as to undertake to support them with their respective Governments. To this I replied, that without being very exactly informed on the subject, I could not avoid suspecting that the favourable opinion of them, as the bases of an arrangement attributed to the English Plenipotentiaries, must have been purposely very much exaggerated at Vienna; that he must not forget, that although it might be true that proposals for an understanding between Russia and Turkey had been put forward by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the mode of proceeding did not meet with the concurrence of the Russian Plenipotentiaries, and thus rendered any further discussion of them mere waste of time; that, under such circumstances, it could scarcely be matter for wonder that the allies should refuse to entertain them when reproduced in a yet less acceptable form. Baron Von der Pfordten here interrupted me, to remark that M. Drouyn de Lhuys must still have attached some value to them, or else he would not have sacrificed his position to the maintenance of them, as was commonly understood to have been the case.

His Excellency then proceeded to comment upon the four Articles, and especially upon that one which led to the rupture of the Conferences, and which he characterised as going beyond the bounds of moderation, and, with the interpretation given to it by the Western Powers, as forming an insurmountable obstacle to the conclusion of peace; for never, he said, whatever reverses she may suffer, will you be able to extort from Russia a promise to limit her naval forces in the Black Sea, or elsewhere, to a given number of vessels: the pretension on the part of other Powers to prescribe the law to her on this point, is an attack upon her dignity, and an attempt to weaken her, to which she cannot submit. Why, continued he, should Russia be the only maritime Power called upon to reduce the force of her fleet? Why are not others, and particularly France and England, whose naval preponderance is at least as dangerous to their neighbours as that of Russia, compelled to contract their naval armaments; and what sort of a principle are you seeking to establish, and how would it find its application as between France and Baden, for instance, if in cases where a powerful and a weak State adjoin you proceed to endeavour to pare down the one to the level of the other? What do you imagine would be the answer of France, if she were summoned by any other Power to raze the fortress of Strasbourg, or reduce the effective force of her cavalry? The truth is, that you aim at the destruction of the Russian fleet, because it is inconvenient to you, and you may possibly ultimately succeed in burning or sinking it in the harbour of Sebastopol, but you will be but small gainers, for in the course of a few years you may rely upon its being replaced upon a more formidable footing. You have taken upon yourselves the thankless and hopeless task of revivifying an Empire which is crumbling under the rottenness of its own internal institutions, and not from any outward pressure; and the very measures to which you have had recourse to prop it up a little longer, are those which are most powerfully contributing to precipitate its final dissolution. Abandon at once the delusion of an independent Turkish Empire, and open the Euxine to the ships of all nations. Erect the European provinces into an independent Christian State, under the sceptre of a Christian Sovereign, and you may arrive at a final settlement of the Eastern dispute. These are the only conditions on which such a desirable result is possible; for so long as you persevere in your present course of trying to sustain a helpless Potentate, even peace on almost any terms is altogether unattainable. Blinded by passion, and yielding to the democratic pressure for war, you have thought proper to reject the overtures which the Austrian Cabinet considered to offer a fair basis of arrangement, even after they had been accepted by your ally the Emperor of the French; but whether you

have done wisely in submitting to the democratic party, the evil effects of whose rule is likely hereafter to tell severely upon your institutions, is a question which time alone can solve. In the meanwhile be assured that Germany will never allow herself to be drawn into a war which has for its sole object the annihilation of the Russian fleet, the existence of which in no way affects her interests.

I have thus given, with as much conciseness and as close an adherence to his words as was in my power, the substance of Baron Von der Pfordten's remarks, suggested by the perusal of your Lordship's despatch; and although they evince the prevalence of many erroneous impressions, upon which I was quite aware that all argument was useless, I did not allow them altogether to pass in silence. I told him, in the first place, that I could not admit the correctness of the parallel he had drawn with respect to Russia and other European Powers, inasmuch as the strong and weak, although their frontiers were, in most cases, purely conventional, subsisted together in perfect amity under existing Treaties—no question of the more powerful ever assuming an aggressive attitude towards their weaker neighbours, whilst even cases of representation or remonstrance were extremely rare amongst them. With Russia, I said, the case is altogether different: she maintains in the Black Sea a maritime force which, as recent events have proved, is totally incapable of contributing to the defence of her coasts when menaced by well-appointed fleets; and in ordinary times, when the Straits are closed, it is of still less necessity in its defensive capacity, because no danger can possibly be felt of an attack on the part of Turkey. In fact, if proof were wanting of the aggressive character of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, I thought it was furnished in the most ample manner by the progress of the siege of Sebastopol, which had brought to light the immense accumulation, on an extreme point of the Empire, of stores of war of every description.

I tried once more to convince Baron Von der Pfordten that it was, at least, as much the interest of those States which bordered on the Danube, as it was that of the Powers now contending for the free navigation of that river, that Russia should not, by her ships of war, be able to oppose obstacles to the passage of vessels engaged in commerce; but his Excellency seemed to be of opinion that there was no ground for apprehension on that head, and answered my arguments by observing, that they would equally apply to English or French ships of war in other German rivers. I noticed also the singular piece of advice he had volunteered, relative to the opening of the Black Sea, to Powers who had undertaken a great and onerous contest avowedly for the purpose of maintaining the independence of the Ottoman Empire; but I had little hope of showing him the inconsistency involved in his plan of settlement, for he universally derides the notion that even a shadow of independence is left to the Sultan.

I inquired by what process he contemplated amalgamating, and moulding into an orderly state, the different half-savage races who inhabit the Provinces of European Turkey; and from what Royal family he proposed—or, in short, it would be possible—to select a Sovereign of capacity and firmness sufficient to rule over, and preserve tranquilly among, such heterogeneous elements; and, finally, I asked him whether he really seriously thought that, if his plan were carried into execution, the intrigues of Russia would cease in those countries, and the Christian population at once enter upon the enjoyment of peace and happiness.

I did not quite understand whether Baron Von der Pfordten alluded to the reigning King of Greece, or to some other Prince, but his reply to my question was, that there would be no great difficulty in finding a Ruler competent to undertake the task.

I pass over, as possessing no very striking interest, other points touched upon in the course of one conversation; and shall terminate the present report of it by stating that the impression left by it on my mind was, that although Baron Von der Pfordten may feel some disappointment, and even alarm, at the abrupt conclusion of the Vienna Conferences, he is, upon the whole, better pleased that the rejection of the Austrian propositions should have come from the Western Powers than from Russia, for this reason,—that the Austrian Cabinet is, for the moment at any rate, relieved from the necessity of forwarding anything in the shape of an ultimatum to St. Petersburgh, and, consequently, of adopting such active measures as could hardly have failed, after the adhesion of this Government unreservedly given, as I am informed, to those propositions, to

render a further escape from a participation in the struggle a matter of extreme difficulty.

Instead of the much-talked-of ultimatum, I have reason to believe that the Cabinet of Vienna addressed to the Austrian Minister at St. Petersburgh, about a fortnight ago, a despatch explanatory of its views in the present altered state of affairs, the main object of which appeared to me to be to impress upon the Russian Government the fact, that the Emperor means strictly to fulfil the engagements taken with his allies; that he still looks upon the four points as constituting the only basis upon which a solid peace can be concluded; that he intends to continue to occupy the Principalities until a definitive peace shall have been signed; whilst at the end of the despatch a hope is expressed, almost in terms of menace, that Russia will not add to her present embarrassments, by interfering in any way with that occupation. A great portion of this despatch is devoted to the Austrian propositions; and without actually asking the opinion of the Russian Cabinet upon them, a door is left open for any appreciation of them that the latter may feel disposed to make known.

Your Lordship is of course acquainted with the steps recently taken at Berlin by the Austrian Cabinet, for the purpose of securing the concurrence of the Prussian Government in the long-promised communications to the Diet. I cannot, however, ascertain, and I do not believe, that any agreement on the subject has as yet been come to.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

No. 23.

Draft of Despatch from Count Walewski to Baron de Bourqueney.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by M. Baudin, July 3.)

Paris, le Juin, 1855.

M. le Baron,

IL importe au plus haut degré aux Puissances signataires du Traité du 2 Décembre de se rendre compte de la situation qui leur est faite par la rupture des négociations ouvertes avec la Russie. Il y a un moyen sûr d'y parvenir, c'est de comparer les obligations contractées avec les résultats obtenus.

Les quatre garanties énoncées pour la première fois dans les notes du 8 Août sont posées par le Traité du 2 Décembre comme le but à poursuivre en commun, et l'Article V de ce Traité fixe au 1 Janvier, 1855, l'échéance des engagements que l'Autriche y prend envers la France et l'Angleterre. Si à cette date la Russie n'avait pas adhéré aux quatre garanties, le Cabinet de Vienne, en vertu de l'Article Secret, devait prendre sans retard les mesures nécessaires pour concourir avec nous à lui en imposer l'acceptation par la force.

Je n'ai pas besoin de vous rappeler, M. le Baron, l'importance que nous attachions au troisième point des notes de Vienne; nous l'avons de tout temps regardé comme la condition sans laquelle l'abolition du Protectorat Russe dans les Principautés, la liberté du Danube et l'indépendance du Sultan dans ses rapports avec ses sujets de la communion Grecque, seraient vaines et illusoires. L'Autriche partageait notre opinion; et lorsque, par déférence pour elle et au risque de voir reculer le moment de sa coopération, nous consentîmes à entendre les ouvertures de l'Envoyé de Russie à Vienne, elle signa avec nous une interprétation des quatre garanties par laquelle elle déclarait que la troisième ne comprenait pas seulement l'introduction de l'Empire Ottoman dans le droit Européen, mais aussi la cessation de la prépondérance Russe dans la Mer Noire.

Si le Protocole du 28 Décembre ajoute que les arrangements à prendre pour atteindre ce but dépendent trop directement des événements de la guerre pour que l'on puisse les fixer d'avance, il en pose toutefois formellement le principe.

C'est à cette formule que le Prince Gortchakoff a adhéré et M. le Comte Buol l'a reproduite en ouvrant les Conférences.

Nous étions donc autorisés par les assurances officielles du Plénipotentiaire Russe, à croire que son Gouvernement consentait réellement au sacrifice de sa prépondérance dans la Mer Noire, et nous avions surtout la confiance que si, dans le cours des négociations, la Russie refusait de souscrire à un sacrifice

reconnu nécessaire par chacun des alliés du 2 Décembre, le Cabinet de Vienne admettrait sans difficulté avec nous que le but de la troisième garantie n'était pas atteint et que le Traité était devenu exécutoire.

Quand les Plénipotentiaires Russes, après avoir fait sur le premier et le second point des concessions qui leur étaient arrachées par la force des choses, sont venus nous déclarer qu'ils repoussaient en principe tout système de limitation comme attentatoire à la dignité et aux droits de leur Souverain, nous étions pleinement fondés à nous retirer des Conférences en faisant appel à la coopération effective de l'Autriche pour obtenir la complète réalisation de la troisième garantie.

Toutefois le Cabinet de Vienne dans son sincère désir de mener les négociations à bonne fin, élaborait un projet d'arrangement que le Gouvernement de l'Empereur était disposé de son côté à examiner scrupuleusement avant de renoncer à tout espoir d'un résultat pratique. Ce projet, vous le savez, M. le Baron, ne répondit pas à notre attente. Basé sur un système de contrepoids qui nous eût astreints à avoir en permanence des armements maritimes considérables, ils eût permis en même temps à la Russie, sans nous fournir aucun moyen précis d'y mettre obstacle, d'atteindre à un seul bâtiment près l'effectif qu'elle entretenait dans la Mer Noire avant la guerre actuelle et de reprendre ainsi, malgré une surveillance coûteuse pour nous, la position qu'elle avait précédemment dans cette mer.

Ce système devait être complété, il est vrai, par une alliance entre la France, l'Angleterre, et l'Autriche, qui dans le cas d'agression eussent apporté à l'Empire Ottoman le concours de leurs armes. Mais en supposant même qu'une telle alliance pût être assez durable, et assez constamment étroite pour que les trois Puissances fussent toujours prêtes à faire face aux dangers imprévus, on s'écartait du but principal de la guerre actuelle en substituant, sur le point en litige, à l'idée primitive et fondamentale d'un Traité avec la Russie celle d'un arrangement auquel elle n'était pas appelée à participer et qui ne lui imposait aucune obligation directe et déterminé. La proposition de M. le Comte Buol ne faisait donc qu'éluder la question au lieu de la résoudre.

L'Autriche pouvait nous présenter son projet d'arrangement comme un moyen de tourner les difficultés que l'opiniâtreté de la Russie soulevait sur le troisième point, mais elle ne pouvait pas prétendre qu'il renfermât une solution conforme aux termes et à l'esprit du Protocole du 28 Décembre, à l'engagement pris de faire cesser la prépondérance de la Russie dans l'Euxin.

La production de ce projet d'arrangement ne dégageait donc nullement le Cabinet de Vienne de l'obligation contractée envers nous de concourir à faire cesser cette prépondérance au besoin par les armes.

Je ne parlerai pas, M. le Baron, de la dernière combinaison qui nous a été proposé par M. le Comte Buol. Si elle se rapprochait davantage du système que nous avions nous-mêmes porté devant la Conférence, le Cabinet de Vienne nous avait en revanche avertis qu'il ne faisait pas de cette nouvelle proposition un cas de guerre. Il y voyait avant tout une occasion pour réunir de nouveau la Conférence et pour la clorre dignement. Ce plan dépourvu de toute sanction n'était pas de nature à rien changer aux situations respectives. Un projet d'arrangement basé sur la limitation, mais n'impliquant point de *casus belli*, ne pouvait pas plus nous satisfaire et dégager l'Autriche qu'une proposition impliquant la guerre mais restreinte à un système incomplet de pondérations.

Aujourd'hui les négociations sont rompues: les Plénipotentiaires Russes ont protesté jusqu'au dernier moment de la ferme volonté de leur Cour de repousser toute limitation que l'on chercherait à lui imposer; c'est-à-dire, tout moyen sérieux de mettre fin à la prépondérance de la Russie dans la Mer Noire. Je n'examinerai pas si les déclarations réitérées à ce sujet par le Prince Gortchakoff dans la dernière Conférence n'ajoutent point encore à la force des engagements de l'Autriche envers nous, mais j'ose affirmer que ces engagements subsistent sans restrictions et que le Traité du 2 Décembre n'a pas cessé d'être obligatoire dans toutes ses dispositions. La troisième garantie n'a pas reçu la réalisation que comporte l'interprétation consignée par les trois Puissances alliées dans le Protocole du 28 Décembre. L'objet de l'Article I d'Alliance, qui pose le cas de guerre sur les quatre points, n'est pas rempli. L'Article V, qui détermine l'échéance du Traité, et l'Article Secret, qui stipule que des mesures seront immédiatement prises pour en poursuivre le but par les armes, conservent toute leur signification et toute leur portée.

Telle est, M. le Baron, dans l'opinion du Gouvernement de l'Empereur, la position réciproque des alliés du 2 Décembre par suite de la clôture des Conférences. M. le Comte Buol nous a déclaré à plusieurs reprises, depuis lors, et nous avons été heureux de cette déclaration, que l'Autriche entendait se maintenir sur le terrain de l'alliance. C'est sur le terrain que nous nous sommes placés pour apprécier ses obligations. Nous avons la conviction qu'en s'y plaçant comme nous pour examiner consciencieusement et loyalment les faits que je viens de passer en révue, le Cabinet de Vienne ne saurait arriver à d'autres conclusions que nous.

Je vous invite à donner à M. le Comte de Buol communication de cette dépêche.

No. 24.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 859.)

My Lord, *Paris, July 3, 1855.*

COUNT WALEWSKI wishes me to inform your Lordship that, when there was a question of withdrawing the French Military Commissioner from Vienna, in consenting that General Letang should remain for the present, his Excellency wrote to M. de Bourqueney to desire to be apprised, whenever he (M. de Bourqueney) should think the time was come that General Letang should be instructed to return home. M. de Bourqueney had now written to say that he considered that the Commissioners should be withdrawn, and Count Walewski proposed, if it met with the concurrence of Her Majesty's Government, to direct General Letang to take leave and quit Vienna as soon as the Emperor of Austria had returned to his capital.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 25.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 861.)

My Lord, *Paris, July 3, 1855.*

COUNT WALEWSKI informed me this morning, that M. Baudin had written to him that your Lordship was not indisposed to adopt the project of despatch alluded to in my despatch No. 825 of the 29th ultimo, as one that the French Government was desirous of addressing to Vienna, but that Her Majesty's Government having some time back come to the conclusion that it would be better to let Austria alone for the moment, you could return no answer until the Cabinet had been consulted.

Yesterday Count Walewski spoke to me in the strongest manner of his hope that Her Majesty's Government would not make objections to adopting the despatch, so necessary did he consider it to have some such document on record.

To-day his Excellency was at equal pains to make me understand that if Her Majesty's Government had the faintest scruples as to the propriety of the course he had recommended, he should not press it.

I attribute this change of language to the despatches received from Vienna since Count Walewski spoke to me yesterday, to which I have adverted in a subsequent despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 26.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 866. Confidential.)

Paris, July 3, 1855.

My Lord,

COUNT WALEWSKI has received the despatches which I had the honour to inform your Lordship, in my despatch No. 834 of the 30th ultimo, he was expecting from Vienna by messenger. His Excellency was much pressed for time when I saw him this morning, but he gave me the following rapid analysis of them.

MM. Thouvenel and de Bourqueney had had a three hours' conversation with Count Buol. The tone of the Austrian Minister left nothing to be desired in so far as it evinced an inclination to remain upon amicable terms with the belligerent Powers.

Count Buol, while adhering to his own views respecting the last proposition made by Austria, admitted that he was not surprised that those Powers should wish for some more positive result to the Treaty of December 2. He said, however, that it was impossible for Austria to go to war; that her army was in a deplorable condition; and that it was in order to avoid showing its weakness and inefficiency that the French and British Military Commissioners had not been invited to accompany the Emperor on his tour of military inspection. But Austria had no intention of deserting the alliance which she had contracted with the Western Powers, or of declaring herself neutral—her position in the Principalities would prevent that; and in case of a reverse (to the allies), which, however, Count Buol would not contemplate, she would be found ready to act as an "arrière-garde," and she would still continue to insist with Russia on the maintenance of the four points.

Count Buol offered many excuses for the despatch lately addressed to the Porte in respect to not carrying the war to the Danube. He said that it was meant that it should be kept secret; nevertheless, in order to have no concealments from the French and English Governments, he had sent copies of it to Paris and London. The refusal of the Porte, however, to enter into the engagement proposed to her he considered as certain, since France and England objected to it; and as Austria could not take umbrage at this refusal, the Russian Government would not profit much, even if the whole proceeding became known to them.

Count Buol said, further, that he should be very glad to find some means of showing his desire to abide by the Treaty of the 2nd of December; and he hinted that perhaps the Emperor Francis Joseph would not object to binding himself to protect European Turkey from Russian invasion, and even to declare war upon Russia in case, on account of some unforeseen successes, or for any other reason, she should declare hereafter that the four points were not binding upon her. Your Lordship, however, will understand that this was not a proposition on the part of Count Buol, and that he distinctly stated that he could say nothing more until the return of His Imperial Majesty to Vienna.

Count Walewski seemed inclined to think that some advantage might be found in binding Austria to protect European Turkey.

Both M. de Thouvenel and M. de Bourqueney state that the last French despatches have made a serious impression on Count Buol. He feels that, if the estrangement of France is to become more marked, it will be taken advantage of in Italy, and he has communicated his fears in this respect to those two gentlemen. They are consequently of opinion that matters should not be pushed further at the present moment, as the fears of Austria may be so much excited as to induce her, for safety to herself, to turn suddenly round and join the Russian standard.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 27.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 696.)

Foreign Office, July 4, 1855.

My Lord,

M. BAUDIN has read to me the draft of a despatch which Count Walewski proposes to address to Baron de Bourqueney, and has requested that, if it meets with the concurrence of Her Majesty's Government, similar instructions may be sent to the Chargé d'Affaires of Her Majesty at Vienna.

This despatch, of which a copy is inclosed* for your Excellency's own information, is written with great ability, and records with perfect correctness the facts and proceedings connected with the recent negotiations at Vienna.

The only objection entertained by Her Majesty's Government to addressing a similar despatch to Mr. Elliot is, that the various points alluded to in Count Walewski's despatch have already been brought by Her Majesty's Government in more than one form under the consideration of Count Buol, and that answers to those communications have been received.

By despatches to Lord Westmorland, Nos. 223, 224, 226, 227, 247, and 248, of the 12th, 13th, and 25th ultimo, have been transmitted to your Excellency, and you have probably shown them to Count Walewski. If not, you will do so, together with my despatch No. 232 of the 19th of June to his Lordship, and my No. 2 of the 26th of June to Mr. Elliot, and also Mr. Elliot's despatches Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 6 of the 26th and 27th ultimo, of which copies are inclosed.

I believe that similar communications have been made to M. de Bourqueney, and your Excellency will therefore suggest to Count Walewski whether, as the Cabinet of Vienna is now fully informed of the views of the two Governments upon the obligation and the proceedings of Austria, we could hope for any practical advantage from such an identic despatch as Count Walewski proposes to send; and whether it might not be the cause of irritation, and serve as a pretext to establish a greater coolness than now already exists between Austria and the Western Powers.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 28.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 703.)

Foreign Office, July 7, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 859 of the 3rd instant, stating that Count Walewski is of opinion that the time is arrived for the withdrawal of the Military Commissioners from Vienna, and that his Excellency proposes to direct General Letang to take leave and quit Vienna as soon as the Emperor of Austria has returned to his capital, and I have to instruct your Excellency to acquaint Count Walewski that Her Majesty's Government concur in his views and have sent similar instructions to General Craufurd.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

* No. 23.

No. 29.

Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 88.)

My Lord, *Stuttgardt, July 5, 1855.*

BARON DE LAGO, the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, has been instructed to inform this Government that Count Prokesch d'Osten was about to make a communication to the Diet, in opposition to any project of disarming on the part of the other German Governments, and to request that they would give it their support, since the partial disarming of Austria would be only such as could be very speedily restored, in the event of any emergency.

Baron de Lago has not been able to obtain an assurance of such support, but only the declaration that the decision of Wurtemberg would be made known when the question should come before the Diet.

Your Lordship will recollect that Baron de Linden recently stated in the Chamber of Deputies that a reduction of the army was under consideration.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 30.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 82.)

My Lord, *Frankfort, July 5, 1855.*

REPORTS are rife that a Treaty is about to be negotiated between Austria and Prussia, with a view to fix the relations of the two States, in respect to Eastern affairs.

I should not have noticed these reports to your Lordship without more definite information than I as yet possess on the subject, had not circumstances indicated the great probability of endeavours being made in that direction.

Until some definite understanding is arrived at between the Cabinets of Berlin and Vienna, it is improbable that either of them will make a move in the Diet, which unless a previous agreement had been arrived at, would only serve to mark and to widen the dissidence of opinion which still exists between them.

Austria, it is said, means to claim payment of a part of the expense incurred in occupying the Danubian Principalities with her troops, from the Confederation, and also to invite adherence on the part of the Diet to the four points, which it is alleged she still proposes to maintain as established bases for any joint negotiation with Russia.

There would not appear to be much prospect of the Prussian Government consenting to bind itself to either of these conditions, unless the suggestion were made to her from St. Petersburgh that her so doing would be the surest way of detaching Austria from her still apparently existing ties to the Western Powers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 31

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 46.)

My Lord, *Stockholm, July 2, 1855.*

I HAD the honour to receive your Lordship's circular of June 19th, relative to the unsuccessful termination of the Vienna Conferences, by post on the 28th ultimo, and, in conformity with your instructions I read this despatch on the 30th ultimo to Baron Stierneld, the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency was much gratified by the perusal of this important document, and appeared to coincide in its reasonings, though he made no commentaries on it, only observing it was richer in illustration than English State Papers usually are.

Baron Stierneld informed me that General Nordin in one of his late despatches, of, I think, the 19th ultimo, mentioned that on the preceding evening he had a conversation with Count Nesselrode; the Russian Chancellor had observed to him, referring to the late proposals of the Austrian Cabinet, though he did not further specify those proposals, that if they were such as it was reported, he believed that the Emperor of Russia, consistent with the principles which he had announced, would reject them.

It is, however, to be expected that knowing those proposals had been already rejected by the British and French Governments, the Russian Government should declare that they would also have rejected them. A contrary course would bring with it no corresponding advantage, but would be simply an admission that they had been obliged to accept conditions which they had before declared to be inadmissible.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

No. 32.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 277. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, July 7, 1855.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 217, inclosing an extract of one from Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at the Hague, No. 32 of June 29, relative to the presentation of the command of a Prussian regiment to the King of the Netherlands, and to the tone assumed at the Hague by Colonel Oldberg, the Prussian officer charged to deliver the commission to His Netherlands Majesty, I have thought it advisable to mention incidentally to Baron Manteuffel the language and proceedings of Colonel Oldberg during his stay in Holland.

Baron Manteuffel said that he deeply regretted the favour and confidence shown by the King to Colonel Oldberg; that the character of that officer stood very low in the army; and that the Prince of Prussia was greatly distressed at his late advancement; but notwithstanding all this, the King had taken him under his special protection.

That Colonel Oldberg should be indisposed to show civility to the French Legation is however not to be wondered at, for the French Government some time ago made complaints against him, and requested his removal from Paris, believing that he was employed in the interests of Russia during the late mission of General Wedell; and upon that complaint reaching the King of Prussia, His Majesty immediately withdrew Colonel Oldberg from Paris, and appointed him Commandant at Luxembourg, and I am assured that he will soon be raised to the rank of a general officer, over the heads of many others, really deserving of promotion.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 33.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 280.)

My Lord, *Berlin, July 7, 1855.*

I HAVE received from a confidential source the following information respecting the present strength and position of the Russian armies, which has been derived from the official reports transmitted to this Government, and which, I am informed, emanate directly from the Ministry of War at St. Petersburgh.

The effective Russian force in the Crimea is computed to be 160,000 men of all arms, inclusive of 40,000 sick and wounded.

In Bessarabia is stationed a corps of 80,000 men, under the command of General Lüders.

The western army, under Field-Marshal Paskiewitch, is stated to be 160,000, of which a corps of 40,000, composed of the corps of Grenadiers and the Reserves of the 3rd Corps, were (on the 15th of June) on their march to the Crimea.

It was not expected that the Grenadiers could arrive at Sebastopol before the 15th of July at the earliest. The Reserves of the 3rd Corps are said to have commenced their march at an early date.

When this intelligence was forwarded from St. Petersburgh, the Emperor Alexander entertained the idea of detaching a further corps of 60,000 men from the western army, and of stationing it at Kieff, midway between Poland and the Crimea, to serve as a reserve depôt to the army in the Crimea, as well as for any defensive purposes which eventualities might require in the north or in Poland.

The eastern army, stationed along the southern shores of the Baltic to St. Petersburgh, consists of 40,000 men, under the command of General Sievers.

In addition to this force, a further corps of 20,000 men is stationed in Esthonia, under the orders of General Grabbe.

The army in Finland and its dependencies amounts to 80,000 men, under the command of General Berg.

In and around St. Petersburgh there is a corps of 60,000 men, commanded by General Rüdiger, under the immediate orders of the Emperor.

This gives a total of 600,000 men, to which may be added 120,000 scattered through the distant Eastern Russian provinces, but which are totally unavailable for the operations of the present war.

The foregoing statement of the Russian forces is independent of the army of the Caucasus.

These returns were made up at St. Petersburgh on the 15th of June, at which time the military reports of the affairs of the 7th and 8th ultimo, before Sebastopol, had not yet arrived, and consequently the losses sustained by the Russians on those occasions are not taken into account.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 34.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 283.)
Berlin, July 7, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE already had the honour to inform your Lordship, by telegraph, that the Prince of Prussia was to leave Berlin this evening for St. Petersburgh.

His Royal Highness will only be accompanied by an aide-de-camp, his doctor, and secretary, and is desirous to avoid giving any political importance to an act which is purely one of affection to his sister the Empress Dowager, and in fulfilment of a promise given at the period of the death of the Emperor Nicholas, when His Royal Highness was prevented by indisposition from conveying the condolence of this Court to the Imperial family.

On announcing this intelligence, and in order to remove the possibility of my attaching any political object to this visit, Baron Manteuffel remarked to me, that to judge by the language His Royal Highness had held to him, his opinions would not be very acceptable at the Imperial Court.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 35.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 284.)
Berlin, July 7, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 270 of the 30th ultimo, on the subject of a communication from the Austrian Government, inviting this Court to approve of all the late proceedings of the Cabinet of Vienna on the Eastern question, and support propositions which they intended to submit to the German Diet, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the Prussian answer was sent off last night to Vienna.

Baron Manteuffel, whom I have just seen, mentioned to me that the Prussian Government had not altered their original impressions of the object of the Austrian communication, and that they had now sent a civil reply to decline the proposals generally, as it was the King's intention that the position occupied by Prussia at this moment should be maintained.

I asked his Excellency if there was anything positive in the refusal, or if, as I was told, the matter would be still left open for future discussion; and he replied, that the answer was drawn up in vague language, but that Prussia was resolved not to adopt as her own the unsuccessful policy of Austria, and would not tie herself down to any particular course, and would remain free and unfettered.

In reply to an inquiry which I made as to the question of the "Kriegsbereitschaft," Baron Manteuffel said that Prussia and Austria were agreed on this point, and considered it advisable that the German armies should be maintained in their present state of readiness, and that he thought that opposition was to be expected only from Bavaria and Wurtemberg, where there was a desire that a prolongation of the period for preparation should be stipulated, and that one month instead of one fortnight should be allowed to bring the troops together.

Your Lordship will judge from the foregoing, and from what I have already written on this matter, that Prussia and Austria are not likely to come to an understanding at the Diet; and to judge from Baron Manteuffel's tone, he seems hopeful that the policy of Prussia is that which will prove most tasteful to the German Governments. His Excellency mentioned that he understood it was the intention of the Austrian Government to lay the Treaty of the 2nd of December before the Diet.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 36.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 16.)
Vienna, July 4, 1855.

My Lord,

I REPEATED to Count Buol your Lordship's observations to Count Colloredo, mentioned in your despatches to the Earl of Westmorland Nos. 247 and 248 of the 25th ultimo, relative to Count Buol's late despatches to the Internuncio and to the Austrian Minister at St. Petersburgh.

Count Buol entirely coincides in your Lordship's wish to avoid all irritating discussion, and for the present would only observe that, as long as Austria occupies the Principalities under an engagement to defend them against attack on the part of Russia, he must deny the justice of the assertion that she has adopted a position of neutrality.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 37.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 19.)

My Lord, *Vienna, July 4, 1855.*

I HAD the honour to transmit to your Lordship, on the 28th ultimo, the Imperial order for the dismissal of the reserves of the 3rd and 4th armies, which however, to the present moment, has not been followed by the more important orders for the reduction of the Austrian army, which will unquestionably be very shortly issued.

The number of men hitherto dismissed probably does not much, if at all, exceed 50,000, who could, if required, join their regiments in ten days; while the total reduction known to be in contemplation is expected to amount to 150,000 men.

I have stated to Count Buol that the measure would be viewed with deep regret by Her Majesty's Government, and was peculiarly unfortunate at a moment when your Lordship had been defending Austria against the charges of insincerity which had been brought against her in the House of Lords.

His Excellency did not appear to be blind to the bad effects likely to be produced on public opinion by this measure, but spoke of the necessity of it on financial grounds. He added, also, that it might be well I should prepare Her Majesty's Government for the other reductions, which he admitted to be in contemplation.

I said I hoped these reductions would, at least, not comprise Artillery and Cavalry, which on an emergency cannot be quickly replaced; but his Excellency's answer was far from satisfactory, and his allusion to the great expense of those branches of the service lead me to apprehend that they will not escape the operation of the proposed measure.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 38.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 25.)

My Lord, *Vienna, July 4, 1855.*

PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF has this morning communicated to Count Buol the reply of his Government to the despatch his Excellency addressed on the 10th of June to Count Esterhazy, respecting the closing of the Vienna Conferences, and the consequent position of Austria.

I am at present unable to give your Lordship more than the slightest sketch of the nature of this communication, but I understand that it is conceived in terms expressive of general satisfaction at the contents of Count Buol's despatch.

The Russian Government endeavours to throw upon the allies the whole responsibility of the rupture of the negotiations, and repeats the assurances of the continued readiness of the Emperor to conclude peace upon the basis embodied in the four points.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 39.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 467.)

My Lord, *Therapia, June 28, 1855.*

WHEN I visited the Grand Vizier on his return from Vienna, his Highness informed me that Count Buol had apprised him of the intention of his Court to make known to the Russian Government, that if an army belonging to that Power were to recross the Danube into the Turkish Provinces, the operation would be considered by Austria as a *casus belli*. This communication confirms what the Austrian Envoy had previously stated to Fuad Pasha, accompanied with the expression of a hope that the allied Powers would not undertake, and that the Porte would, if necessary, dissuade them from undertaking, any expedition into the Russian territory beyond the Danube, which might have the effect of provoking any hostile aggression on that side in return.

Fuad Pasha's reply, as he assured me at the time, was calculated to impress upon Baron Koller the Porte's unwillingness to enter into any engagement or understanding upon a subject as to which both the Sultan and his allies were free to act according to their common interests in the prosecution of the war.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 40.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 9.)

(No 468.)

My Lord, *Therapia, June 28, 1855.*

WITH my despatch No. 410 of the 7th instant, I forwarded to your Lordship a paper which I had sent in to Fuad Pasha. It contained a series of remarks and inquiries intended to elicit some further information as to the real state of the Porte's financial system.

My expectation that the answers would be sent to me in two or three days has not been realised. More than two weeks elapsed before I received them, and it is only now that I have an opportunity of forwarding them to your Lordship. They were transmitted to me in Turkish, and an English translation is forwarded herewith.

I have not time to comment upon them, although I cannot say that they inspire me with much confidence.

The revenue of the Porte before the war is set down, I observe, at 10,000,000*l.* sterling. I firmly believe that it never exceeded 7,000,000*l.*, or, at the outside, 8,000,000*l.* The deficit is stated at 300,000*l.* I am under a strong impression that it was far more considerable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 40.

Memorandum.

(Translation.)

THE meeting of equality between the income and the expenditure of the Porte in time of peace, is the balance of the accounts. In fact, the expenses were met by the income; and if there appeared a little (deficit), it was not to any degree that could impair or embarrass the administration of affairs, because the difference between the revenue amounting to nearly 2,000,000 purses, and the expenditure covered by it was perhaps 50,000 or 60,000 purses. The greatest portion of this was a sacrifice made by the Porte for keeping down the

exchange for a time, in the sole interest of commerce. Agriculture and commerce are daily on the increase, and likewise the revenue of the Porte derived therefrom. By careful attention, moreover, to the expenditure, no doubts were entertained of making good this deficit; but it was never intended to do so, by increasing the taxation. If the Porte had levied this deficit upon the country, it would have been cleared off without any one feeling the burden of it. The balance-sheet of the ordinary expenditure and income of the State is now to be drawn up in a new and regular form, and the relations between the two are to be again established. Although the extraordinary expenses of the war form a separate branch, yet owing to the increase in the price of articles caused by the war, and to other reasons, the ordinary expenses are likewise on the increase. On the other hand, it must be gratefully admitted that while the effects of a state of war on all countries is well known, the general increase in the Ottoman States has not been impaired; and that God Almighty has rewarded with plenty and abundance the sacrifices made by the nation at large.

2ndly. The military forces of the Porte, owing to the war, have been doubled, and, perhaps, during a time, tripled. I mean that the land and sea-forces amounted in reality to 300,000, and, during a time, to 400,000 men, and upwards. If the irregular troops being included in this amount, the imperial troops from the provinces of Tunis and Egypt, who are temporarily provided for here, must be included also. On the occasion of the Hellenic incursion, a body of not less than nearly 40,000 troops, regular and irregular, were assembled at Joanina, Tricala, and Salonica. This in confirmation of the above statement. Such is the general estimate of the amount. The balance of the extra expenses of the war is drawn up separately, and the number of troops entertained at all times is clearly set forth.

3rdly. The meaning of the ordinary expenses having become mixed up with the extraordinary expenses is, not that the accounts are confused, but that the ordinary income allotted to the ordinary expenditure is expended in the extraordinary outlay. The accounts of the extraordinary expenditure are being examined into; and although they will be cleared up, yet so long as there are extraordinary means for meeting the extraordinary expenses, the war expenses cannot be delayed; but as matters stand now, the Treasury pay the most essential part of the extraordinary expenses out of the ordinary revenue.

4thly. The Sublime Porte wishes that the Commission for the war expenses be organized, so as to be really and truly useful, and to inspire confidence. Necessary measures are in contemplation with this view.

5thly. In organizing the balance-register of the extraordinary expenses, the debt of the State and the revenue will be placed separately.

6thly. In organizing the balance-register as above stated, the war expenses hitherto incurred will be set forth, and the extraordinary means provided to meet them, and an approximate estimate will be made of the yearly expenses to be incurred hereafter, in the event of the war continuing. With respect to the collection of these, the Sublime Porte has not levied anything on the country for war expenses, in order that they may not be a burden on His Majesty's subjects in any way. Although the nation, animated by a certain degree of zeal, has made payment in anticipation to a small account, these have not come to any large sum. They will, however, be set forth in the balance-sheet.

7thly. The species, and the amount of the income appointed to meet the payment of the capital and the interest of the loan, are set forth in the note which has been given in.

8thly. The question of a sale of land is a very important one. Land in Turkey belongs in general to the Sultan's subjects, and there exists very little out of this category. Supposing there did not, there would be no purchasers in the country for it. With reference, also, to selling land to persons seeking to purchase it from abroad, it is impossible to change the present state of the question, so long as the exceptions established by Treaty in favour of foreigners are not modified. For this reason a positive opinion cannot be pronounced on this subject, based as it is on established principle.

With reference to the produce of the soil, and to that of timber pointed out, the Porte has had those subjects in her mind; and the means of carrying out her views form one of the improvements which are in contemplation. Nevertheless, it is, at the present crisis, one of those things necessary to meet the obvious necessities of the Porte.

This applies exactly to the subject of the cannon. It would not, moreover, be suitable, at the present period, to upset anything belonging to the system of defence. In the same manner, if the present field-guns were exchanged against iron guns, the surplus of the money that would be expended for the new guns, and the special sort of ammunition required for it, would go very little way in the remedy now sought for.

No. 41.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 469.)

My Lord, *Therapia, June 28, 1855.*

GENERAL VIVIAN informs me that he has now under his command in camp seven regiments of Infantry, three batteries of Artillery, and a regiment of Cavalry, with an additional troop. Two other regiments are to join his camp the day after to-morrow, and the regiment of Cavalry detained so long at Volos for means of transport, is partly arrived.

He has had some cases of desertion, and some of cholera. The former have ceased, the latter are disappearing. He speaks with much satisfaction of the conduct and goodwill exhibited by the soldiers under his command.

General Beatson writes me word from the Dardanelles that the service of enrolment for his corps of Irregular Cavalry is everywhere carried on with success. The difficulties which have occasionally obstructed the progress of his officers, have yielded to their firmness and judicious management. An affray which recently took place between two troops of his Cavalry, terminated, not indeed without bloodshed, but without compromising, in any respect, the relations established between the soldiers and the British officers.

There are particulars, not destitute of interest, which I am obliged to reserve for a future opportunity.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 42.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 11.)

(No. 476.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, June 30, 1855.*

THE meeting which I had previously announced to your Lordship, took place this morning, at the Grand Vizier's house on the Bosphorus. In addition to his Highness, the Seraskier and Fuad Pasha were present. I was accompanied by Brigadier-General Mansfield.

We found that the Porte had received advices from Vassif Pasha, brought by an officer who had left Kars about eleven days before. Despatches from General Williams also came to hand at the moment we were entering into conference. Their latest date was the 19th instant.

It appeared from both sources that the Russians, advancing from Gumri with an amount of force varying from 20,000 to 30,000, had presented themselves before Kars; that a partial engagement of Cavalry had taken place, followed two days later by an attack, which had been repulsed, on the part of the enemy, and that the town was threatened with a siege.

I collected from the Turkish officer that when he left the scene of action rain was falling in torrents, the waters of the river were out, and the Russians had no choice but to encamp. It appears from the English statements that the defences of the fortress were deemed to be of considerable strength, that the place was provisioned for a month, and that the Turkish army may be estimated at 18,000 men.

It was clear to all present that whether the Russians besieged or turned Kars, the Turkish army required an effort to be made for its relief, with all practicable dispatch, and that of three possible modes of acting for that purpose,

the only one likely to prove effective was an expedition by Kutais into Georgia. To send reinforcements by Trebizond would be at best a palliative. To establish an entrenched camp at Redoute-Kaleh would, at this unhealthy season, be equivalent to consigning the troops to destruction.

The real question was, whether a force numerically sufficient, and in all respects effective, could be collected in time at Kutais, to make an incursion into Georgia, and threaten the communications of the Russian army, placing it indeed between two hostile forces, should the Turkish army still be in a condition to take the field.

It was for the Turkish Ministers to solve this problem, and they proposed that the expeditionary force should be composed of 12,000 men from Batoom and the neighbouring stations; of the troops made over to General Vivian, and estimated at 10,000 of all arms; of General Beatson's Irregular Cavalry; of 10,000 men to be detached from the army in Bulgaria, as the complement of the Turkish Contingent; of 5,000 more derived from the same source; of an Egyptian regiment of Horse, now here; and of another regiment expected from Tunis. To these the Seraskier proposed to add 2,000 Albanians, by way of riflemen. These several forces, completed according to the figures, would present a total of 44,400 men, not perhaps to be reckoned with prudence at more than 36,000 effectives.

Admitting the urgency of the case, and the consequent necessity of incurring a certain degree of hazard, I called attention to the importance of not exposing the Turkish Contingent or General Beatson's Horse prematurely to a trial beyond their strength. It was accordingly understood, that supposing the expedition to be resolved upon, neither of these corps would be required to embark for Redoute-Kaleh until the preparations were completed in other respects, and it is to be hoped that the interval thus gained for their benefit, would suffice to secure their efficiency. I took, moreover, the liberty of remarking that the proposed expedition, besides being prepared with secrecy and sanctioned by superior authority, must finally depend for its adoption on our available means of providing it with all the requisite appliances. This indispensable field of inquiry might be investigated with advantage by General Vivian, the Seraskier Pasha, and Brigadier-General Mansfield, who, indeed, have undertaken to meet to-morrow for that purpose.

The Turkish Ministers having expressed their readiness to entrust the direction of the expedition, should it eventually take place, to a British commander, and to accept General Vivian in that capacity, subject, of course, to the approval of Her Majesty's Government, I lost no time after our separation in communicating personally with that officer, and putting him in possession of all that had passed on the subject of our discussion.

It only remains for me at present to refer your Lordship to the accompanying memorandum, for which I am indebted to General Mansfield. It contains information resulting from inquiries addressed to the Seraskier and his colleagues, on several matters from which it is most desirable, with a view to our ultimate success, that all uncertainty should, as far as possible, be removed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 42.

Information obtained from the Seraskier with reference to the proposal of the Porte to relieve the Army of Kars by an operation from Redout-Kaleh towards Tiflis.

QUESTIONS having been put to the Seraskier, the following information was obtained:

1. The country in the neighbourhood of Redoute-Kaleh is declared to be low and marshy.

2. A sufficient supply of grain for the maintenance of an army without the importation of corn cannot be found. The country from the coast to Kutais cannot supply the necessary magazines.

3. Ships engaged in the supply of the army would seek Batoom for safe anchorage. Redoute-Kaleh is impracticable, except for boats of small draught.

4. The exact distance from Redoute-Kaleh to Kutais is eighteen hours, or about fifty English miles.

5. There is no coast-road practicable for guns from Batoom.

6. The River Rhion is navigable by boats as far as Kutais. The necessary boats can be sent from Trebizond.

7. The streams which run into the Rhion below Kutais are not of any significance, and are not serious obstacles to the advance of an army.

8. The population of Kutais is about 10,000; rather under than over that number.

9. The climate of Kutais is more healthy than that of the coast. It is, therefore, more prudent to throw the troops forward after their disembarkation as quickly as possible.

10. Labourers can be secured in the country to assist the engineers in forming an entrenched camp at Redoute-Kaleh.

11. The population in the region referred to is indifferently disposed towards the Turkish Government since the fatal affairs of last year. It would be difficult to attract recruits to the ranks, independently of raising the country on a grand scale by acting on the Chiefs.

12. The force at Batoom and in its neighbourhood is 15,000 strong, of whom 12,000 effective men can be spared for the expedition.

13. Of these, 700 or 800 men are Artillerymen. There are 30 or 32 field-guns quite ready, besides some guns of position.

14. It is also said that means of land-transport for the 12,000 men at Batoom are actually available.

15. It is declared that the Russians have constructed a *chaussée* from Tiflis to Redoute-Kaleh, the commerce on that line having been always much favoured by them.

16. The Porte would depend upon the British and French Admirals for assistance in transporting the troops to Redoute-Kaleh; but many steamers and transports may be spared from the transport fleet engaged in supplying Omer Pasha, besides that the Porte is prepared to buy other transports for this purpose.

17. The Porte proposes to give the command of the army, which, when concentrated, will exceed 43,000 men of all arms, to Lieutenant-General Vivian, now in command of the Turkish Contingent. The latter would form a Division of the force.

18. The details of the force cannot, however, be analysed and decided on till a decision is made that the design shall be put into execution.

19. There are some officers attached to the Seraskier who possess considerable local knowledge of the country alluded to, and would be placed at the disposal of Lieutenant-General Vivian.

20. The force will be composed as follows:

	Men.
Vivian's Contingent - - - -	20,000
Beatson's " - -	3,000
Batoom garrison - - - -	12,000
Albanians - - - - -	2,000
To be drawn from Bulgaria - - -	5,000
Regiment of Egyptian Regular Cavalry - -	800
Tunis Horse - " - - -	600
	43,400

Three thousand men are raised. The force to be levied by Major-General Beatson, when completed, will be 4,000 men.

(Signed) H. B. MANSFIELD,
Brigadier-General.

No. 43.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 11.)

(No. 477.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July 1, 1855.*

AGREEABLY to what I stated in my preceding number, Lieutenant-General Vivian and Brigadier-General Mansfield waited this morning on the Seraskier, at his Excellency's office in town. Fuad Pasha attended, at the request of the Seraskier. M. Pisani was also present.

Inclosed herewith, for your Lordship's information, is a memorandum containing General Mansfield's notes of what took place on the occasion. The statement promised by General Vivian can hardly reach me before to-morrow, and perhaps not in time to be forwarded by the messenger.

Your Lordship will do me the honour to bear in mind that the proposed diversion at Redoute-Kaleh originated with the Porte; that, recognising the urgency of the case, I have endeavoured to obviate such manifest objections as the premature employment of the Turkish Contingent, and the exposure of troops to a climate which at this season has been characterised as pestilential on the coast of Circassia; and that I lean entirely on military opinions as to the means of eventually carrying out the proposed expedition.

I proposed at the same time to reserve the approval of Her Majesty's Government, and to afford the Commanders-in-chief an opportunity of declaring their opinions.

I have to add, in conclusion, that an entrenched position at Redoute-Kaleh will probably be found indispensable, as a point of retreat in case of any signal reverse; and, with a view to future questions, it may be desirable to have it clearly understood that the Turkish Contingent is to be regarded in the light of a British force, composing the principal part of the expeditionary army.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 43.

Memorandum of an Interview between the Seraskier, Fuad Pasha, Lieutenant-General Vivian, and Brigadier-General Mansfield, on the 30th of June, 1855.

THE Seraskier, before the arrival of Fuad Pasha, spoke of the affairs of the Turkish Contingent under the command of Lieutenant-General Vivian. That force has now actually in camp 8,500 men, two battalions having joined this very day. The remaining 1,500 men, necessary to complete the first half of the Contingent, are in Constantinople, ready, and will be sent to the camp forthwith.

The second half of the Contingent to be assembled at Varna. If the plan discussed at the house of Aali Pasha is decided on, the orders for them to assemble at Varna to be immediately sent. If there is no such object, the Seraskier considers a further reference must be in the first instance made to Omer Pasha, who would take offence if a large portion of the troops in Bulgaria were drafted away without his consent. But in case of the project being decided on to form an army to operate towards Georgia, of course that such a reference might be put aside, considering the urgency of the matter. Supposing the order to be sent without delay to Bulgaria, 10,000 men could be assembled and ready to be transferred to the officers deputed by General Vivian at Varna in fifteen days.

On being asked what steps could be taken to form a depôt, in case of the Contingent being sent on service, he replied that it was not the Turkish custom to form depôts; that the Porte raised about 18,000 or 20,000 recruits a-year, who were immediately sent to the different battalions.

On the matter of arms, he declared that he was ready to supply the

Contingent with 15,000 percussion muskets immediately, although he trusted that the Minié guns sent for to England by General Vivian would soon make their appearance. The percussion muskets are now in the arsenal, and there is plenty of ammunition.

Fuad Pasha having arrived, General Vivian desired that his Excellency would have the goodness to explain exactly the views of the Turkish Government on the subject of an expedition to the coast in which it was proposed to employ him. Fuad Pasha then at great length went over all the matters which had been brought forward before his Excellency Lord Stratford de Redcliffe the day before.

He explained the situation of the army of Kars, and that it was proposed to relieve that army by a powerful diversion. That this diversion could be best made, indeed only made, from Redoute-Kaleh, or some place in its vicinity, for the landing of troops and the establishment of a basis of operations. That troops so landing should be thrown in advance as quickly as possible on Kutais, and operate towards Tiflis, where it is considered the real objects of a war against Russia by the allies may be best obtained. That by such a grand operation the best chance for the army of Kars is secured; whereas by any other mode means would be frittered away, without result, either immediate or ultimate, to the good of the cause. That if the project is not adopted for want of means, they must have recourse to those measures in which they have no confidence.

General Vivian replied that he should like to know what means were disposable for so great a plan.

Fuad Pasha answered, that in the first place there was of the contingent now ready:

10,000—Actually at Buyukdéré.
10,000—That part of the contingent to be immediately assembled in Bulgaria.
5,000—To be drawn in addition from the garrisons in Bulgaria, and attached to the British contingent at Varna in camp.
3,000—Beatson's Horse.
2,000—Albanian Light Troops.
12,000—Garrison at Batoum and in the neighbourhood.
800—One regiment of Egyptian Regular Cavalry.
600—A body of Cavalry expected immediately from Tunis.

43,400

It was proposed to give the command of their army to General Vivian himself.

On being pressed as to the means of transport in land, Fuad Pasha declared that the plans once fairly decided on, every effort would be made to furnish all the means of whatever description.

General Vivian said that he begged that he might not be misunderstood. That he put himself out of the question; but that it was one thing to throw an army on a coast, and another to feed and move it. That it was necessary for him to have exact details on this matter, in which success depends altogether. Further, that he quite admitted the justice of the reasoning addressed to him, which seemed to vouch for the necessity of employing his contingent; that there was a state necessity against which he, as a military officer, had nothing to say. But that while he admitted this, he must inform the Porte that the employment of the contingent was premature, and, as is self-evident, cannot but interfere with the arrangements and organization he has so much at heart.

Important, however, as these considerations are, that it is his business to carry out the orders as far as lies in his power of the Government under which he is acting, and that his only desire is to do that as effectually as may be, according to the injunctions he may receive from Her Majesty's Ambassador. But that putting all personal considerations on one side, they cannot be too careful in arranging the necessary matters of detail, sea and land transport, provisioning and victualling, ammunition, payment, &c.

To this Fuad Effendi agreed, and proposed that General Vivian should sketch out on paper what he considered indispensable to enable this project to be carried out. That the officers of the Porte would then be able to judge whether they had the necessary means; but that there ought to be no delay.

General Vivian promised to send such a document the next day, and expressed his gratitude for the high honour which has been conferred on him.

(Signed) H. B. MANSFIELD,
Brigadier-General.

No. 44.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 561.)

Foreign Office, July 13, 1855.

My Lord,

THE plan proposed by the Porte for the relief of the Turkish army at Kars, as sketched out in your Excellency's despatches Nos. 476 and 477 of the 30th of June and 1st instant, has been attentively considered by Her Majesty's Government, and I have to state to your Excellency that it appears to them objectionable for the following reasons:

It would be in the greatest degree imprudent to throw on an unwholesome coast, without means of land transport; without any certainty of provisions: without an assured communication with the rear; without an accurate knowledge of the country to be traversed, or the strength of the enemy to be encountered; and with a probability of a hostile population; 40,000 men, hurriedly collected from various quarters, imperfectly disciplined, doubtfully armed and equipped, and as yet unorganised, and to expose them at once to all the hazards and difficulties of a campaign against a Russian army. They would fall ill between Redoute-Kaleh and Kutais, and be defeated between Kutais and Tiflis. Moreover, the fragments to be united for the purpose of composing this army are so scattered about, that the crisis, if it is to take place, would be over long before it could reach the scene of action.

Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the wiser course would be to send reinforcements to the rear of the Turkish army, instead of sending an expedition to the rear of the Russian army. The reinforcements might go to Trebizond and be directed from thence upon Erzeroom. The distance from Trebizond to Erzeroom is less than that from Redoute-Kaleh to Tiflis, and the march is through a friendly instead of through a hostile country; and at Erzeroom the army would meet supporting friends instead of opposing enemies, and supplies instead of famine.

If the army at Kars cannot maintain that position against the Russians, it should fall back upon Erzeroom, and the whole Turkish force should be concentrated there. If the Russians are to be defeated, it will be easier to defeat them by the whole force collected, than by divided portions of that force; and a defeat would be the more decisive the further it took place within the Turkish frontier.

Trebizond is a port where supplies of all kinds might be landed; and Her Majesty's Government believe it is a healthy place, and that Erzeroom is so likewise.

Such an arrangement as that which I have described would give time for collecting and organising the various detached corps of which the proposed army of 40,000 men is to be composed; and Her Majesty's Government entirely concur in Lieutenant-General Vivian's opinion that an army thrown on a coast without means of transport and supplies is doomed to destruction.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 45.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 899.)

Paris, July 8, 1855.

My Lord,

COUNT WALEWSKI read me this afternoon a despatch, which he is about to send this evening to M. de Persigny, on the subject of the communications recently made to him by M. de Hübner; and he then stated to me that, all things considered, the French Government had come to the same conclusion as that of Her Majesty, that it would be useless to press Austria more closely at the present moment, and that, in view of the future, it would be as well to let her maintain the ground of the Treaty of the 2nd of December as long as she could. He had, therefore, resolved not to send to Vienna the despatch which had been communicated to your Lordship, in project, by M. Baudin. He is, however, fearful, from some words which fell from M. de Hübner, that Count Buol has some intention of replying to the Emperor's speech, particularly to that part which alludes to the engagements of Austria; and he has written to M. de Bourqueney to say that, if Austria really holds to the continued existence of the Treaty of the 2nd December, he recommends Count Buol to abstain from all further discussion of what are and what are not the obligations of Austria, for that a discussion of the kind might end in France declaring the Treaty to be virtually at an end.

The despatches communicated by M. de Hübner were five in number, and, although containing much matter for contradiction, will, on the principle of avoiding all further irritating discussion, not be replied to by the French Government. As the same despatches will be shown to your Lordship by Count Colloredo, I need not allude to their contents; but one point calls for observation, because Count Walewski dwelt upon it. It appears that Count Buol remarked on what he conceived to be a shade of difference between Count Walewski's last despatches and those of your Lordship, in a matter of some importance. The Austrian Minister understands that Her Majesty's Government, in any future negotiation, consider themselves bound to the four points; and M. de Hübner is instructed to call Count Walewski's attention to the fact, and to ask him whether the French Government consider themselves to be under the same obligation.

Count Walewski refused to give M. de Hübner any answer until he had consulted your Lordship. He wishes to make precisely the same answer as your Lordship makes to Count Colloredo, and that that answer should be to the effect that the belligerent Powers do not consider themselves any longer bound to the four points, though it is probable that they may not refuse, when occasion offers, to take them as the point of departure for other negotiations.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 46.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 470.)

Therapia, June 28, 1855.

My Lord,

THE intelligence, however scanty, which comes in from the north-eastern frontier of Asiatic Turkey, is not calculated to diminish the Porte's anxiety. The latest advices from Trebizond, which came round to me through Lord Raglan, describe the Russians from Gumri as being within a few hours' march of Kars. Their force is stated at 36,000,—a number which considerably exceeds the previous estimate, but which may perhaps comprise the detachment which appears to have been directed upon Ardahan.

Be that as it may, the Turkish forces, including all between Kars and Erzeroom, with the circumjacent stations, cannot be safely carried beyond an amount of 20,000, if so much, and the Seraskier Pasha has prepared me for a

retrograde movement on their part, it being his decided opinion that the positions at Kars are not tenable against the enemy.

His Excellency and his colleagues are naturally desirous that no time should be lost in counteracting the Russian attack, and it is some consolation to me to find that even at this eleventh hour the necessity of listening to my advice and sending off reinforcements without further delay is recognized.

But where are reinforcements to be found in sufficient quantity? How are they to be provided with necessary supplies? What plan of operation offers the best chance of employing their services with effect?

Nothing can with prudence or consistency be detached from the army acting under Omer Pasha in the Crimea. At Batoom, Soukoum Kalé, and other neighbouring stations on the coast, it would be extremely difficult to muster more than 11,000 men, though a higher figure was quoted at first. In Bulgaria, I question the existence of more than 50,000 men, including garrisons. The other parts of the Empire afford no additional reserves, with the exception of Bosnia, where it is still possible that a few thousand men might be detached; I speak of Regulars. Bashi-Bozouks may be procured, but your Lordship knows what little dependence is to be placed on such undisciplined hordes. There remains the half-formed corps of General Vivian, and the Irregular Cavalry collected by General Beatson and his officers.

The Turkish Ministers, who had talked of sending 10,000 men from Batoom to Erzeroom, now, in their embarrassment, and swayed, I think, by General Guyon's advice, incline to another plan. They propose to form an entrenched camp at Redoute-Kaleh, and to concentrate there the corps of General Vivian, completed by a draft of 10,000 men from the Bulgarian army, that of General Beatson and the detachment from Batoom, reduced to 7,000 men. The total of these combined forces would be about 30,000 of all arms. Stationary, they might operate as a diversion in favour of the army at Kars or Erzeroom. Advancing by Kutais on Georgia, they might either attack the Russians in the rear or force them to retreat.

The main objections to this plan are the extreme insalubrity of the Circassian coasts and valleys from now till October, the incomplete organization of Beatson's Horse and the Turkish Contingent, the difficulty of procuring supplies or transport, and the danger of exposing a mixed Turkish force to collision with a well-appointed and numerous enemy in the open field.

On the other hand, there is ample evidence of a necessity which must be met at no small risk, and with more or less of sacrifice. The Russians appear to have opened their campaign with a great numerical superiority than had been expected; and the consequences of leaving Erzeroom without any additional support, and of abandoning the unarmed population to its own resources, might be very difficult to repair. Reinforcements advancing from Trebizond would require to be strong enough for their own defence, as, before they could reach Erzeroom, the enemy might have taken or invested that place, and obtained the command of the high road leading to it from Constantinople. Ten or fifteen thousand men taken from the means of collecting an army at Redoute-Kaleh would be a serious drawback from the plan, which promises the greatest amount of advantage; and it is not probable that either the Porte or Omer Pasha would consent to detach a sufficient force from Bulgaria to meet singly the requirements of the case. Austria, it is true, has declared her intention of considering the passing of the Danube by Russia a *casus belli*, and she also stands pledged to the exclusion of that Power from the Danubian Principalities; but the resolution, which in such an emergency would enable the Porte to take its line upon those assurances, and to overlook the awkwardness of leaving an important position inadequately defended, is more fit to be admired than likely to be embraced.

On a review of all these circumstances and considerations, your Lordship will easily comprehend my embarassment in being consulted by the Porte on matters involving so much responsibility, without time for reference to the Commanders-in-chief.

I have naturally communicated with Lieutenant-General Vivian, and I have also availed myself of the military talents and professional experience of Brigadier-General Mansfield. But with all the advantage derived from their views and counsels, I am still in presence of two very difficult and delicate questions; first, whether to approve the destination which the Porte proposes thus prematurely to give to the Turkish Contingent and Beatson's Horse; secondly, whether to recommend the formation of an entrenched camp at Redoute-Kaleh by means of a force detached from Bulgaria.

The Turkish Ministers have invited me to meet them in conference on the subject, and the circumstances are too urgent for me to decline the invitation.

My next report will inform your Lordship of the result; I am, meanwhile, anxious to apprize Her Majesty's Government of the situation without loss of time.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 47.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July* 11.)

(No. 913.)
My Lord, *Paris, July* 10, 1855.

I THINK it right to state, in consequence of certain observations made during the late debates in the House of Commons, on the subject of the Vienna negotiations, that M. Drouyn de Lhuys' resignation was not occasioned by the refusal of the Emperor to agree to the last Austrian propositions, but was the consequence of his having misunderstood the intentions of His Majesty in regard to certain instructions sent to Count Walewski in London. M. Drouyn de Lhuys considered that his own position was compromised by his misapprehension of the Emperor's orders, and he determined in consequence to retire.

I feel certain, that if this eminent statesman was still in a situation to do so, he would put this statement officially on record, for, although I had not an opportunity of seeing him myself after he left office, I know that he was at great pains to assure the Emperor, his successor in the Foreign Office, and others with whom he conversed on the subject, that his determination to resign was not caused by the rejection of Count Buol's propositions.

I have, &c.
(Signed COWLEY.

No. 48.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 14.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 13, 1855.

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch from Count Buol stating, with reference to my despatch No. 232 of the 19th ultimo which you had read to him, and in which I expressed the hope of Her Majesty's Government that the attitude of Austria towards Russia would undergo no change, and that no reductions would take place in the Austrian army, that he had nothing to add to the declaration which the Austrian Government has already made upon this subject.

Faithful to the spirit of her alliance Austria will continue ready to seize every opportunity for the reestablishment of peace upon the basis of the four points. She will continue at the same time, by the occupation of the Principalities, to furnish her contingent for the defence of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire upon the side of the Danube.

As regards her military measures, these, Count Buol observes, are questions which are within the domain of her own liberty of action, just as the direction of their military operations belongs to the belligerent Powers, without being subject to any control upon the part of Austria, and expresses the expectation of the Emperor that in such matters the confidence shown to his allies will be reciprocated by them.

The Emperor, whilst diminishing the burdens imposed upon his people by the extension of his armaments, will maintain his forces upon such a footing as will enable him to give effective assistance in obtaining the object of the alliance. On the other hand, the Emperor hopes that his allies will use their liberty of

action with moderation, and will not give the operations of the war a character which might compromise the original object of the alliance.

The Austrian Government, whilst it does not contest that, strictly speaking, the belligerent Powers are not, since the rupture of the negotiations, bound by the partial understanding established in the Conferences, hopes that the four bases are still considered by Her Majesty's Government as the essential elements of peace.

Count Buol incloses copy of a circular, of which I transmit a translation, explaining the nature of a statement which the Austrian Government is about to submit to the Diet.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 48.

Circular addressed to Austrian Representatives at Foreign Courts.

(Translation.) *Vienna, June 28, 1855.*

THE manner in which the Governments of Germany have received the communication of the Protocols of the Vienna Conferences, has been a source of the sincerest pleasure to the Imperial Court. All its confederates have testified their acknowledgment of its endeavours to contribute to the restoration of peace on a just basis suitable to the interests of Germany, and it announces with the most lively satisfaction the value which it sets upon this testimony.

But it is now the wish of the Imperial Court also to be assured of the consent of its German allies in regard to the attitude which it has assumed since the close of the Conferences. It appears to us to be not only a duty of federal and amicable confidence to explain clearly this attitude to the members of the Confederation, but we believe also to act in a manner responsive to the claim equally appertaining to all the German Governments, if we put the Confederation in possession of the means of adopting a resolution which is proper under existing circumstances, in regard to the future attitude of the whole of Germany.

Baron von Prokesch, who is about to proceed to his post, will therefore be empowered to explain fully to the Federal Assembly the present position of the Austrian Court, at the same time that he lays before it the Treaty of Alliance of the 2nd December last, between Austria, France, and Great Britain, the memorandum of the 28th December, and the Protocols of the Conferences. The confidential communications which we have had with Prussia upon this measure give us hope for her full assent to the declarations which we are about to make in the Federal Assembly.

We believe that in what follows, we are stating briefly the tenour of the statement which the Imperial Legate is empowered to make, in order to put the Federal Governments beforehand in possession of the extent of what is proposed, and thereby enable them to furnish their Representatives in the Federal Assembly with instructions as to the statement of their views.

The present well known state of affairs clearly shows that a union of views upon the practical application of the third guarantee point has not taken place between Austria and the two Western Powers. There were no grounds for Austria's joining in the war, because the question was of a mode of carrying it out which Austria did not consider to be indispensable. But the belligerent Powers did no more than avail themselves of their undoubted right in declaring for a continuance of the war, their conditions being more rigid. The case of the active cooperation of the allies in the joint carrying out of the conditions of peace, has consequently not occurred; but the acknowledged objects of the alliance remain unchanged, and the mutually contracted obligation retains for both parties its strength and validity. It consequently follows that Austria will not only make it her especial task to maintain the admission already obtained from Russia in regard to the first and second point, and partially the third also, but she will also continue to be bound to cooperate for a clear and effectual fulfilment of the four points. On the other side the attitude remains unaltered, which she has assumed for defending the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and maintaining the interests of Austria and Germany in the Danubian

Principalities. The Imperial Court has taken care to put this its idea of the situation out of all doubt by the most unambiguous declarations made to the European Powers, and the instructions given to the Imperial Legate will fulfil the same object towards the German Confederation.

Baron von Prokesch will state also that in the uncertainty of the continuance of this situation, a double necessity exists for Austria's considering the determination of her military state to trace back to a smaller measure the efforts which circumstances have hitherto rendered necessary, but yet with this to remain completely in preparation both for securing a reserve to our troops in the Principalities, and in case of need to be able to complete the state of the army, in the shortest time possible, to its former strength.

Being persuaded that throughout the whole of the affair we have perfectly maintained the position that the German Confederation assumed by its resolutions of the 24th June and 9th December of last year, we believe that we may add to the above statement the expression of our confidence that the full and candid approval of the Confederation will not be refused to our conduct. We shall close our statement by declaring that in regard to the resolution to be taken by the Federal Assembly, the present situation in our opinion implies no cause for the contraction of new obligations by the Federal body, or for the enlargement of those existing; that the interest of peace and the attainment of a firm union of Germany appear to require that the Confederation, maintaining firmly the position it has hitherto held, and looking to the former Federal resolution mentioned above, should resolve to continue provisionally the state of preparedness appointed on the 8th of February of last year.

The Imperial delegate is charged to submit the foregoing statement so soon as the members of the Federal Assembly find themselves in possession of instructions for their voting. We may assuredly assume that all parties desire to see, as soon as practicable, a unanimous attitude secured for Germany; and we therefore hope that all the Governments will hasten to furnish instructions with all speed.

You will give the Government a copy of this paper.
Receive, &c.

No. 49.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 15.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 13, 1855.*

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch from Count Buol in which his Excellency adverts to the remark at the conclusion of my circular despatch of June 19 last, that when the period shall arrive when negotiations for peace may with any prospect of success be renewed, Her Majesty's Government will steadily keep in view the principles which have guided them throughout the past negotiations, and inquires whether the Austrian Government is authorised to infer from this declaration that Her Majesty's Government, whilst it does not recognise any obligation in the partial understanding come to on some of the points during the negotiations, does not the less continue to consider these points collectively as the common ground which the Powers who signed the Treaty of December 2 are under a mutual engagement to take as the point of departure for their endeavours to restore peace.

I told Count Colloredo that whenever negotiations for peace were resumed, there could be no doubt that the questions of putting an end to Russian preponderance in the Black Sea; of bettering the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte; and of securing the privileges of the Principalities and the free navigation of the Danube, must come prominently under discussion; and I said it had been my duty to announce to Her Majesty's Ministers at foreign Courts the determination of Her Majesty's Government steadily to keep in view the principles which had guided them throughout the past negotiations, but beyond this Her Majesty's Government were not disposed to contract any other obligation, nor to bind themselves by the terms of the four bases of negotiation which had lately been discussed at Vienna.

Count Colloredo earnestly, and in the same friendly spirit which he has

always manifested in favour of an alliance between England and Austria, pressed for a compliance with the desire expressed by Count Buol, as it was important that there should still exist a common ground of agreement between the Powers who signed the Treaty of December 2.

I replied, that although the Treaty of December 2 was now, by the course pursued by Austria, reduced to a dead letter, yet it was not the intention of Her Majesty's Government to press Austria any further with respect to it, because they were determined to avoid, as far as possible, appeals and discussions of a nature to impair the friendly relations which we desired to maintain with Austria, but when we were asked to renew engagements that had become void, I must take the liberty of reminding Count Colloredo of the position in which the two countries now stood towards each other.

Austria, I said, having more to fear from the aggressive policy of Russia than either England or France, and her interests being completely identified with theirs in the war, the utmost deference to her wishes was throughout exhibited by the Western Powers, who never failed to bear in mind the geographical position and the German difficulties of Austria.

The Protocols were agreed to at the time fixed by Austria; the Treaty of December 2 was signed at her invitation; the Conferences which, by England and France, were thought to be premature, were entered upon at the desire of Austria, in the firm belief on the part of the Western Powers that if peace were not obtained by negotiation, the active participation of Austria in the war would be the immediate consequence.

The negotiations failed, and the Treaty of December 2 was barren of results; but no sooner were the Conferences closed, than Austria lost not a moment in officially announcing her neutrality to Russia, and in pressing the Porte not to permit the theatre of war to be transferred to the line of the Danube.

She reduced her army by 150,000 men, and the Russian Guards, as might be expected, were sent from Poland to the Crimea. Austria had thus done great harm to the Western Powers, and she now still further sought to tie their hands for the future, by a renewal of the engagements which have already failed to produce the desired result, on account of the interpretation put upon them by Austria.

Austria, moreover, makes to us this proposal, after having voluntarily pledged herself to Russia to seek no other terms of peace than those contained in the four bases (her own construction being, as a matter of course, put upon the third basis), and to use her influence to prevent any further conditions being demanded by others.

In conclusion, I said that if the Cabinet of Vienna was animated by the same desire as Her Majesty's Government to maintain friendly relations between the two countries, Count Buol will rest satisfied with the assurances given in the circular to Her Majesty's Ministers, and he will not attempt to impart an apparent vitality to the Treaty of December 2, by proposals which cannot be accepted; while Austria allows that Treaty to be practically a dead letter, by declining to give to it that effect, the expectation of which, in the contingency which has actually happened, was one of the chief motives which induced the British Government to conclude it.

You will accordingly inform Count Buol that although, as his Excellency infers from my circular despatch of the 19th ultimo, Her Majesty's Government does not recognize any obligations in the partial understanding come to on some of the points during the negotiations at Vienna, yet Her Majesty's Government does adhere to the principles which form the foundation of those negotiations.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 50.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 935.)
Paris, July 15, 1855.

My Lord,

M. DE MOUSTIER informs Count Walewski that the Prince of Prussia is instructed to state at St. Petersburgh that on no account will the King of

Prussia give military aid to Russia, and that events may arise which would oblige His Majesty, in consequence of his engagements, to depart even from his present neutrality.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 51.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 483.)
Therapia, July 5, 1855.

My Lord,

THE Porte is chiefly engaged in continuing to prepare the elements of an expedition destined to relieve the army of Kars. Brigadier-General Mansfield, accompanied by M. Pisani, waited on the Seraskier Pasha yesterday. I had previously received from Lieutenant-General Vivian the statement and estimate which he undertook to send in. They were preceded by a prefatory letter, on which I thought it necessary to offer a few words of remark. Copies, six in number, of these several papers, are inclosed herewith for your Lordship's information.

The large amount of transport and supplies required by General Vivian, doubtless on sufficient grounds, for landing and moving forward a force of more than 40,000 men, and the delays inseparable from so extensive an operation, suggested another and more expeditious mode of proceeding, which General Mansfield threw upon paper for my consideration and that of the Turkish Ministers. It is inclosed herewith. I lost no time in submitting it, together with General Vivian's papers, to the Seraskier Pasha; and for the guidance of General Mansfield in communicating them to his Excellency, I drew up the accompanying minute of the points which it was important to keep distinctly in view.

General Mansfield has since reported to me the substance of what passed in conversation between the Seraskier and himself. It leaves me nothing to add for the present, and joined with the papers previously enumerated, will serve, I imagine, to put your Lordship in full possession of all that has taken place on the important subject in question, as well as of the views entertained by the Porte, and the means required, and in part commanded, for carrying them into effect.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 51.

Lieutenant-General Vivian to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Turkish Contingent, Head-Quarters,
Buyukdéré, July 3, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my letter of yesterday's date, I do myself the honour to submit to your Excellency, memorandums from the Deputy Quartermaster-General and Commissariat Departments, on the means of conveyance for an army of 25,000 men, to be moved to the coast of Asia.

These documents give a proximate idea of the general requirements of the army for both sea and land transport, and your Excellency will be enabled to judge whether, with the aid it is intended to seek, the Turkish Government will have at its disposal the means indispensably necessary for carrying out a movement of such importance.

I do not entertain a doubt of the advantage of the proposed measure, provided it can be efficiently arranged; but it appears to me to be useless to go further into the subject until it be known whether shipping in sufficient number can be permanently made over to me for the expedition.

There can, however, be no objection to preparing the contingent as far as practicable, and therefore I shall be ready to send officers to Varna to take

charge of the division which it is intended to hand over to me at that place, as soon as I am informed of the period when the troops are expected to arrive there.

I presume that the Turkish Government can in like manner make all the preparatory arrangements for collecting the force they propose placing at my disposal, and I will at once use my utmost endeavours to complete my land transport corps for the contingent; and I should be glad to be informed what means of transport and commissariat resources may be at the disposal of the Turkish Government for the remaining portion of the troops that are to join, as your Lordship will observe that my estimate is made for 25,000 men only.

I have, &c.

(Signed) S. VIVIAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 51.

Memorandum.

Buyukdéré, July 2, 1855.

Confidential Memorandum on the means of Conveyance and requirements of an Army of 25,000 men, to be moved from the Bosphorus to the Coast of Asia.

WHEREVER it may be decided to convey a force of this magnitude, the amount of sea-transport will be the same, with this modification, that, should it be decided to make a descent in the neighbourhood of the enemy, the landing would be necessarily simultaneous; but if at a secure place, the troops might be conveyed by detachments.

The amount of tonnage in either case would be the same, but fewer vessels would be required in the latter.

Assuming that the army would be required to act on the offensive away from the sea-coast immediately on disembarking, it should be accompanied by the necessary Cavalry, Artillery, and transport animals.

For a corps of 25,000 men, there may be estimated as follows:

	Horses.
For guns - - - - -	1,200
Cavalry - - - - -	4,000
Reserve musket ammunition - - -	2,000
Tents - - - - -	1,000
Ambulance - - - - -	500
Engine and pontoon team - - -	500
Officers - - - - -	800
Transport for provision - - - -	5,000
Total - - - -	15,000

The number of transport animals are calculated for the carriage of provisions and barley for three days to be constantly present with the army, for one relay returning to the depôts, and one moving from the depôts.

It is evident the number is under-estimated, for as the army increased their distance from the base of operations several relays of horses would be required.

The ammunition reserve is calculated for 200 rounds a man for 20,000 men.

A rough estimate of the transport required may be stated as for:

Infantry.—20 vessels capable of containing 1,000 each.

Cavalry.—150 vessels capable of the transport required for the conveyance of one month's provisions and forage, which may be estimated at 3,000 tons of shipping.

Taking the accidents, delays, difficulties in loading and unloading, and other demands which would subsequently be made on this shipping, into consideration, it may safely be said that this amount should be doubled.

This latter tonnage must be entirely at the disposal of the Lieutenant-

General, or no reliance could be placed on the supply of the troops being maintained.

Preparations should be made immediately to ensure a supply of flat-bottomed boats, without which neither Cavalry nor Artillery can be embarked or disembarked; thirty should be at once provided.

A safe and commodious harbour accessible and capable of giving shelter in all weather is absolutely essential to the safety of the expedition.

The nature of the harbour at Redout-Kalé, if one exists, should be accurately ascertained.

The mouth of the River Rhion, by which it is stated there is water communication with Kutais, is some miles south of Redout-Kalé; is it known if there is an anchorage or shelter there? Is there a bar? Or supposing there is shelter for shipping at Redout-Kalé, can boats enter the Rhion at all seasons?

No reliance can be placed on obtaining any resources at Redout-Kalé, and should provisions or transport animals be obtainable on that coast they would be sent by sea; the same amount of sea transport would, therefore, be required whether they were collected here or not.

If there are to be collected here, three months is about the earliest date at which a sufficient number of animals could be obtained to enable the army to take the field. It would hardly be possible to obtain 1,000 a-week, which would take nine weeks under the most favourable circumstances. Should the army be collected at Kutais at an earlier period, it could not, therefore, move from thence before the end of September.

Considerable time would be required to form magazines of camp equipments, boots, blankets, great coats, &c.: none at present exist with this force, nor has the ambulance, engineer park, or pontoon trains arrived.

Under favourable circumstances, with all the details previously arranged, it would take about ten days to embark this force.

(Signed) E. R. WETHERALL.

Inclosure 3 in No. 51.

Estimate.

Estimate of Supplies for a Turkish Army of 24,000 men and 1,000 European natives; 4,000 Cavalry and 1,000 Artillery Horses; and 11,000 Pack-Animals—which includes charges for 40 days:

	lbs.
Biscuits - - - -	1,400,000
Rice - - - -	300,000
Salt Meat (from England) - -	40,000
Sugar - - - -	4,500
Coffee - - - -	2,600
Butter - - - -	35,500
Lentils - - - -	50,000
Oil - - - -	7,000 (875 gallons)
Soap - - - -	7,000
Candles - - - -	7,000
Do. Composite - - -	250
Salt - - - -	50,000
Onions - - - -	50,000
Barley for Forage - - -	6,500,000
Tobacco - - - -	

For these supplies it will require about 5,500 tons of shipping.

The biscuit, rice, salt meat, sugar, and coffee could probably be supplied from the depôt at Constantinople. The other articles must be purchased. Fresh meat could probably be obtained on the coast, in the immediate neighbourhood; and for this purpose three cattle-steamers will be required. For hay or chopped straw the army must depend upon the resources of the country.

It will be necessary to provide immediately at the place of landing ample storeroom and ample space for Commissary purposes. Immediate steps should also be taken to establish depôts at Batoom and Trebizond. In addition to the above supplies, the shipping should be provided for about the same period of forty days, to victual the troops when embarked; but the arrangements for this purpose rest with the naval authorities. The estimate for money is not here entertained; but if the contemplated movement takes place, the Deputy Commissary-General must draw bills direct upon the Treasury for the payment of supplies and other services.

Commissariat, Turkish Contingent,
Buyukdéré, July 2, 1855.

(Signed) R. ADAMS.

N.B. Lord Raglan's army of 25,000 men had four steamers and eight landing vessels.

Inclosure 4 in No. 51.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to General Vivian.

Therapia, July 2, 1855.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated this day.

As the Turkish Ministers have it in view to employ your corps in the operation to which your letter refers, I thought it desirable that you should confer with them; and after receiving their confirmation of what I had told you the evening before, that you should state in full the nature and amount of the means which you conceive to be necessary for carrying eventually into effect their intended project.

The information for which, in concert with them, I look to your experience and military judgment, was not so much relative to the expediency of their plan, or to the command of means required for its execution, as to the means themselves, taken with reference to the force which could be employed, the country in which it would have to act, and the object to which it would be directed.

I understand from your letter, that with an army of 45,000 men you would hardly think of landing at Redout-Kalé, without having their full complement of stores, both Ordnance and Commissariat, with land transport ready for its advance. You add, that sea transport to a very large extent, security for continued independence of action, and an abundant command of money, would be necessary throughout your operations; and you reserve whatever relates to arming, clothing, and rationing such portion of the army as would not be included in the Contingent.

The question at issue is so urgent, that I have thought it my duty to bring the leading points under your immediate consideration. I hope you will find yourself at liberty to meet my wishes as fully as the pressing interests of the situation would seem to require.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 51.

Lieutenant-General Vivian to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Turkish Contingent, Head-Quarters,
Buyukdéré, July 3, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 2nd instant, marked confidential, by which I am informed that the Turkish Ministers, in concert with your Excellency, desire from me in my military capacity not so much an opinion on the expediency of the proposed plan, and the command of means required for its execution, as a report on the means themselves with reference to the force to be employed, the country in which it is to act, and the object to which it is to be directed.

At the time my letter, of yesterday's date, No. 39, was written, the limit within which the report expected from me was to be confined had not been prescribed, and I thought it advisable, pending the preparation of documents in detail on transport and Commissariat, to bring to your Lordship's notice some points which appeared to me of vital importance in reference to the contemplated expedition.

Some time prior to the receipt of your Lordship's letter now under acknowledgment, I this morning forwarded reports which convey a general idea of the amount of transport required to move an army of 25,000 men to the locality proposed for their operations, and the Commissariat stores required for their supply on landing.

To enter more minutely into the subject, much information in detail must be obtained, and with this view I request your Excellency will be so good as to render such assistance as you may be enabled to give by putting me in communication with persons who have a local knowledge of the country, and from whom I may learn some particulars as to the strength and position of the enemy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) S. VIVIAN.

Inclosure 6 in No. 51.

Lieutenant-General Vivian to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Turkish Contingent, Head-Quarters,
Buyukdére, July 3, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose a further memorandum as to the requirements of an army of 25,000 men proceeding on an expedition such as is proposed, and I request, with your Lordship's permission, that M. E. Pisani will be so good as to forward it to the Seraskier Pasha.

I have, &c.
(Signed) S. VIVIAN.

Inclosure 7 in No. 51.

Memorandum.

Schedule of the requirements of the army of 25,000 Kurds, whom it is proposed to land in Asia.

Before leaving their respective quarters—

From the Turkish Government.

New clothing and equipment, nearly all, as far as can be seen, being nearly worn out.
New arms.
New accoutrements, or to be required.
Shoes, from 30,000 to 40,000 pairs.
Ammunition, 6,100,000 rounds.
Caps or flints.
Seven Artillery batteries, to be rendered serviceable.
Ammunition for seven batteries.

The Commissariat will require—

Two months' supply of provisions.
An immediate establishment of depôts at Batoom and Trebizond.
A permanent establishment of steamers and sailing-vessels, including three cattle steamers.
Preparation at the place of landing of ample store-room, and space for for Commissariat purposes, or a certainty of there being such.

The country being hostile, the army must take everything with it. It will therefore require—

Twenty vessels for Infantry (1,000 men each).

One hundred and fifty vessels (100 horses each), for 15,000 horses of all descriptions, giving transport for three days' provisions.

Thirty flat-bottomed boats.

A small tug steamer, to tug boats to the shore.

For one month's provision, 3,000 tons; and for ditto on board ship for use on casualties, 3,000 tons. Total, 6,000.

Inclosure 8 in No. 51.

Minute.

GENERAL VIVIAN'S estimates to be communicated to the Seraskier Pasha.

His Excellency to be asked how far the Porte can undertake to answer for furnishing the various objects of transport, supply, &c., and in what time.

The new plan to be submitted to him in consideration of the time required for preparation, and the urgency of giving relief to Kars.

His opinion of its merits to be ascertained.

It is to be distinctly understood that the idea of beginning by an advance of troops on Kutais, and the construction of an entrenched camp at or near Redoute-Kaleh, is not to be taken as a substitution for the original plan, but rather as a commencement, leading eventually to the execution of the whole.

Can the Seraskier provide a battering train to accompany the first advance of troops?

Can he provide the necessary boats for the conveyance of heavy guns to Kutais?

If the half of the contingent now encamped proceeds to Redoute-Kaleh, will measures be taken at once for repairing and organizing the other half of it completely, and preparing the other troops intended to form part of the ulterior expedition?

Let it be clearly understood that the assent of Her Majesty's Government is a necessary condition of the enterprise, and that reference be also made at a proper moment to the Commanders-in-chief of the allied forces in the Crimea.

Notice of the plan in contemplation is already on its way to London.

Therapia, July 4, 1855.

Inclosure 9 in No. 51.

Report of an Interview between the Seraskier Mehmet Rushti and Brigadier-General Mansfield, July 4, 1855.

IN the first place the Seraskier alluded to some details regarding the contingent under the command of Lieutenant-General Vivian. He said 6,000 stand of arms (percussion) had actually been sent to that officer, as well as a large quantity of new clothing. That it was the habit of the Government to supply the troops every four months with shoes, and that on service the men in general preferred walking in a sort of sandal. A band of music which had been asked for by General Vivian was also ready, but that there had been a little difficulty about this in consequence of the battalions forming the contingent having been drafted from different regiments, thus leaving only one band for each regiment, which consists of several battalions.

The Seraskier, who seemed much pleased at the energy displayed by his Government, the object of the relief of the army of Kars being one to which he is evidently most keenly alive, said at once, "I have written the order for Ismail Pasha, who commanded in Bulgaria, to hold in immediate readiness to march, 15,000 soldiers, viz., 10,000 to complete the contingent, and 5,000 as a supplementary force, to be attached to it in the camp at Varna, for the expedition."

On my touching on the question of arms he said, after supplying General Vivian's contingent at Buyukderé, or about 8,000 Infantry, there still remained 7,000 percussion muskets for those to be collected at Varna. He then sent for the letter he had written to Ismail Pasha, and in my presence added a postscript, directing that officer to send 4,000 Minié rifles with the troops held in readiness for service.

I then submitted the estimates of General Vivian for the transport and supply of an army of 25,000 men, and they are now in the hands of the Seraskier for the consideration of the Council of Ministers this day.

The Seraskier said distinctly, "I can undertake for the supply of an army of 40,000. I have one month's supply here ready, and in a few days another will be ready. The only difficulty is in procuring steam-transport. We are taking heavy guns out of our ships and making the latter transports for stores, &c. But the Council will consider all this in the discussion on General Vivian's estimates, and exact details, shall be afforded in writing."

The plan drawn up by me for the consideration of his Excellency Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe was then read, viz., to dispatch the troops by detachments to save transport, of which there is a deficiency, the first detachment consisting of about 10,000 men. The men in the neighbourhood of Batoom, to the amount of 12,000, to be concentrated at Redoute-Kaleh. On the first detachment being landed, a forward movement of 22,000 men to be made immediately on Kutais; engineers being left at Redoute-Kaleh to trace and establish an intrenched camp, the labourers of the country being called in to assist their work. The first detachment being landed, the ships to return and take up the remainder of the force as it could be got ready, and to land it by battalions at the camp.

I explained that the object of this was at once to render available for the relief to the army of Kars, the resources and troops actually now ready, and not to interfere with the ultimate and larger objects of the expedition. That it was the opinion of Her Majesty's Ambassador that the plan was feasible, but that it would be necessary to use the utmost diligence, both in throwing forward the force and in providing the supports, transports, and supplies.

To all this the Seraskier agreed most joyfully. He said it was exactly his own idea, which he had two days before expressed at the Council of Ministers. It was the only chance for the army of Kars. There was a canal from Poti to Redoute-Kaleh, the entrance of which had been stopped up by the Russians when Redoute-Kaleh was evacuated by them. Poti, being out of range from the fire of shipping, is still held by them. He believed there are two battalions there now. The concentration of the men at Redoute-Kaleh would probably cause its evacuation; at all events, it must be taken.

I agreed to this.

The Seraskier quite understands that the first advance on Kutais, as has been detailed, is not a substitute for the larger plan.

There are fifty guns of different calibre for siege purposes at Batoom, of 5, 7, and 9 okes respectively; 5 okes being taken as the equivalent of 12 lbs.

Twenty heavy guns will be immediately put in a state of readiness at the arsenal in Pera, for the service of a siege.

Plenty of boats can be procured at Batoom and Trebizond for conveyance of stores and guns on the River Rion, when Poti has been taken. It is only a question of paying the boatmen. There will be no difficulty in that respect.

I then informed his Excellency that Her Majesty's Ambassador had communicated to the British Government on the subject, and that it would be necessary to do the same in due time with the allied commanders. Without the consent of the former the enterprise could not proceed.

The Seraskier replied, "Of course not; the contingent could not be employed by the Porte without the consent of Her Majesty's Government, and it is as absolutely necessary for the Turkish Government to communicate with Omer Pasha, as it is for the English to advise with the Generals in the Crimea. But, in the mean time, there need be no delay, and all the preparations are in progress." Five ships (steamers) have been already procured. The Tunisian Horse have arrived. There is the greatest diligence in collecting provisions. Orders have been issued for the collection of 5,000 baggage animals.

All the reports received by the Turkish Government are to the effect that

the Russian forces are in very slender numbers in that country, where the first operations would take place.

I concluded by recommending secresy; that I should wish to be furnished, for the information of Her Majesty's Ambassador, with as many details regarding the country and resources as possible, and particularly with regard to roads and the defences of Kutais.

This the Seraskier promised, but doubted whether a Georgian officer and deserter from the Russian service, now in his employ, who knows the whole country, was sufficiently trustworthy; but he would see about it.

I then complimented him on the appearance of the camp, of the contingent, which I had seen that day, and the good understanding between the officers and men, and took my leave.

(Signed) J. W. MANSFIELD,
Brigadier-General.

No. 52.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 572.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July* 16, 1855.

I HAVE received this morning your Excellency's despatch No. 483 of the 5th instant and its inclosures, in continuation of your despatches No. 476 and 477, on the subject of the proposed expedition to Redoute-Kaleh, and from thence to Kutais.

I have already stated to your Excellency, in my despatch No. 561 of the 13th instant, and in my telegraphic despatch of the following day, the objections entertained by Her Majesty's Government to the proposed operations; and those objections are not removed, but on the contrary rather strengthened, by the papers inclosed in your despatch No. 483, because it appears that the troops to be sent forward in the first instance would have to be detained for some time in the unhealthy country between Redoute-Kaleh and Kutais.

Her Majesty's Government would still recommend that whatever force is sent for the relief of the army at Kars should proceed to Trebizond; but it might perhaps be advantageous to send a force to Anapa, to move on from thence and take possession of the passes of Vladi Kaucos in cooperation with the Circassians, and thus cut off all communication between Russia and Georgia.

If, indeed, Omer Pasha, who we understand is about to proceed to Constantinople, should determine to take any part of his own army, with Tunisians and Albanians, to Redoute-Kaleh, Her Majesty's Government would have nothing to say to that proceeding; but as regards the Contingent under General Vivian and General Beatson's Horse, Her Majesty's Government abide by their opinion that they should be directed through Trebizond or Erzeroom.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 53.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 293.)

My Lord, *Berlin, July* 14, 1855.

THE "National Zeitung," a liberal journal of this town, has published in its columns of yesterday, a letter from their private correspondent at St. Petersburgh, of which I forward to your Lordship herewith a *précis* in translation.

Although I cannot vouch for the authenticity of the information it reports with respect to the commercial wealth and importance which the towns of Berdiansk and Rostoff, on the Sea of Azof, have lately acquired, I am disposed to attach credence to it, inasmuch as it appears to have been derived from the

Russian official organs, whose object at the present moment would rather be to conceal than to exaggerate the losses which Russia has sustained by the total annihilation of her commerce in that sea.

I have, &c,
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 53.

Précis of an Article inserted in the "National Zeitung" of July 13, 1855.

(Translation.)

PRIVATE reports from Taganrog state that three churches in that town have suffered considerably, in one of which a shell had damaged the altar.

Wherever (says the report) flags were hoisted to designate the buildings and hospitals—and this applies more especially to the old citadel—the roofs and walls remained uninjured, but all others were literally riddled like a sieve. The report of General Todtleben, who has hitherto conducted the defence of Sebastopol, having been wounded, has created a great anxiety at St. Petersburgh. The bombardment of Gros Tschorn and Krasnajarjorka by the English, had also created great sensation. Nevertheless the enemy only directed their forces against the property of the State. Neither of these places have suffered damage.

The report then reproduces, from Russian journals, some details with respect to the commercial importance of the towns of Berdiansk and Rostoff. The former, it states, was little else thirty years ago than a fishing village, but produced to the country the last year before the war a revenue of 4,000,000 of silver roubles. The latter enjoyed considerable commerce from the fairs held there in spring and autumn. In the autumn were brought thither Russian manufactures—woollens, cotton, silk, and leather—to the value of 1,200,000 silver roubles, as also wine from the Crimea. The spring fair had greatly increased, by the development of the navigation of the Don. Foreign merchandize at the fair was in the proportion of $\frac{2}{5}$. The export trade of Rostoff had become the greatest lever to the development of agricultural cultivation in Southern Russia. Odessa firms often brought produce here for ready money fourteen months in advance, which is brought here in enormous masses, sure of a sale. Rostoff had become the central point for the produce of the district of Rostoff; of the military colonies of the Don and of the Black Sea; of Sebastopol, and of the Governments of the districts of the Wolga. In Rostoff, where formerly there was not a single foreign commercial house, eight very large ones had been established. The difference between the commercial revenue of the years 1836 and 1853 is most clearly seen from the account of the Ministerial papers, which gives an increase to the export trade for the last year of 20,722,000 silver roubles to foreign countries, and of 3,428,000 silver roubles to Russia. For the last month the export trade has been almost nothing.

No. 54.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 295. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, July* 14, 1855.

I ASKED Baron Manteuffel last night if he had heard anything from Vienna of the effect which had been produced by his last communication, reported in my despatch No. 284 of the 7th instant. His Excellency replied, that he believed the Austrian Cabinet were dissatisfied with it, and observed that Count Esterhazy, who had called on him just before his departure on leave of absence, had used every argument he could find to promote the adhesion of the Prussian Government to the policy which had been pursued by the Cabinet of Vienna, and to the communication which it was proposed to make at Frankfort, but that he had not given him the least encouragement to infer that Prussia was disposed, under present circumstances, to modify her policy.

Baron Manteuffel said further, that the language of Count Esterhazy was

so urgent, that he is inclined to believe that some attempt will be made during the King's stay at Erdmansdorff, in Silesia, by means, perhaps, of a special mission from Vienna, to persuade His Majesty to yield, but he hopes to be able to prevent His Majesty from doing so, and has obtained a promise from him that, in the event of any such special mission being announced, he will send for him.

Your Lordship is aware that any influence which the Queen of Prussia and General Gerlach can exercise over the King's mind will be in favour of a concession to Austria, and it is not improbable that this opportunity will be taken advantage of to promote their object.

I have, indeed, good reason to believe that efforts were made by the Court party, when a visit to Erdmansdorff was first proposed to the King, to overcome His Majesty's objections in order to bring about a meeting with the Emperor of Austria, who was about that time to pass the Prussian frontier on his return to Vienna from his late military inspection, and there is no doubt that the object of the Russian party here at this moment is to endeavour to effect a reconciliation with Austria, and afterwards to lay the foundation of a common understanding between the three Northern Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 55.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 30.) *Vienna, July 11, 1855.*

My Lord,

I DID did not fail to communicate to Brigadier-General Craufurd your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of the 5th instant, directing him to take leave of the Emperor and return to England.

General Craufurd and General Letang yesterday forwarded through Count Buol their applications for an audience in order to take leave of his Imperial Majesty, but no day has as yet been fixed for their reception.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 56.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 32.) *Vienna, July 11, 1855.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, in translation, an article from the "Austrian Correspondence," commenting upon the speech of the Emperor Napoleon on opening the session of the Corps Législatif.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

Inclosure in No. 56.

Extract from the "Vienna Gazette" of July 7, 1855.

(Translation.)

A SPEECH from the Throne, delivered either at the opening or at the close of the session of a Legislative Assembly, belongs, from its very nature, to the internal politics of a country. Whatever a Sovereign may deem it right to communicate to his people, or to their Representatives, bears the character of a conversation in a family circle, even when relations with a foreign State are touched upon. The point of view, therefore, from which a document of this kind must be criticized is quite different from that

from which an international State paper must be submitted to public examination.

This consideration not only points out to the foreign critic the proper boundary for his criticism, but it enables him to weigh, without prejudice, a mode of representation calculated from certain definite points of view.

No one, as experience has shown, more thoroughly understands the character of the French nation and its peculiarities than the illustrious Prince who has saved France from the abyss of a revolution. All the more, therefore, are addresses of the Emperor Napoleon to be looked upon as calculated specially for his people.

As, however, in the late speech from the French Throne, mention is several times made of Austria, it may not be out of place, with all due deference to the illustrious organ from which it emanates, and which gives to those expressions a peculiar weight, to comment upon some passages in the same, so far at least as they touch upon historical facts.

We can safely leave to the judgment of the public, who are in possession of the facts, the question as to who it was that saved Turkey and forced the Russian army to evacuate the Principalities; whether this result was alone due to the victories of the Anglo-French arms, or whether, in some degree at least, "strategical grounds," this side the Austrian frontier, contributed to it.

As regards the Austrian proposition of which the French speech treats, its object was that the Russian fleet in the Black Sea should not again reach the numbers which it counted previous to the commencement of the war.

The difference in principle between reaching ("atteindre"), and passing ("dépasser"), is so clear—its importance so great—that on the very ground of this difference the first Plenipotentiaries of the Western Powers declared themselves ready to support, at their respective Courts, the point in question.

The difference here pointed out is however practically set right by the article printed in the French "Moniteur," simultaneously with the publication of the Emperor's speech, and which reproduces the Austrian proposition in its correct form.

The omission in the speech of the important fact of the counterbalance to the possible augmentation of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea before the attainment of the specified maximum provided for by the Austrian proposal, is likewise supplied by the article in the "Moniteur."

As we stated before, these remarks are only intended to demonstrate the proposition with which we started—that addresses of Sovereigns to the Representatives of the nations over which they rule cannot be criticized from the same point of view as international State papers.

If we turn from this to the question as to whether Austria is holding back from the engagements to which she had pledged herself, it will be sufficient for our purpose to quote the two Articles in the Treaty of Alliance of the 2nd of December which bear upon the subject:

"Article V.—In the event of the general peace not being restored upon the basis fixed by Article I, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, His Majesty the Emperor of the French, and Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, &c., will, without delay, deliberate upon the most effectual means for the attainment of the object of their alliance.

"Art. III.—In the event of the breaking out of hostilities between Austria and Russia, their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, &c., &c., respectively promise to each other their offensive and defensive alliance, &c., &c."

The Protocol of the 28th of December had declared that the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea was to cease. The Austrian proposition fulfilled this condition, according to the testimony of the Ambassadors of England and France. The basis of peace stipulated for in the Treaty was thereby obtained. The propositions of the Imperial Cabinet can never be described as insufficient if placed in natural and necessary connexion with the draft of Treaty simultaneously projected, which declared an increase in the Russian fleet in the Black Sea up to the point at which it was before the breaking out of the war as an act of aggression against Europe. It is true that a form humiliating to Russia was avoided, but all that the Protocol of December really required was obtained.

It must be granted that the Western Powers had kept to themselves the

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right to demand further conditions, but there was no obligation for Austria, either morally or by Treaty, to back these further demands.

Each of the Contracting Parties has exercised its right. No claims founded on right have been violated, none have remained unfulfilled, and the common objects of the alliance remain the same.

No. 57.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July* 18.)

(No. 47.)

Stockholm, July 6, 1855.

My Lord,

GENERAL NORDIN, in a despatch dated the 23rd ultimo, which was forwarded by way of Germany, and which reached this Government subsequently to one of the 26th sent by the Finland post, mentions that Count Nesselrode had again alluded to the rejection by Great Britain and France of the last Vienna proposals for carrying into effect the third point of the basis of negotiation, and stated that the allied Governments had thereby rendered a most important service to Russia, and relieved her from a most embarrassing position, for His Imperial Majesty would never have consented to accept the terms proposed. I mention this renewed statement of the Russian Chancellor, though, beyond confirming what I had the honour to report to your Lordship in my despatch No. 46, it contains nothing to weaken the doubts I ventured to express as to its sincerity.

The news of the repulse on the 18th ultimo of the attack of the allies on the Malakoff and Redan Towers at Sebastopol, was known at St. Petersburgh when General Nordin wrote on the 23rd, and had produced great exultation, the more so as very lively apprehensions had been for some time felt at St. Petersburgh as to the fate of Sebastopol. The Emperor had ordered a *Te Deum* to be celebrated on the occasion, and the mourning for the late Emperor to be laid aside for twenty-four hours.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

No. 58.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July* 18.)

(No. 489.)

Therapia, July 6, 1855.

My Lord,

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL VIVIAN has now in camp under his command about 10,000 men, including Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery. Of the latter arm there are four batteries of six guns each. The remaining half of the contingent is ready to be detached from the Bulgarian army, and also to be placed under General Vivian's command. The General is satisfied with the soldiers in his camp. There is reason to presume that those in Bulgaria are not inferior. Thus the whole contingent is composed of troops of the Line, already well drilled and exercised, in part even of those who have engaged the enemy. According to the Convention, 5,000 of the men might have been Redifs.

General Beatson is at the head of about 1,000 horse; 3,000 more have been collected by his officers. Their reports and those of the Consuls justify a belief that not only the additional thousand required to complete his corps, but that many thousands more, might be obtained if such were the pleasure of Her Majesty's Government.

There is every appearance of the whole force being ready for service in the field before the end of next month, provided the means of transport can be obtained, and Her Majesty's Government be not backward in providing whatever is still to come from them. General Beatson complains of the want of British officers for his troops, and the deficiency of their transport has been and still is a great cause of delay. Medical men are also wanted, and General Beatson owes to General Vivian the loan of several.

Referring to your Lordship's despatch No. 389 of the 21st May, I beg to observe that no intention of requiring the active services of the contingent in the early part of this campaign appears to have been communicated officially either to the Turkish authorities or to Her Majesty's Embassy, and that no arrangements were made or signified to me for giving effect to that Article of the Convention which stipulated that certain particulars, essential to the formation of the contingent, should be arranged by a Commission of officers appointed respectively by the Contracting Parties. It is incumbent on me to add that my application to head-quarters on points relating to the progress of the contingent did not, for some good reason, I presume, elicit the desired information.

With respect to Omer Pasha, whose disinclination "to spare a man for service in the contingent" had been known to your Lordship "from authentic sources," I must refer to the statements of Colonel Simmons in his more recent correspondence. The Pasha's assurances are favourable, but he suggests difficulties, which have not originated here, and he intimates apprehensions for which, I believe, there is very little foundation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 59.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July* 18.)

(No. 492.)

Therapia, July 8, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to forward to your Lordship, in copy, with my despatch No. 372 of the 2nd of May, an official note which I addressed a short time before to the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs respecting various acts of criminal and sanguinary violence which had of late occurred in several parts of the Turkish Empire.

Fuad Pasha was at first not disposed to close with my proposal of instituting a joint inquiry into the facts on which my appeal was grounded. He intended apparently to answer, and perhaps, as he thought, to refute, my allegations. But the very serious language which I held upon the subject with the view of its reaching his ears, was not thrown away upon him, and after a while he offered to go into the inquiry himself. An interview took place in consequence between us, and the result of our discussion was a promise on his part to inform me of whatever had been done by the Porte to redress the grievances pointed out to him, and to inflict due punishment on the offenders. He did not seek to question the truth of my statements, or in general to shrink from the consequences which followed on the admission of their correctness. But he naturally tried to exonerate the Porte from any charge of injustice or indifference, and intimated that the crimes of which I complained were not attributable to the Mussulmans alone.

I have since occasionally endeavoured to obtain a further communication, and at length I have received, through M. Pisani, a reply to the following effect.

Documents relating to the commission of crimes in Bulgaria and the judicial proceedings thereon are in course of translation, and will be communicated to me forthwith.

The Bashi-Bozouks, who had murdered more than twenty Greek primates not far from Salonica, were condemned to penalties which I had thought inadequate, but six of them had died in prison, and two, who remained, were still in confinement.

The new Pasha of Thessaly, who had formerly filled the office of Minister of Police at Constantinople, and subsequently that of Mushir in Candia, would be charged on his arrival at Larissa to correct the evils which I had pointed out, and to settle, in particular, that grievance of the "soubashies" to which Mr. Blunt has drawn attention in his correspondence.

I am assured by Fuad Pasha that the Governor of Damascus, who is recently appointed, has been instructed to institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the massacre which, as your Lordship knows, took place in a village

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near that city several months ago, and that the Porte, having received no answer, engages to repeat its orders.

With respect to the troubles in Syria, instructions have been issued to form a militia for the protection of the peaceable inhabitants; and Jerusalem is placed under the authority of the Mushir of Saida.

As to those in Kurdistan, the Porte is stated to be waiting for information which the authorities of that country have been directed to send.

In Albania the numerous villages in the districts of Paramythia and Saffligre, for which the compassion and justice of the Porte have been so frequently claimed by Mr. Saunders and Mr. Longworth, are relieved for the present from the obligation of paying their taxes.

The Turkish Minister is of opinion that in Bosnia force must be employed before the country can be brought into a state of dutiful and permanent order.

At Scutari the Pasha has been removed for misconduct in the affair of the Buluk-bashee who ill-treated a Greek tchorbadjee, and the offender has been summoned again to Constantinople for trial.

Such is the substance of Fuad Pasha's reply to my official note. It implies in more instances than one, if not an inclination at the Porte to connive at the grievances complained of, at least a want of vigour in preventing, investigating and redressing them. The authorities are not entirely without excuse. The war operates as a great hindrance to improvement, and even to regular administration, in the provinces. More, however, may be done; and I hope by repeated endeavours and unwearied perseverance to extort gradually a more substantial measure of justice from the Turkish Government. In cases where British rights and British interests are not directly concerned, we can hardly expect an immediate and complete success. It is much if we obtain an occasional instalment, and keep the Porte alive to the necessity of advancing, however slowly, towards a fairer dispensation of justice and a steadier application of the principles which it professes.

I shall have occasion to return before long to the subject of this despatch.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 60.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July* 18.)

(No. 499.)

Therapia, July 9, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE been of late several times under the necessity of recommending the dismissal of Turkish functionaries, in consequence of flagrant acts of misconduct on their part; and I observe, with concern, that even when the Porte is compelled to recognize the justice of my demand, there is an evident inclination to spare the offender as far as public decency will allow. I have therefore thought it my duty to insist, in one signal instance, that a formal and exemplary character should be given to the act of dismissal, and to urge strongly that the same principle shall be observed in dealing with other cases.

The officer whom I particularly marked out for public disgrace, is one who bears the title of "Monavin," or Assistant to the Council of Police. I received the most pointed complaints against him from Rear-Admiral Grey and from Her Majesty's Consul-General. I therefore required that his dismissal should be gazetted, with express reference to his failure in duty towards the British authorities. Fuad Pasha complied reluctantly, after some resistance, and not before I had appealed to the Grand Vizier.

Hussein Bey, whose dismissal was announced to your Lordship on good authority some time ago, is still in office. I am assured that the Porte's engagement to dismiss him will be ultimately fulfilled; but the object of the delay is to give a colouring to his disgrace by making it time with some kind of change in the office he holds. He is supported, in spite of his notorious unworthiness, by some secret influence in the Seraglio, and my efforts to make his retirement more exemplary have hitherto failed of success.

Osman Pasha is more completely sheltered for the present by an assertion conveyed to me officially from the Porte, that the paper on which I had grounded my charges against him, was not drawn up by him, but forwarded from a private source. Lord Napier's approaching visit to Salonica will, I hope, enable me to ascertain the truth of this excuse. Meanwhile I think it better to suspend my proceedings against the Mushir.

Akif Pasha, however culpable in his conduct, as described by Mr. Hughes, concluded by doing justice to the Christian girl, and promising the law's vengeance against her persecutors. Apprehensive that his dismissal under such circumstances might be interpreted as a proof of his having been disapproved for sanctioning the girl's emancipation, I have confined myself to requiring that he shall be strongly reprimanded by his Government, and compelled to redeem his pledge of bringing the offenders to justice.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 61.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July* 18.)

(No. 500. Confidential.)

Therapia, July 9, 1855.

My Lord,

INCLOSED herewith, in the form of a translated copy, is the draft of an instruction prepared for transmission to the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna, after it shall have received the Sultan's sanction. It relates to what has passed between Fuad Pasha and Baron Koller with reference to the present position of Austria towards Russia in the Principalities on the Danube, and to the wish expressed by Baron Koller that the Porte and her allies should place themselves in a corresponding position as to military operations in that quarter.

Conceiving it to be desirable that the Porte should record its opinion in a sense favourable to the rights of the belligerents, I offered the suggestion of an ostensible despatch to Aarif Effendi on the part of the Porte, and I hope your Lordship will approve of the step, and the manner in which Fuad Pasha is prepared to carry it into effect.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 61.

Draft of a Despatch to be addressed to the Ottoman Minister at Vienna.

(Translation.)

Constantinople, July 6, 1855.

BARON KOLLER has read to me confidentially a despatch received by him from Count Buol inclosing a despatch addressed to the Court of St. Petersburgh containing the opinion of the Austrian Cabinet respecting the breaking off of the Conferences of Vienna. The purport of it is as follows:—"After expressing regret at the rupture of the Conferences without being able to obtain the object desired, it states that Austria has notified in a definitive manner to the Cabinet of Russia that, while protecting the two Danubian Principalities held by her, if the Russian troops should be again in a position for invading those two Ottoman Provinces, the Austrian troops will oppose them, and likewise that, if they should again cross the Danube, Austria will consider it a *casus belli*. Moreover, that, although the rights and the engagements of the Sublime Porte are known and secure if the Ottoman troops and those of the allies were to cross the Danube, it would give rise to certain objections which would impair that *status* which Austria has to defend, and Austria expresses the desire which she entertains that that measure should be abstained from.

With reference, firstly, to the regret evinced by Austria at the breaking off of the Conferences, when the Sublime Porte and her allies were invited to discuss a pacification consistent with the dignity and the interests of all parties, they complied, and afforded proofs of the moderation of their views; and no

Power, likewise is more in a condition than Austria to appreciate the equity and the uprightness of their proceedings at the Conferences. It is well known from whence the obstacles to the desired result proceeded, and the Sublime Porte, in perfect accordance with her allies, participates in the regret evinced also by the Austrian Cabinet on this score.

The definitive intention notified by the Imperial Government of Austria in the event of Russia invading the Principalities or crossing the Danube, is a mark of her friendly disposition towards the Sublime Porte, and a natural result of the alliance between the Powers. The Porte has nothing to say on this subject but to express her satisfaction.

With reference to the observations and the desire expressed by Austria that the Ottoman troops and those of the allies should abstain from crossing the Danube, and carry the war to the other side, Austria was among the first to confirm and acknowledge the right of the Sublime Porte in this respect, and her engagements with her allies. It is the natural consequence of those rights and engagements that the Porte should be under the necessity of preserving full freedom of action together with her allies. Our allies are, moreover, united with us on this subject, and we do not entertain the smallest doubt that the Imperial Government of Austria will in her wisdom and equity appreciate the objections of the Sublime Porte to complying with this desire.

These observations were made to Baron Koller on receiving Count Buol's communication; but for the removal of all doubt that may arise on this subject, it is His Majesty the Sultan's orders that this communication should be conveyed through your Excellency to the Cabinet of Austria. You will, therefore, see Count Buol, and convey to him in full, confidentially, the present statement.

No. 62.

Telegraphic Despatch addressed to the Earl of Clarendon, dated Varna, July 18, 12·30 (day).

OMER PASHA has left the Crimea without loss of time to proceed to Constantinople without having been summoned by the Turkish Government.

He would reach Constantinople to-day. The motive of his leaving is not known here.

No. 63.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 581.)

Foreign Office, July 19, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve your Excellency's proceedings in urging the Porte to carry out its promised measures for repressing outrages in the Turkish provinces, as reported in your Excellency's despatch No. 492 of the 8th instant.

Her Majesty's Government are convinced that nothing but continued perseverance in the same course will bring the Porte to a sense of its true interests, by acting with vigour against criminal authorities, and with justice towards all classes of the Sultan's subjects.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 64.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 18.)

(No. 155.)

Copenhagen, July 14, 1855.

My Lord,

M. DE SCHEEL informs me, that according to the reports which he has received from Baron Plessen, great fears were entertained at St. Petersburgh for the safety of Sebastopol subsequently to the capture of the Mamelon, and that there was a general disposition to blame the measures adopted by Prince Gortchakoff for the defence of the fortress. This feeling had, however, been greatly, if not entirely removed, by the repulse of the allies on the 18th, and hopes were again entertained of a successful resistance.

As to the effect which might be produced on the feelings of the Russian Government and people by the eventual fall of the fortress, his Excellency said Baron Plessen did not expect, as far as an opinion could be formed from the language of the public at St. Petersburgh, that it would render Russia more disposed to accept the terms of the allies; and that he described the opinion as almost universal, that Russia could never have accepted the "humiliating" terms contained in the last Austrian proposal for the solution of the third point of guarantee discussed at Vienna; but M. de Scheel observed at the same time that it ought to be remembered that these opinions were expressed at St. Petersburgh after the rejection of the proposal by England and France.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 65.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 18.)

(No. 156. Confidential.)

Copenhagen, July 14, 1855.

My Lord,

HAVING been informed that a Danish traveller had arrived a few days ago from Riga, I sought an interview with one of his friends, and learnt that he had described the population there as being heartily tired of the war, and as suffering greatly from its consequences, though there was no apparent want of men or money at the disposal of the Government.

I requested my informant to see his friend again, with a view to obtain some further particulars; and I have the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, the copy of a memorandum embodying the result of his inquiries. I ought to add that the Danish traveller's sympathies are entirely Russian.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Inclosure in No. 65.

Memorandum.

MR. ——— has nothing further to communicate to Mr. Buchanan than what he verbally had the honour of doing on Wednesday, respecting the state of things in Riga, where it appears the depression of the population is very great, and peace eagerly wished for; but it must be borne in mind that native Russian feelings hardly can be expected in Riga from its original German nationality.

It appears the conscription presses most cruelly on the population everywhere; for on an estate of 400 souls, after deducting 200 for females, and 100 for old men and children too young to be enlisted, the amount of 8 or 10

per 1,000 souls are levied in proportion on the remaining 100, and yet youths of 16 and 17 years are taken as conscripts.

In the neighbourhood of Riga, at the beginning of July, there were about 50,000 men, but by the end of this month it was expected the number would amount to 150,000, principally militia. The demoralization in the army is excessive, and thefts on a large scale are the order of the day; and as a Major-General's pay is only 1,500 silver roubles annually, corruption and bribery pervade all grades of the army, now as much as ever.

Prince Suwarrow, Governor of the District, was fetched in a hurry from a dinner party last Sunday week, on a report being brought from the fortress that the English were in the act of landing, which however proved incorrect, and arose from two frigates having neared the land.

The harassing kind of war which the allies are following, causes great injury to the interests of Russia.

In private circles politics are freely discussed; and it is not expected Sebastopol will hold out long. The service of the Cossacks, who are very quick in their movements, is very severe, owing to the number of outposts.

The Government has plenty of money at its disposal.

No. 66.

Mr. Mugenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July* 18.)

(No. 52. Secret and Confidential.)

Stockholm, July 11, 1855.

My Lord,

UPON the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 21, Secret, of the 28th June, by the messenger Haviland, on the evening of the 4th instant, I lost no time in communicating with my French colleague, M. Lobstein, as to the course we were to pursue. I learnt from him that he had not received instructions from his Government of a similar nature to those your Lordship was pleased to forward to me in the above despatch, and though M. Lobstein thought it possible that he might receive them by the Lübeck steamer on the 8th, they have not yet reached him. It is, however, more than probable that they will be forwarded by Count de la Rochelambert, attached to the French Mission at this Court, at present on leave of absence, and they may reach this by the Stettin boat on the 12th, or by that from Lübeck on the 15th instant.

As I had already asked for an audience of the King to present to His Majesty Mr. Grey on his return here, my French colleague agreed with me that I had better avail myself of that opportunity to sound His Majesty as to his willingness to come to an arrangement of the nature sketched out by your Lordship in your despatch No. 21. His Majesty's occupation at the camp, and a military excursion which His Majesty made with five squadrons of Cavalry and a portion of the Horse Artillery to Gripsholm, from whence he only returned on the 9th instant, caused some delay in my audience, which took place yesterday afternoon, when Mr. Grey and myself were invited to dine with their Majesties at Haga.

I had previously made known to the King through Prince Oscar the general nature of the proposals which I was desirous of making to him, and though a dinner was not the most favourable opportunity for overtures of so important and delicate a nature, I felt pretty sure His Majesty would enable me to make them. I was not disappointed, for after dinner His Majesty took me into an inner room and invited me to sit down by him on the sofa.

I commenced our conversation by stating, that I believed His Majesty had been made acquainted by Prince Oscar with the nature of the proposals I was about to make; to which he replied that Prince Oscar had spoken to him on the subject, but he appeared to wish me to believe it had been in a very vague manner, and as if he was less aware of the real nature of those proposals than I think His Majesty really was.

I then said that I had brought with me your Lordship's instructions, and that I was prepared to adopt the course which seemed the least liable to error, and at the same time to be the most frank, namely, to show them to His

Majesty, though I expressed some doubt as to the possibility of doing so where we were.

His Majesty at once said there was no difficulty whatever, and having expressed his desire to see them, I placed in his hands your Lordship's despatch No. 21. He read it over with much attention, and dwelt some time on the last page, more, as it appeared to me, to collect his idea on the whole, than on the importance of that part of the despatch. He then returned it to me, merely observing at first that it was a most interesting and important communication. We subsequently had a conversation which lasted a considerable time, the substance of which I will endeavour to report to your Lordship.

His Majesty commenced by observing that he had always been desirous of intimate relations and alliance with Great Britain: the sympathies, the constitutional tendencies, and the interests of the two countries were identical, and thus offered the surest basis for such an alliance, and he appealed to my experience of the feelings of his people as a proof of his assertion. He dwelt upon the danger to Great Britain if Russia should succeed in obtaining a port in Finmark, and added that the Warranger Fiord would admirably suit her purpose, where it never froze, and where there existed every capability to make it the "Sebastopol of the north," which it would speedily become in the hands of Russia, at no great distance from the coast of Scotland. His Majesty then added such a fact was a proof that our interests were identical.

In replying to His Majesty, I at first dwelt on the proof of the friendly feelings which animated Her Majesty's Government towards Sweden in making proposals so advantageous to her as those I had just submitted to His Majesty, and offering so great security against the future ambitious projects of Russia—a security which was increased by the cordial concurrence of the French Government in those views. I added, that were we at peace with Russia, or if the present war was concluded before the termination of a Treaty securing Sweden from future aggressions of Russia in Finmark, great difficulty might be felt by both the British and French Governments in concluding such an arrangement; but His Majesty might be assured that if such an arrangement was once concluded, we never should shrink from its obligations. I further remarked, that though the ambitious projects of Russia might for the moment be laid aside, they were by no means abandoned, and would surely be brought forward at a future and more auspicious moment. The "fishery right" was, I said, merely a pretext for inserting the sharp point of the wedge, which would be driven home hereafter if such endeavours succeeded. I fairly admitted our interest and wish to prevent Russia from obtaining a port in Finmark. This interest is so self-evident, and is so strongly felt by His Swedish Majesty, that any denial of it would have appeared futile in his eyes, and possibly might have tended to weaken the "unlimited confidence" which His Majesty has been pleased, on more occasions than the present, to express in me.

The King mentioned as a proof the Russian Government desired to let the question slumber for the present, in order to renew it at a more favourable moment, that he had pressed, by frequent instructions to His Minister at St. Petersburgh, for a final settlement of the question, and that General Norden was always met by the answer that, at a moment when Russia was engaged in such a war, it was impossible to attend to so trivial a subject; and His Majesty said that a Norwegian Plenipotentiary, who came some time ago to Stockholm by his orders to treat the question, had waited here in vain four months for the arrival of the Russian negotiator.

His Majesty then admitted to me, that he regarded the conclusion of an arrangement such as I had submitted to him as the most important event which had occurred for the policy of the north of Europe since the commencement of the present war. He said that if the ambitious designs of Russia were checked in the south, she would endeavour by increased activity to obtain a compensation for that check in the north, and he authorised me to state to your Lordship his general acceptance of the principle of an arrangement of the nature I had proposed. He was, however, desirous of seeing the engagements we required, and the nature of the guarantees which we offered, detailed in the Secret Articles of a Treaty, to which he would give his best attention.

I told His Majesty that I had not touched upon this subject with his Minister for Foreign Affairs, before I learnt his own views on the subject, and he authorised me to speak to Baron Stierneld, which I shall not fail to do,

though it is possible I may not have an opportunity before the departure of the messenger, who has already been detained here longer than I could have wished. As my French colleague is still without instructions, I think it, however, the less important.

With regard to keeping both the proposal and the Treaty secret, His Majesty appeared to think it was our wish to adopt such a course; but upon my assuring him that such was not the case, and that although we would accede to such secrecy, if His Majesty desired, your Lordship's instructions stated "the manifestly aggressive intentions of Russia would fully justify His Swedish Majesty in resorting openly to this measure for his protection."

The King then said with great frankness, and with a courage which I think does him credit, that it was quite useless to endeavour to conceal such matters—they must be known a little sooner or later; the conclusion of such a Treaty was perfectly justifiable on his part, it was purely defensive; if no aggressive projects were cherished or put forward by Russia, it became "non avenu;" in the contrary case his precaution was at once justified; and finally, that he looked on concealment as unworthy of the three Powers parties to such a Treaty. His Majesty however desired that until the Treaty was finally concluded, the negotiations should be carried on in secrecy; a course which I ventured to assure him would meet with no objection on the part of your Lordship.

His Majesty finally adverted to the intimacy of his relations with Denmark, and the deference which His Danish Majesty had invariably shown for his opinions on all political questions since 1848; and inquired whether I thought it would be possible that Denmark might become a party to the proposed Treaty? He at the same time admitted that some difficulty might arise from Denmark's connection with the German Confederation, and appeared to me to put forward this idea more as a compliment to that country than as an essential condition. I answered, that the accession of Denmark to the Treaty could offer no greater security to Sweden than what we already proposed without her; that Great Britain had shown every disposition to protect Danish interests and integrity when menaced in the Schleswig-Holstein question; and that although I was unable to pronounce any opinion on the subject, I would not fail to bring it under your Lordship's notice. I may observe in doing so, that His Majesty did not appear to attach any great weight to his suggestion, or in any respect to make it a *sine qua non*. I hope that I am not mistaken in this opinion, for I should regard Denmark becoming a party to the Treaty as a most fruitful source of difficulties and delays.

I must observe that the King made no comment on the partial guarantee which was proposed in your Lordship's despatch, nor expressed any expectation that the guarantee should be general, and extend to the whole of his possessions. I think it, however, probable that such an expectation may be put forward by his Ministers when we enter more fully on the question, and I think it right to prepare your Lordship for it.

I have, I believe, reported the substance of His Majesty's conversation, and I am sure that I have stated correctly all the sense of the opinions which I have put into His Majesty's mouth.

Mr. Sampson, the British Vice-Consul at this place, returns to England on the 17th on private business, and I shall have by him a safe opportunity to report any conversation which I may have with Baron Stierneld on the subject of this despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

No. 67.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 53. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Stockholm, July 14, 1855.*

MY French colleague received by the Stettin steam-boat on the 12th instant, instructions dated the 1st similar to those which your Lordship was pleased to transmit to me in your secret despatch No. 21 of the 28th ultimo.

M. Lobstein called on me the following morning to compare our instructions, and to concert on the course we were to pursue.

The instructions forwarded to him by Count Walewski are identical with, and appear to have been translated from, those of your Lordship, though the introduction adverting to the former history of Finmark is more detailed.

We agreed, as I had already sounded the ground with the King, and obtained His Majesty's consent to the principle of the proposed arrangement, to bring it more formally before the Minister for Foreign Affairs; and M. Lobstein went from my house to the Foreign Office, where he saw Baron Stierneld. After having informed his Excellency that I had agreed with him not to bring the proposed arrangement to his notice until he, M. Lobstein, had received his instructions, but that I had mentioned the subject to the King when I lately had the honour to dine with their Majesties at Haga, M. Lobstein read to Baron Stierneld his instructions.

He informs me that Baron Stierneld received this communication at first with some signs of coldness, and appeared to wish to attach less importance to the danger and menace of the Russian fortifications of Bomarsund than Count Walewski attributed to them. His Excellency finally became more cordial, said he saw no objection to the proposed arrangement, and promised to confer with the King on the subject and to give M. Lobstein an answer at the weekly Conference on Monday next. I called at a later hour on the 13th at the Foreign Office, but was unable to see Baron Stierneld, who was engaged at a Cabinet Council. I requested Count Ehrensvärd to inform his Excellency that I had called, and begged him to fix an hour to see me on the following day.

His Excellency called on me early this day, when I read to him, slowly and distinctly, your Lordship's instructions, offering him at the same time, if he desired, to read them himself. He declined my offer, saying he perfectly understood them, and that they were precisely similar to those of M. Lobstein. He made no objection to accept, as His Majesty had already done, the principle of the proposed arrangement; but he added, that when your Lordship spoke of the "aggressions of Russia," he must say that no "aggressions had as yet been made." I replied at once that he was under a mistake. Your Lordship's expression was, "the manifestly aggressive intentions of Russia," and that that expression referred equally to Bomarsund and to Finmark. In that case, replied his Excellency, and if you refer to Bomarsund, I at once admit the correctness of the expression. I mention this more particularly to show that he did not with me make light of the danger or menace of Bomarsund. Our conversation was short, as Baron Stierneld was on his way to a Council of the Ministers, but he was very cordial, promised to confer with the King on the subject, and to give me an answer at the next Conference.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

No. 68.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 54. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Stockholm, July 16, 1855.*

IT was intimated to my French colleague that the King would probably wish to converse with him on the subject of his late communication to Baron Stierneld, which I adverted to in my preceding despatch, and M. Lobstein was accordingly invited to dinner at Haga yesterday. No other member of the diplomatic body was present, and no other stranger; and the Queen having withdrawn early after dinner with her suite, M. Lobstein was left alone with the King.

My French colleague adopted the same course which I had previously done, and put into the King's hands, for his perusal, Count Walewski's instructions. M. Lobstein has obligingly read to me his report of the King's observations, the substance of which is as follows:

After having carefully read the despatch, His Majesty commenced by

expressing his gratitude to the Emperor of the French for the proof of his friendly feelings evinced in the proposed arrangement. He then said, M. Lobstein had probably been acquainted by me that he had accepted the principle of the arrangement, and he did not mean to retract that acceptance. He had, however, since my communication, reflected deeply and fully (murement reffèchi) on the subject, and he was convinced that what our respective Governments aimed at could only be obtained by a defensive Treaty extending to all the Swedish and Norwegian possessions, and he accordingly desired that the proposed defensive Treaty should extend to both of those kingdoms. His Majesty said that if Russian projects of aggrandizement in the south were checked, that Power on the conclusion of peace would surely endeavour to obtain an equivalent by increasing her influence in the north. Our object then, he presumed, was to establish a barrier against such projects by strengthening and supporting Sweden. Were Russia to obtain possession of Gothland, she would at once command the Baltic; were she to obtain Landskrona—a port of which the captains of the English men-of-war who had sought refuge there this spring knew the value—she would command the Sound. His Majesty did not deny the great importance of our guaranteeing Finmark to Norway, but he said it was a subject little understood in Sweden, and he appealed to M. Lobstein whether he had heard it mentioned here as a subject of apprehension.

He was Sovereign of both countries, but he felt that the Crown of Sweden was by far the more important; his duties consequently to this country were the stronger, and he felt he might require something more important in the judgment of his Swedish subjects, who had supported him so liberally and cordially in all he had asked of the Diet for his military preparations than the guarantee of Finmark, to justify the entire change of that policy which had been followed in this country since 1815; namely, instead of leaning for support on their powerful neighbour, now to seek for that support from England and France, for such His Majesty said would be the result of the proposed arrangement. He was certainly justified in adopting the proposed arrangement as a precautionary measure of defence; but it would show a distrust of Russia, and could not fail to produce feelings of coldness on her part, and though he would obtain increased protection in Finmark, he might in consequence be so much the more exposed in Sweden.

His Norwegian subjects had met his proposals to increase the military defences of the country with a far less liberal spirit, and a feeling of jealousy might be created in this country by the defensive Treaty not being extended to it.

M. Lobstein, I believe, made some remark on His Majesty's suggestion to me, that Denmark should be a party to the proposed Treaty, and I conclude those remarks were unfavourable, for His Majesty observed that he felt the difficulty, and did not insist upon that accession.

Such, as well as I can recollect, were the important points of His Majesty's observations to my French colleague.

I called on Baron Stierneld this day at the Foreign Office. His Excellency said he supposed I had learnt from M. Lobstein the nature of his communication with the King yesterday; to which I answered that I had. He then went over pretty much the same arguments, and I do not think brought forward anything new, excepting that he, as a Swede, felt constitutional difficulties as to signing a defensive Treaty in which Norway alone was concerned. Sweden, in case it was necessary to repel by force of arms any aggression of Russia in Finmark, would expose her own soil to those aggressions, if the latter were not included in the arrangement. I replied, that though a Swede, his Excellency was Foreign Minister for both countries, and I thought ought to look to Norwegian interests as well as Swedish; what we proposed was undoubtedly favourable to Norway; what His Majesty desired would be advantageous to both countries, no doubt; but as the kingdoms were united, Sweden must protect Norwegian interests if violently attacked, and would thus be exposed to the danger he apprehended, whether the guarantee of Finmark existed or not.

I promised to report to your Lordship His Majesty's desire to extend the defensive Treaty to both kingdoms, and to lose no time in apprising his Excellency of the decision of Her Majesty's Government, so soon as I should be acquainted with it.

I learn from M. Lobstein that Baron Stierneld made use of the same arguments to him, and that he likewise promised to forward to his Government His Majesty's proposal, which he does by Mr. Samson, the bearer of this despatch.

In my secret and confidential despatch No. 52, I remarked that I did not think it improbable that when we entered more fully into negotiations, an endeavour would be made to extend the proposed arrangement to the whole possessions of the United Kingdoms, and your Lordship will have been somewhat prepared for the present proposals. Those proposals will, I feel sure, receive the attention which they deserve on the part of Her Majesty's Government, and, if they should appear not to increase unduly the responsibility which the Governments of Great Britain and France have declared their willingness to incur, may be accepted.

The King of Sweden has behaved, it appears to me, with great frankness and honour in declaring that he did not retract his acceptation of the principle of the partial guarantee; and his motives for desiring that it should be general are natural and evident, neither can I think that the reasons which he gives are without weight. The possession of Gothland by Russia would certainly give her the command of the Baltic, and Landskrona of the Sound, and I conclude that we should oppose by force of arms either of these aggressions. I may remark that in Gothland the port of Stilö is very rarely frozen, so that in addition to the commanding position of that island in the Baltic, one of the great objects of Russian ambition would be obtained by its possession. The danger to England would be less imminent than if Russia obtained a port in Finmark; but it appears to me that there still might be considerable danger, and every successful aggression of Russia would increase her power, and weaken the power of resistance of Sweden. By a general guarantee we should incur a much greater responsibility in appearance; but I cannot but think that it would be alone in appearance, and that the fact of a guarantee on the part of two Powers like England and France would, when known, put a stop to any projects of aggrandizement which Russia may cherish against Sweden, while such a guarantee could hardly fail to bind this country more closely to the interests and cause of the Western Powers.

I beg to apologize to your Lordship for trespassing on your time with these observations, which can hardly fail to suggest themselves to your own consideration.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

No. 69.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 505.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July 12, 1855.*

IMMEDIATELY after my representations to the Sultan on behalf of Omer Pasha, who sent in his resignation, His Majesty determined to gratify his Commander-in chief by a complimentary message with a sword of honour, conveyed to him by one of the Imperial chamberlains, and accompanied with an injunction not to give up the command. From some motive unexplained to me His Majesty subsequently changed his mind, and took the resolution of writing what was styled an autograph letter to each of the three Commanders-in-chief. On hearing this intention I remarked to Fuad Pasha that the measure, for one which had originated in a wish to gratify Omer Pasha, did not appear, in my judgment, to be well-conceived, and, after the unfortunate issue of the allied attack on the Redan and the Malakoff Tower on the 18th ultimo, I remarked to his Excellency that a more auspicious moment might hereafter be chosen. The Ministers, however, did not think proper to interfere, and Fuad Pasha may possibly have been called upon to respect his own suggestion. The consequence was, that Ettem Pasha, aide-de-camp and chamberlain to the Sultan, started for the Crimea without any communication with the Embassy, and arrived in time to deliver the Sultan's letter for Lord Raglan, not to his Lordship himself, but to his successor, the Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's army there.

A copy of the letter, originally composed in French, has been communicated to me by the Porte, and it is now forwarded herewith for your Lordship's information.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 69.

His Imperial Majesty the Sultan to Field-Marshal Lord Raglan.

My Lord, *Au Palais de Tchéragan, le Shewal*, 1271.

LA Reine, mon auguste et intime alliée, vous a envoyé pour la défense de ma cause, qui étant aussi juste que légitime, devient la cause de tout le monde civilisé.

Vous et la brave armée qui est sous votre commandement, vous avez répondu à l'attente de votre pays et du mien. Vous avez mérité l'admiration générale par vos exploits glorieux sous un climat éprouvant.

Les nouveaux faits d'armes que vous venez d'ajouter à tant d'actions d'éclat effectuées en Crimée, ensemble avec mes soldats que j'aime à l'égal de mes enfants, me donnent l'espoir d'un résultat définitif et très prochain, qui sera aussi glorieux pour ces grandes nations alliées que le commencement de la campagne.

J'éprouve un sentiment de contentement d'autant plus pur qu'une chose aussi terrible que la guerre aura servi à réunir mes peuples avec les plus grandes nations de l'Occident par des liens indissolubles.

Tant que la noble moteur de la gloire fera battre le cœur humain, ceux qui ont lutté d'émulation fraternelle, ceux qui ont mêlé ensemble leur sang sur la terre étrangère, n'oublieront pas des compagnons qu'ils considèrent comme leurs frères. Ce qui était jusqu'ici un fléau pour l'humanité aura donné le satisfaisant résultat de rapprocher les peuples dont les Gouvernements étaient déjà alliées : cette guerre portera le germe d'une paix durable et riche en fruits salutaires entre des nations qui méritaient de s'apprécier.

Désirant offrir aux braves combattants de la Crimée une preuve de ma vive satisfaction, un témoignage public de ma gratitude, je viens de charger mon aide-de-camp Général Edhem Pacha de vous remettre cette lettre. J'aime à croire, my Lord, que tous les braves officiers et soldats qui sont placés sous vos ordres seront persuadés que nous ne ferons de distinction entre aucun des soldats qui combattent pour la cause commune et que l'affection que je leur ai vouée trouve de l'écho dans le cœur de tous les peuples de la Turquie, qui aiment à reconnaître en eux les plus anciens alliées de mon Empire.

Je prie Dieu de vous destiner aux succès les plus glorieux et de vous avoir en sa très sainte garde.

No. 70.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 508.)
My Lord, *Therapia, July* 12, 1855.

CONCEIVING that your Lordship must feel anxious to obtain as much information as possible respecting the present state of the army at Kars, I do myself the honour to inclose herewith an extract of a private letter from Erzeroom, communicated to me by a private hand, and derived from what I consider to be a reliable and well-informed source.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 70.

Extract of a Private Letter, dated Erzeroom, June 26, 1855.

OUR letters from Kars are dated the 23rd. The Russians were then in their camp, almost swamped by the rain. They sent out their horsemen, and they have full liberty to do so as they please, for the Turks have no mounted men to oppose them. They came to Chiplaklee,* one station beyond Yenikin,* and there they destroyed some grain, and retired to their camp. They sent to Gumri for eight heavy guns to play on Kars; they stuck in the mud near Arpa-chaï, but horses and men were sent to get them out, and bring them to their camp. It is about an hour from Kars, and the tents can be seen and counted; but they are spread over a wide space, probably to make the army appear larger; they have ascertained that their force is 24,000, among which a large proportion of cavalry, a great part irregular. The Turkish troops are in high spirits, and the townspeople full of courage and alacrity; about 1,000 have been supplied with arms at their own request, and come to their post on the least alarm, without being sent for. The Russians will never take Kars but by a regular siege, and those within have no fears while they have ammunition; nevertheless, it were indispensable to send up succours.

No. 71.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 509.)
My Lord, *Therapia, July* 12, 1855.

I AM grieved to state that a considerable desertion has taken place from among the Albanians at the Dardanelles, under General Beatson's command. I have the honour to forward herewith the official correspondence relating to that untoward incident. I have no knowledge of the causes beyond what is stated by General Beatson and Mr. Calvert. It is impossible not to deplore the excesses which have been committed, and difficult not to apprehend a continuance, and even an aggravation, of the outrages, bad as they already are.

I have communicated with the Porte, and also with Rear-Admiral Grey, upon the subject; and adopting Mr. Calvert's suggestions, I am engaged in urging the Porte to send down succours as quickly as possible to the Dardanelles, together with orders for the seizure of the mutineers, addressed to all the provincial authorities within whose districts they are likely to be found.

At the same time, it would scarcely be wise to rush to a decided conclusion against the experiment entrusted to General Beatson. The conduct of the men was exemplary, from the time of their arrival at the Dardanelles. The same good opinion of their conduct is reported from other quarters. The reports of Colonel Wilpole and of Consul-General Moore are alike favourable to them; and your Lordship will not fail to remark in the correspondence of the former, how easily those whom he had enrolled allowed themselves to be marched over the mountains of Syria, disarmed and embarked.

I have placed Mr. Skene, who enjoys General Beatson's confidence, in personal communication with that officer at the Dardanelles; and I trust that no length of time will elapse before we shall be able to ascertain the true character of the late outbreak, and to judge how far it may be possible to apply an effective remedy to the existing evils.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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* Villages on the direct road between Kars and Erzeroom.

Inclosure 1 in No. 71.

Consul-General Moore to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Beyrout, July 5, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to report the arrival of the English transport steamer "Medway," on the 1st instant, towing the ship "Chalmers," and of the "Niagara," on the 3rd, for the purpose of embarking the troops enrolled by Colonel Walpole at Damascus.

The "Niagara" sailed last night for the Dardanelles, with 170 men and 170 horses, towing the "Chalmers," with forage and provisions, and 55 men and 55 horses. The "Medway" leaves this evening, with 221 men and 221 horses, making a total of 446 men and 446 horses. Lieutenant Rodney, who came in the "Medway" to superintend this service, returns in that ship.

Colonel Walpole remains at Beyrout, with about 60 men and 60 horses of the number enlisted at Damascus. He has since his arrival here enrolled 33 horsemen.

I learn from this gentleman that he shortly expects a body of 500 horsemen from Moossul, collected in Mesopotamia by a native Chief.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. MOORE.

Inclosure 2 in No 71.

General Beatson to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Dardanelles, July 7, 1855.*

I REGRET to have to report that an unpleasant affair took place yesterday with a portion of the Albanians of the 1st and 2nd Regiments, which has ended in the desertion of 79 of the 2nd Regiment and 68 of the 1st.

The night before last, when I was in the camp of the 1st Regiment, a number of the men came round me, and complained of the conduct of Adem, the Colassie of the 1st Regiment. I told them two men from each troop should go to the Commanding Officer of the 1st Regiment, who would write down their statements and submit them for my orders. The men were all perfectly satisfied with this, and returned quickly to their tents.

Yesterday morning Colonel Bruce, commanding 1st Regiment, took down the depositions, copy of which is herewith sent.

This paper was sent to me by Colonel Bruce early in the day, but did not reach me till late in the afternoon, the messenger having been stopped on the road by some of the friends of Adem, who appear to have been under the impression that he would be punished when the report reached me. Acting on this impression, Adem appears to have got his friends together for the purpose of deserting, and in a state of great excitement they proceeded to a police guard-house in the town, and forcibly released a prisoner, an Albanian.

When I heard that the men had gone off, I sent for the 1st Regiment to pursue them, and at the same time got Mr. Calvert to go to the Military Pasha to know what assistance he would give in case of their being any backwardness on the part of the other Albanians to assist in apprehending the deserters.

The Pasha at first hesitated to give any; but on the representation of Mr. Calvert, he consented to give two guns and a detachment of artillery.

It was by this time dark, so that any chance of finding the deserters before morning was out of the question, besides which I regret to say there seemed to be considerable disinclination on the part of the other Albanians to undertake the duty; a great number of them declaring that, although they were ready to fight against the Russians, they did not like fighting against their friends.

With such feelings on the part of the Albanians, added to its being dark and our not knowing where our deserters were, there was nothing to be done but to wait till morning. At daybreak I was with the men, and found the same disinclination to act against the deserters, who have disappeared no one knows where, expecting that they are gone to the south.

I have repeatedly pointed out to the Minister of War the danger to which he exposed the success of the organization of the body of wild men, such as the Albanians and others, by leaving me without a sufficient number of officers, and the present affair is one of the many evils which have arisen from the neglect of this force in respect to officers. The best remedy now is to send the whole of the men at once to the Crimea, where we can give them something to occupy them. I can organize just as well at Balaklava or Kamara as at the Dardanelles.

Another cause of such scenes as that of yesterday is the Albanians being left alone at such a place as this. If transports had been sent to bring the Arab troops from Syria, I should have had no difficulty in getting them to put down any excesses of the Albanians, and thus one would have kept the other in check.

Both tribes make excellent soldiers, but they require to be kept in order, which can only be done by having a mixture of other tribes with them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. BEATSON.

Inclosure 3 in No. 71.

Consul Calvert to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Dardanelles, July 7, 1855.*

I REGRET extremely to have to inform your Lordship that yesterday about fifty men of Beatson's Horse came from their camp to this town, and rescued a prisoner confined for gross misconduct. They then proceeded in a body to the bridge on the Rhodius, and were presently joined by small parties from their regiment, increasing their numbers to nearly 150 mounted troopers, mostly from Monastir. They then placed themselves under the command of a man who was formerly Mr. Consul Longworth's cavass, and marched off towards the village of Renkioi, plundering everybody they met on the road.

General Beatson ordered a regiment to turn out immediately, for the purpose of stopping and disarming the mutinous men; but only three troops obeyed his orders, and came down to the town.

By this time, however, it was too late to do anything against them. Meanwhile, I considered it prudent to request the Pasha, with General Beatson's concurrence, to call the garrison under arms, and to take up positions outside the town, with field pieces loaded with grape. Other troops were also brought over during the night from Kilid Bahar, and a detachment sent down by the steam-tug "Redpole," to protect the British Military Hospital at, and the village of Renkioi, where they arrived just in time to prevent the mutinous troops from committing any disorders, though they were unable to prevent them from proceeding on towards the town of Ejiné.

Her Majesty's steam-vessel "Harpy," and the French war steamer "Tisiphone," in the meantime, at my request, anchored as close as possible to the Consulate and General Beatson's residence, and in a position likewise to protect the town.

The Turkish garrison and the three troops of Irregulars who obeyed General Beatson, remained under arms outside the town until the morning, when they returned to their quarters.

These demonstrations will, it is to be hoped, produce a proper effect on the troops remaining in camp, and prevent a recurrence of any such serious outrages, and which keep the inhabitants of the town in a state of perpetual fear and agitation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. W. CALVERT.

Inclosure 4 in No. 71.

Consul Calvert to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Dardanelles, July 8, 1855.

My Lord,

IN continuation of my report of yesterday's date, I have the honour to state that the deserters from Beatson's Horse, after leaving the village of Renkioi, went to my farm on the Plain of Troy, where they demanded a supply of food and provender from the farmer, Mr. Gottland, which he at once gave them, in hopes of preventing them from committing any disorders. However, they began soon after to ransack the premises, and to plunder and destroy everything they could lay their hands upon, and at last some of them attempted to lay violent hands upon Mr. Gottland, who, in self-defence, with the assistance of one of his men, killed two of his assailants. The rest of the party being dispersed all over the place, Mr. Gottland profited of the opportunity to fly for his life, leaving the Bashi-Bozouks separated in small parties over the Plain of Troy, destroying the crops, plundering the houses, and ill-treating the inhabitants, all of whom have left their harvest and other agricultural labours to take refuge in the mountains. They released a robber who was being brought in the custody of a cavass, who was robbed of everything he had. In fine, these fellows have proved to be nothing but a band of lawless marauders.

I have been informed that fifty more men have deserted to-day. Colonel Bruce says that, to the best of his knowledge, this is not the case; but the fact cannot be ascertained with any degree of certainty until the evening, when the men on leave in the town return to the camp. It is certain, however, that no dependence can be placed on any of the men who remain, and under these circumstances I have endeavoured to induce the Turkish authorities to take such measures as are most likely to insure the safety of life and property in this town and the country at large.

The Military Pasha, at my request, is about to send a force of forty artillerymen to protect the new establishment of the Civil Hospital at Renkioi until the country is in a more secure state than it is at present. I also proposed to him to send out a few hundred men in detachments from four different quarters, two to be conveyed by sea and two to go by land, so as to surround the Bashi-Bozouks on the Plain of Troy, where they may be captured with ease; but the Pasha declines assuming the responsibility of doing so until he receives instructions from Constantinople. This is much to be regretted, for when those orders do come there may be no longer the opportunity of doing what may be accomplished with ease at this moment, and which I have offered to see carried out my own self.

The Civil Governor, Djemel Pasha, is doing all that his limited means of action permits. He has ordered the population of the villages to arm, and to seize the deserters dead or alive. He has made a requisition on the Government of Gallipoli to send him fifty cavasses. This has become necessary, as the Turkish Government, notwithstanding the Pasha's urgent and oft-repeated requests, has constantly refused to increase the police establishment here, and which, with reference to the duties to be performed, is on a most ridiculously low scale.

I have only to add, that it is highly desirable that some energetic military officer should be at once sent here by the Porte, with full powers to dispose of the garrisons of these forts as circumstances may require, and even, if necessary, to convey them to some distance down the coast in steamers, so as to assist the inhabitants and local authorities in arresting the brigands wherever they may go. Orders should also be dispatched immediately to the Pashas of Smyrna, Balukessei, Broussa, Magnesia, and Aidin, to arrest any Albanians who may be found wandering about the country without "teskeris," for, unless prompt and vigorous measures of repression are at once taken in the right direction, I foresee that all the Irregulars at present serving here under General Beatson will gradually join their companions, and the evil will then have increased to such an extent that it may be attended with the most serious consequences, and be most difficult to suppress.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. W. CALVERT.

Inclosure 5 in No. 71.

Consul Calvert to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Dardanelles, July* 9, 1855.

AFTER addressing your Lordship yesterday, the Military Governor came to the determination of sending 200 of his troops to Koum Kali, for the purpose of clearing the Plains of Troy of the marauding deserters from Beatson's Horse; but positive intelligence having been received that they had decamped from that quarter, and were forty miles distant on the road to Smyrna, the measure was, of course, abandoned.

The two men reported as killed in my despatch of yesterday, were only wounded and made prisoners.

The "Niagara" steam-transport has just towed in the "Chalmers" transport, bringing between them 244 men, chiefly Syrians, for Beatson's Horse.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. W. CALVERT.

Inclosure 6 in No. 71.

Consul Calvert to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Dardanelles, July* 10, 1855.

IN continuation of my despatch of yesterday's date, I have now to inform your Excellency that during the night an express steam-boat was dispatched to me by Dr. Parkes, Superintendent of the Renkioi Hospital, to acquaint me that about 100 of the Bashi-Bozouk deserters had returned to the village of Dumbreck, about three miles from Renkioi, with the avowed intention of liberating two of their comrades who had been captured, or of burning down the latter village. The Pasha has therefore, at my request, sent by the steamer a detachment of troops to protect the inhabitants. The prisoners have been removed to an English ship anchored near the hospital, and on board of which the ladies of some of the principal medical gentlemen have taken refuge.

I further regret to report that the remainder of the Albanian troops who are here evince a spirit of extreme insubordination, as General Beatson himself will have doubtless explained to your Excellency.

Meanwhile, as the Arab Irregulars who arrived yesterday have no arms, and as it is impossible to say what degree of dependence is to be placed upon them, as also the local Artillerymen are mostly raw recruits, who, if unsupported, could scarcely act with effect in case of need, I beg to urge upon your Lordship the absolute necessity of sending here with the least possible delay an adequate force of Regular Cavalry, and which might be embarked at once on board of the transports "Niagara," "Chalmers," or "Medway," proceeding to-day to Constantinople.

In case this suggestion be adopted, as I trust it will, it might be desirable that orders be given for these vessels to call on their way down at Lampsacus, where I would have a person waiting to inform the commander of the force whether he should disembark his troops there, or at any other point, according as circumstances may require.

I am informed that the Moudir of Eginé has succeeded in capturing eight of the deserters, whom he is sending here. In order to provide against any attempt at releasing them, I have induced the Pasha to have them confined in the fortress of Kilid Bahar, on the Europe side of the Straits.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. W. CALVERT.

P.S.—The Pasha has this moment informed me, that the fact of the Moudir of Eginé having captured eight of the deserters has not been confirmed.

F. W. C.

No. 72.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 510.)

Therapia, July 12, 1855.

My Lord,

THE extreme importance of obtaining correct data before the expedition proposed for the relief of the Turkish army at Kars be finally submitted to Her Majesty's Government, produces an unavoidable delay in the progress and preparation of the plan. The Turkish Government has decided on sending confidential officers to examine the localities at Trebizond, Batoum, and Redoute-Kaleh, with a view to forming a more correct idea of their resources and difficulties.

I hope that General Vivian and Sir Edmund Lyons will pursue the same course, and that an officer from each service will be sent in a suitable vessel to obtain the requisite information on the coast. I have already applied to General Vivian and Rear-Admiral Grey for that purpose; and I shall avail myself of the earliest opportunity to make a similar application to Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons.

I abstain from troubling your Lordship with particulars, until I can submit the complete result of the present inquiries to Her Majesty's Government. The general nature and object of the plan entertained by the Porte, and promoted as a matter of eventual execution by Her Majesty's Embassy, has been explained to your Lordship in my preceding despatches.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 73.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 512.)

Therapia, July 12, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General at Bucharest, reporting on a visit of the Grand Vizier on his return from Vienna.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 73.

Consul-General Colquhoun to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Bucharest, June 30, 1855.

My Lord,

ALI PASHA arrived at Roustchouk on the afternoon of the 19th, and was received with every possible honour. I paid my respects to His Highness on the morning of the 20th at 8 o'clock. He asked me about the state of public feeling in the province; and I did not hesitate to repeat to him the many causes of complaint which the inhabitants of Wallachia have against the Hospodar and his administration. He appeared well *au courant* of the state of affairs, and said that if the Porte had not hitherto acted as she had intended towards the Prince, it had been owing to the peculiar circumstances of the moment before which she had thought it right to bow.

Prince Stirbey came over the same morning, and had an interview with the Vizier. Nothing has transpired of what passed; but the Prince left immediately for Bucharest. Understanding that a deputation of the Boyars intended to cross the Roustchouk, with a view of submitting their sufferings to the Vizier, the Hospodar issued strict orders that no one should pass the Danube without a passport. Information of this having been given to Ali Pasha, he sent over a boat to Giurgevo, with orders to the Boyars to come to Roustchouk,

and accordingly Prince Alexander Ghika, ex-Hospodar, arrived, accompanied by Messrs. Balliano, Balatchano, A. Ghika, and Count Rosetti: they were subsequently admitted to an audience, and submitted to the Vizier their doleances. He received them very graciously, but with a certain reserve. The Vizier left Roustchouk at 10 A.M. for Shumla and Varna.

While I was at Roustchouk, Colonel Neale arrived with Major Havelock, to remove some obstacles which the old Pasha Said had thrown in the way of collecting men for the Turkish contingent.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ROBERT G. COLQUHOUN.

No. 74.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 299.)

Berlin, July 21, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith, in translation, copy of the reply of the Prussian Government, dated the 5th instant, to the proposal of the Austrian Cabinet, dated 28th ultimo, with respect to a communication to be addressed to the Diet on the Oriental question.

I am informed that a further correspondence has since taken place between the Austrian and Prussian Cabinets, in which the former proposed some modifications of its previous propositions, in order to meet the views of the Prussian Cabinet.

These modifications, however, are said to relate more to form than to substance; and inasmuch as they pourtrayed no material change in the views of the Austrian Cabinet, they have not obtained the approval of the Prussian Government.

There appears no doubt but that the Prussian Government will firmly adhere to the views and intentions expressed in their answer, herewith inclosed, of the 5th instant.

In conversation yesterday with the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the subject of these communications, I could only extract from him that there was a prospect of improved relations between Austria and Prussia, and that Austria deserves full credit from Germany for the pacific intentions displayed by her in the Vienna Conference. He further stated, that he believed that the modified Austrian communication to the Diet was made on the 19th.

Much secresy is now observed here as to what is now passing between Berlin and Vienna; but I shall use my best endeavours to procure for your Lordship copies of the communications that have passed within the last few days.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 74.

Baron Manteuffel to Count Arnim.

(Translation.)

Berlin, July 5, 1855.

WE have now been favoured by Count Esterhazy with the confidential communication of the draft of the declaration concerning the Eastern question which Baron Prokesch in the name of his Government, is to be instructed to lay before the German Diet.

The Cabinet of Vienna has also had the goodness to acquaint us with the circular in which Count Buol, on the 28th ultimo, informs the German Governments of the steps intended to be taken by the Imperial Austrian Court.

It is scarcely necessary for me to assure your Excellency that these documents have imparted the liveliest interest to His Majesty's Government, and that, in considering them as members of the Diet, we are animated by the most

friendly feelings towards the Austrian Imperial Cabinet, as well as by the sincere desire to give, as far as possible, a character of unanimity to the declarations which the Diet may be called upon to make.

This being the case, it is with particular satisfaction that I especially notice the express declaration made in the circular, that there can be no question of the Diet's entering into new engagements, or of extending those already existing. The numerous documents that have lately proceeded from His Majesty's Government will furnish the most indubitable evidence that this view also agrees with our own, and therefore the only question that could arise would be, whether any new declaration whatever on the part of the Diet is necessary in order solely to maintain its former resolutions? We should be inclined to answer in the negative if we had only to consider our own situation; as Prussia, in her character of an European Power, is already, in a military sense, under any circumstances, in that state of preparation which corresponds with the resolution of the Diet of the 8th February.

If, however (although the hope for the restoration of peace between the belligerent Powers has not yet been fulfilled), we may be allowed to suppose, from the late turn of affairs, according to the communications made to us, that the active cooperation of Austria in the war is removed to a remote period, and that thereby also, as regards Germany, apprehensions on this account are considerably diminished, then we cannot consider otherwise than justifiable the wishes of our German allies to see themselves relieved in a suitable manner, as, for example, by a prolongation of the "Kriegsbereitschaft" from the engagements imposed upon them by the resolution of the 8th of February.

The consideration of this matter in the Committees will furnish the best opportunity of coming to the necessary understanding upon this point, and it will be the more requisite to lay the Austrian declaration before the Committee, as the purport of the same has not been communicated to the other German Courts, and a thorough and general examination of such a comprehensive exposition appears (and assuredly the Austrian Cabinet is of the same opinion) indispensably necessary.

The position of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the December Treaty, and the negotiations connected with it, is known to all. Prussia did not join in this Treaty, notwithstanding the invitations addressed to it. An express approval both of the conclusion of this Treaty, as well as of the deliberations in the Conferences connected with it, would therefore only place us in direct contradiction with our past policy.

We are in advance convinced that this cannot be the intention of the Cabinet of Vienna.

If we willingly acknowledge that the latter, after it had concluded the December Treaty without consulting thereupon with us and with Germany, and after it had, upon the basis of this alliance, discussed also with non-German Powers questions at Vienna that concerned the interests of Germany; if we admit more especially her recent attitude in order to avert the danger of war from Austria, and thereby also from Germany, has done its utmost to protect the interests of Germany; nevertheless an unreserved approval of all the circumstances of the alliance (which, notwithstanding the momentary divergence upon a question of execution, is expressly stated to continue in force as to its object, and therefore with its eventual obligations can be made available again in the most pressing forms in the future course of the development of the war), would imply a joint and common obligation of mutual support which Prussia considers, now as hitherto, incompatible with her political convictions, and with her solicitude for her own and Germany's real interests, and therefore must withhold its approval just as frankly and freely now as she did immediately after the conclusion of the December Treaty.

Such an approval could (in order to avoid misunderstandings, which would be doubly unpleasant now, when it is necessary above all things to set the position of the Diet in a clear light) only ensue if and in as far as Austria, on the other hand, also expressly approved the policy which Prussia and Germany, from their point of view, consistently pursued; but even such a supplementary mutual approval might, by a recapitulation of the facts, perhaps cause the divergences of the past to appear in a manner not to be desired, and we would therefore submit to the Imperial Cabinet whether it would not be preferable on both sides to renounce the same in the interest of the union sought to be attained. We are

the more confirmed in this consideration by the declaration contained in the Austrian draft of her desire to maintain irrevocably the basis of peace as acknowledged by Austria. Inasmuch as the carrying out of the afore-mentioned four points as an inseparable whole is hereby intended to be conveyed, it would far exceed the limits of the resolution of the Diet of 9th of October last. No such engagement exists in Germany. It has only resolved to appropriate and to maintain the two points. Since Russia has declared that she will also henceforth consider the same as binding upon her so long as Germany and Austria take no part in the war, there are no grounds to consider them in danger from that quarter. These points also acquire their real value only by their being carried into effect, and as regards this Prussia believes she must in her own name, and in that of Germany, again withhold a due participation in them.

As respects the third point, it refers on the one hand to the maintenance of the integrity of Turkey, and on the other to the diminution of the Russian preponderance in the Black Sea. In the first respect, scarcely any difference of views exists. Austria, on her part, declares her wish to prolong her occupation of the Principalities of the Danube for the maintenance of this integrity. As to how far and for what length of time this is requisite, may be reserved to an understanding between Vienna and the Porte to settle; for the occupation of the Principalities took place in consequence of a Treaty between Austria and the Porte. In a German point of view, the event of an attack from Russia, which the Diet contemplated in its resolution of the 9th December, is just now less than ever to be apprehended.

Should, however, on the other hand, the circumstances tending to endanger the security of the German territory assume a more threatening aspect, the determination to protect the fatherland assuredly exists so firmly with all the German States, that for its protection in compliance with their duty to the Diet they would, within the shortest space of time, adopt the most energetic measures.

His Majesty the King, our august master, is at all events resolved to fulfil this sacred duty with his entire disposable force.

The diminution of the Russian preponderance in the Black Sea is the point on the precise settlement of which the understanding between Austria and the other Contracting Parties to the December Treaty foundered, and which was the principal cause of the termination of the negotiations for peace. We refrain from making any inquiry as to who it was that caused this result, and willingly pay our tribute of acknowledgments to Austria for her exertions to effect a a peace.

Now, however, that these have been fruitless, and that the Cabinets of Paris and London allow no doubt to be entertained that they no longer consider themselves bound by the declarations made by them in the Conferences, all the separate proposals which were discussed within and without the Conference for the solution of this point do not form a certain basis for the carrying out of which it appears desirable to undertake any obligations, but rather only a valuable material which, since the development of circumstances, has, alas! been left exclusively to the decision of war, may perhaps serve to prepare the way for a secure state of right and peace, for the attainment of which the resolution of the Diet of the 9th December indicates the four points in their essential substance as a fitting basis.

We can only consider as perilous to tie one's hands in any way with respect to the employment of these materials, and would not recommend it to the Austrian Cabinet, and still less would we advise our German allies to do so.

The foregoing are the principal observations which the Austrian draft as communicated to us has given rise to; and, according to the desire expressed to us, I beg your Excellency to communicate them, by copy of the present despatch, to his Excellency Count Buol. We are very desirous to learn whether, and to what extent, our considerations, which we have thought it our duty to express frankly and openly, may influence the course to be adopted in this matter by the Imperial Austrian Cabinet.

(Signed) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 75.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 39.) *Vienna, July 18, 1855.*

My Lord,

BRIGADIER-GENERAL CRAUFURD had an audience of the Emperor on Friday last, at which he took leave of His Imperial Majesty preparatory to returning to England according to your Lordship's instructions.

General Letang, the French Commissioner, also took leave of His Imperial Majesty the same day, and has already left Vienna.

The recall of the two Commissioners could scarcely have taken place at a more appropriate moment, as it was simultaneous with that selected for General Hess to lay down the command-in-chief of the 3rd and 4th Armies, which are now again placed under the immediate command of their separate Generals.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 76.

Sir J. Milbanke to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 47.) *Munich, July 17, 1855.*

My Lord,

I UNDERSTAND that Baron von der Pfordten has lately been again occupied in endeavouring to mediate, as it is here termed, between Austria and Prussia, and it is stated that the Cabinet of Vienna has shown itself on this point infinitely more tractable than on former occasions, and more inclined to listen to the arguments in favour of an united course of action on the part of all Germany in the present crisis than heretofore.

I am, unfortunately, not acquainted with the exact nature of the communications which have been exchanged between the Federal Governments; but as I cannot comprehend how either Austria or Prussia could, under existing circumstances, be lightly induced to abandon the policy they have until now pursued on the Eastern question, I must suppose that the mediation of the Bavarian Cabinet is limited to an endeavour to establish something like concert between the two Great German Powers, before an appeal to the Confederation is hazarded by either of them.

If Austria really has become more accessible to the representations of this Government, it can, I conceive, only be explained by the difficulties which her vacillations in the great European question at issue seem likely to bring upon her; but my own opinion is, that Baron von der Pfordten's hopes of success rest upon mistaken and exaggerated notions of the weight of Bavarian influence, and have probably no better foundation than some vague expressions of satisfaction at the approval given, as I stated to your Lordship in a former report, by the Bavarian Government, to the last Austrian propositions for the settlement of the question of Russian preponderance in the Black Sea.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

No. 77.

Sir J. Milbanke to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 48.) *Munich, July 18, 1855.*

My Lord,

SINCE my despatch No. 47 of yesterday's date was written, I have learnt that the Bavarian Government has availed itself of the pretext afforded by the declarations of the British and French Cabinets, that they no longer consider themselves irrevocably bound by the four points of guarantee, to decline

entering with Austria into any positive engagement to support them in the Diet.

On the other hand, the Bavarian Government has expressed its readiness to vote for the maintenance of the Federal contingents on their present footing, in a state of readiness to take the field, on condition that a month, instead of a fortnight, should be allowed to it and the other minor States, for fulfilling their federal obligations in this respect.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

No. 78.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 963.) *Paris, July 20, 1855.*

My Lord,

COUNT WALEWSKI has received despatches from Stockholm, which represent the King of Sweden to be favourably disposed to entertaining the project of a Defensive Treaty against designs which Russia may have upon Finmark, which Treaty the English and French Governments had proposed to His Majesty.

M. de Lobstein states that, although he had not received his instructions upon the subject, yet on seeing those addressed by your Lordship to Mr. Mugenis, and your assurance that they had received the approbation of the French Government, he had determined on moving without waiting for them; that in concert with Her Majesty's Minister he had made confidential overtures to the King; that His Majesty had replied that he could not conceal from himself the gravity and importance of the step demanded of him, but that he was inclined to consider it favourably. He wished, however, that Denmark should be included in the proposed Treaty.

Count Walewski appears to be of opinion that the King of Sweden's wishes in this respect ought to be attended to, and that the accession of Denmark to the contemplated Treaty would be more advantageous than otherwise.

I said that I thought the proposal required reflection. If we were certain that the Danish Government would make no objections to the provisions of the Treaty, their joining it would give it additional force. But if, by any chance, they should not be well disposed towards it, or should hope by throwing difficulties in the way, or by informing the Russian Government of what was passing, to obtain advantages hereafter from Russia, we should be defeating our own purposes by intrusting her with the secret. I asked whether it would not be more prudent to invite the King of Sweden to sign the Treaty primarily with Great Britain and France, under the condition that the adhesion of Denmark should asked to it immediately afterwards. If Denmark adhered, well and good; if she refused, but little mischief could ensue, even were she to betray the secret to Russia.

Count Walewski did not object to this course, but he said that he had good reasons for believing the King of Denmark to be well disposed to follow in the footsteps of Sweden in the present conjuncture.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 79.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 24.)

(No. 978. Confidential.) *Paris, July 23, 1855.*

My Lord,

COUNT WALEWSKI has received further advices from Stockholm of the 16th instant.

M. de Lobstein reports, that having received his instructions analogous to

those on which Mr. Magenis had acted in the matter of the proposed Treaty respecting Finmark, he had at once made overtures, in the sense of them, to the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, and subsequently to the King; that the principle of such a Treaty had been accepted by both His Majesty and his Minister, but that both had declared that the Treaty must have greater extension than had been given it by the allies, and must include, in the defensive alliance which it proposed, not only Finmark, but the whole of the dominions of His Swedish Majesty. The King had more particularly dwelt with M. de Lobstein on the necessity of His Majesty's showing that he had no predilections for one part of his subjects over the other; though in his heart he confessed that the Swedes were more congenial to him than the Norwegians; that they had come forward lately with far greater alacrity to meet the burdens imposed upon them by present circumstances, and it was consequently more necessary to show that Gothland and Lanskrona were as safe as Finmark.

The King appears to have dwelt on the great changes which such a Treaty must make in his future policy, admitting that until now he had been accustomed to lean on Russia, while for the future he must look to the Western Powers for protection. He did not conceal from himself that he must be prepared for the future hostility of Russia, as he was about to form a great Scandinavian barrier against her.

Count Walewski is inclined to consider the extension which it is proposed by Sweden to give to the original project to be an improvement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 80.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 24.)

(No. 979.)
My Lord, *Paris, July 23, 1855.*

M. DE PERSIGNY will no doubt have put your Lordship in possession of the tenour of M. de Bourqueney's late despatches from Vienna, and of the course which the French Government proposes to pursue in consequence.

A few days ago Count Walewski stated to me that Count Buol was much disappointed by the tone of the French Government in regard to the Treaty of the 2nd December, for it seemed, that while willing to admit its continued validity, they resolved to consider its stipulations as no longer obligatory. In reporting this language of Count Buol, M. de Bourqueney added that he could not conceal from himself that the alliance between Austria and the Western Powers had assumed a very critical appearance, and that unless something was done to reassure Count Buol that the four points were still considered binding by France and England, that Minister might become so alarmed at finding Austria deserted by them, and consequently in a state of isolation, that great danger would arise of seeing the Emperor Francis Joseph endeavour to come to a separate understanding with Russia on the basis of the four points.

M. de Bourqueney recommended, therefore, that satisfactory assurances should be given to Count Buol, being confident that very little in this sense would suffice, and that that little need only be verbally expressed.

On receiving this despatch Count Walewski took the Emperor's orders, and it was determined to invite Her Majesty's Government to calm the apprehensions of Count Buol, by joining France in a declaration that, in any future negotiations for peace, the two Governments would regard the four points as the minimum of what they would ask.

Yesterday Count Walewski informed me that he had, on the previous day, transmitted to M. de Persigny a draft of the instructions which he intended sending on the following day (that is, yesterday) to M. de Bourqueney, with an intimation of his hope that similar instructions might be addressed by your Lordship to Mr. Elliot. Your Lordship will have been enabled to form your own judgment upon it, and I need not refer to it further, except to say that I observed to Count Walewski that if he was anxious that the two Governments should hold the same language at Vienna, he ought in courtesy to defer writing

to M. de Bourqueney until Her Majesty's Ministers had had time to consider the terms of the instructions which he proposed sending. Count Walewski replied that he would not forward the despatch to M. de Bourqueney until he had heard from London.

He went on to state that since he had seen me he had received further advices from Vienna; that Count Buol was about to send a messenger to Paris with instructions to M. de Hübner to inquire whether, in future negotiations for peace, the Western Powers would take the four points as "leur point de départ," and whether they would enter into a reciprocal engagement with Austria not to treat separately with Russia. Count Buol had again assured M. de Bourqueney that he did not seek for any further written engagement. He admitted that the moment was not propitious for the signature of official documents, he would be satisfied with a verbal assurance; but he gave it clearly to be understood that no argument would be left to him to oppose the progress of the Russian party with the Emperor Francis Joseph, if something was not done to make His Majesty comprehend that the maritime Powers still considered him as bound by certain engagements to them. Already Prince Gortchakoff had, during an audience of His Imperial Majesty, endeavoured to obtain a promise that Austria would not attack Russia, if Russia engaged neither to invade the Principalities nor to cross the Danube. The Emperor had pleaded his engagements with the Western Powers as a bar to any such promise, but if it became apparent that the Western Powers conceived themselves to be free from all obligations towards Austria, how could the Emperor continue to plead engagements which were thus repudiated?

I asked Count Walewski whether, as he expected to receive so shortly a communication from the Austrian Government, it would not be as well to defer writing to M. de Bourqueney on this subject; but his Excellency observed that it might be more embarrassing to answer a categorical demand, such as that which it appeared to be Count Buol's intention to address to the French Government through M. de Hübner, than to give the somewhat vague assurances with which M. de Bourqueney had declared that Count Buol would be satisfied, and that for his part he should be glad to be enabled to state to M. de Hübner, when the latter presented himself, that instructions were already on the road to M. de Bourqueney.

I am sorry to add, that the same dread of seeing Austria draw nearer to Russia, and the same hope of preventing it by equivocal assurances, appear to exist in Count Walewski's mind, as in that of his predecessor. For instance, his Excellency stated to me yesterday, that by employing the word "envisager," when speaking of the four points as the minimum to be asked, he incurred no obligation, and that hereafter France might insist on the four points, or abandon them, as she pleased.

In conversing on this matter my language has been guided by the tenour of your Lordship's despatch No. 15 of the 13th instant to Mr. Elliot. I may add, in conclusion, that at bottom I do not conceive that there is much difference of opinion between your Lordship and Count Walewski as to what will happen hereafter in regard to the four guarantees. He is quite aware that they must come prominently forward in any future negotiation; but there is this difference of opinion in regard to entertaining them, that he had certainly understood that when the negotiations were broken off at Vienna, the two Governments had resumed entire liberty of action, either to abide by or reject them, as the future interests of the two countries might dictate; and with this impression on his mind, he rather took objection to the latter part of the second paragraph of your Lordship's despatch to Mr. Elliot, as admitting, in his opinion, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, engagements from which the French Government considered themselves absolved. At the same time I must state, that nothing has fallen from him which gives me the right to suppose that he thinks the two Governments ought to be satisfied with less than that which they have already asked.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 81.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 26.)

(No. 989.)

Paris, July 25, 1855.

My Lord,

COUNT WALEWSKI read to me yesterday the further correspondence which had passed between M. de Persigny and himself, respecting the declaration which he wished Her Majesty's Government to join him in making to Austria. He said that your Lordship desired that some definition should be given of the principles of the four guarantees, which Count Walewski proposed stating to Count Buol would be the minimum of the demands made by the belligerent Powers in any future negotiations for peace.

Count Walewski was inclined to think that any such definition was useless, and perhaps calculated to engender further discussion between Austria and the maritime Powers. At all events, he said, he could not accept the definition as submitted by your Lordship to M. de Persigny, because he conceived that two essential parts of the four guarantees had been omitted, namely, "the connecting the Ottoman Empire with the European equilibrium" in the third, and "the abandonment by Russia of covering with an official protectorate the Christian subjects of the Sultan of the Oriental ritual" in the fourth.

I asked Count Walewski whether, in case your Lordship continued to think some definition necessary, he would be satisfied if you took the words of the four guarantees, as inserted in the Protocol of the 28th December. His Excellency replied, that he should prefer a simple assurance to Count Buol that France and England would consider the principle of the four guarantees as the minimum on which peace could be made, but that he would not object to the repetition of the text of the Protocol of the 28th December, in their development, if your Lordship pressed it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 82.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 30.)

(No. 48. Confidential.)

Vienna, July 26, 1855.

My Lord,

HAVING learnt that, in the interval between the audience at which Prince Gortchakoff delivered his credentials to the Emperor, and his departure for Stuttgardt, he had again been received by His Majesty, I have endeavoured to ascertain the cause of this somewhat unusual occurrence, and am now enabled to communicate it confidentially to your Lordship.

Immediately after his first audience, it became known that Prince Gortchakoff had very generally expressed his satisfaction at the language of His Imperial Majesty, and had hinted that Count Buol could not be taken as a faithful exponent of the sentiments of His Imperial Master.

On this report reaching Count Buol, he considered it essential that it should receive a formal contradiction, and that the Russian Minister should be informed by the Emperor himself that, if in the previous interview anything which fell from him had been understood in a sense at variance with the language of his Minister, his meaning had been entirely misconstrued.

At Count Buol's suggestion, therefore, the second audience took place; and while all possible misconception on the part of Prince Gortchakoff was removed, this renewed attempt to establish the existence of a discrepancy between the sentiments of His Majesty and those of his Minister for Foreign Affairs, ended in the disappointment of the party who consider Count Buol as the chief obstacle to a line of policy entirely favourable to Russia.

On the day of Prince Gortchakoff's first audience, the Emperor also received Baron Manderström, the new Swedish Minister, who informs me confidentially that the language of His Imperial Majesty on that occasion was

anything but favourable to Russia; and that while he made no concealment of his regret that the proposed ultimatum of Austria should not have met the views of the allied Governments, no leaning whatever towards the other side could be detected.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 83.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 30.)

(No. 49.)

Vienna, July 26, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE asked Count Buol how he accounted for the satisfaction expressed by Prince Gortchakoff at the result of the audience of the Emperor mentioned in my despatch No. 48 of this day's date.

Count Buol said he was not aware of any real cause of satisfaction to Prince Gortchakoff. The Russian Government had promised that the Austrian forces in the Principalities should not be attacked, and had proposed to enter into a formal engagement to this effect, provided Austria would also undertake to abstain from hostilities; but the Emperor had answered that, while he received with satisfaction the assurance that his troops should not be molested, he could not on his part enter into any agreement which would be incompatible with the other engagements he had taken.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 84.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 30.)

(No. 51.)

Vienna, July 26, 1855.

My Lord,

COUNT BUOL a few days ago sent off a messenger to London and Paris with despatches to Count Colloredo and Baron Hübner, relative to his proposal that the English and French Governments should declare their continued adhesion to the four points as the basis of future negotiations.

As Count Buol's despatch to Count Colloredo is to be communicated to your Lordship, it is only necessary for me to state that I understand from his Excellency that he has expressed himself willing to be satisfied with the general declaration of Her Majesty's Government that the questions involved in the four points must come under consideration, and that in any future negotiations they will bear in mind the principles which animated them in the last.

There is only one point, Count Buol said, on which he required any further explanation, and respecting which it was necessary there should be no misunderstanding, and that he had therefore instructed Count Colloredo to ascertain whether, in the event of Austria continuing pledged not to enter into any arrangement with Russia without consultation with the Governments of England and France, those Governments admitted that they would be equally bound not to enter into negotiations without any communication with Austria.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 85.

Brigadier-General Cranfurd to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 30.)

(No. 24. Private.)

Vienna, July 18, 1855.

My Lord,

HAVING made, as ordered by Her Majesty's Government, an application through Count Buol for an audience of leave previous to returning to England, I received an appointment, through his Excellency, to be at the Imperial Palace

in Vienna upon Friday, the 13th instant, when His Imperial Majesty would deign to receive me for the purpose of taking leave.

The Emperor accordingly admitted me to the honour of an audience upon that day, and upon the first words was pleased to say, that it had given him satisfaction to see me at Vienna, and that he would have wished to keep me longer; "but," His Imperial Majesty added, after a pause, "circumstances have not allowed it." He then proceeded graciously to inquire the time at which I purposed to leave Vienna, and the length of time during which my family had been in this country with me.

The Emperor then entered upon the subject of the late events before Sebastopol, and spoke of the great difficulties the allies met with there, and of the heavy losses we had sustained in the last assault.

I answered, that the investigation of our losses had proved them to be smaller than was at first supposed, and than might have been expected, after such an operation as that of the 18th of June.

His Imperial Majesty then went on to speak of the loss England and her army had sustained by the death of Lord Raglan. I was able to correct the error the Emperor was under, as to the age of the lamented Commander of the British army, whom he evidently supposed to have arrived at extreme old age; and I was able to assure His Imperial Majesty that not only did his age not exceed sixty-seven, but that at the period of his late Lordship's departure from England to take command of the army, both his appearance and the energies he possessed would have led those who observed him to conclude that he had not attained to his real age, and I added that Lord Raglan was beloved by the whole army.

The Emperor expressed in very warm terms his admiration of the noble qualities which distinguished the late British Commander, enumerating the distinguishing points of his character with some detail.

The Emperor then reverted to the subject of the siege of Sebastopol, where he imagined another effort would shortly be attempted. He inquired also whether we were sending out reinforcements to our army, and whether the health of our troops was satisfactory, on both which points I was able to answer in the affirmative.

The Emperor then added, "After all, peace is what we want at last."

I answered, that I believed every one sincerely wished for it; and the Emperor rejoined, "Et la Russie aussi!" And dropping his voice, he said with some hesitation, and in a lower tone, "Elle en a besoin."

I was of course silent, anxious not to lose anything which might follow upon the same subject, but His Imperial Majesty was silent after these words, and only adding something obliging to myself, he then gave me my congé.

I purpose leaving this to return to England upon the 23rd instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JAMES R. CRAUFURD.

No. 86.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 30.)

(No. 520.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July 16, 1855.*

I HAVE transmitted to your Lordship the official reports addressed to me respectively by Lieutenant-General Beatson and Mr. Calvert, with regard to the late desertions from the corps of Irregular Cavalry at the Dardanelles. I have now the honour to forward herewith, in copy, my official answers to those reports. Additional information, throwing light upon the real character of the movement, and the spirit in which it was met, has since come to my knowledge. This information is of a confidential nature, calling for deliberate inquiry and a well-considered plan of action. I shall lose no part of the time which can be spared from other urgent demands, to shape the course which it may be found advisable to pursue, and I hope to have it in my power to write upon the subject fully to your Lordship by the next messenger. Meanwhile, Mr. Skene, whom I had intrusted previously to the late occurrences with the delicate task of

communicating in person confidentially with General Beatson, respecting the state and prospects of his corps, returns to the Dardanelles after seeing me here, and until he can receive some definite instructions from me, will afford that officer, who justly esteems him, the benefit of his personal advice.

I have learnt with much satisfaction from Mr. Skene, that in his judgment the late deplorable acts of mutiny are traceable to causes which by no means necessarily compromise the permanent success of the enrolment, and that by judicious management the effects of the outrage may be obliterated, with every fair prospect of a satisfactory result.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 86.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Lieutenant-General Beatson.

Sir, *Therapia, July 13, 1855.*

I HAVE received with much concern the account of the desertions which have recently taken place from your corps, and I have informed Mr. Calvert, who will show you my despatch, of the measures adopted in concert with the Turkish Government for your assistance and support.

I trust that, by a firm and judicious course of measures, you will succeed in applying an effectual remedy to the spirit of insubordination and violence which has declared itself with so little apparent provocation among a part of the Albanian troops under your command.

There is room for apprehending that sufficient attention has not been given to the characters of the men enrolled, and the late intolerable outbreak may afford a just opportunity for clearing the Cavalry of its worst ingredients, without resorting to the hazardous experiment of unmerited concessions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 86.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Consul Calvert.

Sir, *Therapia, July 13, 1855.*

I HAVE received your several despatches dated the 8th, 10th, and 11th instant, respecting the desertions from Beatson's Horse and its deplorable consequences.

At the same time that I lament so untoward an occurrence, and wait for a further explanation of the causes, I have applied with success for everything calculated in my opinion, as well as in yours, to meet the emergency, and I have much satisfaction in approving your conduct under such trying circumstances.

Vizirial orders have been sent to the authorities in the several districts where the deserters are likely to be found. All are to be arrested, and those who resist to be shot.

Several companies of Infantry will also be sent down immediately, with two or three troops of Cavalry, who are to follow.

I applied for a score of artillerymen, and an officer of firmness and prudence to put himself in communication with the Pashas of the Dardanelles and General Beatson, with the view of concerting the most effective measures.

Admiral Grey has directed a vessel of war to stay at present in the Dardanelles for the protection of Her Majesty's subjects, and at my request has appointed two vessels for the conveyance, if necessary, of the Turkish detachments to their destination.

Those detachments will, however, in all probability, go down to the Dardanelles in Turkish vessels.

I observe with lively satisfaction the improvement which you announce in your despatch of the 11th instant; but as I conceive that it will be necessary to deal resolutely with the deserters and to take this opportunity of purging the

Regular Cavalry of the worst characters unfortunately received into it, I have not proposed any alteration in the protective measures announced to me as adopted by the Turkish Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—You will communicate this despatch to Lieutenant-General Beatson.

No. 87.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 30.)

(No. 521.)
Therapia, July 16, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 519 of this day's date, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship copy of Brigadier-General Mansfield's memorandum of a visit to the Seraskier Pasha on the 15th instant, relative to the means of defending Kars.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 87.

Memorandum.

Memorandum of a visit to the Seraskier Pasha made by Brigadier-General Mansfield at the desire of Her Majesty's Ambassador.

IN obedience to my instructions, I yesterday visited the Seraskier Pasha, accompanied by Mr. Doria. The information elicited is as follows:—

The latest advices from Kars and Erzeroom received by the Turkish authorities being of the same date as the despatches of Brigadier-General Williams and the other officers and Consuls, and generally of a more favourable tendency, 500 men had thrown themselves on the side of Batoom. Till now the Seraskier had been alarmed for the garrison on the score of force, but he had received lists showing that there are three months' provisions in the place, viz., Kars. The enemy's horsemen swept all the country round. Erzeroom may be said to be threatened, a Russian Division having advanced one march in its direction.

The people of Erzeroom were much alarmed, and had appealed to Hafiz Pasha at Trebizond to come to their assistance. That officer had started with 20 guns and 500 artillerymen. The country in the neighbourhood of Trebizond had been raised. Ten thousand armed men by this were on the road to Erzeroom.

Five hundred gunners collected in the Dardanelles were also to be sent forward without delay when landed. They are off Trebizond, now having sailed two days since in a steamer. Tussoum Pasha is actively engaged in raising men at Sivas, not for Erzeroom, but to guard the country in rear of that place, should the enemy advance upon it. These irregular troops would also do good service if paid regularly. The Seraskier Pasha informed his colleagues in Council the day before yesterday that if money were not provided for the war he would resign.

The Seraskier Pasha does not believe there is ground for alarm regarding Batoom. It would be a great mistake for the Russians to detach largely from their proper line of operations. Mouravieff is far too clever, in his opinion, to make such a blunder.

There is plenty of ammunition in Erzeroom. The country round is most fertile; grain is being stored; the population capable of bearing arms and contributing to the defence is 8,000. The works are very extensive and require a large army for their proper defence; they are without regular troops, except a few artillerymen.

Everything is forward, and being made ready for the contemplated expedition to Redoute-Kalé; answers have been received from Ismail Pasha, who

reports that the 15,000 men to be drafted from Bulgaria are ready to march with the baggage-animals, &c., &c., as directed, when the order is received. As stated in the previous conversations, 10,000 of these are for the contingent of General Vivian. What is now wanted is the order to give effect to the expedition.

Three hundred picked Infantry soldiers, under a very experienced officer, have been sent to the Dardanelles.

The artillerymen there are sufficient. It is proposed to send some Cavalry soldiers to meet the emergency. There are none available, except a regiment arriving from Volos in detachments for the Contingent.

(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD.

No. 88.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 30.)
Foreign Office, July 31, 1855.

Sir,

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch from Count Buol, stating that in compliance with Article I of the Treaty of December 2, he was bound to make known to Her Majesty's Government a communication which had been received from Russia.

His Excellency then informs Count Colloredo that Prince Gortchakoff had availed himself of an audience to deliver his credentials, to inform the Emperor of Austria that Russia was not disposed to extend her operations on the Danube, and that she would engage herself not to do so if Austria would give similar assurances on the part of the allies.

The Emperor of Austria replied, that the Treaty he had made with England and France prevented him from entering into any engagement of the kind proposed by the Russian Minister.

Count Colloredo likewise communicated to me the substance of a despatch to Count Buol from Count Esterhazy, who, after complaining of the reserve of Count Nesselrode, says, that he had discussed with Baron Brunnow the relations between Austria and Russia, and had distinctly told him that the Treaty of December 2 would be maintained by Austria.

Baron Brunnow appears to have criticized Count Buol's despatch, which he said had been received with dissatisfaction by the Russian Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 89.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 31.)
Foreign Office, July 31, 1855.

Sir,

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me the despatch of Count Nesselrode to Prince Gortchakoff, in reply to the despatch of Count Buol to Count Esterhazy, written shortly after the rupture of negotiations at Vienna.

Count Nesselrode professes to be well satisfied with the explanations volunteered by Austria, and declares that there is no fear of disagreement between the two Powers respecting the Principalities, and that their perfect understanding will keep the centre of Europe safe, in spite of the bitter and uncompromising hostility of the Western Powers. Count Nesselrode regrets the rupture of the negotiations; he agrees with Count Buol in throwing upon the Western Powers the responsibility of their having been brought to a close, and considers that any fresh pacific offers on the part of Russia would now fail, in the same way that those made by Austria have failed.

Russia does not ask for any engagement from Austria with respect to the Russian propositions which are the four bases as explained by Prince Gortchakoff, but she considers that the two first are gained to the cause of peace, and will so remain as long as Austria continues neutral. On the third point Russia will

keep herself free until the Western Powers exhibit a real desire for peace. As regards the fourth point Russia will reckon upon the assistance of Austria for the settlement of a question which presents so many difficulties that England and France, rather than discuss it, preferred to break off the negotiations on the third point, but Russia must postpone, as Austria does, all further discussion, while England and France persist in their hostility to Russia.

Count Buol intimates that he does not accept Count Nesselrode's interpretation of his despatch to Count Esterhazy.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 90.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 32.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 31, 1855.

I HAVE called the attention of Count Colloredo to a passage in the Austrian note which has recently been presented to the Diet at Frankfort. Count Buol in that note states, that "Austria considers as a fact gained ("fait acquis") the understanding which has been arrived at on the two first points;" and I told Count Colloredo that if Austria thereby intended to inform the Diet that Russia is bound by all she has agreed to, I had no observation to make, but if the meaning was that England and France were bound to abide by the arrangements provisionally "paraphés" at Vienna, I must request Count Colloredo to inform Count Buol that we hold ourselves entirely free as to those arrangements, and at full liberty to make others which will be better calculated to carry into effect the principles of the four points, by putting an end to Russian interference, and by securing the independence and integrity of Turkey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 91.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 1,007.)

My Lord, *Paris, July* 30, 1855.

AS Count Colloredo will have made to your Lordship the same communication which M. de Hübner made on Friday last to Count Walewski, in order to obtain some more formal assurance on the part of the belligerent Powers that they still adhere to the Treaty of December 2, and that they will not enter into any separate negotiations with Russia, it is only necessary for me to record the reply which Count Walewski informed me he made to the Austrian Envoy.

In answer to the first question, he told M. de Hübner that a despatch had already been sent off to M. de Bourqueney, which he trusted would satisfy the Austrian Government. In answer to the second, he said that he could state nothing officially, without previous communication with Her Majesty's Government, but that it seemed to him that if the Treaty of December 2 was not to be deemed a dead letter, it would follow that no negotiations could take place with Russia without a previous concert between the three Powers who had signed it.

I observed to Count Walewski that it might be well to take this opportunity of coming to an understanding with the Austrian Government as to the value of the word "concerter." It seemed to me that although Austria took credit to herself for having strictly adhered to her engagements on this point, it was very doubtful whether her last communications to the Russian Government were not a direct violation of them.

Count Walewski replied that such was also his opinion.

His Excellency said further that he should be glad to know what your Lordship proposed to say to Count Buol.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 92.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 1.)

(No. 1,024. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, July* 31, 1855.

IN the course of my late correspondence with your Lordship, I have had occasion to mention Count Walewski's conviction that the King of Denmark was well disposed towards the Western Powers, and that His Majesty would willingly follow any example of hostility to Russia set by the King of Sweden.

Count Walewski has now given me, in confidence, his reason for entertaining this conviction. It appears that a short time ago the King of Denmark, having learnt that the Emperor was making a collection of portraits, took the opportunity of sending by a confidential agent to His Majesty the picture of himself. This gentleman addressed himself to Count Walewski, and told him that he was commissioned by the King to express His Majesty's sympathy for the cause of the Western Powers, and his own readiness to join the King of Sweden in any measures that might be determined on to support that cause. The agent added that his mission was a secret to the Danish Government; that the King of Denmark hoped that his Ministers would not oppose his policy, but that if they did, he was prepared to change them. The King, he added, was much vexed by the intrigues of the Duke of Glucksberg, who was entirely in the interests of Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 93.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 1.)

(No. 1,026.)

My Lord, *Berlin, July* 31, 1855.

WHEN Count Walewski read to me Count Buol's despatch to M. de Hübner, to which I alluded in my despatch No. 1,007 of yesterday's date, it appeared to me that if the passage "va l'interprétation que nous avons donné à l'Article V du Traité du 2 Décembre" was allowed to pass by the French and English Governments without observation, they might be told hereafter by Austria that by their silence they had accepted that interpretation. Count Walewski did not participate in this apprehension, and I said no more upon the subject; but it appears that the Emperor in reading Count Buol's despatch, took the same view of the passage, and Count Walewski intends in consequence to mention in the despatch which he will address to M. de Bourqueney giving an account of his conversation with M. de Hübner, that although the French Government is willing to recognize the validity of the Treaty of the 2nd of December, they must, in order to guard against all misconception, state that they do not consent to the interpretation put upon Article V by Austria.

In telling me this, Count Walewski added, that he should be glad to be informed of the answer which your Lordship proposed finally to give to Count Colloredo.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 94.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 1.)

(No. 525.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July 19, 1855.*

THE night before last I was greatly surprised to learn that Omer Pasha had arrived suddenly from the Crimea. I learnt from Colonel Simmons, who accompanied him, that his Highness had intended to call upon me before he passed down the Bosphorus; but, as I happened to be absent, he changed his plan, and went straight to the Seraskier, which even otherwise would have been the most advisable course to pursue.

I heard at the same time from Lieutenant-General Simpson, who was good enough to send me an account of what had passed in Conference and correspondence between Omer Pasha and the other Commanders-in-chief before the departure of the former.

The correspondence to which I allude is inclosed herewith, in copy, for your Lordship's information.

It appears that Omer Pasha, apprised of the danger to which the army and fortress of Kars were exposed, and also of the plans for relieving them which were under consideration here, had proposed to withdraw from the Crimea the 25,000 Turkish troops before Sebastopol, and to put himself at their head, in order to operate a diversion from the coast of Circassia, and not finding among his colleagues, the other Commanders-in-chief, a disposition to support him, announced his intention of proceeding at once to Constantinople, with the view of submitting his opinions to the Government there.

This impulsive resolution is by no means in keeping with the decided opposition offered by Omer Pasha to the late Seraskier's requisition for detaching 5,000 of his men from the Crimea. His Highness may account for the change of view by referring to the pressure at Kars, and to the suspension of active operations near Sebastopol. But the Generals, his colleagues, deprecate the latter ground of justification, and means might apparently be employed for the rescue of Kars without deranging the calculations of the allied armies in the Crimea.

Your Lordship is already acquainted with the plan which has been for some time under consideration here on the part of the Sultan's Government, and in concert with Her Majesty's Embassy. An appeal has, moreover, been made by means of the electric telegraph to Her Majesty's Government, who were entreated to lose no time in making known its pleasure as to the proposed diversion, supposing it to obtain the suffrages of the naval and military authorities in point of means for carrying it into effect. The answer may be expected from day to day, and a final decision may then be taken with the advice and concurrence of the Commanders-in-chief. It would have been idle to make any earlier communication to them of an official description. The state of the army at Kars was made known to the British Commander-in-chief by General Williams himself.

I learn from M. Pisani, who called by my desire yesterday upon the Grand Vizier, the Seraskier and Fuad Pasha, that the Generalissimo's arrival without the orders of his Government had created some feelings of dissatisfaction, and that he had explained his conduct by referring to the perilous nature of the emergency, and the inutility, as he thought, of his presence near Sebastopol under present circumstances. He has seen the Sultan, but nothing has yet transpired as to the reception which he experienced from His Majesty.

On the whole, I am under a strong impression that Omer Pasha has committed an act of imprudence in coming here alike without leave and without the approval of his colleagues; that his idea of detaching a considerable portion of his army from the Crimea will be no more accepted here than it was sanctioned in the Crimea; and, although some advantage may be derived from personal communication between him and his Government, that he will best consult the interests of his Sovereign and of the alliance, by returning, without unnecessary delay, to the command of his forces in the Crimea.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 94.

General Simpson to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Before Sebastopol, July 16, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to lay before your Excellency copies of a correspondence that has taken place between Omer Pasha, General Pelissier, and myself, relative to a proposal made by the former to withdraw a certain portion of his troops from the Crimea, and have them transported into Asia.

At a conference which was assembled at the French head-quarters on Saturday the 14th, at the request of Omer Pasha, and at which he, General Pelissier, General La Marmora, Vice-Admiral Sir E. Lyons, Vice-Admiral Bruat, Rear-Admiral Stewart, and myself, were present, his Highness set forth his reasons and views on the subject in question; he also produced a very large sheet of paper, which contained, as he affirmed, the instructions of his Government; but on being asked for a translation of which, he said that it would take a fortnight to make one.

The arguments used by Omer Pasha were those set forth in the correspondence, and failed to produce any effect on the minds of the other members of the conference, who all, without exception, entertain the strongest objection to the withdrawal of any troops from the Crimea at this moment.

Omer Pasha, having failed in leading us to adopt his views, then announced his intention of proceeding to Constantinople to consult with his Government; and he starts this day at noon in Her Majesty's ship "Valorous," by which same vessel Lieutenant-Colonel Sulcau, attached to my Staff, in succession to the late Lieutenant-Colonel Vico, proceeds with this letter, ostensibly for the purpose of restoring his health.

General Pelissier has also charged him with a mission to the French Minister on the same subject.

I earnestly, therefore, beg your Excellency to use your powerful influence with the Porte to cause our opinion to prevail over that of his Highness; for great public interests are at stake, and serious consequences might result from his success.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAMES SIMPSON.

Inclosure 2 in No. 94.

Omer Pasha to General Simpson.

Quartier-Général au vallon des Marins Anglais,
M. le Général-en-chef, *devant Schastopol en Crimée, le 7 Juillet,* 1855.

J'AI l'honneur de transmettre à votre Excellence la note confidentielle ci-jointe, et je vous prie de bien vouloir la prendre en considération.

Recevez, &c.
Le Généralissime de l'Armée Impériale Ottomane,
(Signé) OMER.

Inclosure 3 in No. 94.

Memorandum.

LE Général-en-chef de l'armée Ottomane soumet aux Généraux et Amiraux-en-chef des armées et flottes de France et d'Angleterre les considérations suivants, qu'il croit demander l'attention la plus sérieuse.

Il paraît d'information incontestable que l'armée Ottomane d'Asie au nombre de 10,000 hommes renfermée dans le camp retranché de Kars par une force supérieure Russe, se trouve dans une position dans laquelle on peut

attendre que par manque de vivres, sinon par autre raison, elle pourrait être obligée de se rendre.

Le Commandant de cette armée, trouvant que ses communications avec Erzeroom sont coupées, demande en date du 23 Juin, avec la plus grande urgence, que des renforts lui soient envoyés sous le moindre délai, ou qu'une forte diversion soit faite du côté de Redoute-Kalé.

Il est à considérer que si la garnison de Kars succombe, Erzeroom, qui est une ville par sa situation difficile à fortifier, tombera aux mains de l'ennemi : par ce moyen il sera maître des communications avec la Perse et d'une grande partie d'Asie Mineure—succès qui aurait un très grand effet sur la guerre.

L'objet donc de sauver la ville et garnison de Kars, qui est en effet l'armée Ottomane d'Asie, demande l'attention sérieuse et immédiate des Puissances alliées.

Par rapport à la distance du théâtre de la guerre en Asie, c'est impossible de penser d'aucun secours pour cette armée, excepté des côtes de la Mer Noire, où la seule armée Ottomane qui est effective et capable de marcher est celle qui se trouve sous mon commandement.

Considérant maintenant la position des armées alliées en Crimée qui peut être formée des troupes effectives, comme suit :

Français (Infanterie)	-	-	-	70,000
Anglais (Infanterie)	-	-	-	20,000
Sardes (Infanterie)	-	-	-	13,000
Turcs (Infanterie) -	-	-	-	25,000
	Total	-	-	128,000

outre la garnison d'Eupatorie.

Selon les opinions des Généraux à la Conférence du 15 Mai, il faut pour défendre la position des alliés entre Balaklava et Kamiesch, et pour pousser le siège de Sebastopol, 90,000 hommes d'Infanterie effective. Par suite il ne reste que 38,000, desquels il faut ôter 8,000 pour les garnisons des Détroits de Kertch, et il ne reste que 30,000 hommes d'Infanterie pour opérer en dehors—une force trop petite pour faire aucune opération décisive contre un ennemi plus nombreux et fortifié dans des positions très difficiles.

Le seul effet donc de cette force de 30,000 hommes est que les alliés sont obligés d'occuper une position plus étendue sur la Tchernaya qui n'est pas plus forte que la position renfermée dans leurs lignes originales, et qui pourrait être gardée par la Cavalerie qui se trouve à leur disposition.

Dans ces circonstances je crois de mon devoir à proposer aux Généraux commandant-en-chef et aux Amiraux le seul moyen qui me paraît de sauver l'armée de Kars, en utilisant du plus grand avantage à la disposition des alliés, c'est-à-dire de la facilité de transport par mer.

La proposition que je veux faire est que je me porte avec la partie de mon armée qui se trouve ici et à Kertch, 25,000 hommes d'Infanterie, 3,000 hommes de Cavalerie d'Eupatorie, et une proportion d'Artillerie sur quelque point du côte de Circassie, duquel en menaçant les communications des Russes, ils seront obligés d'abandonner le siège de Kars.

Cette force unie avec celle de Mustapha Pacha de Batoom suffira pour cette opération, mais pour faire le mouvement j'invite la concurrence des Amiraux pour le transport de mes troupes, sans laquelle les moyens à ma disposition ne suffiront pas pour traverser la mer.

La proposition que le mouvement soit fait par mon armée est motivée par la considération que mes troupes ne peuvent pas entreprendre le service des tranchées devant Sebastopol, et la nécessité dans toute opération militaire de tenir, autant que possible, l'unité de commandement.

Ayant soumis cette mémoire à la considération très sérieuse de vos Excellences, j'invite le Général commandant-en-chef l'armée Française de rassembler une Conférence des Généraux et Amiraux commandant-en-chef, le plutôt possible, pour en prendre décision.

(Signé) OMER.

No. 95.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received August* 1.)

(No. 537.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 23, 1855.

OMER PASHA is still here. He has been most graciously received, and also most generously rewarded by the Sultan, who has conferred a considerable grant of land upon him. I need not add that he is on excellent terms with His Majesty's Ministers, and particularly with the Seraskier Pasha. His Highness, accompanied by the last-mentioned Minister, called upon me yesterday. He is expected to leave on his return to the Crimea in four or five days. Meanwhile, he does not conceal his conviction that nothing effective will be done in the Crimea on the present plan of operations. He thinks that the allies have erred in accepting the Russian line of defence as their object of attack, and he suggests the preferable course of starting with an army from Eupatoria, and giving battle in that part of the country where the Russians would derive no advantage from their natural fortresses or artificial defences. He conceives that 80,000 men would be sufficient for the enterprize, in addition to the few thousands which it would be necessary to leave in the entrenchments on the coast.

With respect to the dangers which threaten Turkey from the side of Kars, he proposes to add 25,000 men to the 10,000 or 12,000 at Batoom, to place himself at their head, and to make an incursion towards Georgia, starting from Redoute-Kalé, and turning Kutais to good account.

This idea was debated last night in a Council at the Grand Vizier's, and the result of the deliberations, as communicated to the Embassy through M. Pisani, was, that the troops to be employed in the above-mentioned manner, under the command of Omer, should be taken from Eupatoria to the amount of 20,000, and from Bulgaria to the amount of 5,000; and that the Contingent, with its numbers completed, should occupy the vacant space at Eupatoria. By way of alternative, it is proposed that, if the above-mentioned plan be deemed objectionable, it might be so far modified as to take only 10,000 men from the Crimea, and 15,000 from Bulgaria, including those destined to form part of the Contingent.

The Council professes itself ready to listen to any other suggestion proceeding from the two Embassies, in case that neither one nor the other of the preceding plans should be accepted.

I must confine myself, from want of time, to a statement of these leading points. My personal impression is, that Eupatoria would be an advantageous position for the more complete organization of the contingent, that the absence of Omer Pasha from before Sebastopol, supposing the troops to remain there under a suitable commander, would be free from the objections lying against any serious diminution of their numbers, and that it might even be productive of some beneficial results.

I propose to communicate on the whole subject freely with my French colleague, and, after advising the Porte to the best of our judgment, to refer to the Commanders-in-chief, and to report again to your Lordship. It is of course to be understood that my course of opinion is guided by a knowledge of your Lordship's objection to a premature employment of General Vivian's corps.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 96.

Consul-General Colquhoun to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 1.)

(No. 41. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Bucharest, July* 11, 1855.

I HAVE received, of late, frequent visits from several Boyars, as well of Wallachia as of Moldavia.

The subject uppermost in their minds was naturally the Protocol of the Vienna Conferences which bore upon the Principalities.

These men are of different parties as regards their wish for the ultimate system of government: some desiring immediately a foreign Prince, still tributary to the Porte; others, a native to be chosen from the two provinces, united under one administration; but all agree on one point—a most positive dread of Austria succeeding Russia, as the one natural conterminous influence in the country, and in the urgent necessity for the removal of power from the present hands.

I followed with much attention the various arguments advanced, and requested the parties to put their ideas on paper; they accordingly gave me, a few days ago, a memorandum, of which I have made copious extracts; there appears to me much in it which will repay the perusal.

In conversing over the subject, I found the minds of these men very uneasy on one question: Did the interruption of the Conferences absolve the parties from all engagements to which they had become bound by the earlier meetings? For example, was the decision come to regarding the provinces, to hold good in any subsequent negotiations? If so, I believe it is intended to protest in the strongest manner against such proceeding. The Wallachians declare they have not been heard through the medium of men they can rely on; while the Russian party was represented not only by all that was most distinguished in their diplomacy, but by every person who has had any transaction with the provinces. MM. Titoff and Khaltchinsky, and Kotzebue, formerly Russian Consuls-General, MM. Fonton, Mavros, and one or two such persons as the last-mentioned, who, though not ostensibly put forward, were the most active and best informed on all matters of detail of the late system of Government under Russian domination.

While myself, disavowing much of what is said in the inclosed memorandum, I venture to recommend it confidentially to your Lordship's attention.

I have not thought it my duty to allude to the second point, the navigation of the Danube; but I may simply call to your Lordship's notice that paragraph (6th of Article II) wherein Russia claims full liberty to establish military or other works on certain islands northward of the point where St. George's Channel quits the main arm of the river—a right she never yet had, and from which she was debarred by the Adrianople Treaty.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ROBERT G. COLQUHOUN.

Inclosure in No. 96.

Memorandum.

(Extract.)

THE political position of the Principalities of the Danube previous to the declaration of the present war, was defined by the Treaty of Adrianople, and by that of Balta Liman.

By these two political acts the Danubian Provinces were to form an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, while enjoying under the Imperial ægis an internal and independent administration.

The Sublime Porte had guaranteed to them a form of government, voted by the inhabitants and corroborated by the Organic Statute; Russia reserved to herself a right of control, and in fact she became the protectress of these countries.

Such were the rights which the Sublime Porte had granted at the termination of the wars in which she had been a loser, with, at the same time, a sincere desire to benefit the inhabitants of these countries.

If Russia claimed for herself any of the sovereign rights of the Porte it was not in virtue of any Treaty right, but by force, by cunning, and by the intrigues which she perpetually fomented in the Provinces. It was only in consequence of the events of 1848, that the Sublime Porte granted to the Court of Russia a right of joint intervention, and that for only a limited term of seven years, at the expiration of which time the Porte was to resume the plenitude of her sovereign rights acquired by conquest by the Sultans, and to obtain which they had undertaken so many wars, and even the present war, with the material aid of the Western Powers and the moral help of Austria.

What is the position which the Conferences at Vienna would assign to the Sublime Porte and to the Principalities at the close of the war, which certainly has hitherto, at least for Turkey, proved victorious, since she has successfully repulsed her enemies, and in concert with her allies has driven them beyond her frontiers?

The above is the question which requires to be examined with calmness and impartiality, although the Conferences are at the moment broken off.

Baron Prokesch, representing the Power which had engaged to protect the Principalities against the recurrence of any new invasion on the part of Russia, submitted to the Conference a memorandum drawn up by Austria, composed of seven Articles. This memorandum corroborates in itself the Treaty of Adrianople, that of Balta Liman, and adds other stipulations on the part of the Sublime Porte far more onerous, and which positively deprive her of the sovereign rights which she exercised over these Provinces before the war.

Prince Gortchakoff and M. Titoff submitted identical memorandums, but claiming to introduce such reforms into the country as the country should wish.

From these three memorandums the Plenipotentiaries drew up the final Protocol, bearing the title of "Development of the First Point," but his Excellency Aarif Effendi reserved to the new Turkish Plenipotentiary daily expected, full liberty of action respecting the third and following Articles:

"Article 1. The Danubian Principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia, shall continue subject to the Sublime Porte in virtue of ancient capitulations and Imperial hats, which have fixed and determined the rights and immunities which they enjoy."

This Article is in strict conformity with the interests of the Sublime Porte and of the Principalities, as well as with the sovereign rights of the Sultan and the rights of the Principalities granted them by the Sublime Porte.

"No exclusive protection shall in future be exercised over these Provinces."

Russia was not a protecting Power in virtue of any Treaty. Her Plenipotentiary distinctly asserted so much; but she had arrogated to herself that right through abuses and the vicious administration of the Hospodars, who thus afforded ground for her to plead, with an appearance of sincerity, the cause of the unfortunate inhabitants, and to invoke the intervention of the Sublime Porte.

"Art. 2. The Sublime Porte, in the plenitude of its suzerain power, shall preserve to the said Principalities their independent and national administration, and consequently entire freedom of worship, legislation, commerce, and navigation."

This Article has ever been respected by the Sublime Porte: as proof of this, we may bring, that these countries which have been under Turkey for about three centuries, still speak their own language, preserve their own religion, their national institutions, and if some abuses had crept into and marred their commercial liberty, such is to be mainly attributed to the vicious system which prevailed throughout the Empire, previously to the introduction of the reform. The maintenance of these privileges is due to the magnanimity of the Sultans, to that respect which the Mussulman nation has ever shown towards all institutions they found existing in the nations they had conquered. Thus she has violated not one single privilege of the people she has vanquished: all are in the enjoyment of the same privileges they held at the period of the Lower Empire.

Not so Russia. No sooner had she torn Bessarabia from Moldavia than she changed its institutions, introduced the Russian language as the official one, banished the Moldavian language from the church ritual, and day by day the last traces of Moldavian nationality are disappearing. The same state of things obtains in Bucovina under the Austrian domination.

It is therefore hardly logical to receive the guarantee from these two Powers, of privileges which both have equally violated as soon as they obtained possession of a portion of territory which formerly belonged to these Principalities. Historical facts, on the other hand, speak in favour of the Porte, who respected these privileges, not only in these countries, but in those farther removed, which could not inspire any jealousy to limitroph Powers, and whose inhabitants live in a greater or less degree of independence of the suzerain Power.

"The territory of the said Principalities cannot be subjected to any diminution."

Surely, from the side of Turkey, no serious fear of any such diminution can arise; her interest would be to increase the territory.

"Art. 3. The Sublime Porte, considering, in its wisdom, that the political position of the three Principalities in question is very nearly connected with the general interests of Europe, will make arrangements in the most friendly spirit with the Contracting Powers, as well for the maintenance of the legislation in force in those Provinces, as for the modification to be therein made. To this effect, the Porte will consult the wishes of the country, and will record in a solemn hatti-sherif the whole of the regulations relative to the rights and immunities of the said Principalities. Before promulgating it, this Act shall be communicated to the Powers, who, on their side, after examining it, will assume its guarantee."

From this point the Contracting Powers commence a series of violations of the suzerain rights of the Sultan and those of the Principalities. This same Protocol, drawn up by Baron Prokesch, in the second Article, obliges the Porte guarantee to the country an independent and national administration.

In this Article, on the contrary, it is stipulated that the legislation, modified according to the wishes of the country and of the Sublime Porte, shall, in the first instance, be examined by the Contracting Powers, shall receive their suggestion for modification, and after that the legal sanction.

It is no longer then an independent administration, but requires to be submitted to the sanction of the Contracting Powers. Up to the present moment these Provinces could officially, with the consent of the Porte, adopt such form of government as they considered fit. Now, on the contrary, all modifications must, in a measure, depend on Russia and Austria. The Porte will have to beseech these two Powers in any case,—anarchy must inevitably follow such a course. Remark that these modifications have been already beforehand decided on at Vienna, as the price at which the Hospodars procured their reinstallation. One of these Provinces drew up a memorandum on this view, entitled "Défaut d'avenir et de stabilité;" it was sent to Constantinople to endeavour to procure the sanction of the Suzerain Power.

France and England are too far off to be constantly intermeddling in the in the internal affairs of the Provinces.

Previously to this present war, Turkey never submitted to such conditions, and if occasionally Russia claimed such a liberty she always chose some moment when Europe was engaged in political troubles: witness the Treaty of Balta Liman.

Without, however, entering on a examination of the rights and privileges granted by the Sublime Porte to the Provinces from time immemorial by the illustrious Sovereigns who certainly possessed the right acquired by conquest, and which assured to these countries an independent administration without the interference of any Power whatever, should not in courtesy these inhabitants have been consulted as to whether they were desirous of being under European guarantee? Why should the Porte, so to say, be compelled to make a separate Treaty with each of the Contracting Powers? Is she in the position of a vanquished Power, that Europe should impose on her conditions more onerous than those of the Treaty of Adrianople? Is this, perhaps, the price she is to pay for her present alliance? Or, perhaps, it is the price she is to pay for the Austrian alliance

which undertook to expel the Russians, but which having a previous understanding that she was to replace the latter, stipulated for the above conditions?

The Russians under the walls of Adrianople dared not propose such conditions to the Sultan, while Austria having hitherto, throughout the present war, played the part of a very doubtful Power, requires, in the face of all Europe, guarantees from a Power which has ever respected the privileges of every and any people, which she (Austria) has ever violated by sowing intrigue and disunion wherever she went; and why should we guarantee the privileges of these Principalities and their territory when the whole Ottoman Empire is under the guarantee of all the Powers? Are these Provinces and their territory unidentical with the rest of the Empire? No! but another Cracow is contemplated to be partitioned so soon as any political complications shall arise between France and England.

If the Ottoman Empire is to form part of the European Powers for the maintenance of the European equilibrium, why should Europe impose on her a task which can only tend to degrade her in the eyes of her peoples and in the eyes of the other Powers; for surely to be called on to guarantee the privileges of her own people to Europe, is an acknowledgment that she is capable of violating those privileges, or has, at least, had the intention so to do. It strikes at the suzerain rights of a people whom we now class amid the European family, and that blow falls on the Sovereign.

If a like principle is to be recognised as part of the European public law, why should not, and with more reason, Austria be required to guarantee the rights of Hungary and Italy? and why should not Russia be required to guarantee the Constitution granted by the Treaty of Vienna to the Kingdom of Poland? But the averred object of Austria is to maintain the Treaty of Adrianople, the first Article of that of Balta Liman, to give it even a greater development, and to insert into the public European law, what was in fact only a private affair between State and State, the result of unfortunate wars, and which must sooner or later have disappeared from the political code of Europe.

"Art. 4. The national armed force organised with the object of maintaining the internal security and insuring that of the frontiers, can be developed when necessary according to the resources of the country. The conditions of a defensive system shall be taken into consideration, in the common interests of the Sublime Porte, of the Principalities, and of Europe."

The tax-paying population capable of furnishing soldiers amounts, according to the recent census, to 600,000 families. Suppose a levy of 10 per cent. to be made (an enormous rate not only in peace time, but even in war), an army may be raised in the two Principalities of 60,000 men. Such an army is not sufficient to defend the country either against Austria or against Russia, in the event of either of these Powers invading these provinces, as the frontier of Austria extends from Orsova to Mamorintza, and that of Russia from this last point to Galatz. For such a line of defence, 200,000 to 300,000 men would hardly suffice; moreover, a force of 10,000 men would be required for the maintenance of internal order and the wants of the administration.

If the Principalities had not as neighbours two Empires such as those of Austria and Russia, they might certainly be in a position to defend themselves against all and every invasion; but against these two Powers the Principalities alone could never cope, not only on account of the insignificant numerical force of their population, but from the deficiency of financial means.

The proposal of the Baron Prokesch forces on the provinces the necessity of expending all the revenues of the State in keeping up an army, which in the end would prove perfectly useless.

And what guarantee does the Conference of Vienna propose to give to the Sublime Porte, that the army of the provinces shall not unite itself in any special case to that of one of the two neighbouring Powers which might for the time be at enmity with Turkey? Has not the Porte an example of this in the present struggle? Was not the Moldo-Wallachia Militia an auxiliary of Russia?

What guarantee can the Conference of Vienna give, that this force shall not rise in revolt on any opportunity against the Suzerain Court—were there not examples of this in 1821 and 1848? A Wallachian army may be of the utmost utility both to Turkey and to the Principalities, so long as it be under the immediate orders of the Porte, not under those of the Hospodars, who may

betray, as they have already betrayed, their country and the interests of the Porte; examples of this treason are not wanting from the days of Cantimir and Brancovano down to those of Stirbey and Ghika. A well-organised system of defence is requisite both for the Empire and for the provinces, for their interests are one and identical—any blow struck on the one has its echo on the other: but then the fortresses should not be garrisoned by Moldo-Wallachians alone, but by mixed troops, otherwise the propositions contained in the fourth Article would become a perpetual menace to the possessions of the Porte beyond the Danube, and a centre of intrigue and conspiracies against Turkey, against which she would have no means of defending herself.

"Art. 5. In the event of doubts arising as to the interpretation of the constitutive Hat, the guaranteeing Powers will examine, in concert with the Sublime Porte, into the grounds and the object of the representation, and they will neglect no means to bring about an arrangement.

"Art. 6. In the event of the internal tranquillity of the said Principalities being compromised, no armed intervention shall take place in their territories without being or becoming the subject of agreement between the High Contracting Powers."

These two Articles are merely corollaries to the preceding ones; it was with the view of giving more strength to them that these latter have been inserted in the Austro-Russian memorandum, and more especially with the view of continually raising subjects of discussion between subjects and their Sovereign. Hence the consequence of any political interventions could only be to detach these Provinces either to render them independent of the Porte, or to effect their partition between the two Powers. History offers many examples of this policy in the days of Rome and in our own day: witness Poland, partitioned in consequence of the friendly intervention of Austria, Prussia, and Russia.

This sixth Article is so diametrically contrary to the interests of the Sublime Porte that but little discussion is required to prove it. When have such revolutionary principles ever been advanced by Powers arrogating to themselves the term "Conservative?" A Province revolts against its lawful Sovereign, and that Sovereign must implore his powerful neighbour to permit his suppressing such revolt, with the further conditions that the whole of the Powers shall cooperate in laying the revolt, each as he interprets such a movement. Is this the manner in which the integrity of the Ottoman Empire is to be guaranteed, at a period when conspiracies, revolts, visions of nationality, are the order of the day, and these too often fostered by the very Powers professing to check such, when their effects appear to bear upon their own States?

If such principles are to be introduced into the public European law, why not apply them to the Austrian Empire, which threatens dissolution on the first revolutionary symptom breaking out, or to Russia, composed of sixty different and distinct nationalities? Such principles are not applied to these two Powers, because, inevitably, they would cause their dissolution. But, forsooth, they are proposed to be applied to Turkey, in the preconceived determination to snatch from her these two rich Provinces. But the Provinces will not consent to this; their inhabitants prefer rather to live under the domination of Turkey, than under an influence Austro-Russian. They will not, under existing circumstances, accept an independent *régime*, with the example of Greece before their eyes,—a prey to continual anarchy and foreign intervention.

"Art 7. The Courts engage not to afford protection in the Principalities to foreigners whose proceedings might be prejudicial either to the tranquillity of those States, or to the interests of neighbouring States. Disapproving such proceedings, they engage reciprocally to take into serious consideration the representations which may be made on this subject by the Powers, or even the local authorities. On its side the Sublime Porte will enjoin on the Principalities not to tolerate in their territory foreigners such as above described, nor to allow the local inhabitants to meddle with matters dangerous to the tranquillity of their own country and of foreign States."

The avowed object of this Article, masked under circumlocutory phraseology on the part of Russia and of Austria, is to arrogate to themselves a right of ostracism for any political crime they shall invent, and to consecrate by Treaty that which hitherto was non-official respecting political refugees, as in 1849.

But we must not forget that the Austro-Russian demands of that day were rejected by the Porte, with the approval of the Western Powers, and in the interest of humanity. At that period Austria, almost torn to pieces by revolutions, dared not raise her voice, and certainly, had not the British fleet appeared at the Dardanelles, Russia would then have found an excuse for laying hold of a material guarantee.

This Article is entirely useless in a Treaty respecting the provinces, for the Porte can regulate all that concerns her internal administration, but she is not to apply an external policy other than what is applicable to the rest of the Empire, unless she consents to abandon these countries to the exclusive influence of Austria and Russia.

As regards the memorandum of the French Cabinet presented by the Baron Bourquency, and backed by Lord John Russell and the Earl of Westmorland, if the Sublime Porte were to take the initiative in such proposal, with some few modifications of importance to the interests of Turkey, it would indeed be the best adapted to the times, and would offer the surest guarantee for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

The union of the two Principalities, with one internal and independent administration without guarantee from any one single Power, without the memorandum from MM. Prokesch, Gortchakoff, Titoff; without a foreign Prince, for that already argues a certain independence; but with a Viceroy, named by the Sultan, à volonté, responsible for his acts before the Imperial Divan; an army bound to combat for the general interests of the Empire; a Turkish army in the interior, or on the frontier, as the case may necessitate, and the fusion of that Royalty (by right appertaining solely to the Sultan) with the other parts of the Empire; surely such a state of things would be far preferable to that proposed to the Porte on the other hand.

Although in reality such a system increases the value of the autonomy of the Principalities, and gives a greater strength to the Empire, its real source of interest, under present circumstances, consists in maintaining the privileges of the Provinces, such as they existed previously to the conclusion of the Treaties with Russia. It is also in the true interest of the Principalities, which are not yet ripe for the enjoyment of a larger portion of liberty and for an extension of political action.

The object of the present war is to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, continually menaced by Russia. To arrive at this end, it was proposed to shut up the road to Russia on the Continent, by the Principalities; on the sea, by the equalization of the fleets of both Empires. The maritime question is being decided at this moment, the Continental question has been laid down by the Austro-Russia Cabinet in such a manner as shall in no way impede the victorious march of Russia; on the contrary, so as to facilitate and furnish her with opportunities for seizing material guarantees; for the Treaties of Kainardji, Bucharest, and Jassy, the Convention of Akermann and Balta Liman, and the Treaty of Adrianople, only receive a wider development and greater solemnity under the guarantees of the Western Powers.

These Treaties hitherto were not recognized by the European public law: they had been extorted from a Power which all Europe was supposed to protect; naturally, therefore, they would have given rise to the present war, under the name of "Eastern question." This war was no new one on the diplomatic arena—a favourable opportunity was only wanting to take up arms. Thus, at the conclusion of the war (had it now been concluded), the Sublime Porte instead of gaining weight and influence, not only in Europe, but even in her own States, would have found herself deprived of certain rights, of which a victory could not have despoiled her; she has been made mistress of provinces which she has no right to repress in case of revolt; she is even refused a right to have a proper influence in the country, and is placed in such a state of political embarrassment as cannot fail sooner or later of provoking a European war.

For what then has Europe been now coalescing? Is it to keep up a state of things worse than existed previously to the war? Is Turkey not perfectly justified in saying to Europe, "You instigated and urged me on to war; you prevented me from subscribing to the demands of Prince Menchikoff, which would have proved fatal on a future occasion more or less distant, and you deliver up my northern provinces to an Austro-Russian policy?"

Russia made no difficulty in accepting the first point and guarantee, since

it placed her in a situation far better than that she occupied before the war. Her Treaty of Adrianople, under another name, receives a solemn sanction; her Convention of Balta Liman, concluded merely for a limited term, with the approval of the Western Powers receives a new and perpetual confirmation. She therefore asks nothing farther on the Continent; but she shares that influence and those rights with Austria, with France, and with England. The policy of Austria before the Revolution of 1848 was most conservative as regarded the Ottoman Empire; from that period Russia has forced her to adopt her policy, and it is about to become as menacing as the latter, both interests becoming identical; but her governmental system, the antipathy with which her present occupation is looked upon, her present line of policy, her position as a first-rate Power, with no means of action, deprive her of all influence. In the Conferences she has rendered an eminent service to Russia, as she has also done by the occupation of the Provinces; she has defended Russia on her Bessarabian frontier; she furnishes her with the means of utilising her army in the Crimea: she restores to Russia her former influence in the Provinces, and guarantees to her a Treaty far more favourable than the one she held before the war.

Russia hastens to accept the first point, and she considers it as already assured to her, although the Conferences are not yet passed into a Treaty. (See the circular note of M. de Nesselrode, lately addressed to M. Gfinka for communication to all the German Courts.) She will be able to say to France and England on the conclusion of peace, "You have already ceded this Article to me, and I have all Germany to support me, in whose interest I accepted it."

As for France and England they are, as said already, too far distant to pretend to exercise a real influence on the Principalities. They may possess their sympathies, but to support their policy, when having to deal with a Power like Russia, who will always drag Austria in her wake, such being the present condition of the existence of this latter, the Western Powers require an army always ready to support that policy. But what is surprising is, that the Cabinets of the western and maritime Powers should take into serious consideration the proposals of Austria. When, in 1828, Lord Aberdeen, then head of the Foreign Office, addressed to Russia a confidential note on the subject of the Treaty of Adrianople, in which he exposed the fatal consequences which this Treaty must produce, and the position in which it placed Turkey, he then foretold the present war, and said *à propos* of the Principalities, that Russia was so modelling these countries as to prepare for subsequently detaching them from the Ottoman Empire. Has the policy of England changed since then? Does the Austrian alliance, or the exclusion of the sole guarantee of Russia by the Austro-Russian guarantee, inspire her with greater confidence in her intentions? The English Cabinet should bear in mind that the Austrian monarchy, since the footsteps of the Russian soldiery has traversed it, is no longer what it was. It has become a Government at the mercy of the Russian policy; if even it would offer any resistance it is unable to do so. The young Emperor and his Minister, Count Buol, may lean towards the Anglo-French policy, but ther soldiery, their nation, are devoted to Russia. Europe persists in remaining under the delusion that Austria will actively support the Western policy; neither her army of 500,000 men, so highly vaunted, is able to cope with Russia, nor is it the intention of the Austrian Cabinet to take an active part in the war; she is simply occupied in supporting and serving the cause of Russia.

No. 97.

Consul-General Colquhoun to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 1.)

(No. 43.)

My Lord, *Bucharest, July 11, 1855.*

I HAVE been much disgusted at the spirit of satisfaction which has shown itself among a certain set (not entirely, as some would have it believed, of Greeks, but of Boyars and employés high placed), on the non-success of our attempts on the Malakoff and the Redan forts on the 18th ultimo. Last week some Boyars and merchants came to complain of this; the former that such exhibition took place in certain houses, the latter that in the public coffee-

houses, indecent expressions of joy were uttered, and the hopes that after a few more such reverses, magnified to 18,000 men lost, the invaders would be driven out of Russia. I determined to speak to the Prince on the matter; and accordingly, last Sunday, I went out to Cotrocheni, and communicated what had passed.

I told him, as British Agent, I was the last man here either to put a curb on the press, or a stop to free and proper liberty of conversation, but that two years ago the police had promulgated such stringent regulations against persons speaking of politics, which rules had been put in force by immediate imprisonment and exile, without form of process, of persons of whatever nation, that I could not tolerate the present unbridled license which his own subjects were indulging in. I declined mentioning names, but told him I certainly would do so if the offence were repeated.

I have just learnt, from the Under-Secretary of State, that orders had come from the Prince, that measures should be taken to endeavour to repress, at least in places of public resort, such exhibition of feelings as those I have alluded to.

In the course of conversation, the Prince said it was difficult to check conversation. I observed to him, I had at this moment a suit of damages against his Government, raised by a Sardinian merchant at Ibraila under British protection, for his having been expelled from that town, where he had resided for years, on forty-eight hours' notice, for simply admiring the valour of the Turks at Oltenitza.

The rupture of relations between the local Government and the Prussian Consulate-General, was owing to the sending out of the country, without form of process, a Prussian subject, for speaking on the battle of Calafat. Two of his own young Boyars were at this moment arrested in Bender for similar causes, and many other cases I could cite; that I simply required a proper check should be put in time on what might degenerate into a serious abuse, and become inconvenient to the Government itself, if allowed to pass unnoticed. There are others here whose conversations are not very measured; as these are foreigners, I do not hesitate to treat such with the contempt that such an unfriendly line of conduct deserves.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ROBERT G. COLQUHOUN.

No. 98.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 824.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 1, 1855.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith a copy of a despatch* from Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, respecting the suggestions made by Omer Pasha during his visit to Constantinople, for the relief of the Turkish army at Kars; and with reference to that passage in which his Excellency states that the result of the deliberations of the Divan was, that the troops to be employed in the manner suggested by Omer Pasha, and under his command, should be taken from Eupatoria to the amount of 20,000 men, and from Bulgaria to the amount of 5,000 men, and that the British Contingent, with its numbers completed, should occupy the vacant space at Eupatoria. I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government are favourably disposed to this proposition, and they hope that the Government of the Emperor will concur in it.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 95.

No. 99.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

Paris, August 2, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

COUNT WALEWSKI is opposed to the proposal contained in No. 824. He will submit it, however, to the Emperor, and hopes to give His Majesty's answer on Saturday.

No. 100.

Mr. Howard to the Earl of Clarendon.

Paris, August 2, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

PLEASE to forward the following message from General Torrens to Lord Panmure:

The Emperor objects to any diminution of the Turkish army in the Crimea. General Pelissier is written to to consult always with General Simpson, and also to conciliate him and Omer Pasha; also that the siege must be carried on.

No. 101.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 3, 3 P.M.)

Paris, August 3, 1855, 1·30 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

GENERAL TORRENS begs me to forward the following message to Lord Panmure, as an addition to his letter of yesterday:

Marshal Vaillant had a pasted paper over postscript of General Pelissier's despatch. It contained, he said, a secret project which no one but himself was to see.

In the despatch General Pelissier said, that he often thought on the subject of the possibility of using the shipping, in making a diversion from a new base, but as yet had not found it feasible.

Marshal Vaillant said, that the siege must go on, if it lasted three or four winters.

No. 102.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 3, 6·10 P.M.)

Paris, August 3, 1855.

(Telegraphic.)

COUNT WALEWSKI has shown your despatch No. 824 to the Emperor.

His Majesty is most anxious that not a man should be moved from the Crimea, but has commissioned Marshal Vaillant to state his views to General Torrens. I hope to see the Emperor myself to-morrow.

No. 103.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 830.)

Foreign Office, August 3, 1855.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government have learnt with regret, by your Excellency's telegraphic despatch of yesterday, that Count Walewski does not concur with them in the opinion that Omer Pasha and a portion of the army under his command might be sent to Asia to effect a diversion for the relief of Kars and the

adjoining country, now menaced by the Russian forces under General Mouravieff, while their place in the Crimea might be filled up by the Turko-British Contingent under Lieutenant-General Vivian.

Her Majesty's Government, however, consider the relief of the Turkish troops in Asia of such vital importance that they cannot abstain from laying before the Government of the Emperor the various arguments by which they consider the plan recommended by them may be supported.

It is plain that without assistance the whole Turkish force in Asia must be destroyed or captured. The force at Kars is surrounded, and even if able to defend its position against assault, which may be doubted, it must surrender when its provisions are exhausted, and that will happen in a few weeks. The immediate result would be, that 13,000 Turkish troops would become prisoners of war, and a strong position be occupied by the Russians.

But, moreover, Kars taken, Erzeroom must share the like fate, and the whole of the neighbouring country would be in the hands of the Russians, while the season would be too far advanced for military operations to drive them out of it.

In this event, if the allies take Sebastopol, the Russians will have an equivalent to set against it, and against any demands which the allies may found on the possession of that place. If, on the other hand, the allies do not take Sebastopol before the winter, the Russians, by occupying Asia Minor, will have a considerable advantage over the allies; and as the Russians have nothing to do on the Danube, and are free from apprehension anywhere to the north of the Danube, they can send into Georgia, and thence into Asia Minor, a force of considerable magnitude. This would be striking a serious blow at the Turkish Empire, and one, the effects of which it would be difficult to remedy. If, on the other hand, Omer Pasha were to go to Redoute-Kalé, or Erzeroom, with a sufficient force, the Russians would be driven back, or forced to retire; the Circassians would be encouraged, Georgia might be cleared, and the allies would stand on vantage-ground in any negotiations which may be entered into during the ensuing winter.

Omer Pasha's knowledge of Asiatic Turkey would give him advantages in carrying on war there, which no other Commander can possess, while in the Crimea his presence is comparatively of no value.

Her Majesty's Government, indeed, feel doubtful whether, if the Turkish Government should desire to avail itself of Omer Pasha's special qualifications for service in Asia, any just objections could be made to the Porte's utilizing in that quarter the services of one who has proved himself to be so able a Commander, and who has succeeded in organizing an efficient army, at a moment when some of the most important provinces of the Turkish Empire are invaded by the enemy, and when a considerable Turkish force is in danger of being made prisoners of war. Her Majesty's Government would doubt whether it was wise, even if they felt sure they had the right to do so, to object to the adoption by the Porte of such a course; especially as the transfer of the contingent under Lieutenant-General Vivian either to Balaklava or to Eupatoria, whichever might be deemed best, would fill up, or nearly so, the void occasioned by the removal of Omer Pasha, and a portion of his force to Asia Minor; and the reinforcement sent to Lieutenant-General Vivian and to the British and French armies would add still further to the aggregate force of the allied armies in the Crimea.

Her Majesty's Government wish that your Excellency should submit these observations without delay to the French Government, in the hope that they may be induced to take a different view of the question from that which they have hitherto entertained, and may enable your Excellency to convey to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe by the messenger of to-morrow, while a similar communication is made to M. de Thouvenel by the French Government, authority to recommend the Porte to adopt the course of detaching Omer Pasha and an adequate portion of his army to Asia Minor; so that by this means the only resource which now remains for saving from the Turkish army in Asia the great disaster which there is too much reason to apprehend is impending over it, may at all events not be left untried.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 104.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 630.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 4, 1855.*

THE inclosed copies of despatches* which I have addressed to Lord Cowley, and of telegraphic messages which I have received from him, since the arrival of your despatch No. 537 of the 23rd ultimo, will put your Excellency in possession of the communications which have passed between Her Majesty's Government and that of France, respecting the suggestions made by Omer Pasha, with a view to a diversion to be made by a Turkish force under his orders for the relief of the Sultan's army at Kars and its neighbourhood.

My despatch to Lord Cowley, No. 830, of yesterday's date, contains a full statement of the grounds on which Her Majesty's Government consider such a movement under Omer Pasha advisable; and I have received, this afternoon, from his Excellency the further telegraphic message which I inclose, announcing that the Emperor of the French will no longer oppose the desired expedition.

Immediately on the receipt of this message, I sent to your Excellency, by telegraph, through Varna, a despatch in cypher in the following terms:

"August 4. Omer Pasha can go to relieve Kars, provided he does not diminish the Turkish troops before Sebastopol, or disturb the garrison of Yenikale.

"Desire Vivian to hold himself in readiness to go to Eupatoria with his Turkish Contingent."

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 105.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 5.)

(No. 1,036.)

My Lord, *Paris, August 3, 1855.*

COUNT WALEWSKI has answered M. de Hübner, in respect to the late communications from Vienna, in the words which I informed your Lordship in my despatch No. 756 of the 19th June, his Excellency proposed employing. He has, however, added the opinion that, in future, the Austrian Government ought to be more circumspect in the relations which they continue to maintain with the Court of St. Petersburgh, for that, in the opinion of the French Government, the spirit if not the letter, of the Treaty of the 2nd of December was violated by the last communications made by Count Buol to the Russian Cabinet on the close of the Conferences.

Count Walewski said also a few words to show M. de Hübner without raising a controversy, that he did not mean to be bound, in any way, to the interpretation which Count Buol had placed upon the VIth Article of that Treaty.

His Excellency read me a circular despatch which he had addressed to the French Diplomatic Agents abroad, giving an account of what had lately taken place between the belligerent Governments and Austria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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* Nos. 98, 99, 100, 102, and 03.

No. 106.

The Earl of Clarendon to Consul-General Colquhoun.

(No. 16. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 2, 1855.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 41 of the 11th ultimo, and I have to state to you that I have read with much interest the extracts from a memorandum on the political position of the Danubian Principalities, which you received from some Boyars of Wallachia and Moldavia.

The English and French Governments, whenever negotiations for peace are resumed, will consider themselves free and unfettered by the proceedings of the Conference at Vienna.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 107.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No 36)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 7, 1855.*

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch from Count Buol, stating that the Austrian Government were satisfied with the assurances which they had received of the desire of Her Majesty's Government to maintain the alliance with Austria, and that similar assurances had been received from the French Government.

Count Buol infers from these explanations that England and France agree with Austria that the four guarantees cannot, in any case, be excluded from the future conditions of peace, but always with the reservation of their right to put forward such conditions over and above the four guarantees as the general interest of Europe may appear to require, and with the understanding that they are released from all obligation to resume the negotiations purely upon the basis of the four principles.

The Austrian Government, Count Buol states, see nothing in this which is inconsistent with the engagements contracted between Austria and the Western Powers, since it is understood that in any case the four principles must form part of the guarantees to be given to Europe.

Austria has no objection to the reserves made by England and France, regarding those reserves as the natural consequence of the position held by the belligerent Powers and of the sacrifices which the war imposes upon them.

The Austrian Government does not, therefore, consider it necessary to enter into any fresh engagements; but they wish the respective positions of the three Powers to be more precisely defined than they have been yet.

With reference to this point, Count Buol puts the following questions:

Does Great Britain, looking to the position of Austria since the breaking off of the negotiations, and to the interpretation which Austria puts upon the VIth Article of the Treaty of December 2, 1854, still recognize the stipulations of that Treaty as obligatory upon the Contracting Parties?

Are the three Powers, in consequence, bound together in the pursuit of a common object, and is their mutual engagement not to enter into any arrangement with Russia, without having deliberated thereupon in common, still in vigour?

Austria, on her part, Count Buol adds, has scrupulously observed, and will continue to observe, this last engagement, so long as she can count upon a perfect reciprocity upon the part of her allies, and upon the original object of the war, as laid down in the Acts signed in common, not being departed from; but it would not, in Count Buol's opinion, be consistent either with the dignity or convenience of any of the Powers to leave so important a stipulation in doubt, or to make its value depend upon the events of the war.

Count Buol concludes by expressing his hope that the explanations of Her Majesty's Government will be satisfactory upon a point which cannot be without influence on the line of conduct which Austria will for the future pursue.

I told Count Colloredo that Her Majesty's Government, in conjunction with that of the Emperor of the French, would adhere to the principles which had guided them throughout as necessary for the future peace and security of Europe; that those principles, namely, the cessation of Russian Protectorate in the Principalities, the free navigation of the Danube, the formal acknowledgment of the Turkish Empire as an integral part of the balance of power in Europe, the cessation of Russian preponderance in the Black Sea, and the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte, would come prominently under discussion as the foundation of any future negotiations, and that England and France reserved to themselves the right of proposing such further terms as they might think expedient and the events of war would justify. I said also that we were prepared to consider the Treaty of December 2 as still in force, and that, consequently, the three Powers were bound to make known to each other any proposal which might be addressed to either of them by Russia, and not to enter into any arrangement with Russia without having deliberated thereupon in common.

I added that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, this engagement implied that no communication should be made to Russia by either of the three Powers without the previous knowledge of the other two Powers.

In conclusion I said that, if I did not advert to that part of Count Buol's despatch which had reference to the interpretation which Austria put upon the Vth Article of the Treaty of December 2, Count Colloredo would not consider that the correctness of that interpretation was thereby admitted by Her Majesty's Government; but that I should not allude to the subject, because it was the wish of Her Majesty's Government to avoid all cause of irritation, and to look to the future rather than to recur to past events, as they were unwilling not to believe that united action must, sooner or later, be the result of interests so completely identified as those of the three Powers who signed the Treaty of December 2.

You will read this despatch to Count Buol.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 108.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 6.)

(No. 55.)
My Lord, *Vienna, August 1, 1855.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 22 of the 24th ultimo, I have the honour to state that I have called Count Buol's attention to the observation made by Mr. Cunningham that the 6th Article of the Regulations by which it was proposed at the late Conferences to secure the freedom of the navigation of the Danube, would not restrict Russia from erecting fortifications on the islands at the mouth of the river in the way she had hitherto been restricted by the IIIrd Article of the Treaty of Adrianople. Count Buol said he had not been aware of the circumstance; but as there was certainly no intention of putting Russia in a better position than she had occupied under the Treaty of Adrianople, the objection now made to the regulations which had been proposed ought to be borne in mind in any future negotiations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 109.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 6.)

(No. 56. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Vienna, August 1, 1855.*

IT has come to my knowledge, through a channel to which I cannot hesitate to give entire reliance, that Prince Gortchakoff, before his departure for Stuttgard, stated in his confidential communications to his Government, that the Emperor Francis Joseph, since his return from Gallicia, has been much less favourably disposed towards Russia than was the case previous to his journey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 110.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 6.)

(No. 57.)
My Lord, *Vienna, August 1, 1855.*

YOUR Lordship's despatch No. 15 reached me on Sunday evening, and I waited on Count Buol on the following morning, in order to execute the instructions contained in it.

In consequence of your Lordship's desire, that irritating discussion should be avoided, I did not repeat to Count Buol the recapitulation of your remarks to Count Colloredo upon his communicating the wish of his Government to be informed whether Her Majesty's Government still adhered to the four points as the basis on which future negotiations for peace must be conducted; and I merely stated that in reply to this inquiry, I was instructed to inform his Excellency that he was right in inferring from your Lordship's circular despatch of the 19th of June, that although Her Majesty's Government do not recognize any obligation in the partial understanding come to on some of the points during the negotiations at Vienna, yet Her Majesty's Government do adhere to the principles upon which those negotiations were founded, and I expressed the hope that he would enable me to report to your Lordship that he considered this a satisfactory answer to his inquiry.

Count Buol replied, that it was now scarcely necessary to enter at all upon the question, which he looked upon as settled by his last despatches to Count Colloredo and Baron Hübner; but that as the principles to which Her Majesty's Government express their continued adherence are those contained in the four points, it was satisfactory to him to have the assurance that they were maintained.

He added, that a communication he had received that morning from Baron de Bourqueney on the same subject, was more explicit than that which I had been instructed to make; but from them both, he thought it apparent that the three Governments understand each other upon this matter, and that all which now remains to be ascertained, is whether the Governments of England and France, as well as that of Austria, consider themselves bound not to enter into negotiation with Russia without mutual consultation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 111.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received .)

(No. 86.)

My Lord, *Frankfort, July* 20, 1855.

THE Austrian communication to the Diet was made in the sitting held yesterday, and with such trifling variation from the published document, that I subjoin it, *pro memorid*, as it appeared in the "Journal de Frankfort."

The concluding sentence expresses the Emperor's confidence that his confederates will recognise the efforts made by Austria to secure the advantages of peace, and to promote German interests.

M. de Bismark observed, as I am informed, that, in so grave a conjuncture, his Government was desirous of showing all consideration and comity towards Austria; that, while resolved to uphold all existing engagements, the Cabinet of Berlin was unwilling to enter into any new ones, but that his instructions permitted him to proceed to an immediate vote, expressing the thanks of the Assembly for the communication, and the readiness of his Government to maintain the state of preparation for war. The Bavarian and Saxon Representatives were desirous of having the matter referred to the standing Commission, and that the usual term of fourteen days should be allowed for the preparation and reception of their report.

After a brief discussion, altogether, as I am informed, of a friendly character, it was decided to refer the communication to the Commission for Oriental Affairs, with the instruction to present their report in next Thursday's sitting.

Your Lordship will observe that there is no indication of any understanding being arrived at between Austria and Prussia, as to the four points, or the other differences notoriously existing between them.

All mention of engaging the Diet to adopt the four points is studiously avoided, while Austria's adhesion to the Treaty of the 2nd of December, 1854, is upheld.

With reference to the state of preparation for war, I have learnt that several of the minor States have not hesitated to reduce their military establishments, without waiting for the sanction of the Diet; and notwithstanding the impending resolution of that Assembly to maintain this attitude, I apprehend there is but little chance of an inspection being made, or of the order being enforced.

No other business of any general interest was transacted in Thursday's sitting.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. MALET.

Inclosure in No. 111.

Extract from the "Journal de Frankfort."

LES Conférences sont closes, sans avoir amené le résultat qu'on en attendait. En face de cet insuccès de l'œuvre de la paix, le Gouvernement Autrichien croit devoir exposer à l'Assemblée Fédérale avec une entière franchise, l'ensemble de la situation actuelle, indiquer à la Diète son attitude future et lui soumettre les résolutions qu'elle aura à prendre.

Le Gouvernement Impérial sera heureux d'apprendre que ses confédérés apprécient le dévouement avec lequel il a pris la défense des intérêts de l'Europe et de l'Allemagne.

L'évacuation des Principautés dont l'envahissement par les Russes avait été la cause première de la guerre, et les chances de paix qui se laissèrent entrevoir alors, imposaient une double tâche à l'Autriche.

Elle devait d'un côté couvrir ses frontières touchant au théâtre de la guerre, sauvegarder les intérêts Germaniques sur le Bas-Danube, et s'assurer du concours de ses confédérés Allemands; de l'autre, il lui importait de faciliter et de hâter la reprise des négociations entre les parties belligérantes. Pour appuyer

énergiquement ses propositions, basées sur l'équité et de nature à garantir l'Europe contre le retour de semblables complications, l'Autriche réclama l'assistance de ses confédérés qui lui fut assurée par l'Article Additionnel du 26 Novembre et l'Arrêté Fédéral du 9 Décembre.

Les pièces qui seront déposées sur le bureau de l'Assemblée par le Président de la Diète (texte du Traité du 28 Décembre, Protocoles 1 à 14 des Conférences) montrent quelle activité persévérante le Cabinet de Vienne a déployée pour le rétablissement de la paix.

La France et l'Angleterre déclarèrent au début de la guerre, dans un Traité solennel qu'elles ne poursuivraient aucun avantage particulier. Les notes du 8 Août tracèrent, à leur tour, les bases d'une paix durable pour l'Autriche, l'Allemagne et l'Europe. Plus tard on s'entendit sur la précision des quatre points de garantie.

Les membres de la Diète sauront apprécier le langage plein de dignité que le Cabinet Impérial a tenu au sein des Conférences, la modération et l'équité qu'il a mises à résoudre les questions qui y furent discutées.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté ne pense pas qu'il soit nécessaire de donner des explications sur les Protocoles qui sont soumis à la Diète. Les Plénipotentiaires Autrichiens ont assez clairement exposé, dans le cours des Conférences, la politique de leur Cabinet.

La Diète verra par les Protocoles 1 à 5 que les négociations ont produit un résultat satisfaisant quant aux deux premiers points.

Les concessions obtenues sur les deux premiers points concernant le Danube et les Principautés, sont dues à l'initiative de l'Autriche.

Les négociations ont échoué sur le troisième point. On a pu s'entendre, il est vrai, sur une formule au sujet de l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, au moyen d'une note de garantie collective; mais on n'a pas pu tomber d'accord sur les moyens de faire cesser la prépondérance Russe dans la Mer Noire.

L'Autriche était intéressé à la solution de cette question tout autant qu'aux autres garanties, car elle a reconnu que le développement des forces maritimes de la Russie dans l'Euxin était une menace perpétuelle contre la Turquie.

Il revenait aux Puissances maritimes de s'expliquer en premier sur les conditions de cette garantie.

L'Autriche était convenue avec les Puissances Occidentales, avant l'ouverture des négociations, qu'on ne poserait que la base de la solution, la solution elle-même dépendant trop des événements de la guerre pour être précisée d'avance.

Les propositions formulées tour à tour par les Plénipotentiaires de France et d'Angleterre et par les Représentants de la Russie, n'ayant amené aucun arrangement, l'Autriche dut s'entendre avec ses alliés sur les propositions à présenter à la Russie. Les négociations entre le Gouvernement Impérial et les Cabinets de Londres et de Paris furent longues et laborieuses. On ne parvint pas à s'entendre. La Cour de Vienne ne crut pas devoir s'associer à la guerre pour une interprétation du troisième point qu'elle n'approuvait pas et qui ne lui paraissait pas répondre à l'intérêt Européen. Il ne lui restait plus qu'à faire un dernier essai d'entente. Elle en trouva les éléments dans les négociations qui avaient précédé. Lorsque enfin les Plénipotentiaires des Puissances Occidentales demandèrent la clôture des Conférences, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté déclara qu'il serait toujours prêt à soutenir énergiquement toute proposition équitable, de quelque côté qu'elle vint.

C'est avec regret, et ce regret a été partagé par les Gouvernements Allemands, que l'Autriche a vu disparaître les espérances qu'elle avait fondées sur les Conférences.

En entrant dans une situation nouvelle, elle a fait un examen sévère des obligations qui lui incombent dans les circonstances présentes. Elle expliquera avec franchise à ses confédérés Allemands de quelle manière elle envisage sa position, et comment elle veut qu'elle soit comprise par tout le monde.

Il y a eu divergence entre l'Autriche et les Cours de Paris et de Londres sur une question d'application; mais les principes établis en commun n'ont rien perdu de leur force. Les liens de l'alliance continuent à subsister, et, aux yeux du Cabinet Impérial, rien n'est changé dans les rapports des Puissances alliées entr'elles.

L'Empereur n'a pas cru qu'il était de l'intérêt de son pays de prendre les armes pour l'interprétation que la France et l'Angleterre donnent au troisième

point. Les Puissances belligérantes usent de leur droit; le sentiment de Sa Majesté sur le but à atteindre en commun reste le même. Décidée à persévérer dans la voie actuelle, l'Autriche maintiendra d'une manière invariable les bases reconnues de la paix, elle les soutiendra dans la mesure des obligations qu'elle a contractées de toute son influence et de toutes ses forces.

Une paix qui n'assurerait pas l'exécution des quatre points de garantie tels qu'ils ont été posés dans la Conférence, n'offrirait pas à l'Autriche des garanties suffisantes pour la tranquillité future de l'Europe.

L'Autriche considère donc comme un fait acquis l'entente sur les deux premiers points.

Elle a indiqué une voie pour le règlement du troisième point; il importe que cette question reçoive un solution claire et précise, assurant la sécurité à l'intérêt Européen, mais dont l'acceptation ne soit blessante pour la dignité d'aucune des Puissances.

L'Autriche a prouvé par son intervention quelle importance elle attachait à l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman; elle persistera également à l'avenir à placer la Turquie sous une garantie générale et efficace.

Non seulement elle respectera elle-même cette garantie; mais elle saura aussi, au besoin, la faire respecter.

En ce moment déjà, elle se considère dans la position qu'elle a prise sur le Danube, appelée à veiller au maintien de ce principe. Ses troupes resteront dans les Principautés jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix, et elle espère y remplir sa mission jusqu'à la fin.

Quant au quatrième point, l'Autriche s'en rapporte aux sympathies de l'Europe pour les Chrétiens placés sous la domination de l'Empire Ottoman. Elle ne doute pas que lorsque le moment sera venu, toutes les Puissances prendront à cœur les intérêts des Chrétiens en Orient, en respectant toutefois les droits de souveraineté du Sultan.

L'Empereur serait heureux si, dans un avenir prochain, l'œuvre de la paix pouvait être reprise. Il a fait déclarer dans les Conférences, qu'il ne soulèverait aucune demande dans son intérêt personnel, mais qu'il soutiendrait toutes celles qui présenteraient un intérêt général. Il se maintiendra dans l'attitude actuelle aussi longtemps qu'il pourra conserver l'espérance d'atteindre le but de ses efforts pacifiques.

Dans cet état de choses, Sa Majesté a dû songer à alléger les charges qui pèsent sur son pays. Néanmoins, en raison de l'incertitude qui règne dans la situation, les mesures qui seront prises seront telles qu'on pourra être prêt en tout état de cause. Des changements auront lieu dans la position des troupes qui se trouvent sur le pied de guerre, mais ils seront combinés de manière à permettre à l'armée de reprendre ses anciennes positions dans le plus bref délai.

L'Autriche demande que la Confédération Germanique maintienne l'attitude qu'elle a prise par suite des résolutions de la Diète du 9 Décembre et du 8 Février. Elle espère que le dévouement avec lequel elle a défendu les intérêts Germaniques lui vaudra de la part de ses confédérés, &c.

No. 112.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 6.)

(No. 91.)

Frankfort, August 2, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to inclose to your Lordship in my despatch No. 86 of the 20th ultimo, the proposed text of the late Austrian communication to the Diet, which was made in the sitting of the 19th ultimo, as it appeared in the "Journal de Frankfort," extracted from "L'Indépendance Belge."

I beg now to inclose the text as published in the "Journal de Frankfort," translated from this document, as it appears to have been officially communicated to various German newspapers, and I am informed by competent authority that such is the fact, and that this translation renders the original correctly.

I need not draw your Lordship's attention to any remarkable variation from

the previous document; the concluding sentence is, as will be observed, studiously framed to avoid the chance of eliciting any declaration or enunciation of principles which should render patent in the Diet the differences still subsisting between Austria and Prussia—differences which are however sufficient to have rendered a joint declaration impracticable.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. MALET.

Inclosure in No. 112.

Extract from the "Journal de Frankfort."

LES Conférences de Vienne dans lesquelles ont été discutées les conditions du rétablissement de la paix générale sont closes sans avoir atteint leur grand et salutaire but. En face de cette issue profondement regrettable d'une tentative de paix qui paraissait promettre de plus heureux résultats, la Cour Impériale se sont appelée à exposer à cette haute assemblée ses vues sur l'état actuel des choses, et à donner ses confédérés Allemands l'occasion de déclarer qu'elle est l'attitude ultérieure de la Confédération qu'ils jugent conforme aux résolutions précédentes et aux importants intérêts que la Diète doit sauvegarder.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur, fort de la conscience d'avoir pris pour guide de tous ses efforts le bien général de l'Europe et celui de la Monarchie Autrichienne en même temps que le bien de toute la Confédération Germanique, verra avec une grande satisfaction les Gouvernements Allemands partager les sentiments que, plein de franchise et de confiance, il fait exprimer à ses confédérés.

Une double tâche était imposée au Cabinet Impériale depuis que l'évacuation des Principautés Danubiennes par la Russie avait écarté la cause immédiate de la guerre, et qu'on pouvait espérer une solution pacifique. L'Autriche devait d'un côté tenir à voir réglée et soutenue par ses alliés la position militaire que, comme Puissance fortement intéressée aux événements, mais non belligérante, elle avait prise sur le Bas-Danube au nom du droit public de l'Europe et pour sauvegarder ses intérêts et ceux de l'Allemagne; de l'autre, il lui importait de faciliter la reprise des négociations entre les Puissances belligérantes.

A cet effet, elle a cru devoir contribuer autant que possible à la fixation et à l'exécution des bases d'une paix juste et offrant des garanties contre le retour des complications actuelles. Par l'Article Additionnel du 26 Novembre et la Résolution Fédérale du 9 Décembre, 1854, la Prusse et la Confédération ont donné, sous ces deux rapports, une application précise au principe de l'alliance du 29 Avril (24 Juillet), et offert ainsi à la Cour Impériale un soutien dont elle apprécie toute la valeur.

Les documents que l'Envoyé Impérial est chargé de communiquer à la haute Assemblée, prouvent avec quelle persévérante activité le Cabinet Autrichien a poursuivi cette tendance dans ses négociations avec les Puissances Européennes. Il a l'honneur de lui soumettre le texte d'un Traité d'Alliance conclu le 2 Décembre entre l'Autriche, la France, et la Grande Bretagne; un memorandum remis le 28 Décembre par les Répresentants de ces Puissances à l'Envoyé de Russie près la Cour Impériale; enfin les Protocoles 1 à 14 des Conférences de Paix tenues à Vienne du 15 Mars au 4 Juin de cette année.

A l'origine de la guerre, la France et l'Angleterre ont, par un Traité pacifique et en renonçant à tout avantage particulier, placé la solution de la question Orientale sur le terrain des intérêts Européens généraux, et les notes du 8 Août avaient désigné les bases d'une paix que la Cour Impériale jugea favorable pour l'Allemagne comme pour l'Europe. Pour y arriver, l'Autriche a conclu l'Alliance du 2 Décembre, dont les conditions étaient données par l'entente des Contractants sur les besoins de l'Europe, et s'est entendue avec les signataires de ce Traité sur le sens des quatre points préliminaires contenus dans les notes du 8 Août.

Les hauts Gouvernements de la Confédération sauront apprécier le langage plein de dignité que le Cabinet Impérial a tenu au sein des Conférences, la modération et l'équité qu'il a mises à résoudre les questions qui y furent discutées.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté ne pense pas qu'il soit nécessaire de donner des explications sur les Protocoles qui sont soumis à la Diète. Les

Plénipotentiaires Autrichiens ont assez clairement exposé, dans le cours des Conférences, la politique de leur Cabinet.

Le Cabinet Impérial croit pouvoir assurer qu'il n'a jamais méconnu l'importance de l'œuvre de la paix pour toute l'Allemagne, et que rien n'a plus augmenté son zèle que le désir d'arriver à un résultat répondant aux buts approuvés par la Confédération et favorable au développement de la prospérité générale de l'Allemagne.

La Diète verra par les Protocoles 1 à 5 que les négociations ont produit un résultat satisfaisant quant aux deux premiers points.

L'initiative de la discussion sur ces points est échue à l'Autriche, comme étant la Puissance pour laquelle le règlement de l'état des trois Principautés Danubiennes et la liberté de la navigation du Danube ont le plus d'importance, et les propositions qu'elle a présentées de concert avec la France et l'Angleterre servent essentiellement de base aux arrangements déjà pris. Toutefois, l'application pratique et l'exécution des principes adoptés feront le sujet d'ultérieurs arrangements, dont la condition préalable est le rétablissement de la paix.

Les négociations ont échoué sur le troisième point. On a pu s'entendre, il est vrai, sur une formule assurant l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, au moyen d'une garantie collective ; mais on n'a pas pu tomber d'accord sur les moyens de faire cesser la prépondérance Russe dans la Mer Noire.

L'Autriche s'est crue intéressée à la solution de cette question tout autant qu'aux autres garanties. Elle a reconnu que le développement des forces maritimes de la Russie dans l'Euxin ne pouvait être une menace perpétuelle contre la Turquie.

Mais il revenait aux Puissances maritimes de s'expliquer en premier sur les conditions de cette garantie d'autant plus que l'Autriche était convenue avec les Puissances Occidentales, avant l'ouverture des négociations, qu'on ne poserait que la base de la solution, la solution elle-même dépendant trop des événements de la guerre pour être précisée d'avance.

Les propositions formulées tour à tour par les Plénipotentiaires de France et d'Angleterre et par les Représentants de la Russie, n'ayant amené aucun arrangement, l'Autriche dut s'entendre avec ses alliés sur le mode de solution pour laquelle elle était résolue à tout tenter. Les négociations entre le Gouvernement Impérial et les Cabinets de Londres et de Paris sur les propositions à présenter à la Russie furent longues et laborieuses. On ne parvint pas à s'entendre. La Cour de Vienne ne crut pas devoir s'associer à la guerre pour une interprétation du troisième point qu'elle ne lui avait pas donnée elle-même et qui ne lui paraissait pas ressortir nécessairement de l'intérêt général Européen. Il ne lui restait plus qu'à faire un dernier essai d'entente ; elle en trouva les éléments dans les négociations qui avaient précédé, et lorsque enfin les Plénipotentiaires des Puissances Occidentales demandèrent la clôture des Conférences, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté déclara qu'il serait toujours prêt à soutenir énergiquement toute proposition équitable, de quelque côté qu'elle vint.

C'est avec regret, et ce regret aura été partagé par les Gouvernements Allemands, que l'Autriche a vu disparaître les espérances qu'elle avait fondées sur les Conférences.

Elle s'est rendu un compte sévère de la nouvelle situation des choses qui en est résultée et des obligations qui lui incombent dans les circonstances présentes. Elle croit devoir déclarer avec franchise comment elle comprend sa position et désire qu'elle soit comprise par tout le monde.

Il y a eu divergence entre l'Autriche et les Cours de Paris et de Londres sur une question d'application ; mais les principes établis en commun n'ont rien perdu de leur force, et aux yeux du Cabinet Impérial, rien n'est changé dans les rapports des Puissances alliées entr'elles.

L'Empereur n'a pas cru qu'il était de l'intérêt de son pays de prendre les armes pour l'interprétation que la France et l'Angleterre donnent au troisième point. Mais tandis que les Puissances belligérantes usent de leur droit, le sentiment de Sa Majesté sur le but à atteindre en commun reste le même. Décidée à persévérer dans la voie actuelle, l'Autriche maintiendra d'une manière invariable les bases reconnues de la paix. Elle sera toujours prête à ouvrir de nouvelles négociations sur ces bases, et elle les soutiendra dans la mesure des obligations qu'elle a contractées de toute son influence et de toutes ses forces.

Une paix qui n'assurerait pas l'exécution des quatre points de garantie, tels

qu'ils ont été posés dans la Conférence, n'offrirait pas à l'Autriche des garanties suffisantes pour la tranquillité future de l'Europe. L'Autriche considère donc comme un fait acquis pour la paix future l'entente sur les premiers points.

Elle a indiqué une voie pour le règlement du troisième point, et elle croit nécessaire que cette question reçoive une solution claire et précise, reposant sur le principe de la sécurité de l'intérêt Européen, mais dont l'acceptation ne soit blessante pour la dignité d'aucune des Puissances.

L'Autriche a prouvé par son intervention quelle importance elle attachait à l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman ; elle persistera également à l'avenir à placer la Turquie sous une garantie générale et efficace.

Non seulement elle respectera elle-même cette garantie ; mais elle saura aussi, au besoin, la faire respecter.

En ce moment déjà, elle se considère appelée à veiller au maintien de ce principe sur le Danube. Ses troupes resteront dans les Principautés jusqu'à la conclusion la paix, et elle espère que cette occupation empêchera toujours les complications actuelles de s'étendre davantage du côté qui menace le plus l'Allemagne.

Quant au quatrième point, l'Autriche s'en rapporte aux sympathies de l'Europe pour les Chrétiens placés sous la domination de l'Empire Ottoman et à l'importance que mettent toutes les Puissances à une règlement définitif et salutaire de cette question. L'intérêt dont les Puissances maritimes ont donné tant de preuves à la Porte, la promesse de la Russie de vouloir respecter l'indépendance du Sultan, mettent hors de doute que lorsque le moment sera venu, toutes les Puissances prendront à cœur les intérêts des Chrétiens en Orient, en respectant toutefois les droits de souveraineté du Sultan.

L'Empereur serait heureux si, dans un avenir prochain, l'œuvre de la paix pouvait être reprise. Il a fait déclarer dans les Conférences, qu'il ne soulèverait aucune demande dans son intérêt personnel ; à l'avenir encore, il se bornera aux exigences concernant la sécurité et les intérêts généraux de la famille des Etats de l'Europe. Il se maintiendra dans l'attitude actuelle aussi longtemps qu'il pourra conserver l'espérance d'atteindre le but de ses efforts par une voie pacifique.

Sa Majesté a, dans ces circonstances, cru pouvoir alléger les charges que l'état des choses a jusqu'ici imposées à la Monarchie Autrichienne.

Néanmoins, en raison de l'incertitude qui règne dans la situation, les mesures qui seront prises seront telles qu'on pourra être prêt en tout état de cause avec des sacrifices moindres. Des changements auront lieu dans la position des troupes qui se trouvent sur le pied de guerre ; ils seront combinés de manière à couvrir non seulement la position des troupes Impériales dans les Principautés Danubiennes, mais aussi de manière à permettre qu'en cas de besoin l'armée soit rétablie dans sa force précédente dans le plus bref délai.

Au milieu de circonstances difficiles dont elle s'est en vain efforcée de rompre l'enchaînement funeste, la Cour Impériale a été uniquement guidée dans ses résolutions par la poursuite énergique d'un but que la Confédération Germanique tout entière a reconnu comme étant salutaire et propre à ramener un état légal et pacifique durable en Europe. Tout en s'efforçant d'atteindre complétement ce but, elle l'a limité d'une manière juste et équitable.

Les Gouvernements Allemands, dans l'esprit vraiment fédéral qui les anime, reconnaîtront combien sa manière d'agir est conséquente, et ils ne lui refuseront pas l'approbation franche et prévenante qu'elle croit pouvoir réclamer.

Mais la Cour Impériale n'a pas eu la satisfaction de pouvoir annoncer à ses confédérés Allemands la solution de la grande question actuelle. La lutte malheureuse qui tient le monde en suspens, n'est pas encore terminée ; les intérêts les plus importants y sont encore en jeu, et la réalisation des buts en faveur desquels l'Allemagne s'est déclarée n'est pas encore assurée.

Comme Puissance Fédérale Allemande, l'Autriche peut donc se prononcer pour que la Confédération maintienne l'attitude qu'elle a prise par les résolutions du 9 Décembre, 1854, et du 8 Février de cette année. Le désir que Sa Majesté l'Empereur rattache au présent exposé sera rempli si l'Allemagne reste, en se fondant sur les résolutions mentionnées, en état d'attendre dans une attitude imposante et forte par son union le développement ultérieur des événements.

No. 113.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 6.)

(No. 547.)

Therapia, July 26, 1855.

My Lord,

THE accompanying letter from Admiral Slade relative to the state of the Turkish navy, being of a nature to offer some interest to your Lordship, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 113.

Admiral Slade to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Arsenal of Constantinople, July 23, 1855.

My Lord,

I WILL do myself the honour to inform you of the state of the Turkish navy.

The ships are disarmed in general for the conveyance of troops or provisions, except the "Muhaderné Khair," 84, which is about to return from Eupatoria, where she has been lying three months to land her guns.

The "Mahmoudée," 120, and the "Péih Safer," 96, have been prepared since three weeks for the conveyance of troops, supposed to the eastward. They are lying in the harbour ready to sail. Excepting a flotilla in the Archipelago, and some small vessels in the Bosphorus, all the sailing-ships are now employed in the Black Sea.

Four of the five steam-frigates in the Imperial navy are now at Constantinople. One only of these, the "Saiki Shade," is in a state to go to sea. The "Faisi Bari," which has been idly used as flag-ship in the Black Sea, returned here a fortnight since; she is under repairs, and another month I am informed will be required to complete her. It is to be regretted that she had not been sent back two months ago for that purpose. The hull of the "Medjédié" is rotten, and cannot be trusted at sea; on the other hand, the boilers of the "Jaif" are worn out; it is therefore proposed to transfer the boilers of the "Medjédié" to the "Jaif," and then the latter may serve another year. But this is not certain; the transfer of the boilers will probably be a two months' job. The "Mookberi Sourdur," screw-frigate, now in the Black Sea, requires repairs, but of no great amount, I believe. Nothing in my opinion should be allowed to operate against repairing all the steamers before winter; in that season we shall have to trust mainly to them. There are four steam-corvettes in fair condition; two merchant steamers in port are being looked at with a view to purchase by the arsenal, and orders are to be sent to England to buy four large merchant steamers, reported to be nearly ready for launching. Thus we have some reason to hope to possess by winter eight large and six ordinary steamers.

These, aided as weather permits by sailing-ships, will suffice, I hope, for provisioning and otherwise attending on the Turkish army in the Crimea and on the eastern coast of the Black Sea, provided the Cavalry be not numerous.

Since my entry into the Turkish service, I have constantly urged on the authorities the necessity of building screw-ships; about two years ago the principle was adopted. Since then a line-of-battle ship has been converted, but as her lines are coarse, engines may not be placed in her. Two other liners are building—one at the arsenal, and one at Ismail; and a first-class frigate has recently been launched at Sinope, all for screw propulsion. The engines for them—650 horse-power for each liner, and 500 horse-power for the frigate—have been contracted for with Messrs. Napier's firm at Glasgow. Models and drawings of approved line-of-battle ships in the English navy have been applied for, and it is intended, on their arrival, to lay down two more ships. In a paper, on

a steam-navy, I gave the Captain Pasha some months ago, I suggested the following force as sufficient for the wants of the Empire at present:

Six line-of-battle ships,	100 guns,	600 to 650	horse-power.
Four frigates,	60 „	500	„
Four corvettes,	24 „	250	„
Four paddle-frigates and six avisos adopted for dispatch or gun-boats.			

My ruling idea has been, that while the Russian navy is in progress of destruction, a Turkish screw-fleet shall be in process of formation. This will at once give Turkey the preponderance in the Black Sea, and it will be her fault then if she does not retain it.

(Signed) A. SLADE.

No. 114.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 8.)

(No. 555.)

Therapia, July 30, 1855.

My Lord,

THE unfavourable judgment passed by Her Majesty's Government on the plans which have been lately under discussion, with a view to the relief of the Sultan's army at Kars, has naturally increased the Porte's embarrassment. It was my duty to make it known to the Turkish Ministers, not only as an opinion, but with respect to General Vivian's Contingent, as a veto. A most serious dilemma is the immediate result. Her Majesty's Government not only withhold the Contingent, but express a decided preference for the alternative of sending reinforcements to Erzeroom by the way of Trebizond. This opinion is not adopted by the Porte, or indeed by any official or personal authority here. The Seraskier, Omer Pasha, General Guyon, our own officers, as far as I have means of knowing, agree with the Porte and the French Embassy in preferring a diversion on the side of Redoute Kaleh, as offering better chances of success, supposing, of course, that the necessary means of transport supply, and other indispensable wants can be sufficiently provided. France is at the same time decidedly adverse to any diminution of force in the Crimea; and Omer Pasha, ready to place himself at the head of an Asiatic expedition, requires for that purpose a part of the troops now there.

Such being the present state of the case, I am precluded from contributing to the Porte's extrication from its difficulties, otherwise than by countenancing some new location of the Contingent, which, without exposing the corps to a premature trial, might enable a force of the same amount to be detached for service elsewhere.

No final decision has yet been taken by the Porte. My colleague, the French Ambassador, has written for General Pelissier's opinion, and Omer Pasha is still in attendance on his Government.

A memorandum inclosed herewith, will present to your Lordship a comparative view of the several ways in which effect might be given to the idea in question.

Meanwhile the advices from Kars are not encouraging, and time of precious value is unavoidably wasted in doubt and uncertainty.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 114.

Memorandum.

MEANS.

Garrison of Eupatoria:				
	Turks	-	-	8,500
	Arabs	-	-	12,500
Balaklava:				
	Turks	-	-	16,000
Kertch:				
	Turks	-	-	8,000
Bulgaria:				
	Turks	-	-	15,000
Contingent in the Bosphorus:				
	Turks	-	-	10,000

CONDITIONS.

1. No diminution of force in the Crimea.
2. Completion of Contingent to 20,000.
3. Contingent not to be employed in Asia.
4. The Turkish troops at Balaklava to form part of expeditionary force to Asia.
5. The Arab Division not available for any but the duty of a fixed camp, not being equipped for a march.

OBJECT.

A corps of 25,000 men to be detached to Asia.

METHODS.

1. To take the Contingent from the Bosphorus to Eupatoria, hand over the Turkish troops there to complete it. Convey the Arabs to Balaklava and the Turks from Balaklava and Varna to Asia.
2. Take the Contingent from the Bosphorus to Balaklava. Complete its numbers by handing over the garrison of Kertch and convey the Turks from Balaklava and Varna to Asia.
3. Convey the Contingent to Balaklava. Complete its numbers by the Turks at Eupatoria. Convey Turks from Balaklava and Varna from Asia.

METHOD No. 1.

Objections.—The embarkation and disembarkation of 12,500 men more than by either of the other two methods.

Contingent not being isolated will be subject to other Turkish influence.

The force before Sebastopol will remain composed of four different armies, the Turkish Division not being under the command of either of the allied Generals-in-chief.

The Turkish army divided into four portions and a consequent tendency to diminish its value, especially by the absorption of the Division at Balaklava and rendering it difficult for the Turks to provision so many points (four).

Another serious objection is,—the Turkish army having made Eupatoria their base, have there established their magazines, and the arrangement would therefore entail a total bouleversement of their system.

Advantage.—Unity of Contingent in a secure position.

Another serious objection is,—the Turkish army having made Eupatoria their base, have there established their magazines, and the arrangement would therefore entail a total bouleversement of their system.

Advantage.—Unity of Contingent in a secure position.

METHOD No. 2.

Objections.—Disjunction of Contingent, an objection which is questionable; in positions as secure as they would be placed by No. 1.

Advantages.—Smallest possible amount of sea transport.

Troops at Kertch to be handed over to Contingent among Omer Pasha's best troops; one regiment (2,500 men) has been under the command of an English officer for six months.

Separation of Contingent from all other Turkish influence.

Provisioning and hutting prohibited by the mass of the Contingent being with the head-quarters of the British army.

Turks employed in guarding Balaklava immediately under the command of English General-in-chief, and consequently may, as their organization proceeds, be employed to relieve the English army of a part of their duties. In case it should not be necessary to maintain Kertch, the whole Contingent could be united under the command of the English General-in-chief.

The command at Sebastopol simplified by the army being composed of two instead of four separate commands.

Simplicity in the arrangement of the Turks for provisioning, &c., having only two instead of four places to provide for.

METHOD No. 3.

Advantages and *objections* much the same as No. 2, with the disadvantage that the portion of the Contingent at Eupatoria would be subject, by intermixture with other Turkish troops, and by forming part of a garrison commanded by an Egyptian General, to injurious influences. Disadvantage to Turks as compared with method No. 2.

Dislocation of force, and three places to provide for instead of two.

No. 115.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 9, 1855.*

VIVIAN'S Contingent to go immediately to Eupatoria.

The Turkish troops there, 10,000 or 12,000, to go with Omer Pasha to Redoute-Kalé.

The Turkish troops at Balaklava and Kertch not to be diminished in number.

The Turkish force to go to Redoute-Kalé under Omer Pasha, to be completed to its proper number by troops from Bulgaria or elsewhere, not from Crimea.

No. 116.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 656.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 13, 1855.

I HAVE been in communication with the War Department on the subject of your Excellency's despatch No. 555 of the 30th ultimo, and I have now to transmit to your Excellency, for your information and guidance, a copy of a letter from that office, stating the grounds upon which Lord Panmure is of opinion that the Turkish Contingent should be sent in a body to Eupatoria.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 116.

Colonel Mundy to Mr. Hammond.

Sir, *War Department, August* 13, 1855.

I AM directed by Lord Panmure to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th instant, and to request that you will acquaint Lord Clarendon, that after careful consideration, his Lordship is of opinion that the Turkish Contingent should be sent in a body to Eupatoria.

The grounds upon which Lord Panmure founds that opinion are—

1. The Contingent requires organization before it can do credit either to itself or to us, or be efficient as a corps d'armée in the field.

This force must not be looked upon in a false light; when completed it will be as well appointed in Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers as our own army, and in some respects even better.

The Infantry arm may well be increased; and should it be necessary to move in the field next spring, important results may, in his Lordship's opinion, be anticipated from this Contingent.

2. If sent to Eupatoria, the Contingent will be able to maintain that position even in its present state; and the Cavalry under Major-General Shirley will almost immediately be able to act against the Russian convoys.

3. There will be no greater difficulty in supplying and provisioning the Contingent at Eupatoria than there would be elsewhere.

4. Lord Panmure would regret that the force should be detached in separate bodies until more fully organized, and General Vivian has acquired a full knowledge of his officers, and the Turks have become acquainted with and accustomed to obey the British officers.

The above are the views which, as at present advised, his Lordship entertains; but he is well aware that there may arise circumstances which may alter them.

I am, &c.

(Signed) G. C. MUNDY.

No. 117.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received August* 8.)

(No. 557.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 30, 1855.

INCLOSED herewith, for your Lordship's perusal, is a continuation of my correspondence with Major-General Beatson and others of Her Majesty's official servants, respecting the late desertions and acts of insubordination committed by a part of the Albanians employed under British command at the Dardanelles.

Your Lordship will observe that I lost no time in sending back, with necessary instructions, the officer who brought me General Beatson's despatch. The circumstances of the case, and the relation in which I am placed towards the Corps in question are so unusual, that I rely with full confidence on your Lordship's appreciation of my endeavours to redress the existing evils, and to prevent their recurrence.

The assistance afforded to me, not only by the Turkish authorities, but also by Lieutenant-General Vivian, Lord William Paulet, Brigadier-General Mansfield, and Rear-Admiral Grey, deserve my warmest acknowledgments.

I abstain from hazarding any premature remarks on General Beatson's resignation and correspondence. I shall probably be able to exercise a clearer judgment on both after the receipt of some communication from General Neill, who had reached the Dardanelles before Captain Bourke came away, but not till after he had received the despatches of which he was the bearer.

It is almost superfluous to remark, that the precautionary idea of disarming the Albanians was suggested by a wish to narrow as much as possible the chances of an effusion of blood; and that although the preparations for that measure, supposing it to be found necessary, were intended to be as secret as prompt, they were by no means planned with a view to secrecy in the execution.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 117.

Memorandum on the Correspondence relating to Mutiny and Desertion in General Beatson's Horse on and after July 6, 1855.

Therapia, July 28, 1855.

See Mr. Calvert's despatches, dated 7th and 8th July, 1855. Major-General Beatson's despatch, dated July 7.	THE first outbreak took place on July 6. Gross outrages described on that and the following day.
See despatch, dated July 10.	Mr. Calvert is full of the gravest apprehension that if regular troops are not immediately sent to the Dardanelles, the country threatened by the Albanian deserters will be in the greatest peril.
See despatch, dated July 11.	Troops declared to be not so urgently necessary, in consequence of the Albanians having been put in good humour in consequence, as Mr. Calvert hears, of certain concessions having been made to them.
See despatch, dated July 15.	The arrival of the regular troops who were asked for on the 10th, notified on the 15th.
See despatch, dated July 20.	There is no disorder in the country.
Major-General Beatson's despatch of	There is great lack of information from Major-General Beatson since his first report, dated July 7. His report of the 15th indicates that he has made

July 15, inclosing general order issued to his troops of same date.

See private letter, dated July 15.

great concessions to his troops, considering what is the nature of the crime laid to their charge, and his previous report on the conduct of his men generally, independently of those who had committed flagrant outrage.

In his private letter of July 15, no information is given regarding their conduct, although an opinion is expressed that General Beatson does not despair of making the Albanians into good soldiers. A despatch is received on the 18th from Major-General Beatson, but it does not touch upon the state of his troops.

See private letter, dated July 20.

In his private letter of the 20th to the Ambassador, there is no allusion to his troops beyond the words, "We are all getting on well."

Other communications received from Major-General Beatson between the 7th and 20th of the month have been examined, but they cannot be said to be of any consequence with relation to the subject of the correspondence considered.

See General Larchey's despatch to General Pelissier, dated 17th July, 1855.

General Larchey, in his letter to General Pelissier, dated 17th July, 1855, complains of the outrages and repeated desertions of the Bashi-Bozouks. He considers Nagara and the roads in danger from them; and he reports to his superior that he is under the necessity of taking military precautions for the protection of the French establishments, &c.

Mr. Skene's opinion.

Mr. Skene thinks very strongly on the lawless conduct of the Albanian Irregulars. He is of opinion that they may be converted into good soldiers, but that it can only be by the adoption of strong measures, and the display of the firmest conduct towards them.

This opinion was expressed in conversation during his late visit to Therapia, after his personal observation of the state of things at the Dardanelles. It is confirmed by his private and confidential letter, dated July 10, 1855, to the Ambassador.

See private letter to the Ambassador, dated 10th July, 1855.

At a time when the state of the troops is not mentioned by General Beatson, and when Mr. Calvert reports that the state of the country is free from disorder, Mr. Skene uses the following words: "The want of some measure to promote the establishment of what discipline may be promptly attainable, is now becoming more and more pressing." He then proceeds to describe a horrible outrage.

See private letter to the Ambassador, dated July 20, 1855.

See his private letter dated 21st July, 1855, to the Ambassador.

In another communication dated July 21st, he mentions, "Desertions continue daily. Nineteen Albanians went off with their horses and arms yesterday." He also alludes to the

See private letter to Brigadier-General Mansfield, dated July 22, 1855.

total want of staff officers at the headquarters of Major-General Beatson.

Mr. Skene contemplates the necessity of a trial of strength with the Albanians. Fifty of the Arab horse deserted yesterday, *i. e.*, on the 21st of July. The men consider that they are too much drilled. Mr. Skene fears that things are concealed from him. Some days since, he discovered the desertion of nineteen men by insisting on the information being afforded to him. He had also been left unaware of the general order issued by General Beatson on the 5th July, relative to prisoners being guarded by their own regiments. He concludes his letter by these remarkable words: "I persuaded General Beatson last night to go at once to live in the camp, and we went there together this morning with his baggage. I wished to see how it would be taken. He was coldly received. He made a speech and had an order read, but it would not do. I shall continue to endeavour to avert the breakdown which threatens us. I should feel confident of success if the measures recommended were promptly adopted. Pray read this to his Excellency."

Mr. Skene is also of opinion that "the present garrison of the Dardanelles is sufficient to carry us through a trial of strength with the Albanians."

See despatches from the Ambassador, dated 24th July, 1855.

In consequence of Mr. Skene's reports of the 20th and 21st, four staff officers were sent down by Brigadier-General Lord William Paulett, C.B., at the request of the Ambassador, to assist Major-General Beatson. Directions were sent to that officer to cause a Court of Inquiry, to investinge the cause and origin of the mutiny and desertion. In despatches dated the 24th, after Mr. Skene's letter to Brigadier-General Mansfield had been received, the means of restoring order and bringing offenders to justice were indicated to Major-General Beatson. It was announced to him that reinforcements of 200 Regular Infantry and 225 Regular Cavalry, would proceed forthwith to join him. He was also recommended to come to Constantinople for the purpose of conferring with the Ambassador and the Seraskier, and to give over his command for the time to Brigadier-General Neill, who at the request of his Excellency has been sent by General Vivian to the Dardanelles. Brigadier-General Niell was furnished by Brigadier-General Mansfield with the written instructions of his Excel-

lency for his guidance at the Dardanelles. Brigadier-General Neill expressed himself perfectly satisfied with the completeness of those instructions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD,
Brigadier-General.

Inclosure 2 in No. 117.

General Beatson to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Dardanelles, July* 24, 1855.

YOUR Excellency's despatch of the 21st instant has this moment reached me, and in reply I beg to say that, as far as I am personally concerned, I am quite indifferent if the corps were disbanded to-morrow.

The direct opposition I have met in some quarters, with the lukewarm support in others, looks as if Her Majesty's present Government are anxious that a measure which was originated by the late Government should fail.

It is impossible otherwise to account for the delay that has occurred in furnishing me with means of organizing the corps, as repeatedly pointed out by me. The means of administering justice, when immediate example was necessary, has also been a serious evil.

Immediately after the late occurrences, Mr. Skene proceeded to Constantinople to lay before your Excellency the full state of the case, and my most particular request was that I might have a law-officer sent to me to enable me to enter on the trial of the deserters.

Mr. Skene came back, and informed me that immediate measures would be taken to arm me with the powers of the law. Still steamer after steamer comes in without bringing me a law-officer, or power to carry out the sentence of any Court such as ought to deal with grave offences.

I had thus no alternative but to leave everything in abeyance, and there could be no stronger proof that the spirit of insubordination was of a very partial nature, when this delay has led to no further outrages. That the general discipline of the force is by no means affected, I can offer as proofs, that a quarrel have taken place in the town, a few days ago, between a French soldier and an Albanian, in which both parties were wounded, I confined the Albanian in the prison, on hearing which the officers of his troop came and begged that I would make him over to them, as they did not think his wound would be properly attended to in the prison. I assembled a Medical Board to satisfy myself that the man was in no danger, and then peremptorily refused to release him, with the justice of which they were perfectly satisfied.

I yesterday assembled a court-martial—an illegal one, I must allow, as I have no law-officer, but the best I could get under the circumstances—for the trial of two Bulgarian soldiers, who, in a fit of drunkenness, had threatened their yukbashee. The Court was composed chiefly of Albanian officers, and they sentenced the prisoners to be flogged.

Thus I feel confident I can support discipline if power is given me to carry out the sentence of any Court immediately.

The inquiry which your Excellency wishes, I shall order immediately; and as my desire as well as that of your Excellency, is that it should be as full and impartial as possible, I shall put none of my own officers on it.

For this purpose I have requested Mr. Skene, Mr. Calvert, Lieutenant-Colonel Blacklin, the Commandant at Abydos, to form the Court.

Mr. Skene not having received the statement referred to in your letter, I am unable to say anything on that subject, nor do I know to what rumours your Excellency alludes. If they be those that appeared in the Constantinople paper about the British flag being torn down, they are totally false.

Had I followed my own personal feelings and convenience, the difficulties thrown in my way by the War Department would have made me resign long ago; but I felt that I had a higher duty to perform in bringing into order th body of men, which I still feel I can do if I am properly supported, and have the means placed at my disposal.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. F. BEATSON.

The "Journal de Constantinople" of the 19th July contains a tissue of falsehoods.

The men never presented themselves before me to demand the release of the prisoner. They released him before I knew anything about it.

They never refused to go to the Crimea, for the simple reason that I never asked them. The story about the flag is utterly false; but the following circumstances may have given rise to the falsehood:—On the day that the disturbance took place, I was changing my head-quarters from one camp to another, and got a working party from one of the regiments to dig round the flag-staff and take it up, it having been very deeply imbedded in the ground.

The flag still floats in front of my tent, and has never been treated with disrespect.

(Signed) W. F. BEATSON.

Inclosure 3 in No. 117.

Consul Calvert to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Dardanelles, July* 25, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that on the night of the 21st instant about fifty men of the Arab Irregulars deserted with their horses from Beatson's camp.

The first intelligence received of them was from the Mudir of Tehan, who had found means to secure eight of them, and these he dispatched in charge of an escort, who had likewise about 35,000 or 40,000 piastres of Government taxes for delivering here.

On their way hither, they fell in with twenty-eight of the fifty deserters, and who not only released their comrades, but plundered the Government money.

Four of them have been since captured at Bairamitsh, and Lieutenant-Colonel Lankey, with some of his men, have gone in search of the others, but nothing further respecting them has as yet transpired.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. W. CALVERT.

Inclosure 4 in No. 117.

Consul Calvert to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Dardanelles, July* 26, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that General Beatson has shown me your Excellency's despatch of the 21st instant, requesting him to institute an inquiry into the character, extent, and origin of the mutiny and desertion which has lately occurred in the Irregular Cavalry under his command, and I have acceded to his request to be one of the members of the court he has instituted, in order to meet your Lordship's wishes.

The other persons of which the court consists are, Mr. Consul Skene and Lieutenant-Colonel Blacklin, Commandant of the hospital at Abydos.

The first sitting of the Court of Inquiry was held yesterday.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. W. CALVERT.

Inclosure 5 in No. 117.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to General Beatson.

Therapia, July 29, 1855.

Sir,

I HAVE received from Captain Brouke your despatch dated yesterday, and I lose no time in preparing an answer, with which that officer will return at once to the Dardanelles.

Not having heard from General Neill, who, in place of General Michel, has gone down to the Dardanelles with my instruction, I confine myself for the present to those parts of your communication which require immediate notice.

It will be for Her Majesty's Government to appreciate the circumstances under which you have announced the intention of resigning your command. The propriety of the course which I have thought it my duty to pursue, can only be judged with reference to the whole of your correspondence since the first desertion of Albanians, taken in connection with the statements which reached me from other sources, and the results of the present inquiries.

I am glad, meanwhile, to perceive in the conduct of your troops, as now described, such improvement as may fairly warrant a hope that the ends of justice can be secured, without resorting to extraordinary measures. The present strength of the garrison may answer for the submission of men, as it would have provided for the safe execution of the measures.

Convinced that General Neill, after communication with you, will have exercised a sound judgment in that respect, I am content to wait for the reports of the Mixed Commission and Court of Inquiry.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 6 in No. 117.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Consul Skene.

Therapia, July 29, 1855.

Sir,

I HAVE hastened the return of Captain Brouke to the Dardanelles with my answer to General Beatson's despatch, declaring an intention to resign his command. A copy of it is forwarded by General Neill, who will apprize you of its contents. Copies of the despatch itself, as well as of my reply, shall be sent direct to you by the earliest opportunity.

As there seems to be no actual necessity for calling in the arms of the Albanians, I am but too happy to look exclusively to the result of the pending inquiry, and simultaneous court of justice. This you will understand to be my present view of the matter, in virtue of the latest advice.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 7 in No. 117.

Brigadier-General Mansfield to Brigadier-General Neill.

Embassy, Therapia, July 29, 1855.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour, by desire of the Ambassador, to forward confidentially a copy of a despatch from his Excellency to Major-General Beatson for your consideration, and to call your attention to the last paragraph of that communication.

I have to inform you, that according to the latest reports received by his Excellency, it would appear the necessity for extraordinary measures, such as disarming the Albanian corps *en masse*, as contemplated in the despatch of the Ambassador to Major-General Beatson, of the 24th instant, no longer exists, and that it is therefore more desirable to trust to the regular action of the Court of Inquiry, of the Mixed Commission, and the usual manner of firmly enforcing military discipline.

His Excellency is confident that this important matter will receive the maturest consideration on your part, both as regards the permanent establishment of order among the Albanians, considered as a military body, and the avoidance of conflict, if, as it is now stated, the latter can with prudence be insured.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD.

Inclosure 8 in No. 117.

Instructions for Brigadier-General Neill.

Therapia, July 26, 1855.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL NEILL, on arriving at the Dardanelles, will put himself in communication with Major-General Beatson, Mr. Skene, and Mr. Calvert, Her Majesty's Consul.

If Major-General Beatson determines, in consequence of the representations of the Ambassador, to leave the Dardanelles for Constantinople, Brigadier-General Neill is empowered to assume command of the Irregular Cavalry, and consequently, as he will then be the senior officer on the spot, of all the troops now at the Dardanelles, the Turkish Colonel having been already directed by the Seraskier to act under Major-General Beatson.

The object of the concentration of regular troops at that place, is to repress the excesses and check the disorders of a portion of the Irregular Horse.

If great disorders prevail there at this time, and the measures taken appear, in the opinion of Brigadier-General Neill, to be insufficient, he will, on the command being transferred to him, adopt the means suggested by military experience, for the restoration of order, and securing all offenders.

The despatches addressed to Major-General Beatson, on the arrangements ordered for bringing the offenders to justice, and restoring order, as enumerated in the margin,* may be obtained from that officer by Brigadier-General Neill, or from Mr. Skene. If they have not already been acted on, the Brigadier-General will proceed to carry out the instructions therein conveyed. If Major-General Beatson determines not to leave the Dardanelles, but to remain there in the exercise of his command, contrary to the wishes of the Ambassador, Brigadier-General Neill will not refuse to give him the aid of his counsel.

If that counsel be rejected, and disorder continue in consequence, it will be for Brigadier-General Neill to communicate with Mr. Skene and the Consul, and to act on the result of their consultations.

It should be constantly borne in mind that disorder must be stopped, discipline restored, and the offenders brought to trial.

The regular troops at the disposal of the Commander are:—300 Infantry, 225 Cavalry, 400 Artillerymen. Some very light guns are available, which can be easily moved.

The Ambassador understands that Major Hackett, Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General, has been empowered by Brigadier-General Lord William Paulett, to use the British Detachment at Gallipoli towards the general purpose of these instructions. It is not certain whether 200 Infantry in addition went yesterday to the Dardanelles, but if not, they will be dispatched forthwith.

Brigadier-General Neill will send a report whenever there is an opportunity, daily if possible, to his Excellency the Ambassador, till order is completely restored.

By order of Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD,
Brigadier-General.

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* Two despatches from the Ambassador to Major-General Beatson, dated July 24, 1855.

Inclosure 9 in No. 117.

Consul Skene to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Dardanelles, July* 28, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch, dated 24th July, by which I am appointed to represent Her Majesty's Embassy in the judicial proceedings connected with General Beatson's Irregular Cavalry.

I beg leave to express the high sense of the honour done me, by this flattering appreciation of any small services which I may have been fortunate enough to be able to render.

The trial of offenders will commence to-day, a considerable number of them being in confinement for that purpose; and I have much pleasure in adding, that I feel confident of the complete success awaiting the measures adopted and arrangements made by your Excellency to meet the grave emergencies which have arisen in General Beatson's corps.

I have, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SKENE.

Inclosure 10 in No. 117.

Consul Skene to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Dardanelles, July* 28, 1855.

IN reply to your Excellency's note of the 24th, I can only say that I fear more reliance is placed on my poor endeavours than circumstances have as yet justified; but I shall strain every nerve to merit that confidence. Your Excellency's good opinion, so expressed, is more gratifying to me than anything else could be. No zeal or perseverance shall be wanting on my part to warrant it.

I am convinced that the Mixed Commission will prove perfectly successful.

General Beatson has read me the despatch which he sends to your Excellency by this post. His state of excitement left little room for any remarks of mine; but I did not fail to remind him that there were, and still are, facts to account most fully for the manner in which the state of his corps is viewed, without gratuitously supposing it to be founded on other reports, which are either exaggerated or altogether untrue. I alluded to the incidents contained in my note to your Excellency of yesterday's date, which will go to-day, and which, though still unknown to you, form a continuation of a series of disorders, as well known to him as to me. He then expatiated on the breach of faith shown by the wish to disarm the Albanians. I replied that, in all probability, nothing of all this could have happened, and nothing more of the kind would happen, if the condition of the men were not such as to tempt them in a manner to follow their violent impulses; and besides that, I knew of no pledge given them on enlisting them that they were at all times to retain their arms. The General would not listen to me, and returned to his own assertions, that it was a sequel to the massacre of the Janisaries, which I might under other circumstances have attempted to prove to him was the saving of Turkey, and an act of mercy to the nation oppressed by them, but discussion was impossible. With regard to his resignation, I said that in his position, I should never throw up my commission in a huff, and that in matters of business all "brave words" had no weight, but that if he felt he could not carry out the views of the Government I thought he would do quite right to resign, and need not talk of insults, &c. &c. He said he would not disarm the Albanians under any circumstances, and that if the Government insisted on that measure he must resign. This was taking a better ground to stand upon, and if his letter had gone no further, I should have said it was worthy of your Excellency's most serious consideration. I believe that the disarming the Albanians may become necessary, but as long as there is a chance of avoiding the conflict it must produce, I would regard it as a last resource to be adopted only when all other

means are exhausted. Now, this Mixed Commission may change the whole aspect of affairs, and a few prompt and vigorous applications of the law may disarm them in a moral sense without provoking any material conflict. I conceive that justice has a power over every class of men, and that the Albanians will find themselves, not subdued, but gained by its exercise. The hope of leniency, too well founded, destroys the effect of justice on their minds, but when they find that culpability is proved and inexorably punished, when they cannot deny guilt and must witness its expiation, I am much mistaken if we do not succeed with the Albanians. The experiment is now going to be made, and I would most respectfully urge that the question of disarming be left in abeyance for a little time; the garrison is sufficient to enable us to make examples without risk, their being immediately disarmed would not prevent desertion; the Arabs had no arms. At all events I hope the subject may be maturely weighed and considered by General Mitchell before acting on any instructions he may have to that effect, and I shall certainly deem it my duty to state to him my views, which he will no doubt be able to refute if they should be erroneous.

I shall continue to inform your Excellency of anything occuring here to interest you or enable you to form a correct judgment.

Believe me, &c.
(Signed) T. H. SKENE.

Inclosure 11 in No. 117.

General Beatson to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Dardanelles, July* 28, 1855.

I YESTERDAY received your Excellency's two despatches of the 24th instant.

As my reports that the insubordination was of a partial nature, that the discipline of the force was progressing to perfect reestablishment, that I was able and willing to punish the offender, by having given to me the power to carry into effect any sentence awarded, I have failed to counteract the effect produced on your Excellency by the falsehoods put forth in the newspapers, and by the Pashas of this place. I should still have considered it my duty to have remained in command till the Court of Inquiry now sitting had shown that I was right; but when to the above is added the proposal to place the command in other hands, and to proceed to Constantinople, I cannot, in justice to myself, do otherwise than place my resignation in the hands of Her Majesty's Government, and make over the command to any officer whom your Excellency may send to take it, though I shall at the same time remain at the Dardanelles throughout the difficulties which will be caused or increased by the unnecessary and injudicious measures now in progress with regard to military arrangements.

I have already shown that I court impartial inquiry, by forming a Court on which I have not put a single officer of my own force.

I am ready to afford every assistance to the Mixed Commission now ordered to try offenders.

But I must decidedly protest against secret arrangements for the disarming of the Albanians, which, however worthy of the Government which murdered the Janissaries, are not such as a British officer can with honour adopt.

Had the order for disarming the Albanians been immediately sent when a portion of the men were in a mutinous state, it would have been a very different thing; but now that I have told them that I have confidence in their own officers to support discipline, and they justify this confidence by sentencing and punishing every offender, it would be treacherous on my part to take secret measures to disarm them.

All the officers sent down from Scutari were astonished at the respectful demeanour of the men in camp, after the infamous reports they had heard at Constantinople. These reports are chiefly got up by the French Consul, who is the correspondent of the "Journal de Constantinople."

Besides what I have stated above, it would be a breach of faith on our part. Every person knows that the Albanians would rather part with their lives than with their arms; and if we intended to disarm them, we ought to have told them so before we disarmed them. We might possibly murder them

as the Janissaries were murdered; but there is an end to all confidence in British faith and British honour. Thus the measures proposed would have exactly the effect which all the intrigues of fanaticism at Damascus and other places have failed to produce.

The new desertions alluded to in your letter were not from the Albanians, but from the Arabs. Most of them have been brought back by Lieutenant-Colonel Sankey, whom I sent after them with a party of volunteers from their own regiments, and they state that they were induced to desert by a moulayien, who told them that we were going to force them to dress and act in every respect like regular troops.

I have imprisoned the moulayien, reduced him to the ranks, and ordered him to be tried by his own officers, whose sentence I shall carry out.

In one of the Albanian regiments I tried, by their own officers, and carried out their sentence of flogging, two Albanians the day before yesterday.

This will show how far discipline is reestablished; but all this will be upset the moment it is known that there is an intention of disarming the Albanians.

The kind of assurance I have got from the Pasha here will be understood by my saying that a few days ago he sent to tell me that the Arab deserters had plundered some cavasses bringing in Government money; but instead of giving me this immediately, he gave it to me twenty hours after he had received it, thus giving the plunderers every chance to escape. It is the same in everything he does.

He, like the rest of his tribe, is anxious that Christians should fail in attaching any portion of the inhabitants of Turkey to them, and they stick at nothing to gain their ends, which they will only now gain by the withdrawal of that support I have heretofore received from your Excellency.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. F. BEATSON.

No. 118.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received August 8.*)

(No. 558.)

Therapia, July 30, 1855.

My Lord,

INCLOSED herewith in copy is some additional correspondence between General Vivian and myself on the subject of the Turkish Contingent, its future position, and the state of my communications with the Porte respecting plans with which it is connected.

I fully partake of General Vivian's anxiety to clear away the doubts which hang over its prospects; but the prevailing uncertainty, as your Lordship is well aware, arises out of circumstances which do not admit of an easy solution.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 118.

Lieutenant-General Vivian to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Turkish Contingent Head-Quarters, Buyukdéré, July 27, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my letter of the 19th instant No. 52, enclosing copy of a communication from his Highness Omer Pasha, forwarded to me by the Lieutenant-General Commanding in the Crimea, I have the honour now to inclose for your Excellency's information a copy of my reply to Lieutenant-General Simpson on the subject to which his Highness Omer Pasha's letter has reference.

I beg to state that, although my letter bears date the 24th instant, it was not despatched at that date, in consequence of an intimation from Brigadier-General Mansfield that your Excellency hoped on the 24th, or at a very early

date, to be able to communicate something to me regarding the destination of the force under my command. Before transmitting my reply to General Simpson, I would gladly have been in possession of your Excellency's communication, which Brigadier-General Mansfield's letter led me to expect; but I have not felt justified in deferring any longer my answer to the Commander of the Forces.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. J. R. VIVIAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 118.

Omer Pasha to Lieutenant-General Simpson.

Quartier-Général de

Mon Général,

J'AI l'honneur de vous prévenir que j'ai reçu des instructions de mon Gouvernement de m'entendre avec le Commandant-en-chef de l'armée Anglaise sur la manière de former le Contingent de troupes Ottomanes, qui d'après la Convention qui a été faite entre leurs Majestés le Sultan et la Reine de la Grande Bretagne, doivent être mises à la disposition de Sa Majesté la Reine, et passer sous le commandement du Commandant-en-chef de l'armée Anglaise pendant la guerre actuelle.

Selon l'information que j'ai reçu de mon Gouvernement, il paraît qu'environ 10,000 hommes des trois armes ont été déjà mises à la disposition de Sa Majesté la Reine, se sont rendus au Bosphore, et sont actuellement sous le commandement des officiers Anglais. Il reste donc à considérer d'où est ce qu'on pourrait prendre les autres 10,000 hommes pour compléter le total dont il est question dans la Convention susmentionnée.

Ayant bien considéré cette question, je crois, mon Général, qu'il faut prendre en considération en même temps l'endroit où le Contingent doit se former, parceque je suis fortement de l'avis que c'est impossible que vous pourriez contempler qu'on puisse se servir de ces troupes en rase campagne devant l'ennemi, jusqu'à ce que les officiers et les soldats se connaissent les uns les autres, et que les officiers auraient appris assez de la langue et de mœurs pour qu'ils peuvent inspirer la confiance aux soldats, et les commander en face de l'ennemi.

Pour arriver à ce point, je crois qu'on ne doit pas attendre qu'on peut se servir de ces troupes jusqu'au printemps prochain en rase campagne.

En attendant je vous propose, mon Général, de réunir ces troupes à Schoumla, où les casernes, les hôpitaux, et les maisons sufliront pour les arbriter pendant l'hiver, et en même temps où ils resteront comme une réserve en cas d'urgence pour Ismail Pacha sur le Bas Danube, et feront à un certain degré face à l'ennemi. J'observerai aussi, que je ne crois pas que dans les circonstances actuelles, il serait à propos de dégarnir davantage les Provinces du Danube.

Si vous acceptez, mon Général, cette proposition, je proposerai à évacuer Schoumla de toutes autres troupes en laissant cette ville entièrement au Contingent Anglo-Ottoman, et je dirigerai là-dessus 10,000 hommes des trois armés de l'armée qui reste en Bulgarie.

De plus si vous le désirez, je pourrais donner les ordres pour secourir à réunir et à emmagasiner des vivres pour ces troupes.

Une autre observation que je vous soumettrai, mon Général, est, qu'à Schoumla les troupes se trouvent toutes réunies dans un rayon militaire, et étant employées à un service régulier de garnison se soumettront plus facilement à la discipline que dans un lieu où ils n'auraient pas les mêmes avantages, et qu'on pourrait y réunir avec facilité les moyens de transport, &c., sans lesquels le Contingent ne peut pas devenir un corps tactique.

Quant au recrutement des Chrétiens sujets de Sa Majesté le Sultan, je crois, mon Général, qu'il sera à propos de ne pas le commençer jusqu'à un temps plus favorable, et que les événements prennent une tournure plus décidée.

Dans cette observation je n'inclue pas la population des Principautés Danubiennes, dont j'avais déjà soumis à mon Gouvernement une demande de

leur part d'être permis de former un Contingent de troupes, pour concourir à côté de l'armée de Sa Majesté le Sultan à la défense de son Empire.

Si ce plan général reçoit votre approbation, mon Général, je m'entendrai avec vous sur les détails pour les mettre en exécution sans le moindre délai.

Recevez, &c.

Le Généralissime de l'Armée Ottomane,

(Signé) OMER.

Inclosure 3 in No. 118.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Lieutenant-General Vivian.

Sir, *Therapia, July 27, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of this day's date, inclosing copy of your reply to Lieutenant-General Simpson's communication of the 17th instant.

I observe that your suggestions as to the future position of the Contingent are of a military character, relating exclusively to the Corps itself. Considerations of another and wider range may have their claim to attention. The state of my communications with the Porte, involving questions of this kind with reference to the Contingent, have prevented me from returning an earlier answer to your despatch No. 52 of the 19th instant. I regret the delay, and not the less because it was unavoidable and still continues.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 118.

Lieutenant-General Vivian to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Head-Quarters, Buyukdéré, July 29, 1855.*

YOUR Excellency's letter of the 27th instant, acknowledging the receipt of copy of my despatch to Lieutenant-General Simpson, reached me this morning.

The opinion that I offered in my letter to General Simpson was necessarily restricted to the military question submitted for my views, viz., the proposal of the officer commanding Her Majesty's troops in the East, and of his Highness Omer Pasha, to assemble and winter the Contingent at Shumla, and my observations had reference to the arrangement which would become necessary if the intention of the Commander of the Forces were to be carried into effect. Undoubtedly other than military considerations may have claim to attention, and I am persuaded your Lordship must feel convinced that any point submitted by your Excellency for my consideration, would at all times receive immediate and the utmost attention; but naturally any opinions of mine connected with my corps would be of a military character, unless subjects were submitted for my opinion, demanding the wider range of consideration to which your Lordship adverts.

I desire to bring prominently to your Lordship's notice that I am in a state of the greatest solicitude lest the delay in arriving at a decision respecting the destination of the Contingent, should be attended with results prejudicial to its efficiency and well-being.

Wherever the corps has to winter, very considerable arrangements have to be made to meet its requisitions. Stores and provisions have to be collected and provided for the whole winter. Depôts to be formed in various directions. Store room must be prepared; perhaps hutting may have to be built.

If the corps is to occupy an inland position, much time will be required to complete all the requisite arrangements, but in whatever quarter the position may be, there is now barely time to do all that is required.

The speedy determination, my Lord, of the position for the winter quarters of the Contingent is a question on its efficiency as a military body for ulterior purposes appears to me in a great measure to depend; holding, as I do, this opinion, it cannot, I think, surprise your Lordship that I as the officer commanding this corps d'armée, should strongly urge that the point be determined with as little delay as possible: and if, as I infer from your Lordship's letter under acknowledgment, the selection of the position where my corps is to winter must be influenced by the decision on a question now pending with the Porte, I would solicit your Excellency to draw the attention of the Sultan's Government to the important subject which I have thus felt it my duty to bring to your Lordship's notice.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. J. R. VIVIAN.

Inclosure 5 in No. 118.

Brigadier-General Mansfield to Lieutenant-General Vivian.

Sir, *Embassy, Therapia, July 30, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to reply, on behalf of the Ambassador, to your despatch of the 29th instant.

That, as soon as it is in his power, it will afford his Excellency the greatest pleasure to give you the information required, as already indicated in his communication to you of the 27th instant.

I have, &c

(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD.

No. 119.

Consul Longworth to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 13.)

(No. 7.)

My Lord, *"Cyclops," Coast of Circassia, July 20, 1855.*

IN my despatch to your Lordship No. 5, under date of the 20th instant, I alluded to the difficulties raised by the Turkish authorities, who were averse to my proceeding into the interior. Sefer Pasha endeavoured to dissuade me under various pretexts, alleging, among other things, that travelling was unsafe at present; and Mustapha Pasha, the Commander-in-chief, also strongly recommended me not to leave the coast. But their evident anxiety to prevent my penetrating into the country, only served to increase my desire of so doing as early as possible, since I felt more and more convinced that there was much in the state of affairs, to say nothing of their own double-dealing and intrigues which they were interested in concealing, and that it was only in becoming more intimately acquainted with such particulars, as well as with the state of parties and the conflicting interests of the various tribes, that I should find the means of independent action in Circassia.

As a necessary precaution, I first secured the escort of an influential Chief, with whom I had formerly been associated, and who agreed to accompany me, at the request of Mustapha Pasha, though that request I could perceive was very reluctantly made on his part. So visible indeed was the Pasha's disinclination to serve me in this respect, that the person in question on our arrival by steamer at Soudjak Kalé, from which place as the most convenient, I intended to strike into the mountains, positively refused to start, unless I could obtain the additional attendance of two other Chiefs, as Mehmandars on the part of Sefer Pasha.

I wrote accordingly to that functionary, demanding, in virtue of the Sultan's firman and the Bouyourouldi of his superior in command, Mustapha Pasha, that he would forthwith appoint two such individuals to accompany me. It was natural to expect that an escort so appointed would be chiefly occupied in watching and circumventing me for the benefit of their employers. I contrived, however, by dint of perseverance and presents, not only to elude their control, but to make docile instruments of them for my own purpose.

As I felt persuaded that little or nothing could be done for the furtherance of the objects of my mission in the section of the country (forming the north-western angle of the country between the River Kuban and the Black Sea, and

inhabited by the tribes of Shapsook and Natquoitch), I resolved to proceed as quickly as possible to Bzadoog, and the other provinces which extend from some leagues below Ekaterinodar to the sources of the Laba and the Kuban. In these the traditional authority of the feudal Chiefs (Pshees and Ouzdens) had been hitherto preserved, and seemed to present a medium of intercourse and negotiation with foreign Governments, which in Shapsook and Natquoitch had long ceased to exist. The power of the nobles in the latter provinces had never been at any time of the same absolute nature; and the few privileges they possessed (the chief of which was a higher assessment in the price of blood) had been gradually extinguished. Still, at the period of my residence in the country, about eighteen years ago, some of the Chiefs, from personal and family consideration, enjoyed undoubted influence; and to these, as the organs of public feeling, an Envoy might have addressed himself with some degree of confidence. Nearly all of these persons are dead, and their survivors or successors possess no weight or consideration whatever.

The encroachments of the commoners (tocavs) on the privileges of the nobles had been the cause of division; and the latter thus alienated from their countrymen had more readily accepted bribes from the Russian Government, which was deceived, however, as to the amount of advantage it could obtain by these means. It found to its cost that it had to purchase, not individuals, but a whole population—a very expensive operation; still, by its conciliatory policy and the concession of commercial facilities (including a connivance at the Slave Trade), there is no denying that it had made great progress in the pacification of the Kuban Provinces. The principal check it sustained was in the reactionary movement, headed by the famous Naib, or lieutenant, of Schamyl, who, issuing from his stronghold in the central province of Abassak, had visited with fines, confiscation, and in some instances, death, the disaffected inhabitants of Shapsook and Natquoitch. Numbers of these, and more particularly of the class of Ouzdens, took refuge and even service with the Russians. The great majority of them, however, have returned to Circassia since the evacuation of Anapa, and together with those of their countrymen, a very numerous body, who had been prescribed by the Naib, form the strength of the party which gives its support to Sefer Pasha. He is the only man, I believe, who has the slightest influence or control over them, and that rather of a negative than an active character. He has neither the means nor the energy requisite to raise a Circassian force himself; but he is in some measure able, as he is evidently disposed, to prevent any recruitment on our part, making no secret of his objections on that score. As to his organizing anything out of this anarchy for administrative purposes, I consider such a thing as quite hopeless and out of the question.

With this view of the state of Shapsook and Natquoitch, I was desirous of reaching, as soon as possible, Bzadooh and the other Kuban provinces, where the nobles, I knew, were possessed of substantial authority, which would enable them, if they chose, to dispose of their warlike resources for the benefit of the common cause. All these districts bordering on the Laba and the Kuban, namely, Bzadooh, Khatukoi, Demigoi, Beslenoi, and Karatchai, together with those of Great and Little Kabarda, had, from their contiguity to the Russian frontier, as well as the fact of their being situated on the plains, long since maintained peaceful relations with Russia, and had become either neutral or subject to her. The nobles, from the power and influence they possessed, could offer satisfactory guarantees for the security of the frontier; and many of them even had been enrolled in the service of the border police. Upwards of twenty thousand familes, Tatar and Circassian, who were most exposed to the inroads of the hostile tribes inhabiting the mountains of Abassak, had emigrated across the Kuban, where lands had been allotted to them. Living there among the Cossack population, they appeared, however, to the Russian Government, when the war broke out, to present an element of danger; and an ukase had lately arrived from St. Petersburgh, ordering the emigrants to be removed to the distance of 100 versts into the interior of Russia, or to be permitted to return to Circassia. Many chiefs availed themselves of this permission, well aware that they would, in future, have to side with their countrymen against Russia. All these circumstances apparently combined to favour the success of our mission, but on approaching the stream of Aphips,—a confluent of the Kuban which separates Shapsook from Bzadoog,—we first received intelligence of a social revolution which had just declared itself in the latter province. The commoners

(in the Tartar language, Tocavs) had risen against the nobles (Pshees and Ouzdens), with a determination to overthrow their authority and privileges. The avowed instigator of this movement was the Naib, Mohamed Emin Pasha, who, at the head of 500 horsemen from Abbassahk, had proclaimed that feudal distinctions were opposed to the precepts of the Koran, which held all Mussulmans equal in the sight of God.

These levelling doctrines were eagerly embraced by the Tocavs of Bzadoog, who, of themselves were, in point of numerical strength, much more than a match for the Ouzdens; and what rendered them in the mouth of the Naib still more authoritative, was that, in addition to his religious prestige as the Lieutenant of Sheik Schamyl, he now, with the title of Pasha, was thought to exercise the delegated supremacy of the Sultan. In the semi-barbarous feudal institutions of the Caucasus, there is undoubtedly much that is odious and reprehensible. Not only has everything in the shape of revenue to be raised in kind, but the Chief himself, accompanied by his retainers, is the collector, living at free quarters among his vassals, and shifting them as often as he may find it convenient. The abuses of such a system are, of course, deplorable enough, though I am told that of late years they had been extensively reformed. The difficulty, however, is to substitute some principle of authority for that of a feudal character, exercised by the nobles. The theocratic principle proclaimed by the Naib is, in my opinion, the most objectionable of all. In the meanwhile, if we be not prepared to see all the Kuban provinces involved in the same anarchy which prevails in Shapsook and Natquoitch, the prescriptive rights of the privileged class must be maintained; they offer the only chance for raising a force for offensive operations in time of war, and, through the influence which the nobles have over the Mussulman population beyond the Kuban, of producing an insurrectionary movement there; but they are chiefly valuable from the guarantees they present for the security of the border, when peace shall have been re-established with Russia. If, among the conditions of such a peace, the independence of Circassia is to be comprised, an undoubted advantage will result from the circumstance that three-fourths of the frontier is occupied by tribes whose habits and institutions are such as to favour the maintenance of peaceful relations with their neighbours.

By these considerations I was prompted to give my support and countenance to the cause of the nobles—a line of proceeding which was moreover in strict conformity with the tenour of the firman of which I was the bearer to Mustapha Pasha, and which forbade all interference with the ancient institutions and privileges of the Circassians. As a direct consequence of this step, which placed me virtually at the head of the Ouzden party, more than 200 of whom rallied about me immediately, I was brought into collision with the Naib, who was the leader of the revolutionary faction. Availing himself of the opportunity afforded by the levy of horsemen which had been commanded by Mustapha Pasha (and which his Excellency having thus caused to be assembled, had abandoned, without a word in the way of instructions or orders, to their own devices, suddenly leaving the Circassian coast for Batoom), he had marched into Bzadoog, and joined there by the Tocavs, engaged in the work of revolution and plunder under his auspices, a league had been entered into by the Tocavs, by which they bound themselves, under pain of a heavy fine, not to receive the Ouzdens into their houses, and not to pay them any of their customary dues and requisitions in future. They had, in some instances, gone still further; and in the commission of these excesses, I was told they had been encouraged by the Naib. Hearing, therefore, that he was in the neighbourhood, I invited him to a conference; he accepted the invitation, but on proceeding the next day (the 6th of July) to the place of rendezvous, I found that, in defiance of the rules of courtesy, he did not come out to meet me. I stopped short, therefore, and insisted on his so doing; for I felt assured that, if I submitted to this intentional slight, I should at once forfeit the consideration which is indispensably necessary to the success of any negotiation here. Much fruitless parleying took place on this point of etiquette, in the course of which the Naib, through his messengers, repeatedly stated that his reason for not receiving me with the customary honours was, that when he had, on previous occasions, sought to cultivate friendly relations with Agents of the British Government, he had fallen into disgrace at Constantinople; that, in consequence of his having paid a visit of ceremony to Her Majesty's Ambassador, he had

incurred the serious displeasure of the Porte, which had, since that time, suspended the monthly pay he was entitled to as a Pasha of first rank; and that, subsequently, on his return to Circassia, his friendly reception of two English Agents, Captain Brock and Captain Hughes, had also given offence to Mustapha Pasha, who had, in consequence, withheld a sword of honour, and a declaration which had been sent to him by the Sultan. I received, the same evening, a message from him through a confidential emissary, called a Mustazik, confirming the statement which had been thus publicly made; and adding that the people of Abbassakh had been much irritated by this provoking conduct of Mustapha Pasha, who, as a further proof of his displeasure, had done everything in his power to obstruct their commerce on the coast. They had, in consequence, threatened to put him to death if he held any further correspondence with the Christian Governments.

In all these accusations against the Turkish officials in Circassia, I fear there is but too much foundation in fact. The jealousy with which they view the establishment of direct relations with the Circassians on our part, is but too apparent. Still it was equally obvious to me that the artful Lieutenant of Schamyl was, in addition to the satisfaction he derived from the prospect of a misunderstanding between the Porte and the British Government, by no means sorry at the excuse afforded him for waiving all political discussion with me, which, with reference to the part he was taking in the movements of the Tocavs of Bzadoog, might have been anything but agreeable to him. In regard to the question of etiquette, however, I completely gained my point: his own followers compelled him the next day to pay me the compliment which his fanatic pride had objected to; but in the popular assembly of armed and mounted Circassians, in the midst of which our conference took place, he persisted in his refusal to treat with me on public affairs, again affirming that Mustapha Pasha had been offended at his communicating with agents of the British Government, and finally referred me for an answer to the Chiefs of Abassakh, by whom he was surrounded. They, on their part, proved no less intractable, declaring that without an order from Mustapha Pasha they were not warranted in listening to anything that I had to say to them. I vainly offered to produce a copy of the Imperial firman, in which Mustapha Pasha is commanded to afford me every assistance in communicating with the Circassian Chiefs; and I as vainly appealed to the persons whom he and Sefer Pasha had appointed to accompany me, but it was all to no purpose; they dreaded my intervention in the affairs of Bzadoog, and were determined, if possible, to prevent my having a hearing on the subject. I nevertheless told them my mind, as well as the contents of the Sultan's firman with reference to the maintenance of the ancient institutions of the Circassians, and I flatter myself that my representations were not wholly without effect, since, as I was afterwards informed, the Naib and his troop of incendiaries retired immediately upon my departure into Abassakh, leaving the Ouzdens and Tocavs of Bzadoog to settle their disputes among themselves.

I hope this may prove to be true; it is, in my humble opinion, most desirable that the authority and privileges of the nobles should be maintained. I believe, that in return for our support, if it could be reasonably extended to them, they would prove useful auxiliaries in the war; they might even furnish us with a Contingent of Irregular Cavalry. But their assistance would be chiefly valuable to us in the event of an expedition being directed against the communications of Russia with her trans-Caucasian provinces. An expedition for this purpose might be undertaken either on the line of the Kuban, and with the cooperation of the Mussulman tribes, or from the south-eastern coast of the Black Sea, through the country of the Abkhases and Mingrelia, where the population is Christian. In the former case many advantages would present themselves, which, in the general ignorance prevailing with respect to these countries are, I apprehend, but little appreciated.

The plains of the Kuban, from Anapa to the sources of that river, abound in every resource which an army could require; they are well watered, and would yield a plentiful supply of cattle and provisions. The inhabitants, as far as the Kubarda, are eager to make war against the Russians, and would rally enthusiastically around an expeditionary force in that quarter.

While in the neighbourhood of Ekaterinodar, we fell in with a deputation consisting of twenty Chiefs from Kabarda, who had come to ascertain what prospect there was of their being supported if they should rise *en masse* against

the Russians. Now, as an essential condition of our being able to profit by the assistance of these tribes, it is necessary that they should be at peace among themselves. Nothing, therefore, could be more inopportune than the civil dissensions which have been fomented by the Naib.

Fortunately for us, at the same time, the position of our Ambassador at Constantinople is such as, with a view of remedying these evils, to insure the application of the most effectual means and influences. The mischievous power of the Naib in this respect is derived from the authority he claims as an expounder of the Mahomedan law; but the Sultan's authority on such matters is far superior to his, and acknowledged in all these provinces to be paramount. If a firman, therefore, could be obtained by his Excellency condemnatory of the levelling doctrines of the Naib, I doubt not it would be attended with the very best results; and the Porte, I am inclined to think, would the more readily concur with us that the pretensions of this man must be peculiarly obnoxious to her. She has long viewed his influence with growing alarm and mistrust; and the time perhaps is come when she would willingly put an end to it, and, as the promptest way of dealing with him for that purpose, issue a firman for his recall or removal from Circassia—a course she would be fully justified in adopting, inasmuch as the Naib by his acceptance of the rank of Pasha in her service, has decidedly placed himself in the position of a dependant on her.

The opinion I have here expressed of the Naib, may appear perhaps to your Lordship too harsh and unfavourable; as it is generally believed, and with justice too, I rather think that he, more than anybody, contributed at a former period to uphold the independence of the Circassian tribes. But a system which may have been attended with its advantages at a certain epoch, and in the isolated state of the country, may with a change of circumstances which call for a liberal and unreserved cooperation with the Christian Powers, prove equally prejudicial. The Naib first made his appearance in Circassia, at a time when active resistance to Russia was almost exclusively confined to the central Province of Abbassakh; and he there, as the disciple and lieutenant of Schamyl, began to propagate the illiberal and fanatic doctrines of Shafy, by which all intercourse with Christians is held to be a contamination and a curse. Such a principle, while applicable only to the Russians, was of course favourable to the prosecution of the war to the last extremity; and as the Naib grew more popular and powerful, he became also the scourge and terror of the surrounding tribes, who had, wholly or partially, capitulated. He is accused, but with what degree of truth I cannot say, of having behaved with cruelty and rapacity. But whatever may have been his power in Circassia before the commencement of this war, it was no sooner declared, and access to the coast afforded to the Turks by the instrumentality of the allied fleets, than the old feeling of loyalty to the Sultan, as Caliph, and the Supreme Head of the Mahomedan faith, was revived. Even the people of Abbassakh, with whom his influence had been the strongest, partook of the general enthusiasm, and he was himself compelled to go with the tide. At a former period he had been accustomed to denounce the Osmanlees and their Sovereign as a degenerate race of Mahomedans; and he had even substituted the name of Schamyl for that of the Sultan in the weekly prayers for the Caliph's health and prosperity.

There unquestionably existed a design of founding a new Empire in the Caucasus, based upon the principles of Mahomedan fanaticism and domination, which were to be developed in all their primitive energy. This scheme, I believe, has not been abandoned by the Naib, but only adjourned to a more propitious moment. In the meanwhile he found it convenient to temporize; and, as the only means of retaining any share of power and influence, to present himself as an humble suitor at Constantinople. He was disappointed, however, in his expectations there; and not meeting the encouragement he had looked for, next addressed himself to the Representatives of the Great European Powers. The impression he made on Her Majesty's Ambassador was, if I am rightly informed, not very favourable. Why it should have been so, I, at first, did not perfectly understand, nor did I do full justice to the coolness with which his Excellency met this man's advances, till I was subsequently enabled, by my own observations, fully to appreciate his artful and dangerous character.

Most certainly, if we are to choose between the cooperation of the Porte and that of the Naib for the accomplishment of our views in Circassia, we can have no hesitation in giving our preference to the former. His Excellency, I

presume, must have felt from experience that he could deal much more confidently with the Porte, where something like liberality and enlightenment may be found, than the compound of cunning, ignorance, and fanaticism he would have to encounter in the Naib.

Of the soundness of this policy I now feel thoroughly convinced, and though for the moment the functionaries, civil and military, whom the Porte has appointed to conduct her affairs in this quarter, appear to have been most unfortunately selected, I doubt not when proper representations shall have been made on the subject, a remedy will be applied. All these persons have evidently landed in Circassia under the false idea that they could not only reoccupy all the old Turkish possessions which had been ceded by treaty to Russia on the coast, but also make themselves masters of the whole country as far as the Kuban. All this they foolishly imagined could be done surreptitiously, and without the knowledge and acquiescence of the allied Powers. Hence their jealousy and anxiety to prevent French or English agents penetrating into the interior.

There can be no doubt that the Mushir, Mustapha Pasha, who had been appointed by firman Governor-General of Circassia, was much disconcerted by the tenour of the other firman of which I was the bearer, and in which the independence of the Circassian tribes is fully acknowledged and proclaimed. Though lavish, therefore, in his professions of friendship, and of his desire to forward the views of the English and French Governments, I feel persuaded, and indeed have acquired the certainty, that he has exerted himself to the utmost to diminish our influence and thwart our views. Not only the Naib, but his own agents and subordinates, both Turkish and Circassian, have admitted this to be the fact, and have everywhere pleaded his secret orders and instructions for disobeying those contained in the Bouyouroudi with which he had furnished us. We have, moreover, satisfactory evidence that even the operations of our Commissariat for the purchase of cattle on the coast have been in some measure obstructed by their intrigues.

Next to Mustapha Pasha, the Turkish functionary who has shown himself most hostile to our views, as well as the most troublesome and impracticable, is Sefer Pasha. He is by birth a Circassian, but suddenly invested, for political reasons, with the rank of Pasha, he has the most extravagant ideas of the Sultan's omnipotence, and of his own irresponsible power as his deputy. With respect to Circassian affairs also, he indulges in the most childish rhodomontade, so that it is impossible to treat with him seriously on any subject of importance. His superior in command, Mustapha Pasha, conscious of his indiscretion and utter incapacity, has placed him under the official control of a certain Mehemet Bey (a renegade Hungarian Colonel), who seems to have the power of dictating to him on all occasions when he may think it necessary. The only individual I have seen here in the employment of the Porte, who by his knowledge of affairs is capable of occupying a position in a manner honourable to himself and consistent with the real interests and dignity of his Government, is Behshet Pasha; and he also, according to his own acknowledgment, has been sent out in some anomalous Civil capacity to Soukoom Kaleh.

Taking all the above circumstances into consideration, and convinced that the presence of the Turkish functionaries, civil and military, now stationed on the coast and in the interior is fraught with much more prejudice than advantage to the common interests of the allied Powers, I shall venture to submit to his Excellency Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe the propriety of suggesting to the Porte that they should all of them be withdrawn. In their place, an accredited agent, such as those appointed by the English and French Governments, might be instructed to act in concert with them for the attainment of such objects as the Porte would not be ashamed to avow. I have, in a former despatch to your Lordship, already observed that the religious supremacy of the Sultan is an element of power in Circassia, which it would be impolitic to overlook, and which, under prudent direction, might be of great avail in the prosecution of the present war. The agent of the Porte, whoever he might be and whatever his rank and office, should be fully informed as to the nature of this influence, so as not to confound it with civil and military authority; and he might be made to understand, that it was not more than an equivalent for the material advantages which the English and French Governments had to offer for the development of the military resources of Circassia. So forcibly have I been impressed

with the necessity of a complete revision of the system which the Porte has hitherto adopted in respect to Circassia, and also with the impossibility of carrying out the views specified in your Lordship's instructions, unless a totally new policy be adopted, if not other functionaries employed, that I have, in concert with my French colleague, M. Champoiseau, determined for the present to suspend our negotiations with the Circassians, which we believe would have no useful result till we know whether our appeal to Constantinople has been successful or not.

With a view of furnishing his Excellency Lord Stratford de Redcliffe with all necessary detail and explanations relative to the conduct of the Turkish agents complained of in this despatch, I have sent to Constantinople a gentleman attached to the service of this mission, Colonel Yordan, a Polish officer in the employment of the Turkish Government; having the most implicit confidence in his integrity and intelligence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. LONGWORTH.

No. 120.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 13.)

(No. 566.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 2, 1855.*

IT does not appear that Omer Pasha entertains the intention of returning to his army before the middle of next week. I met him at a splendid dinner given yesterday to his Highness, the new French Ambassador, and in general to the Ministers and Diplomatic Body, by the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I had no opportunity of conversing with him in private, but he expressed a wish to see me at leisure, and the day after to-morrow is appointed for our interview.

In the meantime, it is evident that the Turkish Government persist in their plan of operations in favour of the beleaguered army at Kars, by means of a diversion on the side of Redoubt Kaleh. Opinions concur in rejecting the plan of sending reinforcements by Trebizond. The Seraskier assures me that no army of sufficient force could by possibility reach Erzeroum in less than two months. Without artillery the space might be cleared in forty days; but it seems that artillery could not be dispensed with.

Your Lordship's opinions, and those of Her Majesty's Government, have been duly communicated in the words of the instructions, to Fuad Pasha, the Grand Vizier, and the Seraskier, but they have had no effect in changing the intended plan, except that the Sultan's Ministers abstain from making any numerical diminution of their forces in the Crimea, and cease to reckon upon the Contingent as part of the Asiatic expedition.

The French Ambassador assures me that General Pelissier objects formally to any alteration whatever of the Turkish forces before Sebastapol and at Kerteh; but that he does not dispute the right of the Porte to provide for the relief of her Asiatic army, and even to place Omer Pasha at the head of an expedition destined for that object.

The details of the Turkish plan have been received from the Porte confidentially this morning; but the paper is in Turkish, and of a length which necessarily renders the translation of it a work of time. I understand, however, that the Porte suggests the expediency of placing the Contingent at Eupatoria, to be there completed and substituted for 20,000 men, who would be withdrawn and placed at Omer Pasha's disposal.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 121.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 13.)

(No. 326.)

My Lord, *Berlin, August 11, 1855.*

I HAVE asked Baron Manteuffel the impression which the Prince of Prussia has received as to the feeling produced at St. Petersburgh by the continuance of hostilities. His Excellency replied, that His Royal Highness had observed a good deal of despondency as to the probable results of the present campaign in the Crimea; and that he considered the pressure of the war was seriously felt throughout the Empire; but that there was a determination to carry it on with the greatest vigour; and that Count Nesselrode had said to His Royal Highness, that if Sebastopol, or even the Crimea, were taken by the allies, of which he doubted, negotiations would not be rendered more easy; adding further, that he thought it would be useless to think of negotiations until some important event had taken place.

The Emperor Alexander, Baron Manteuffel continued, appeared to feel deeply the position in which he was placed, and the increasing difficulties of carrying on the war. The number of his forces, he observed, was enormous, but his Imperial Majesty was by no means confident of success, and happen what may, it appeared to be the general opinion, that his disposition to concede under reverses would not improve.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 122.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 13.)

(No. 63.)

My Lord, *Vienna, August 8, 1855.*

COUNT VALENTINE ESTERHAZY, the Austrian Minister at St. Petersburgh, arrived here two days ago, on leave of absence, having left Count Karnicky as Chargé d'Affaires.

I asked Count Buol what he had gathered from Count Esterhazy, respecting the general feeling at present prevailing at St. Petersburgh, but he said he had scarcely yet had an opportunity of ascertaining, as Count Esterhazy had only remained a few hours in Vienna. He had, however, told him that he considered that the pressure of the war was beginning to be seriously felt, although no disposition was shown to find fault with the policy pursued by the Emperor Alexander.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 123.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 13.)

(No. 65.)

My Lord, *Vienna, August 8, 1855.*

BARON DE BOURQUENEY has communicated to Count Buol the reply of the French Government to the explanations which had been requested by Baron Hübner respecting the maintenance of the Treaty of December 2, and he informs me that Count Buol expressed himself fully satisfied with the declaration he had been instructed to make, that the French Government regard the four points as the minimum to be demanded of Russia in future negotiations, and that as the Treaty of December is to be maintained, they consider neither Austria nor the Belligerent Powers as free to enter into arrangements with Russia without consulting together.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 124.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 657.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 13, 1855.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 557 of the 30th ultimo, I have to state to you, that instead of disarming the Albanians enlisted by Major-General Beatson, which would probably not be effected without bloodshed, it might be advisable to send the whole body of Irregular Cavalry now in process of formation at the Dardanelles, immediately to Eupatoria to be attached to the Contingent under Lieutenant-General Vivian, and there armed, and formed, and drilled. Cavalry is above all things wanted at Eupatoria, and it would be unadvisable to lose the services of the Albanians just when they are wanted, after having incurred the trouble and expense of getting them together.

Your Excellency will ascertain Lieutenant-General Vivian's opinion on this matter, and take such steps with regard to it as you may together think desirable.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 125.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 16, 10 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Stockholm, August 14, 1855.*

THE French Minister at this Court received, on the 12th, a despatch from his Government, dated the 5th, informing him that the King of Sweden's proposal that the guarantee of His Majesty's possessions and rights in Finmarken should be extended to the whole of the United Kingdom of Sweden and Norway, as I mentioned in my despatch No. 54, had been accepted by the French Government, and that Her Britannic Majesty's Government acquiesced in this acceptance.

The French Minister communicated to the Swedish Foreign Minister his instructions yesterday, and I saw his Excellency afterwards. His Excellency told me he had learned this acceptance with unmixed satisfaction, and that his only objection to the arrangement we had proposed—to wit, its partial effect—was thus removed. I told him I had not yet received your Lordship's instructions, but I had no doubt they would soon arrive, and be identical with those received by the French Minister.

No. 126.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 661.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 16, 1855.*

I HAVE to call your Excellency's attention to the inclosed passages extracted from Mr. Longworth's report, No. 7, of the 20th of July, which has passed through your hands, and I have to point out to you the importance of recalling those Turkish officers who are thwarting the policy of the allies, and betraying the interests of the Sultan in Circassia. But your Excellency should

see the instructions which are sent, as it is impossible to feel sure that Mustapha and Sefir Pasha may not have good and sufficient reasons for believing that the conduct they are now pursuing will be agreeable to the Porte.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 126.

Extracts from Consul Longworth's Despatch No. 7 of July 20, 1855.

THE Naib said to Mr. Longworth, through his messengers, "that his reason for not receiving him with the customary honours was, that when he had on previous occasions sought to cultivate friendly relations with agents of the British Government, he had fallen into disgrace at Constantinople. In consequence of his having paid a visit of ceremony to Her Majesty's Ambassador, he had incurred the serious displeasure of the Porte which had since that time suspended the monthly pay he was entitled to as a pasha of first rank; and that subsequently on his return to Circassia, his friendly reception of two English agents, Captain Brock and Captain Hughes, had also given offence to Mustapha Pasha, who had in consequence withheld a sword of honour and decoration which had been sent to him by the Sultan."

Mr. Longworth says "the functionaries, civil and military, whom the Porte has appointed to conduct her affairs in Circassia, appear to have been most unfortunately selected," and moreover "that we have satisfactory evidence that even the operations of our Commissariat for the purchase of cattle on the coast, have been in some measure obstructed by their intrigues."

Mr. Longworth observes "that the religious supremacy of the Sultan is an element of power in Circassia, which it would be impolitic to overlook."

No. 127.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 663.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 16, 1855.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency a passage from the speech of Lord John Russell on the 7th instant, extracted from the "Times" of the 8th of August, stating that Aali Pasha approved of the terms proposed by the Austrian Government.

Her Majesty's Government had no previous knowledge that this opinion was entertained by the Turkish Plenipotentiary, and your Excellency will, therefore, ask Aali Pasha to have the goodness to state whether the communication he made to Lord John Russell was founded upon instructions which he had received from his Government, or whether it was the expression of his Excellency's individual opinion.

In declining to accept the terms of peace which were proposed by Austria, Her Majesty's Government, in conjunction with that of the Emperor of the French, believed that they consulted the honour and interests of Turkey no less than those of England and France, but in consequence of the communication made by Aali Pasha to Lord John Russell, Her Majesty's Government desire to be informed whether the decision which was taken respecting the Austrian proposition did or did not meet with the concurrence of the Porte.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 127.

Extract from the Report in the "Times" of the Speech of Lord John Russell in the House of Commons, August 7, 1855.

"BUT, Sir, with respect to the future, very serious questions arise, because it will have been observed that the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna—a man of as much intelligence, perhaps, with regard to European affairs as almost any person I ever met of any nation, and who knew well the interests of his own country,—was perfectly satisfied with the terms which were then proposed by the Austrian Government.

The "Times" of the 8th August is sent herewith.

No. 128.

Consul Gardner to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 20.)

(No. 14. Diplomatic.)

My Lord, *Jassy, August 8, 1855.*

THE paper which I have the honour to inclose for your Lordship's consideration, relates to the Moldavian Monasteries, which depend on the Greek Church beyond the frontiers, and is an historical record of their origin and foundation. It had been submitted at Vienna to the Conference, when it was communicated to me by the Prince, and was simultaneously forwarded to Constantinople, and I believe to his Excellency Viscount Redcliffe. It becomes the more interesting as there is at this moment a delegation from the Moldavian Government at Constantinople, consisting of the Minister of Public Worship and Instruction, and of M. Négri, Minister of Public Works, who had been the Prince's delegate at Vienna, endeavouring to procure from the Porte an approval of the projected reform of the Church Establishments in general in Moldavia, and of a larger apportionment of their revenues to the wants or the State.

During the protectorate of Russia, the large revenues of these monasteries gave her a great ascendancy and influence beyond the frontiers, as the Greek Church of the East to whom they appertained, must have felt that they were more or less at her discretion; but now that the baneful influence has providentially been removed, though it hovers still in opinion over the Church of the country, it becomes a question of deep policy if its whole establishment should be remodelled and assimilated for one local purpose or advantage by the Government. The two branches of the Greek Orthodox Church, internal and external, are at present placed in Moldavia in open dissidence by their positions. The Moldavian Church pays one fourth of its revenues to the State, and its clergy receive a moderate stipend from the remainder. The church "De Saints Lieux" pays about one-twentieth part of its revenues to the State, and the remainder is subjected to no control but its own. There may be therefore between the parties and the State at times, little Christian feeling. But the constitution of the Church in this country is a very serious consideration, my Lord, for the character of the Government, is the character which varying circumstances give to it; continual changes succeed on the soil, and the protection of Austria is merely a change, from being more beneficent, from the protection of Russia.

I have the honour to inclose an extract from the "Moldavian Gazette," of 6th instant, which will dispel the doubts entertained by many of the continuance of the Austrian Military occupation; tenders will be received for the victualling of the troops for seven months, from 1st of October ensuing.

I have not addressed his Excellency Lord Redcliffe, on the subject of the present, much of which would be superfluous. I am not over confident in the postal route to the Turkish capital, but the Prince offers his own opportunities totally of course in opinion with him; I have no doubt that he acts with the best intentions, but may doubt if they be for the best. I had the honour of forwarding on September 22, 1851, to Viscount Palmerston, copy of the publi-

cation of the revenues and domains of the Greek Church "De Saints Lieux" in Moldavia, and have the honour to refer your Lordship to it. The copy of my despatch to Viscount Palmerston is also inclosed to your Lordship at present.

I have, &c.

(Signed) SAML. GARDNER

Inclosure 1 in No. 128.

Notes on the Monasteries in Moldavia.

LES propriétés sises en Moldavie des Monastères relevant des Saints Lieux, dérivent de donations faites à l'Eglise, soit par des Hospodars sur le domaine de l'Etat, soit par des particuliers sur leurs propres biens.

Ces propriétés sont aujourd'hui au nombre de 215 réparties entre différentes communautés religieuses de la manière suivante :

101	relevant du St. Sépulcre ;
87	du Mont Athos ;
12	du Mont Sinaï ;
5	du Patriarcat de Constantinople ;
3	du Patriarcat d'Alexandrie ;
2	du Patriarcat d'Antioche ;
5	du Monastère Drian en Epire.
215	

En consacrant partie de leur fortune à l'église, les fondateurs des monastères ne se sont pas proposé uniquement un but d'abnégation et de piété ; ils ont eu principalement en vue de fonder des établissements de charité et de bienfaisance, qui fassent bénir leur nom, et de les doter d'un revenu propre à suffire aux besoins de leur destination, ainsi qu'à l'entretien en bon état des édifices religieux et aux exigences du service Divin, destinées à perpétuer leur commémoration.

Ces conditions originelles ressortent non seulement de la teneur de ceux parmi les actes de fondation qui ont vu le jour—attendu que les donataires, comme il sera dit plus loin, se sont refusés en toute occasion à les exhiber—mais de tous les documents publics qui se rapportent au règlement des affaires conventuelles.

Aussi le Gouvernement de la Principauté, a-t-il de temps immémorial exercé le droit d'allouer sur les revenus des monastères, des dépenses motivées par des intérêts d'utilité générale ; d'obliger les supérieurs à entretenir les édifices en bon état et de veiller à la repression des abus et des dilapidations qui se commettaient sur les fonds mêmes des propriétés.

Le clergé Grec, détenteur des actes de fondation, a de tout temps profité de l'instabilité des choses en Moldavie, et des fréquentes perturbations auxquelles ce pays a été en butte, pour se soustraire aux obligations qui lui étaient imposées.

En 1644 le Prince Basile avait fondé une école à Jassi, et l'ayant dotée de plusieurs biens fonds, la plaça sous la surveillance du Monastère des Trois Saints. Plusieurs chrysobulles subséquentes de différents Princes font foi de cette donation et de l'existence de l'école pendant une série de plusieurs années à dater de sa fondation ; cependant à la suite des vicissitudes survenues, le revenu affecté à l'entretien de la susdite école, a été dès longtemps absorbé par les supérieurs du Monastère des Trois Saints, et ce n'est que depuis une quinzaine d'années que la curatelle des écoles, autorisée par la teneur même du Règlement Organique, a pu, en vertu d'un jugement formel, obtenir le retour des biens fonds susmentionnés à leur destination primitive.

Parmi les actes publics existants, on peut remarquer un anaphora (rapport d'une délibération formelle) du haut clergé et des boyards du Divan daté de 1706, et confirmé par la chrysobulle du Prince Antioche, stipulant une subvention payable annuellement par les monastères relevant des saints lieux, de même

que par les monastères indigènes, et dont partie avait été affectée à l'entretien des écoles et partie au profit et de la vestiarie (au fisc).

Une chrysobulle du Prince Grégoire Ghyka datée de 1748 stipule également une subvention prélevée sur le clergé en général et particulièrement sur les revenus du Saint Sépulcre pour la création de nouvelles écoles.

En 1799 le Prince Alexandre Ipsilanti fait prélever sur les revenus, des monastères relevant des saints lieux une subvention en faveur de la caisse des aumônes. La chrysobulle émanée à cet effet est basée sur les considérations suivantes : "Considérant," y est-il-dit, "que les fondateurs des monastères relevant des saints lieux en consacrant des biens-fonds à ces asiles sacrés, obligent les supérieures des monastères d'en employer en partie les revenus à marier des filles pauvres, à venir en aide aux familles indigentes, à faire des aumônes, et de n'envoyer que l'excédant du revenu aux lieux dont relèvent les monastères ; considérant en outre qu'aucune de ces conditions n'est actuellement observée . . . . . Nous arrêtons que les monastères soient obligés à subventionner la caisse des aumônes de la manière suivante, etc."

Quant aux réquisitions extraordinaires pour cause d'utilité publique, elles ont d'ailleurs été très fréquentes, et les monastères s'y sont toujours prêtés comme à une exigence qui résultait de leurs obligations.

En 1821 les hégumènes (supérieurs) Grecs ayant pris une part plus ou moins active à la révolution de la Grèce, et assisté cette cause par les moyens mis à leur disposition, ils furent expulsés par ordre exprès de la Sublime Porte de leurs monastères, dont la gestion fût confiée à un Comité composé de boyards indigènes, et présidé par le métropolitain.

Au mois de Mars de l'année 1826 le haut clergé Moldave invité à faire un bon choix de supérieurs pour les monastères relevant des saints lieux, adressa à cet effet au Prince Jean Stourdza un anaphora qui a été revêtu de la confirmation princière et qui stipule entr'autres que pendant deux ans, c'est-à-dire, jusqu'en 1828 les monastères relevant des saints lieux recevront la somme fixe de 100,000 piastres annuellement ; qu'à partir de 1828 ils auront à recevoir le tiers du revenu total, le reste devant être employé au payement des dettes dont les monastères sont grevés, et à la réparation des édifices qui se trouvent dans le plus mauvais état d'abandon et de délabrement.

En Février 1828, sur l'insistance de la Cour de Russie à la suite du Traité d'Ackerman, la Sublime Porte adresse au Prince de Moldavie, l'ordre de replacer les propriétés des monastères sous la gestion des hégumènes Grecs. Le Hospodar Jean Stourdza ordonna en conséquence à l'Assemblée Générale du Divan, d'aviser aux mesures d'application de cette disposition ; et avant tout, de prendre connaissance de la teneur des actes de fondation afin que les intentions des fondateurs fussent suivies ponctuellement ; au surplus d'avoir en vue la nécessité de réparer les édifices sacrés qui sont en ruine, et d'amortir les dettes dont les supérieures Grecs avaient grevé les monastères. Dans l'anaphora qui s'en suivit de l'Assemblée Générale, ont pu remarquer les passages suivants :

"Les propriétés conventuelles ont été restituées contre reçu aux exarques délégués des Saints Lieux et moyennant assurance qu'ils exhiberont dans un court délai, à l'Assemblée Générale, les chrysobulles et documents de fondation pour qu'ils soient suivis de point en point. L'adjudication des terres devra toujours avoir leur ici en Moldavie, d'après l'ancienne coutume, et les contrats rédigés par les hégumènes, les curateurs, et les boyards inspecteurs. Les affermages devront se faire pour trois ans, et moyennant enchères publiques, sous la surveillance des curateurs et des boyards inspecteurs. Les forêts ne seront dans aucun cas sujettes à être exploitées, elles seront au contraire gardées strictement. De plus comme presque tous les édifices sacrés, se trouvent dans le dernier état de délabrement ou consumés par le feu, que les monastères sont en général grevés de dettes qui ont été contractées par les hégumènes Grecs dans les tems antérieures. Nous croyons indispensable que le revenu des trois années subséquentes soit affecté à la réparation ou à la réconstruction des édifices et au payement des dettes, etc. Que les hégumènes soient astreints à observer scrupuleusement les statuts de fondation, à entretenir les édifices en bon état sous la surveillance des boyards inspecteurs, à veiller à ce que le service divin soit effectué d'après toutes les convenances ; que les règles monacales soient en tout point observées suivant les intentions des fondateurs, et qu'à cet effet ils soient constamment sous la surveillance active des curateurs et des boyards inspecteurs."

En Mars, 1828, une Chrysobulle du Hospodar Jean Stourdza confirmative de l'anaphora de la curatelle des écoles, porte textuellement ce qui suit :

"Nous approuvons complétement l'opinion comprise dans le présent anaphora et tendant à ce que le revenu des écoles, soit accru par l'augmentation de la subvention qui était prélevée sur les revenus des monastères relevant des saints lieux. Ces revenus par suite de la protection et de l'assistance du Gouvernement local s'étant élevés au quintuple de ce qu'ils étaient lorsque les monastères avaient été assujettis à une subvention de 5,000 piastres, en faveur des écoles, il est rationnel qui cette subvention soit actuellement fixée à la somme modique de 25,000 piastres par an."

En Avril 1828, les troupes Russes ayant occupé la Moldavie, le Gouvernement de cette époque avait nommé une Commission composée de membres du haut clergé et de Boyards, et chargée spécialement de régler les questions qui se rattachaient aux monastères relevant des saints lieux. Il appert cependant des actes ultérieurs que cette Commission elle-même, n'a fait que des efforts infructueux pour atteindre le but qu'on s'était proposé. Les rapports de la Commission et les anaphoras du haut clergé datés de la fin de la même année concordent à représenter l'état des choses sous le plus triste aspect.

Les documents requis n'ont pas été exhibés par les héguménes.

Les dettes de la plupart des monastères sont en disproportion avec leurs revenus.

Le plupart des édifices sacrés sont en ruine.

Le service divin manque des objets les plus nécessaires au culte.

Les registres des effets précieux dont les églises étaient dôtées, ainsi que du bétail et autres accessoires n'existent pas.

En conséquence d'un commun accord le haut clergé et la Commission Spéciale insistent pour l'application de l'anaphora de l'Assemblée Générale, confirmé en Mars, 1828, par le Hospodar Jean Stourdza, et demandent que, conformément aux anciens statuts de fondation, il soit fait un bon choix d'héguménes avec la participation du Métropolitain et des délégués des saints lieux, les quels héguménes soient obligés à aviser au redressement des points susmentionnés.

Le redressement n'a point été fait.

Les héguménes qui profitaient des abus et de la confusion qui avaient régné jusque là, ayant recours aux patriarchs, déjouèrent tous les efforts de la Commission pour parvenir à un résultat satisfaisant.

On commençait cependant à s'occuper de la rédaction du Règlement Organique qui devait trancher aussi la question relative aux monastères. Dans cette prevision de l'Assemblée Générale du Divan arrêta en 1831 que les héguménes ne seraient libres d'affermer les terres des monastères que pour le terme d'une année, afin qu'elles puissent être après cela assujetties au régime qui sera définitivement établi.

Le réglement mis en vigeur en 1832 stipula une subvention annuelle de 150,000 piastres payable au fisc par les monastères relevant des saints lieux et repartie proportionnellement sur leurs revenus. C'était plus que le quart du revenu de cette époque.

Il fut néanmoins accordé aux patriarches, sur leurs instances, un sursis de dix ans échéant en 1841 à charge pour eux de payer les dettes dont les monastères étaient grevés et de réédifier les temples et les bâtisses délabrées.

Le délai expira et la Cour de Russie qui semblait ménager le clergé Grec entama des négociations avec les patriarches qui n'aboutirent qu'à prolonger indifiniment l'application de la disposition règlementaire.

En 1843 le Prince Michel Stourdza eut connaissance d'une déclaration de la Légation Russe à Constantinople comme sous le titre de Mémorandum de Buyukdéré et portant en substance ce qui suit :

"La Cour Impériale offre son appui aux saints lieux pour l'arrangement définitif de la question, à condition toutefois que les saints lieux acceptent au préalable les bases suivantes :

"1. L'affermage des biens conventuels aux enchères publiques, à commencer de l'année 1852.

2. Le même terme de neuf ans est accordé pour l'achèvement complet des réparations et reconstructions des couvents, conformément à leurs ressources et

à la dignité du culte. La Cour Impériale trouverait juste que les saints lieux promissent de consacrer à cet objet important un quart du revenu annuel qu'ils perçoivent des Principautés.

"3. Une subvention convenable doit être accordée en faveur des établissements de bienfaisance et d'éducation publique dans les Principautés. Puisque les saints lieux trouvent incommode un chiffre variable chaque année, la Cour Impériale consent a retirer la proposition primitive du quart du revenu à affecter à cet objet; mais dans ce cas elle demande que cette subvention annuelle soit fixée à deux millions de piastres en monnaie Valaque jusqu'à l'année 1852, époque de la régularisation définitive de ce chiffre.

"4. La somme de 250,000 piastres en monnaie Valaque sera distraite de la subvention precitée et affectée aux écoles, hospices de la nation Grecque à Constantinople et dans ses dépendances.

"5. L'exarque fera partie de la commission mixte à la quelle devront être soumis à Bucarest et à Jassi les titres de possession des saints lieux dans les Principautés ainsi que les obligations ou servitudes spéciales qui en dérivent.

"Ces propositions (dont plusieurs points de détail sont omis) doivent être considérées comme un dernier essai de conciliation. La Cour Impériale s'attend donc à les voir acceptés jusqu'au mois de Novembre, de cette année. Dans le cas contraire, tout en continuant à protéger les monastères que contre les procédés vexatoires ou illégaux, elle regretterait de ne pouvoir plus empêcher les hospodars, d'appliquer aux dits monastères les dispositions des réglements organiques sanctionnés depuis longtems par les deux Cours."

Le Prince Michel Stourdza ne cessa d'insister pour l'application des mesures adoptées et consacrées par le réglement organique. Dans un mémoire adressa en 1846 à la Cour de Russie, il s'exprimait à ce sujet dans ces termes : "Il est nécessaire de constater que les donations faites de tems à autre aux saints lieux, ont eu non seulement pour but de perpétuer la mémoire du donateur mais pas des objections imposées aux donataires de subvenir à des établissements de piété et d'utilité publique. Ces obligations soit par suite des révirements politiques auxquels la Moldavie a été sujette, soit par l'incurie des gouvernements qui se sont succédé, se sont trouvées dans les derniers tems en partie négligées, lorsque le réglement organique qui a statué sur les droits et les devoirs publics dans chacune des branches du service, est venu relever l'abus et signaler le préjudice porté à l'intérêt général par l'abandon des obligations auxquelles les Monastères se trouvaient originairement assujettis.

"Par conséquent et avec l'assentiment des deux hautes Cours, il fut décidé qu'une somme serait perçue annuellement sur les revenus des Monastères étrangers, afin de compenser les obligations d'utilité publique auxquelles ils étaient tenus.

"Néanmoins non seulement les subventions indéterminées prélevées en faveur des établissements d'utilité publique antérieurement au réglement organique, ont cessé tout-à-fait, mais depuis lors bien que les Monastères aient retiré à leur profit tous les avantages que le réglement a assurés aux propriétaires, ils se sont abstenus de s'acquitter des sommes soit déterminées soit proportionnelles auxquelles ils étaient tenus, de manière à faire éprouver jusqu'à ce jour au pays, un dommage de plusieurs millions.

"Il n'est pas superflu d'ajouter que le mode d'administration des terres relevant des Saints Lieux est si vicieux que des sommes immenses prélevées par leurs administrateurs lors de l'adjudication des fermes ne profitent qu'à ces derniers et sont perdue soit pour les communautés religieuses, soit pour le pays."

Dans cet intervalle une loi votée en 1844, opéra la sécularisation des biens relevant des diocèses et des Monastères indigènes. Un département du culte fut créé et eut dans ses attributions l'administration des biens susmentionnées. Les evêques eurent en partage les quatre-septièmes des revenus des leurs diocèses respectifs, et les héguménes des Monastères indigènes furent rétribués proportionellement aux charges qu'ils avaient à supporter. Ces Monastères classifiés d'après leur importance en quatre catégories, eurent une rétribution fixe de 72,000 piastres pour la première classe, 48,000 pour la deuxième, 36,000 pour la troisième, et 24000 pour la quatrième, l'excédant des revenus tant des diocèses que des Monastères versé à la caisse du département du culte, fut destiné à la

restauration et à l'entretien des édifices sacrés, et des bâtisses d'exploitation rurale, ainsi qu'à des actes de charité, de bienfaisance et d'utilité publique.

Mais pour ce qui concernait les Monastères relevant de Saints Lieux les abus originels se perpetuaient en effet indéfiniment.

Les actes de fondation n'étaient pas exhibés.

La subvention légale n'était pas payée.

L'état matériel des Monastères continuait d'être de plus en plus déplorable.

Les affermages n'avaient lieu que par des contrats privés conclus soit à Constantinople, soit sur les lieux.

La plupart des hégumènes arrivaient en Moldavie munis de contrats de fermage qui stipulaient la cession en leur faveur, pour une série d'années plus ou moins longue, de toutes les propriétés d'une communauté, qu'ils sous-affermaient à leur profit. Les contrats originels ignorés presque toujours du gouvernement se trouvaient souvent en contradiction avec les institutions du pays; ils étaient fréquemment cassés par les patriarches ou par les communautés ce qui occasionnait sans cesse des litiges inextricables entre les anciens et les nouveaux concessionnaires comme entre ceux-ci et les sous-fermiers.

Les fermiers hégumènes ne visant qu'à profiter le plus possible de leur position éphémère, abandonnaient dans un complet délaissement les intérêts spirituelles des monastères et les exigences du culte: les forêts étaient devastées les édifices tombaient en ruine et les richesses ainsi amassés étaient détournées à la mort de l'hégumène par ses proches ou ses héritiers tandis que le Monastère n'héritait que de dettes.

Malgré le mémorandum de Buyukdéré la Russie ne parut pas insister efficacement pour l'application des dispositions arrêtées jusqu'au tems où le Prince Stourdza dans la provision de l'invasion du choléra imposa aux Monastères étrangers une somme de dix-mille ducats afin de subvenir aux mesures extraordinaires nécessitées par l'approche de l'épidémie.

Cela eut lieu en 1847.

En 1848, une mesure provisoire avait été arrêtée à Constantinople et communiquée aux hospodars par lettre visirielle pour qu'ils aient à s'y conformer.

Elle stipulait:

Que les terres conventuelles seraient affermées aux enchères publiques à partir de 1852, avec le concours des autorités locales.

Que les Saints Lieux seront tenus de réparer et de mettre en ordre tous les couvents et églises qui en relèvent. de manière à ce que le service divin y soit célébré conformément à la dignité du culte.

Que la subvention à relever sur les revenus conventuels sera fixée provisoirement à 30,000 ducats pour les deux principautés et que (par suite d'une nouvelle concession faite aux patriarches) elle ne sera exigible qu'à dater de 1847, (au lieu de 1841.)

Que sur cette somme 5,000 ducats seront versés à Constantinople au profit des écoles, hospices etc., de la nation Grecque.

Les hospodars n'eurent pas lieu d'être satisfaits de ce resultat partiel.

Aussi dès lors le Prince Stourdza répondait-il au Consulat de Russie qui lui avait communiqué dans une note, les points ci-dessus mentionnés en lui adressant les régulations suivants.

"Le Réglement Organique, en convertissant en une subvention régulière les prestations indéterminées aux quelles les monastères relevant des saints lieux étaient tenus de tout temps, a stipulé qu'il serait prélevé une part sur les revenus des susdits monastères. Cette part avait été approximativement, et d'après les évaluations de l'année 1831, portée à 450,000 piastres du pays, ou près de 715,000 piastres au change actuel de Constantinople.

"Depuis, le Cabinet Impérial a constamment insisté à ce que la subvention à prélever fut une part proportionnelle aux revenus annuels des monastères, vu que la différence énorme entre les prix des fermages actuels et ceux qui seront obtenus par les enchères, était toute entière acquise au pays.

"Dès lors la garantie des enchères, séparée du principe de la part proportionnelle, n'est destinée qu'à porter une atteinte directe aux intérêts locaux.

"Si, après avoir ainsi constaté le préjudice qui s'en suivra pour le pays, on se demandait l'avantage qui en reviendrait à la Chrétienté, on ne peut malheureusement induire, de l'usage que les patriarches et les gérants des communautés ont fait constamment des ressources qui leur étaient dévolues, qu'une conjecture

peu rassurante, savoir que tout surcroit de revenus ne profitera qu'à des vues particulières et à ceux qui sont à même de les protéger ou de les servir.

"Par conséquent, sans rien objecter sur le chiffre auquel le Ministère Impérial a cru convenable de fixer la subvention, en égard à l'état actuel des choses, je crois juste et nécessaire que la proportion de ce chiffre, en égard à la totalité des revenus actuels, puisse servir de base à l'augmentation de cette subvention au *pro rata* de l'accroissement des revenus par suite de l'adjudication aux enchères.

"De cette manière, la perte éprouvé serait compensée au profit de l'utilité publique, et le Gouvernement local y trouverait un mobile suffisant pour aider de tout son pouvoir, et pour entourer de toutes les garanties convenables, l'accroissement progressif des revenus conventuels."

Le Prince Ghyka dès son avénement à la Principauté n'a cessé d'insister dans le même sens.

Voici en résumé l'esprit des représentations qu'il a adressées à ce sujet à la Sublime Porte et à la Cour de Russie soit avant soit après les enchères qui ont eu lieu en 1851 et qui ont fait doubter le revenu conventuel puisque de 90,000 ducats environ, il s'est élevé à 173,000:

"Les donations qui constituent en Moldavie le domaine des Monastères relevant des patriarches Grecs étaient assujetties à des conditions qui y rattachaient différents actes de bienfaisance en faveur du pays. A ce titre des contributions irrégulières mais fréquentes étaient prélevées à la charge des Monastères toutes les fois que les besoins publics réclamaient une assistance extraordinaire. Le Réglement Organique mit fin à cet état de choses en astreignant les monastères à une subvention régulière proportionnée au revenu de cette époque. Sur les instances des patriarches il leur fut accordé un sursis de dix ans qui expira l'année 1841. Cependant le pays qui fut privé de toute subvention pendant ce laps de tems n'en jouit pas non plus à partir de l'époque précitée. Les tergiversations et les moyens dilatoires employés par les patriarches ont abouti à traîner la négociation sur cette question et à laisser un vide considérable dans les ressources affectées aux établissements publics de la Moldavie. Trois principes cependant combinés entr'eux d'une manière inséparable avaient été posés dans cet intervalle. L'affermage des terres, par la voie des enchères; la fixation d'une part proportionnelle à retenir en faveur des établissements publics du pays, et la restauration des édifices consacrés au culte. L'adjudication aux enchères ne devait servir évidemment qu'à produire et à garantir ces précieux résultats. L'adjudication ayant eu lieu a élevé au double le revenu des monastères et néanmoins la part du fisc est restée sur l'ancien pied de même que l'état du personnel et du matériel des églises; de tous les avantages donc que l'adjudication devait produire, il ne reste que celui de l'accroissement du revenu en faveur des communautés, les autres points ont été de nouveau assujettis à des négociations que les patriarches traîneront autant que possible en longueur ainsi qu'ils l'ont fait jusqu'ici."

En 1852 la Légation Russe recevait de son Cabinet des instructions dont les points fondamentaux sont résumés ci-après la traduction communiquée au Prince Ghyka par son agent à Constantinople.

"Si depuis plusieurs années nous insistons à ce que le clergé Grec cède le quart des revenus conventuels en faveur des Principautés, c'est moins en vue d'accroître les recettes des Hospodars que de mettre un terme à une dissension que est devenue scandaleuse . . . . . C'est dans ce but que nous avons toujours préféré à une décision obligatoire un arrangement conciliatoire, entre le clergé et les Hospodars, dût-il en résulter un grand sacrifice pour les communautés religieuses . . . . . Notre intention est point de porter atteinte aux droits de l'Église mais de les sauvegarder en les combinant avec les devoirs et les obligations qui résultent du Réglement Organique en vigueur dans les Principautés.

"Ces obligations résultent principalement:

"*a*. De l'élévation du prix des biens-fonds produite par la liberté du commerce et de la navigation du Danube, et constatée par les résultats de la dernière adjudication.

"*b*. Des réformes opérées dans l'administration intérieure des Principautés, et du règlement des droits et devoirs réciproques des propriétaires fonciers et des cultivateurs.

"Vous ferez entendre aux communautés, combien il est important de placer leurs intérêts temporels dans les Principautés sous la garantie d'un arrangement obligatoire pour les Hospodars futurs.

"Les obligations des communautés résultent d'ailleurs des chrysobulles et actes de donation dont les conditions ont été négligées ou totalement violées par les gérants des biens fonds.

"Vous observerez enfin qu'il y a obligation pour les patriarches de mettre un terme aux abus et aux dilapidations commis par les hégumènes et qui font rejaillir sur la gestion ecclésiastique un blâme qui n'est pas toujours dénué de fondement, etc."

Tel est l'historique succinct de la question qui se rapporte aux monastères relevant des saints lieux.

Si l'on résume maintenant ce qui ressort des phases qu'elle a suivies ainsi que des actes publics dont une grande partie n'a pas même été mentionnée dans le présent mémoire, on ne saurait revoquer en doute les inductions suivants:

Que les donations faites aux monastères étaient en général accompagnées de conditions obligatoires que les donataires n'ont point remplies ainsi que l'attestant des actes successifs rémontant à plus d'un siècle et demi.

Qu'en éludant ces obligations les donataires ne se sont jamais prêtés à exhiber les actes de fondation.

Que le Gouvernement local a néanmoins de tout tems fait valoir son droit en obligeant les monastères à contribuer pour des intérêts d'utilité public soit par suite de dispositions formelles et stables soit d'un manière irrégulière et indéterminée.

Que les hégumènes ont toujours abusé de leur position et moyennant le recours aux patriarches ont réussi à perpétuer le désordre en ajournant continuellement le règlement définitif de la question.

Que le choix des hégumènes est un objet qui intéresse éminemment l'ordre et la tranquillité du pays.

Qu'enfin malgré les instances incessantes, du haut clergé indigène et du Gouvernement local, malgré les engagements pris par les saints lieux en retour des concessions que leur ont été accordées, rien n'a été fait jusqu'ici pour la restauration des édifices consacrés au culte ni pour l'ordre requis dans la célébration du service divin.

Il est urgent de mettre un terme à cet état de choses déplorable aussi ruineux pour les véritables intérêts des monastères que préjudiciable au fisc Moldave.

En conséquence, il est naturel de se reporter aux bases fondamentales consacrés déjà soit par des actes solennels et exécutoires, soit par des dispositions arrêtées de longue date et de profiter des enseignements de l'expérience pour obvier aux inconvénients qui n'ont cessé d'exister.

Les hégumènes Grecs s'enrichissant au détriment de leurs commettants et des intérêts locaux ont toujours mis tous leurs efforts pour empêcher une régularisation définitive. Expulsés en 1821 pour leur conduite séditieuse ils sont rentrés en 1828 en possession des biens-fonds conventuelles et continuant les mêmes abus, ils firent en 1853 un usage tout aussi coupable de leurs richesses en contribuant à alimenter les mouvements séditieux et à organiser des corps Francs hostiles à la Puissance Suzeraine. Il est donc essentiel de leur enlever les moyens de dilapidations et d'abus dont ils disposent en les astreignant à la mission de surveillants retribués, appelés à défendre les intérêts qui leur sont confiés.

Le principe d'une subvention régulière à fournir par les monastères est incontestable; sa connexion avec les enchères publiques et les garanties offertes par le gouvernement local, implique nécessairement la fixation d'une part proportionnelle à l'accroissement du revenu, telle qu'elle a été admise par le réglement et par les actes ultérieures et telles que les hospodars ont constamment insisté à la faire appliquer. Il a été déjà dit que le chiffre de 450,000 piastres fixé par le réglement representait bien plus que le quart du revenu de l'époque. La même proportion a été établie en principe dans tous les actes ultérieurs.

En 1851 les enchères faites sous la surveillance du gouvernement local ont doublé le revenu conventuel et bien qu'elles aient été combinées avec la part proportionnelle à affecter aux établissements publics du pays, cette part resta dans l'oubli. Il en résulta que la combinaison originelle devint un non sens puisque la condition des enchères et la participation du Gouvernement n'aboutirent plus

qu'à augmenter considérablement la part du revenu dévolu aux saints lieux et à enlever ce surcroit au pays où il serait resté en tout cas.

Les instances infructueuses qui depuis une longue série d'années ont eu pour but la restauration des édifices religieux et la célébration du service divin conformément à la dignité du culte, prouvent suffisamment combien il est inutile d'attendre les résultats au bon vouloir des patriarches et des communautés. C'est là d'ailleurs un point qui est essentiellement dans les attributions du département du culte, comme se rattachant de droit à l'administration intérieure du pays. Quant au moyen d'y parvenir on peut se référer à la teneur même du mémorandum de Buyukdéré qui y consacrait un quart du revenu ecclésiastique.

Ces principes posés les conséquences en résultent d'elles-mêmes.

Les hégumènes devront être choisis d'un commun accord par le délégué respectif des saints lieux, le métropolitain du pays, et le chef du département du culte.

Les propriétés conventuelles seront affermées aux enchères publiques par le gouvernement en présence et par la participation du délégué respectif des saints lieux.

Un quart du revenu conventuel sera prélevé par le fisc local pour être affecté à des objets d'utilité publique.

Un second quart sera versé dans la caisse du Département du Culte qui payera les honoraires des préposés et des desservants et procédera à la réparation ou la reconstruction successive des édifices sacrés, et aura le soin de leur entretien ainsi que de l'exercice régulier et convenable du culte.

Les deux quarts restants ou la moitié du revenu total sera mis à la disposition des communautés respectives.

Ces conditions paraissent être aussi justes que modérées et de nature à trancher toutes les difficultés pour l'avenir.

Inclosure 2 in No. 128.

Consul Gardner to Viscount Palmerston.

My Lord, *Jassy, September* 22, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Lordship, a correct statement of the revenues of the Greek Patriarchates and Monasteries in Moldavia, amounting approximately to 200,000 ducats per annum. To the amount of revenue applied to the above purposes, may be added a sum of at least equal magnitude from Wallachia, and a further sum of 100,000 ducats perhaps from the Greek Church in Bessarabia and in Transylvania. These revenues are placed in a high degree, I believe, under the control or direction of the Russian Government, which was permitted by the Treaty of Kiuzuk Kainardji in 1774, to take the whole of the Greek Church in the Turkish dominions under its protection. The influence which it exercises beyond the frontiers must be therefore commensurate with the means placed at its disposal, and the rich endowments of the Moldavian Church are distributed with an equal attention to the same local influence.

One of the chief monasteries in Moldavia, of the congregation of Mount Athos, has, since my residence here, been placed under the charge of an Ionian Archimandrite, or Abbot. It is the Monastery of the Three Saints, or Hierarchs. During three successive changes, the nationality of the incumbent has been the same. The present abbot is the Archimandrite Nilos, of Cephalonia. Nothing can impugn the respectability of these nominations, which have proceeded from the congregation of Mount Athos; but they have undoubtedly been submitted to approval here.

I have, &c.

(Signed) SAML. GARDNER.

Observations on the foregoing.

The Treaty of Koutchouk-Kainardji corresponds in date almost with the first dismemberment of Poland in 1772. The cession of the Bukovine was of two years preceding it, 1770.

The Monastery of Three Saints is the celebrated gem of Byzantine architecture, which contains the relics of the Patroness of Moldavia, Saint Paraskewa. When I arrived at Jassy, the Archimandrite Nicodeme Assani was abbot, born in Cephalonia, succeeded by the Archimandrite Sophronio Mukri, also of Cephalonia, on whose appointment to the Monastery of Teodereni, the Archimandrite Nilos was sent to replace him. He claimed British protection as an Ionian, but I find that he is born in Gallipoli in the Dardanelles, and may be what he says, of Ionian origin. He has been removed to another monastery, and the Archimandrite Macuarius, an Ionian from Salonica, intitled "calogero," or monk, on Mr. Blount's passport, has lately arrived, and has been installed as successor. It is quite a speculation, the incumbent making his terms or bargain with the congregation of Mount Athos, and farming the domains to others, generally at a great profit, but at some personal hazard and risk. Thus, when the Russians entered the Principality, or had a *Te Deum* chaunted for the Emperor Nicholas, or his armies, the monasteries always furnished the choirs, to protect their revenues.

The present Metropolitan Primate of Moldavia, with his clergy, chaunted the *Te Deum* for the victory of the Russians at Sinope, and the whole of the Council of State and functionaries assisted, with the Moldavian troops, and the salute was fired by the Sultan's own Artillery, previously offered and accepted, as a testimony to their loyalty. The Russians had military possession of the country.

Jassy, August 6, 1855.

(Signed) SAML. GARDNER.

Inclosure 3 in No. 128.

Extract from the "Gazeta de Moldavia" of August 6, 1856.

NOUVELLES DE L'INTERIEUR.

A LA demande du Commandement Général des troupes Impériales et Royales d'occupation dans les Principautés le Département de l'Intérieur fait insérer la publication suivante:

Dans le but d'assurer l'approvisionnement des troupes Impériales et Royales d'occupation dans les deux Principautés en denrées alimentaires et fourrages à partir du 1er Octobre, 1855, jusqu'à fin d'Avril, 1856, N. S. par voie de soumission, des enchères publiques sont ouvertes dans les administrations des magasins militaires savoir:

A Jassi le $\frac{5}{17}$ Août, 1855.
— Fokchani le $\frac{11}{23}$ Août, ——
— Galatz le $\frac{13}{25}$ Août, ——
— Craïova le $\frac{15}{27}$ Août, ——
— Bucarest le $\frac{17}{29}$ Août, ——

Toutes les offres par écrit qui devront être accompagnées d'un certificat attestant le dépôt de caution fait dans une des administrations de magasins militaires des approvisionnements dans la proportion de 10 pour cent ne pourront être envoyées au Commandement du corps d'armée de Servie de Banat à Bucarest que jusqu'au $\frac{19}{31}$ Août, 1855; passé ce terme elles ne seront plus prises en considération. Pour pouvoir prendre part à la licitation, les concurrents devront déposer une caution préliminaire de 5 pour cent, laquelle sera compûtée par les adjudicataires jusqu'à concurrence de 10 pour cent. Les quantités à livrer aux diverses destinations et les conditions des soumissions seront mises à la connaissance des concurrents, par les administrations des magasins militaires ci-dessus mentionnées, ainsi que par la direction des approvisionnements.

No. 129.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received August* 20.)

(No. 577.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 4, 1855.

THE time is more than come when, with all the deference due to Her Majesty's Government, I must claim relief from the very inconvenient and compromising position in which I have been long placed with reference to such parts of my duty as bring me into contact with matters of a military bearing. Your Lordship is aware, that in the exercise of my public functions under the present unusual circumstances, I have relations to maintain with several branches of service established, for the time, in this neighbourhood, and also a correspondence to carry on with some of them. I am the channel of communication between the Turkish Government and the Commanders-in-chief of Her Majesty's Naval and Military Forces in the Black Sea; and I look to both the latter for early information of such occurrences in the prosecution of war as the public interests committed to my charge require. Subordinate departments, —the military depôt for instance, and the naval station here, the Commissariat, the Land Transport Service, the superintendence of Russian prisoners,—come also into frequent contact with Her Majesty's Embassy, and claim occasionally no small share of my attention. With the Turco-British Contingent and Beatson's Irregular Cavalry my intercourse is more direct, and my interposition necessarily more frequent. A certain degree of undefined responsibility attaches, moreover, to my action over these corps, the individuals of which, being for the most part Turks, can never so merge their character of subject in that of soldier as to be wholly removed from my interference. The respective commanders of both are in the habit of referring to me on various matters of arrangement; but while I endeavour to afford them all the assistance in my power, I do not feel myself entitled to prescribe any particular course which in my judgment it would be best for them to pursue. I conceive, with respect to the Contingent, that I am at liberty to advise, suggest, and in cases of emergency to recommend, and even protest, as to matters touching its construction, general discipline, and location; but I am not aware of having any authority to insure compliance with my suggestions. The position with respect to "Beatson's Horse" is somewhat different in virtue of a power to disband his corps on certain contingencies; but the measures which are now in progress under my direction for the re-establishment and maintenance of order at the Dardanelles would never have been questioned, and in part counteracted by General Beatson, if their warrant, instead of being derived from necessity, had rested on the clear ground of an expressed authority.

The whole of this subject would have been recommended sooner to your Lordship's notice, had I not been restrained by a natural unwillingness to raise embarrassing questions at a time of much general occupation and difficulty. The inconvenience and risk of having to act with uncertain responsibility were not, however, unfelt from the beginning, and now that the evil has largely exceeded its original proportions, I offer no excuse for seeking a remedy, where alone it is to be found in any effectual shape. Without prejudice to the public service, as well as injustice to myself, I can no longer sustain the twofold responsibility of either allowing a mistaken course to be followed out in spite of its pernicious consequences, or arresting it in its progress by the exercise of a questionable and sometimes insulted authority.

If due provision had been made for the circumstances in which I am placed, it is not too much to say that I never could have been exposed to the official disparagement with which a recent decision of the War Office, accepted by your Lordship, has to all appearance, visited this Embassy.

I have no wish to depreciate the merits of General Vivian, or to question his professional claims on Lord Panmure's attention; but Her Majesty's Representative is also entitled to some consideration, especially under circumstances involving an imperative obligation on the Porte to act, a necessary appeal on her part to our sympathies, and an alternative between most perplexing difficulties. All my reports on the subject bear witness to the conditional terms on which I entertained and considered the Porte's expedients with the advantage of General

Mansfield's advice. According to the answers addressed or transmitted by your Lordship to me, it might be supposed that General Vivian alone had foreseen the objections, and indicated the wants of an expeditionary force, whereas the Porte's suggestions were made by me, not, indeed, with general discouragement, which at such a moment would have been no less cruel than unwise, but with every precautionary guard against the dangers of an ill-prepared attempt, and every exertion to bring the original plan into a practicable shape, dependent for its execution on an ample supply of means, on the consent of the allied authorities in the Crimea, and, above all, on the approval of Her Majesty's Government.

With respect to my correspondence with Major-General Beatson, and the proceedings which I have authorised at the Dardanelles, I am content to await redress at the hands of my immediate superior, and to trust for my justification to the circumstances, as they are established not only by my statements, but also by the various accompanying documents and opinions derived from other sources. I look to your Lordship for vindication from unprovoked aspersions, and to Her Majesty's Government for support in the exercise of an indispensable interference.

Looking to the whole question of my exceptional position, as now brought under notice, I wish to be understood as seeking no increase of power, no extension of sphere, but simply a clearer view of what is expected from me in the several relations, to which I have already alluded, and a better defined circumscription of my duties and powers in those respects, more limited or more ample as the interests of Her Majesty's service and their effectual promotion may be found, on experience and further examination, to require.

At no antecedent period has there been so much need as now of having at Constantinople a centre of weight and authority capable of controlling the many divergent tendencies brought incidentally into play, of meeting the demands, and of carrying out the views of Her Majesty's Government. The task is by no means an easy one.

Throughout this extensive empire, disjointed and often discordant elements obstruct, by their actual want of arrangement and connection, the currents of public business, though in reality, by their fitness for better combinations, they contain the seed, if not the immediate promise, of those administrative and social improvements without which the efforts and sacrifices of the war will be made to little purpose.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 130.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 20.)

(No. 578.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 7, 1855.*

I CANNOT better convey to your Lordship a full and accurate knowledge of my later proceedings with respect to Beatson's Horse, and the grounds of their justification, than by transmitting the correspondence which has taken place respecting them, since the date of my last report to your Lordship on that subject.

I have found it necessary, in the exercise of a questionable authority, to act in some respects less simply and directly than I could have wished to do. My course has been limited by the necessities in which it originated, and modified as well by the imperfect nature of the means at my disposal, as by consideration for the public interests involved in the maintenance and progress of the corps. Being led by information from various sources to believe that the irregularities and criminal offences committed by the troopers were attributable, with few exceptions, rather to mismanagement than to inherent malice or rooted discontent, I have endeavoured, by means of inquiry and correction, not only to ascertain the true causes, but to arrest the progress of the existing evil. I was anxious to respect General Beatson's command, so long as he conformed

to the course of justice, and showed a readiness to act in support of the Mixed Commission.

The language in which he has thought proper to indulge on more than one occasion, will naturally attract your Lordship's attention, and I am entitled to expect that such notice will be taken of it by superior authority as may secure me from a repetition of insulting or disrespectful insinuations on his part. He cannot be ignorant that he enjoyed the full benefit of my support and concurrence, until I had reason to apprehend that the disorders subsequent to the first desertions from his corps were in part to be ascribed to causes for which he was responsible himself. How far his conduct may find a sufficient excuse in the weakness of his staff, and the difficulty of his position, I have no means of deciding to my complete satisfaction without a report from the Court of Inquiry. It is not, however, to be forgotten, that the Major-General neglected to embrace the opportunity offered deliberately for conferring with the Seraskier and myself.

I am assured by Mr. Skene that the labours of the Court are drawing towards a conclusion, and I have directed its final report to be communicated to me without delay. Meanwhile there is ample evidence of a continued, though partial, state of disorder among the troops, controlled to a certain degree by the reinforcements which have been sent, at my request, from here, in aid of the regulars who garrison the castles of the Dardanelles. The complaints, apparently well-founded, of the French, as conveyed to me, partly by their Ambassador and partly by General Simpson, contribute not a little to the awkwardness and gravity of so anomalous a situation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 130.

Major-General Beatson to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Dardanelles, July 30, 1855.*

I MAKE no further comments on the measure which your Excellency has thought proper to adopt in regard to myself, than by acquainting you that I this morning carried out the punishment awarded by the court-martial, of whose proceedings an extract is herewith sent, without the aid of a single Nizam soldier, and without disarming the Albanians, who with the rest of the troops formed three sides of a square in which the punishment was inflicted to the full extent, two medical men standing by.

Having brought to your Excellency's notice in a former letter the conduct of the civil Pasha, in delaying to give me notice of the robbery of the cavasses, I have now a graver accusation to make against him, that of an impertinent attempt to obstruct the course of justice, by refusing to give me up the prisoners this morning for punishment till I had sent several officers to demand them. And one of his officers, the Colonel commanding the troops, himself a member of the Court, had the insolence to say that the reason of the Pasha not giving up the prisoners, was that the proceedings were not quite finished.

Such a remark was an insult to General Neill the President and me, which I hope your Excellency will notice, by demanding the dismissal of both the Pasha and Colonel.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. F. BEATSON.

Inclosure 2 in No. 130.

Proceedings of a Court Martial, assembled at the Dardanelles by order of Major-General Beatson, for the Trial of such Prisoners as may be brought before it.

MAHMOOD, trooper of the 1st Regiment of Beatson's Horse, appears a prisoner before the Court, charged with having drawn his pistol against a French soldier.

The Court, having taken into consideration the evidence for the prosecution, as also the prisoner's plea of not guilty, and what he has urged in his defence, the fact of his having already eight days' confinement, his forbearance in not firing his pistol when provoked, as also his youth, do acquit him of the charge, and order him to be released.

(Signed) J. G. NEILL,
Brigadier-General.

Approved.
(Signed) W. F. BEATSON, *Major-General.*

Proceedings continued.

Twenty-three deserters from the 4th Regiment of Beatson's Horse, taken by the Turkish authorities, were accused of attacking four cavasses, who were carrying treasure and papers belonging to the British Government, and robbing them of the same.

Only two of these men were identified by the cavasses, Coslan, and Hassan Gharfi, on the first of whom the papers were found after his capture. Hassan Gharfi returned to camp, and was arrested upon the evidence of his comrades.

The Court, having heard the evidence, find the prisoners guilty, and sentence them to receive 500 lashes each, and to be exiled, this being the punishment awarded by Turkish law for highway robbery, and recommend Major-General Beatson to have the sentence carried into execution with as little delay as possible, and before the whole force, as a wholesome lesson to the rest.

(Signed) T. G. NEILL,
Brigadier-General.

Approved and confirmed.

The sentence to be carried into effect to-morrow morning at 6 o'clock in presence of the whole of the troops, drawn up in contiguous close columns, under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Morgan, 1st Regiment, on the low ground in front of the 2nd Regiment's camp.

A medical officer will attend, who will stop the punishment when considering it would endanger the prisoner's life, as I will not allow humanity to be outraged in any force under my command by allowing a prisoner to be flogged to death.

After the punishment the prisoners will be made over to the civil authorities, to be sent into exile, according to the sentence.

(Signed) W. F. BEATSON,
Major-General.

July 29, 1855.

Inclosure 3 in No. 130.

Mr. Skene to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Private)

My Lord, *Dardanelles, July* 30, 1855.

ON seeing your Excellency's letter to Mr. Calvert on the subject of the landing of any more of the Irregular Cavaly that might remain here, I took upon myself the responsibility of the immediate disembarkation of a ship-load of Arabs. They had been four-and-twenty hours in the harbour, and were jumping overboard. Three of them had already swam on shore. I feared that the order not to land them might produce some serious consequences; and I, therefore, decided the question at once—acting at least for the best. Mr. Calvert, to whom your Lordship's letter was addressed, was not in the way; but I was convinced that the spirit of the instructions was met by my doing so. He afterwards thanked me for it, and General Neill fully concurred in what I had done. I trust your Excellency will will give me your approval.

I need not relate the circumstances of the punishment which took place this morning, and at which I was present, as General Neill's letter of to-day expresses all I would state on the subject. He and I are quite of the same

mind in everything that concerns the Irregular Cavalry; and he shows me all his letters. If he were in command of it, your Lordship would have much reason to be satisfied. Indeed, I begin to think that the best thing that can be done would be to attach it to the Contingent.

I beg to be instructed whether the report of the Court of Inquiry should remark on the measures (and no measures) taken by General Beatson, or merely be confined to a narration of facts proved by evidence.

I remain, &c.
(Signed) J. H. SKENE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 130.

Consul Calvert to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Dardanelles, July* 31, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch of the 28th instant, delivered to me by Captain Bourke.

The Pasha, Mr. Skene, and myself, being all agreed with General Beatson that no harm could result, either to the peace of the town or to their own discipline, from the landing of the Irregular Cavalry brought here from Alexandretta by the transport "Thames," (previously reported by error as the "Medway"), I have sanctioned the disembarkation of this portion of the force, which was effected at once.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. F. CALVERT.

Inclosure 5 in No. 130.

Major-General Beatson to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Dardanelles, July* 31, 1855.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of the 29th instant from Captain the Honourable J. Bourke, in which you are pleased to remark that it will be for Her Majesty's Government to appreciate the circumstances under which I have announced my intention to resign my command.

These circumstances are: The withdrawal of that support which I freely confess I have had up to the period of the desertion of a few of my men, but which failed me at the first difficulty, and at the time when it was most necessary to my success that it should be given to me earnestly and unreservedly:

And the want of courtesy shown to me as a general officer, whose reputation is based on the services he has performed in all situations, in a period of thirty-four and a-half years, by your Excellency communicating with an officer junior to me, on matters relating to the force under my command, otherwise than through me. Nay, to make the slight even more marked, I find that copies of your despatches to me are sent to this officer, but no communication is made to me of your instructions to him.

Brigadier-General Neill appears to be an officer of discretion, and of him I have not the slightest reason to complain; but to your Excellency's way of acting in this matter, I feel confident that every military man whose opinion is worth having, will agree with me in thinking I have great reason to object.

Further, instructions are sent to naval officers and Consuls regarding the detaining my troops on board ship, and then for the disembarkation of these troops, and the first intimation I receive of these measures is from the naval officer or the Consul.

Your Excellency, knowing the opinions I have expressed as to the value of the corps I have been employed in organizing, and my confident belief, after due experience, that the task, with your support, was practicable—and knowing also the success which I assert has hitherto attended my exertions—can judge how painful it is to me to place my resignation in the hands of Her Majesty's Government, but I feel it due to my position as a general officer, and the character I have acquired in my long service to withdraw from a task in which, with your aid and encouragement, I might have hoped to have been of great

service in this war, but in which—with lukewarm support at best, and sometimes with not doubtful opposition—I know it will be impossible to succeed, and I appeal to Her Majesty's Government to judge if I have been fairly treated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. F. BEATSON.

Inclosure 6 in No. 130.

Major-General Beatson to Brigadier-General Neill.

Sir, *Head-Quarters, Dardanelles, August* 1, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this day's date, making suggestions to me as to the discipline of the force under my command. You state that no respectable woman can leave her house, and that the soldiers are in the habit of fixing the prices of the goods they wish to purchase in the bazaars. I have to request you to state any instance in which a respectable woman has been insulted in the town, or any instance lately in which goods have been sold from fear of danger from the arms carried by my men. Before I can believe such a statement, it must be shown to me that arms have been used for this purpose: for the slightest knowledge of the customs of the country will show that high words constantly occur between vendor and purchaser, without any probability of violence being used; and mere unsupported statements do not warrant you in making such charges against the force under my command.

I beg to remind you that your statements, that it is unmilitary for troops to carry their arms, is incorrect, as it is customary in all Continental armies, and in the native Irregular Cavalry in India; and I must also remind you that the inhabitants of this country are generally in the habit of carrying arms, and I decline to expose my men unarmed to insult and murder.

In conclusion, I must request you to recollect that you were sent here to assist me as my junior officer; and it was only a suggestion of Lord Stratford's that you should be employed as President of a Court of Inquiry; and I have to request that you attend solely to the duty upon which I have employed you; and if you think any communication with me requisite, that you will personally attend to make it, and receive my orders on the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. F. BEATSON.

Inclosure 7 in No. 130.

Major-General Beatson to Brigadier-General Neill.

Sir, *Head-Quarters, Dardanelles, August* 2, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of a letter from you in answer to one I addressed to you yesterday.

You did not use the courtesy due to me as your superior officer by neglecting to call and personally offer me the advice you are bound by your instructions to offer me, and the reasons you may have for giving that advice.

Nothing has transpired to my knowledge to warrant me in taking the measures you propose, and I will not, from mere unfounded rumours, take a step fraught with the utmost danger, and likely even, if successful, to alienate the affections of my troops from me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. F. BEATSON.

Inclosure 8 in No. 130.

Major-General Beatson to Lieutenant-General Neill.

Sir, *Head-Quarters, Dardanelles, August* 2, 1855.

IN reply to your letter No. 2 of this day, I have to request you to accompany any such charges as those made in your letter, by a minute of the evidence on which you ground such vague and, as far as I know, unfounded assertions, regarding the troops under my command.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. F. BEATSON.

Inclosure 9 in No. 130.

Mr. Skene to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Dardanelles, April* 3, 1855.

I DEEM it unnecessary to trouble your Excellency with a recapitulation of all the incidents occurring here, which I see fully reported by Brigadier-General Neill. I shall, therefore, confine myself to a mere general statement: 1st, that the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry are fast drawing to a close, and comprise a mass of evidence of a grave nature; 2ndly, that the Mixed Commission progresses also in the dispensation of justice, but, I must regret to say, not without considerable difficulties, and occasional failure in meeting its ends, arising from obstacles appropriately commented on in General Neill's despatches to your Excellency; and 3rdly, that the disorderly state of the Irregular Cavalry has certainly been in some degree improved in the town, where the troopers are overawed by the presence of a Regular force; but that depredations in the country have, if anything, rather increased, probably on account of the produce being now more generally ripe.

I am not aware of any steps being taken to repress these disorders. I do not cease to offer General Beatson every information I may possess, with the view of assisting him, according to your Lordship's instructions, and of inducing him to adopt measures of obvious expediency. With what success these endeavours may meet, remains to be seen; hitherto I cannot boast of their having produced any results.

I can now state, as a fact of which I feel certain, what I expressed previously as a matter of opinion, that no insurmountable impediment exists to the perfect organisation of this force as an efficient Light Cavalry.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. SKENE.

Inclosure 10 in No. 130.

Brigadier-General Neill to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Dardanelles, August* 3, 1855.

IN forwarding for your Excellency's information the following correspondence connected with the Mixed Commission, of which I am President, on the trial of trooper Ahmed Hassan, I have the honour to state that before the assembling of the Court I have asked General Beatson to detail more experienced British officers of higher rank as members, and afford me the assistance usual on these occasions, a staff officer to attend the Court, and stationery to enable it to make out its proceedings. General Beatson having notwithstanding on this trial given me two very inexperienced officers, Captains Platt and Mathews, who have just landed from England, no staff officer, and no writing materials, I had some difficulty in getting the proceedings written: Captain Mathews although most willing, and did his best, was incompetent for this duty. I had many errrors to correct, and in forwarding them to General

Beatson I again urged him to grant me the detail I had applied for, to be present at the Court which I had directed to reassemble on the following day the 1st instant at 2 P.M. The following forenoon I received a letter from General Beatson stating that his Adjutant-General would receive immediate directions to hear the prisoners' evidences, &c., present at the hour requested, that he had already issued such orders as will enable me to recover any outlay I might be put to in providing stationery, which he was informed could be procured at this place; but the steps thereto he must leave to me. General Beatson also reminded me that I was responsible for the writing and the proceedings. That he could not attach a staff officer for that purpose, and that it was not usual or necessary for such to attend the Court. He stated he had placed as members the two officers of his force next in seniority to those in command of regiments, with whose presence it would be hurtful to discipline to dispense. In a postcript to his letter (which I do not forward as I have unfortunately written on in the rough draft of my reply), General Beatson concludeded by stating that if I considered it absolutely necessary for my assistance to have attached to the Court an officer to act as "Judge Advocate," and make official application for such, he would appoint one, and forward my letter as a voucher for the expense incurred. With this letter was inclosed, for my information, to be returned, the proceedings of the trial of Ahmed Hassan, with the Major-General's remarks.

I received the above after I had been one hour at the place of assembly of the Mixed Commission, and after I had sent Captain Mathews, the only officer present, with a message to General Beatson, informing him that the officers he had promised were not present; but receiving no satisfactory reply, and one hour and a-half having elapsed, I adjourned until 2 P.M. the next day. I addressed General Simpson, vide copy to my letter dated the 1st instant, annexed, and the following morning returned the proceedings of the trial of Ahmed Hassan (having taken a copy of it, which I enclose), with a letter from me dated the 2nd instant, copy of which is annexed; this produced General Beatson's reply through his acting Deputy Adjutant-General, which was satisfactory (it also accompanies this correspondence); and on the Commission meeting at 2 P.M., although two junior officers, and one of them Captain Platt, were furnished as members; the Staff-officer, with his writing material, was present, and this Court has been the first which has been properly conducted, and the proceedings regular

I have now troubled your Excellency with a long correspondence, caused by what appeared to me a disinclination on General Beatson's part to assist in bringing these prisoners to trial. I beg to direct attention to his remarks on the trial of the two men sentenced on the first day the Commission assembled to 500 lashes each. I am informed your Lordship has been furnished by the Major-General with a copy of these remarks. I conceive they were perfectly uncalled for, and could only tend to produce an injurious effect on the minds of the troops, and bring the Commission into discredit with them; the punishment was by no means severe, and was not so severely inflicted as it ought. With regard to his disproval of, and remarks on the sentence of 200 lashes to the Arab trooper Ahmed Hassan, again the Court is severely reflected upon, and an offender deserving punishment escapes. It gives to these troops the appearance of a desire to screen their crime, and save them from punishment.

That the effect being produced on the minds of the men, is tending to evil, I have to report as follows:

Yesterday it was the intention of a body of these Irregulars to ride into the town for the purpose of stating to General Beatson their preference for his administration of justice to that of the Mixed Court. Information of their intention was conveyed to General Beatson by Mr. Skene, and they did not come into town, as by Mr. Skene's advice he was induced to go out to camp to speak to them; this I understood he did. I am not in possession of further facts or particulars; but this, in connection with the Major-General's not affording the Court proper assistance and support, and the remarks I have requested your Excellency's attention to, speak for themselves.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. G. NEILL.

Inclosure 11 in No. 130.

Brigadier-General Neill to Major-General Beatson.

Dardanelles, August 1, 1855.

Sir,

I REGRET much to report to you, that in consequence of the non-attendance to-day of all the members of the Mixed Court, of which I am President, I was obliged, at half-past 3 P.M., to adjourn it. The prisoner, and all the witnesses against him, with Colonel Sankie, were present, also Captain Mathews, but neither staff officer, the other member, nor writing material, as I requested.

Your letter of this day's date, objecting to comply with my request of yesterday reached me about 3 P.M., and before I received your reply to my message conveyed by Captain Mathews, that the Court was waiting for the other members.

I again beg to repeat my application for senior and more experienced officers than Captains Mathews and Platt, who have just, as they inform me, arrived; the first is very willing, the other absented himself to-day; neither are, I conceive qualified for this important duty, if others of greater experience are to be had.

As regards the stationery, it is usual to furnish it at each garrison or camp where a trial takes place; I am much engaged here, and it is impossible I can provide writing materials for the trial of the soldiers under your command, surely it can be supplied by some staff officer or department of your force. If you cannot provide me, I must apply to the Turkish Government for the assistance I cannot obtain from you, this I trust I may not be compelled to do.

A staff officer to attend a Court as Prosecutor is required at all courts-martial inferior to general. At a general court-martial a Judge Advocate-General performs the duty of Prosecutor, &c.; at all Courts the Prosecutor writes the proceedings. The President is responsible that the Court is properly conducted, and for the correctness of the writing. At the majority of the trials I have presided at here, the proceedings have been irregularly and badly written, in consequence of my not having had the proper person present to perform that duty furnished to me; badly supplied as I have been with writing materials, and with inexperienced, although neglected to be so recorded.

I strongly object to putting the State to the expense of a Judge Advocate, who is not required, but I again urge upon you the necessity of having the British officers, with the writing material I have requested, ready to-morrow, at 2 P.M., at the place of assembly, in order that there may be no further delay in bringing to a close the trials of the prisoners now in confinement.

I have, &c.

(Signed) T. C. NEILL.

Inclosure 12 in No. 130.

Brigadier-General Neill to Major-General Beatson.

Dardanelles, August 2, 1855.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to return the proceedings on the trial of Ahmed Hassan, of the 2nd Arab Regiment, and in reference to your disapproval and remarks, beg to observe as follows:

The offence with which the prisoner was charged was a breach of good order and military discipline, and wherever committed was of a purely military nature; in this case it was committed in a garrison town, close to where your troops were encamped.

The first witness Beken Mulazim, ought not to have been sworn as you remark, he, however, had been duly and properly affirmed according to the Turkish law, and that a record of the same was not entered on the proceedings, was in consequence of the inexperience and inability of the officer who wrote the proceedings. As you will observe on the proceedings, I had to correct them in many places, but overlooked this omission; badly written as they are, I had

some difficulty in getting them completed in any way; the officer was most willing and did his best. Had you returned the proceedings and inquired why the witness had not been affirmed, the mistake would have been rectified.

As regards your remark, and I presume excuse for the prisoner, that the pistols were loaded with powder only, there was no proof how they were loaded.

I regret exceedingly that by the escape of this culprit, the ends of justice should have been so defeated, and the example of a punishment so well-deserved lost. To guard against all possibility of the recurrence of what is so detrimental to discipline, the escape by any slight flaw or mistake, of a culprit so deserving of punishment, I have most urgently to beg of you to afford me your utmost support and assistance, in enabling me sufficiently to prosecute the trials of these prisoners. I have been sent down for the performance of this and other most important duties, by order of his Excellency Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and look to you for every assistance in placing efficient means at my disposal for carrying out his Lordship's orders. If the duties of your commandants of corps are so important at this time, that they cannot be spared for employment on the trial of your men, may I beg that the services of some of the officers sent down here by General Lord William Paulet, with a view to their services being made use of, may be granted for this most important duty?

In conclusion, I beg to remind you that much valuable time has already been lost in consequence of the late or non-attendance of parties under your command composing the Mixed Court; on Monday and Tuesday little was done; yesterday nothing.

The effect, this mode of proceeding cannot fail to produce on the minds of the Turkish officers of rank acting with me, must be most prejudicial, and I can answer for the painful impression on myself, as displaying a want of respect to Her Majesty's Ambassador.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. G. NEILL.

Inclosure 13 in No. 130.

Report of the Trial of Ahmed Hassan.

THE Mixed Commission, of which Brigadier-General Neill is President, assembled at the Dardanelles, on the 31st July, 1855.

Members:

Captain T. J. Mathews.
Captain F. W. Platt.
Brigadier-General Suleyman Pasha.
Colonel Muhiedin Bey.
Major Mehmet Aga.

Commissioners:

Mr. Skene.
Djemel Pasha.

Sworn Interpreter, Isaac Russo.

The President, Members, Commissioners, and Interpreters being all present, Trooper Ahmed Hassan, of the 4th Arab Regiment, is brought before the Court, and the following charge is made against him by the head of the police of the place:

Yesterday, at 4 o'clock P.M., the prisoner knocked at a door in the town; it was opened by an Armenian woman. He asked her for water to drink. She was frightened, and ran into the house; he fired his pistol after her. A sentry of the Turkish Regulars hearing the shot, came up and made him a prisoner.

The prisoner pleads Not guilty.

The Court proceeds to hear evidence in support of the charge against him.

Bekir Mulazim, of the Turkish Regulars, stated* that he was on guard yesterday, that he heard a shot, and on looking round he saw the prisoner with a pistol in his hand, and the smoke still near him. He asked him who fired the shot. The prisoner said he fired it, because the woman would not give him water to drink.

Armik, an Armenian woman, stated, after being duly sworn, that she heard a shot, and saw a pistol in the hand of the prisoner, and then she shut her door. Being asked if the shot was fired at her, she says she does not know, and that there was no other woman near.

The prisoner's two pistols are produced in Court, one loaded with powder alone, and the other discharged.

There being no more witnesses to produce before the Court, the evidence for the prosecution is closed, and the prisoner is called upon to state his defence.

Defence.

The prisoner states that he had bought the pistols yesterday, and loaded them with powder, then fired one of them to see if it would fire.

The Court having considered the evidence adduced in support of the prosecution, as well as what the prisoner has stated in his defence, is of opinion that the prisoner is guilty of having fired his pistol; but that it is not proved that he fired it against the woman or any one else.

The Court, therefore, sentence the prisoner to receive 200 lashes, according to the custom of the Turkish army, to be inflicted at such time and place as the officer confirming these proceedings shall be pleased to direct.

The Court is adjourned until 2 P.M. to-morrow.

(Signed) J. G. NEILL, *President,*
Brigadier-General, Turkish Contingent.

Dardanelles, July 31, 1855.

Disapproved.

The whole proceedings are irregular. The offence having occurred in the town was clearly of a civil nature; therefore, the President should have been a Turkish officer.

Bekir Mulazim, the witness, was not sworn, so his evidence goes to the ground.

From these irregularities, added to the fact of the pistols having been loaded only with powder, I directed the release of the prisoner, who is to be admonished that he is not to amuse himself by firing even blank-cartridge in a town.

August 1, 1855.

(Signed) W. F. BEATSON,
Major-General, Commanding at the Dardanelles.

The proceedings to be returned.

(Signed) W. F. BEATSON.

Inclosure 14 in No. 130.

Mr. Skene to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Dardanelles, August 3, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's dispatch of the 31st ultimo, respecting the landing of the detachment of Irregular Cavalry which had arrived from Alexandretta.

Judging that no evil consequences would in all probability arise from their disembarkation, whilst any further delay appeared to be attended with a certain degree of risk, the immediate landing of the troops was recommended by me to Major-General Beatson, and I have the satisfaction of being able to report that

* Being duly affirmed according to the Turkish form.

their conduct during the three days that they have been on shore has not been in any way reprehensible.

Major Brett has arrived this morning from Alexandretta, with 350 more of the same body of recruits, on board the steam transport "Medway," and they will be disembarked to-day.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. H. SKENE.

Inclosure 15 in No. 130.

Major-General Beatson to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Dardanelles, August* 4, 1855.

I KNOW not what secret instructions Brigadier-General Neill alludes to in the letter No. 2 of the 2nd of August, copy of which is herewith sent, and I have a right to doubt that an English nobleman would send any officer into my camp with secret instructions differing from those openly sent to me.

My instructions are plain enough, that your Excellency was of opinion it would be an advantage to the public service if I would communicate fully with General Michel. I was quite ready to do so, or with Brigadier-General Neill when he replaced General Michel; but from the letter now sent, your Excellency will perceive how the latter gentleman received my offer to communicate freely with him in person.

He received my offer by making vague charges against my men, and when I asked for the evidence on which he grounded these charges, he did not even answer my letter, falling back on his secret instructions, the existence of which I have already told your Excellency I doubt.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. F. BEATSON.

Inclosure 16 in No. 130.

Brigadier-General Mansfield to Major-General Beatson.

Sir, *Embassy, Therapia, August* 5, 1855.

I HAVE the honour, by command of Her Majesty's Ambassador, to acknowledge your despatch of the 31st ultimo received yesterday.

His Excellency further desires me to inform you, that in consequence of your having announced, in your previous despatch of the 28th ultimo, an intention to resign, and transfer your command to any officer who might be sent down to receive it, he has been under the impression that it was your intention to cease immediately from the performance of military duty, while at the same time, as stated in that despatch, you remained at the Dardanelles to use your influence with the troops for the preservation of order.

Although, therefore, a copy of the despatch of his Excellency to you, in answer to that communication, was transmitted to Brigadier-General Neill for his guidance, it had become, in the belief of his Excellency, unnecessary to trouble you with further communications.

Despatches have been received from Brigadier-General Neill, reporting progress to the 2nd instant, since his arrival at the Dardanelles. It appears in the two latest, that the reports which have reached his Excellency from various and influential quarters are fully confirmed by the Brigadier-General, after the Courts over which he presides had been sitting for some days.

The Brigadier-General is able to state, from personal observation, as well as from what has transpired in the course of his judicial inquiry, that although the demeanour of the troops under your command is good on parade, and that the appearances of discipline have been maintained in the public punishment of offenders, the town and country in the neighbourhood of your camp are not only in a state of alarm, but absolutely in danger, in consequence of the lawless conduct of the Irregular Cavalry, and the absence of measures to apply a proper degree of restraint.

His Excellency has been favoured by the Brigadier-General with copies of the letters addressed by the latter to you on this subject, and of your replies, and he is compelled to give his testimony in favour of the soundness of the recommendations, which, in the exercise of your discretion, you have been pleased to reject.

Ungracious as the task may be, his Excellency cannot shrink from the duty imposed on him. He cannot, in consequence of your despatches, refuse attention to the reports on the state of your troops, with reference more particularly to the population amid which they are stationed, now that they have been guaranteed by the deliberate report of the General Officer, who has acted with so much discretion and calmness in the performance of the difficult duty with which he has been charged by his Excellency.

I am to request, therefore, on the part of the Ambassador, as speaking in the name of Her Majesty's Government, that you will either proceed without delay to act, as regards the means of quelling disorder on the suggestions of Brigadier-General Neill, or that you will adhere to the determination already announced in your despatch of the 28th ultimo, and transfer the command of the troops at the Dardanelles to that officer till the pleasure of Her Majesty's Government shall be known. The words used by you in that despatch are as follows:—

"I cannot, in justice to myself, do otherwise than place my resignation in the hands of Her Majesty's Government, and make over the command to any officer whom your Excellency may send to take it over, though I shall at the same time remain at the Dardanelles throughout the difficulties which will be caused or increased by the unnecessary and injudicious measures now in progress with regard to military arrangements."

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD.

P.S. A copy of this despatch has been sent to Brigadier-General Neill.

Inclosure 17 in No. 130.

Brigadier-General Mansfield to Brigadier-General Neill.

Sir, *Embassy, Therapia, August* 5, 1855.

I HAVE the honour on behalf of the Ambassador to acknowledge the receipt of your several despatches, bearing date respectively July 30, 31, August 1 and 2, which came to hand yesterday.

After an attentive consideration of their contents, his Excellency hastens to testify his satisfaction with the course you have pursued, and his approval of the counsel offered by you to Major-General Beatson, according to your instructions.

I beg further to inclose for your information copy of a despatch addressed this day to Major-General Beatson.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD.

Inclosure 18 in No. 130.

Brigadier-General Mansfield to Major-General Beatson.

Sir, *Embassy, Therapia, August* 6, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to inform you by desire of the Ambassador, that the proceedings of the Mixed Commission of which Brigadier-General Neill is President, in the trial of trooper Ahmed Hassan of the 4th Arab Regiment under your command, have been under the consideration of his Excellency, together with your disapproval and remarks.

His Excellency regrets that he is unable to coincide in your views, expressed in the latter.

I have it in command to refer you to his Excellency's despatch of the

24th ultimo, in which it is laid down that the Mixed Commission is to be a final tribunal for the trial of all offences, cases of murder, and other crimes requiring capital punishment, being alone referred to the civil courts.

It appears from your remarks and orders of release for the prisoners, that you have somewhat misconceived the object and power of the Mixed Commission.

It is an extraordinary tribunal formed under the concurrent authority of Her Majesty's Ambassador and of the Porte, to meet a very extraordinary combination of circumstances, into the detail of which it is not necessary for me to enter. Its power transcends, if I may be allowed the expression, that of an ordinary court-martial. The Mixed Commission does not, in the opinion of his Excellency, require your approval, although to ensure appearances of unanimity, such approval may be desirable. But the disapproval you have been pleased to record, and the order for release of the prisoners condemned by the Commission, are, in the opinion of his Excellency, in the highest degree calculated to destroy the effect of a measure, which has been devised to restore the authority of justice in your neighbourhood, and to introduce a salutary dread of the consequence of lawless excesses among your troops. His Excellency requests, therefore, that you will be pleased to consider the Mixed Commission as characterized in this despatch, and if you have cause for disapproval of its proceedings, that you will confine its manifestation to a recorded protest, for immediate communication to the Commission and to his Excellency, which is not to be made known to the prisoners or to the troops.

Brigadier-General Neill has received instructions to transmit all proceedings against which you may direct such a protest, for the consideration of his Excellency before execution of sentence.

I am further to inform you that several despatches have been received from various authorities at the Dardanelles, bearing date to the 3rd August, in which it is stated, that although some improvement is apparent in the behaviour of the Irregular Cavalry in that town, owing to the presence of the regular troops, the conduct of the former, if there be a difference, has been more outrageous and dangerous in the neighbouring country than it was before.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD.

P.S.—Copy of this despatch has been communicated to Brigadier-General Neill.

Inclosure 19 in No. 130.

Brigadier-General Mansfield to Brigadier-General Neill.

Sir, *Embassy, Therapia, August 6*, 1855.

I HAVE the honour, on behalf of the Ambassador, to acknowledge your despatch to his Excellency of the 3rd instant.

Inclosed is a despatch to Major-General Beatson, treating of the wishes of his Excellency regarding the proceedings of the Mixed Commission of which you are President. You are requested to comply with that portion of the instructions which has relation to your own duty, viz., the suspension of any sentence against which Major-General Beatson may be pleased to record his protest, till the pleasure of his Excellency shall be known.

With regard to your query as to whether the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry shall be sent direct to his Excellency, or through Major-General Beatson, I am directed to observe that it is advisable to adhere to the regular course, and send them by the channel of the officer in command, who gave the immediate order for the Court to assemble.

If in the interval the Major-General shall have resigned his command, you, as senior officer succeeding him, will, in the natural course, address them direct to his Excellency.

In any case, you will be pleased to retain a copy of the proceedings, the authenticity of which should be vouched as having been compared in Court with the original minutes.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD.

Inclosure 20 in No. 130.

Brigadier-General Mansfield to Major-General Beatson.

Sir, *Embassy, Therapia, August 7*, 1855.

IN answer to your letter of the 4th instant, in which the Ambassador is requested to apply to the Commander of the Forces that two of the officers sent at the instance of his Excellency to your assistance by Lord William Paulett, may be allowed to remain with you, I have the honour to inform you that a communication was addressed to the Commander of the Forces by his Excellency, with a request to afford you the aid of some experienced officers on the 25th of July.

The Commander of the Forces was pleased to reply that, owing to the exigencies of the service, it was out of his power to do so.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD.

Inclosure 21 in No. 130.

Brigadier-General Mansfield to Major-General Beatson.

Sir, *Embassy, Therapia, August 7*, 1855.

I HAVE the honour, on the part of the Ambassador, to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th instant, regarding the instructions of General Neill.

In consequence of the expressions in which that communication is couched, his Excellency declines to reply to it.

It will be submitted for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

With regard to the last paragraph of your letter I would however observe, that Brigadier-General Neill has grounded his remonstrances with regard to the danger of the country from your troops on personal observation and matters which had transpired at the Court of Inquiry of which he is President.

In his despatch to his Excellency respecting the circumstance, his communications to you have been included.

His Excellency cannot consider the charges to be vague against the troops generally, although Brigadier-General Neill has abstained hitherto from bringing forward individual cases.

The evidence against your troops rests on the authoritative reports of functionaries of every nation, whether British, French, or Turkish.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD.

Inclosure 22 in No. 130.

Brigadier-General Mansfield to Major-General Beatson.

Sir, *Embassy, Therapia, August 7*, 1855.

WITH reference to my previous letters, and more particularly to those of the 5th August and this date, I have the honour, by desire of the Ambassador, to transmit to you copy of a communication received from the French Ambassador by his Excellency, and again to call your attention to the absolute and imperative necessity of arresting disorder among your troops.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD.

Inclosure 23 in No. 130.

Brigadier-General Mansfield to Brigadier-General Neill.

Embassy, Therapia, August 7, 1855.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that other and more urgent demands have been made on Major-General Beatson to arrest the disorder of his corps.

His Excellency is confident, that as long as the command is vested as it now is, you will maintain harmony as far as it is possible.

I shall be obliged to you to send me a copy of the proceedings of the Commission on the man who was acquitted for firing at the French soldier at Nagara, about which a serious complaint has been lodged by the French authorities.

His Excellency having intimated his intention of addressing Mr. Skene, you will obtain access to further correspondence which may be useful for your guidance from that gentleman.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD.

Inclosure 24 in No. 130.

Major-General Beatson to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

The Dardanelles, August 3, 1855.

My Lord,

IN forwarding the accompanying copy of a letter from Major Hackett, whom I had yesterday officially appointed to act as Judge Advocate to the Court on which Brigadier-General Neill presides, and in the feelings expressed in which I entirely concur, I have to state that I have at once relieved Major Hackett from the duty in question, and that I have only refrained from noticing Brigadier-General Neill's conduct, in not giving effect to my orders, by placing him under arrest, from a desire not to impede the progress of the important inquiry upon which he is engaged. I leave it to my superiors to take such notice as they think fit of the conduct of the Brigadier sent down on this special service, and merely state what I have done to exonerate myself for not taking a step which could not but be painful to my feelings, but which military discipline would naturally have dictated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. F. BEATSON.

Inclosure 25 in No. 130.

Brigadier-General Mansfield to Major-General Beatson.

Embassy, Therapia, August 8, 1855.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour, on the part of the Ambassador, to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of August 3, received August 6, relating to the office of Judge Advocate-General at the Mixed Commission, of which Brigadier-General Neill is President.

You will have observed from the tenor of my letter No. 65, in what, according to the opinion of his Excellency, the power and functions of the Mixed Commission consist.

On consideration, therefore, you will perceive that the presence of a Judge Advocate-General, whose duty it is to conduct the proceedings of, and to advise, a court-martial under the authority of the President of such Court, as well as to prosecute, is inadmissible in the extraordinary Court constituted under the concurrent authority of Her Majesty's Ambassador and the Porte, which has been denominated a Mixed Commission.

His Excellency cannot but believe that you are under some misapprehension with relation to any intentional disobedience of orders on the part of Brigadier-

General Neill, who, as President of the Mixed Commission, is probably of the same opinion as his Excellency, that he was not empowered to admit any authoritative functionary besides the officers civil and military already convened as above stated.

A report has not been as yet received from Brigadier-General Neill on this subject, but his Excellency is aware that he had requested the attendance of a staff officer to write the minutes and conduct the prosecution.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD.

Inclosure 26 in No. 130.

Brigadier-General Neill to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Dardanelles, July 30, 1855.

My Lord.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Brigadier-General Mansfield's letter of the 29th instant, with copy of your Lordship's of the same date to Major-General Beatson.

The Court of Inquiry, of which I am President, commenced its proceedings early this morning; it adjourned at noon, until to-morrow at 6 A.M.

The Court-martial will reassemble to-day at 2 P.M., and as much as possible will be gone into of the two cases disposed of on the afternoon of the 28th: the first, a Bashi, concerned in the affray in which a French soldier was wounded by another Arab, was fully acquitted. The second case, of four other men, also Arabs, charged with plundering a treasure escort, two men acquitted, and two found guilty, and sentenced, according to the Turkish code, to 500 lashes each, and afterwards to be exiled. All this punishment was inflicted this morning before all the Irregular Cavalry, paraded for the purpose. Had it been a punishment parade before the best-disciplined corps in Her Majesty's or any other service, the demeanour of the men could not have been better. There was no talking nor excitement of any kind; the men sat steadily on their horses, observing closely what took place, but grave, silent, and respectful in their bearing. None of the regular troops were present, Major-General Beatson assuring me of his perfect confidence in his men.

The punishment, had it been properly inflicted, is said to be a very severe one. The man is laid down on his face, and flogged with a rod on his posteriors. The chaoushes, however, did not at first strike as strongly as they ought, until pressed to do their duty. British medical officers were in attendance, watching the punishment, as is the order in our service; and this, I believe, was the only deviation from the Turkish practice. After the punishment was fully inflicted on both prisoners, they were handed over to the civil powers to be exiled.

I shall proceed with the Court of Inquiry, and the trial of the prisoners, with all despatch, and shall to-morrow, if there is an opportunity, do myself the honour of making a further report to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. G. NEILL.

Inclosure 27 in No. 130.

Brigadier-General Neill to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Dardanelles, July 31, 1855.

My Lord,

I YESTERDAY did myself the honour of reporting progress up to noon. In the afternoon the Mixed Court assembled at a later hour than I intended, in consequence of some mistake; but we disposed of one case, that of a Kiatib, for violent conduct and language to the Commissariat Officer, of which he was found guilty. In consideration, however, of the prisoner's good character, that he had been carried away by over zeal, and that he had been in close confinement for some days, the Court awarded him only ten days further imprisonment. There were other circumstances connected with this man, which although not brought before it, weighed with the Court. He is the person whose wife was violated by Adam Kolussi, Hussein Mulazim, and others.

This morning the Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings, and went into as much as it could.

From what has already come to light in the inquiry, there can be no doubt but that the mistaken and ill-judged confidence placed in Adam Kolassi, has caused much of the excess and disorders which have occurred; also that he had headed the party which released Hussein Mulazim, took him to General Beatson's house and obtained his arms; and that the Kolassi and Mulazim both violated the writer's wife. Considering, therefore, that it is of the utmost importance that these two men should be secured, brought to justice, and if found guilty, made an immediate example of before the troops here, I beg to suggest to your Lordship that a reward of 40*l.* should be offered for the apprehension and delivery here of Adam, and 20*l.* for Hussein Mulazim. I would at once myself have advanced these sums, so confident do I feel that by such means only would the culprits be soon secured; but not seeing my way clearly as to who would eventually repay me, may I beg your Lordship's advice and instruction.

I may also state, that from what has fallen under my own observation, I am of opinion that the interior economy and discipline of the Irregular Cavalry here would be better promoted and its organization ensured, had General Beatson an efficient staff, such as Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General attached to him. These should be intelligent, experienced, and steady staff officers, acquainted with the duties of their respective departments, through whom all the details would be conducted, and orders conveyed to Commandants of corps.

It is particularly requisite that in this force, the regular chain of responsibility should be strictly observed, and the authority of Commandants upheld. On no occasion, even on the slightest or most trivial point, should the senior be passed over. All communications from the General commanding should proceed through his staff to the head of the regiment, and from him through the regular order and gradation of officers to the party to whom the instructions refer; on no occasion should this system be deviated from.

The services of Majors Lowrie and Hackett might, I conceive, have been made available for these duties as a temporary measure. Both appear to me to be qualified, and would certainly bring their respective departments into working order. But Her Majesty's regulations must be observed in this corps where they are quite as necessary, if not more so, as in one of our own regiments. The defects which I have observed, and the irregularities which have taken place may in a great degree be attributed to the want of this staff, and had I been empowered I would have lost no time in taking advantage of the services of Majors Lowrie and Hackett as Adjutant and Quartermaster-Generals.

From what I have now seen of this force I consider the material good, and can see no difficulty in its organization, if a regular and proper system of discipline, such as I have described, is observed. Temper, firmness, and energy, with zeal for the service, on the part of all the officers are essentially necessary. Immediate steps should be taken to rid the service of such as are deficient in these soldierlike qualifications. Under such command and discipline the organization of this force would be complete and successful. Under any other it will be a failure.

Now that more officers have joined General Beatson's force, all the rations and forage should be issued by the Commissariat in presence of a British officer detached for that purpose from each regiment, such officer to see that the rations and forage are good and of the proper quantity. This is a most important duty. Neither rations nor pay should ever be given to the soldiers, except in presence of a British officer.

In my opinion also all officers should live in camp with their men. I do not think in this service in particular British officers or non commissioned officers should have their families with them.

In conclusion I beg to be informed whether the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, when closed, should be forwarded through Major-General Beatson or direct to your Lordship. I would suggest that they should be sent direct.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. G. NEILL.

Inclosure 28 in No. 130.

Brigadier-General Neill to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Dardanelles, August 1, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour, in continuation of my report to your Excellency of yesterday's date, to state that the Mixed Commission, of which I am President, assembled yesterday afternoon; but, in consequence of the witnesses against the prisoners not having been in attendance; no Staff officer nor materials for recording the proceedings having been provided; and the two British officers, Captains Mathews and Platt (two young men who arrived from England on the previous day), not being, in my opinion, of sufficient rank and experience for such an important duty, I could only get through one trial, preferring to get on with that rather than incur further delay, as I felt assured that my reference to General Beatson to remedy the defect could not have been immediately attended to.

The Court disposed of the case of an Arab trooper, charged with having fired his pistol at a respectable woman of this town, at whose door he had knocked and asked for water, which was refused to him. The man could only be convicted of having fired his pistol, but against whom could not be decided. He was sentenced to 200 lashes. I have not heard whether the sentence has been approved of by General Beatson, and if so, when and where it is to be carried out.

This morning, at 6 A.M., the Court of Inquiry, of which I am President, assembled, and we made fair progress in our investigation. We have just adjourned until the same hour to-morrow.

From what transpired at the Court of Inquiry this morning, and at the trial yesterday, also from the number of armed troopers I see riding into the town, and lounging about, I addressed General Beatson as follows:

"From what has been stated in evidence before the Court of Inquiry, of which I am President, it would appear that, up to this time, the troopers of the force under your command are allowed to ride into this town, and in the neighbourhood of your camps, with their arms, their pistols being loaded.

"In such a state of alarm are the inhabitants, that no respectable woman, it is said, leaves her house; and there are frequent disputes at the shops in the bazaar in consequence of your troopers insisting upon fixing their own prices for articles they wish to purchase; and, as has been too frequently the case, the temptation to use those arms may be indulged in. Under all these circumstances, and considering that confidence will not be restored, nor order re-established, until your men are forced to conduct themselves in a more peaceable manner; and it being against every military rule that troops, except before an enemy, should be permitted to go about, when not on regular duty, armed, I have earnestly to press on your consideration the propriety of immediately issuing such orders as will in future prevent your men leaving camp with their arms."

I trust that General Beatson will see the necessity of losing no time in complying with my request; should he not do so, and disorders in consequence of these armed men going about continue, I shall consult with Mr. Skene and Mr. Calvert, as the instructions of the 26th ultimo direct, and request your Excellency's representative Mr. Skene to put me in a position, empowering me to carry out these orders and putting a decided stop to the irregularities which still exist.

I again report to your Lordship my decided opinion that there are no difficulties whatever in organizing these men, and I feel confident that under proper discipline, they will become most efficient light cavalry.

Since the above was written I have received Major-General Beatson's reply of this date, which I beg to inclose. I have informed the Major-General that by your Excellency's instructions of the 26th ultimo, I have addressed him and have quoted for his guidance the particular paragraph. I have also informed him that I derived my information from the Court of Inquiry, and from the trial of the Arab troopers yesterday. My counsel having been rejected, should it be necessary I shall not hesitate to obey your Lordship's orders.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. G. NEILL.

Inclosure 29 in No. 130.

Brigadier-General Neill to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Dardanelles, August 2, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour, in continuation of my report of yesterday, to state that the Mixed Commission, of which I am President, assembled at 2 P.M. yesterday, agreeably to adjournment, but in consequence of the non-attendance of the officers whom I requested Major-General Beatson to have present, I was obliged to adjourn the Court until the same hour to-day, after waiting until half-past 3 P.M.

The correspondence on this subject will be hereafter submitted to your Excellency, but from a letter just received from the Major-General, I am inclined to hope that I shall now have every facility afforded for carrying out the business.

As yesterday stated, I acknowledged the receipt of Major-General Beatson's letter, quoting my instructions from your Lordship, and stating that I had derived the information which enabled me to obey your Excellency's orders in offering him counsel, from what had appeared before the Court of Inquiry and at the trial of Ahmed Hassan, a trooper of Cavalry, also from my own observation. I inclose General Beatson's reply to this communication.

This morning the Court of Inquiry assembled early, and went into considerable matter. From what transpired at it I deemed it advisable to write as follows to General Beatson:

"From what has transpired at the Court of Inquiry, of which I am President, I am apprehensive that excesses and disorders continue to be committed by parties of troops under your command, in the vineyards, gardens, and fields in this neighbourhood, I have therefore the honour, in obedience to my instructions from Her Majesty's Ambassador to suggest that you will, as early as convenient, take such steps as you may deem best, at once to put a stop to such irregularities. The destruction of property by your men in the cultivated country, away from under the protection of the regular Turkish troops, is represented to be to such an extent that the country people are abandoning their property.

"I distinctly disclaim all want of courtesy in not waiting on you to make the suggestions I am instructed to offer. I consider I am best following the orders I have received by placing them on record."

So much had been written when I returned from the place of assembly of the Mixed Commission. As I hoped, Major-General Beatson had all I required ready at the appointed time, and we proceeded to the trial of a Mulazim of Arabs, charged with having instigated men to desert, and taking money from them with which to purchase arms and ammunition. The trial lasted some time, and was well conducted. The prisoner was found guilty, and sentenced to dismissal from the service and exile for six months; I considered the punishment too lenient, but the Turkish officers were of a different opinion. The Court adjourned until the 4th instant, at 2 P.M.

In conclusion I beg to impress upon your Excellency the necessity of forcing General Beatson to adopt the measures I have suggested. His assertion that they will be fraught with danger is absurd. These men can easily be brought to a good state of efficiency by firmness and a regular system of discipline. Let them know that justice will be done them, and their comforts attended to, but crime and excess put down at once, whenever it appears and punished. Courting popularity by permitting or countenancing irregularities, or what is worse, screening crime with a view of keeping these men in good humour, is a grievous error; such a false system induces crime, and gives these men an idea that their officers fear them. They must be ruled firmly and justly, or the organization will not succeed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. G. NEILL.

P.S.—General Beatson's reply to my letter has just been received, and I inclose it.

Inclosure 30 in No. 130.

Brigadier-General Neill to Major-General Beatson.

Dardanelles, August 2, 1855.

Sir,

FROM what has transpired at the Court of Inquiry of which I am President, I am apprehensive that excesses and disorders continue to be committed by parties of troops under your command, in the vineyards, gardens and fields in this neighbourhood. I have therefore the honour in obedience to my instructions from Her Majesty's Ambassador, to suggest that you will as early as convenient take such steps as you may deem best, at once to put a stop to such irregularities. The destruction of property by your men in the cultivated country in the neighbourhood, away from under the protection of the regular Turkish troops, is represented to be to such an extent that the country people are abandoning their property.

I distinctly disclaim all want of courtesy in not waiting upon you to make the suggestions I am instructed to offer. I consider I am best following the orders I have received by placing them on record.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. G. NEILL.

Inclosure 31 in No. 130.

Major-General Beatson to Brigadier-General Neill.

Dardanelles, August 2, 1855.

Sir,

IN reply to your letter No. 2, I have to request you to accompany any such charges as those made in your letter by a minute of the evidence on which you ground such vague, and as far as I know, unfounded assertions regarding the troops under my command.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. F. BEATSON

No. 131.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received August* 20.)

(No. 582.)

My Lord,

Therapia, August 8, 1855.

OUR latest advices from Kars, received to-day, are of the 21st ultimo. As Brigadier-General Williams addresses your Lordship, I need not repeat the substance of his despatch to me. I observe, on the one side, with satisfaction, that the garrison had in store nearly three months' provisions, and that nothing had yet occurred to impair its means of resistance. It appears, on the other, that General Mouravieff, operating by means of his Cavalry, had blocked up the Olta road to Erzeroum, and also that which passes through Ardahan. The defences of the town are described as having been strengthened at the point most likely to be attacked, while notice is given that reinforcements, unaccompanied by convoys of provisions, would be of no avail. It would seem that the communications by messenger, though probably circuitous, were still open, and I should hope that the alarming rumours of the arrival of Russian troops at Tiflis from the evacuated forts in Circassia were, at least, premature.

It results, on the whole, from these circumstances, that the arrival of timely relief on the Asiatic frontier is still by no means an impossibility. The natural difficulties, however, are greatly increased by differences of opinion and numerous conflicting demands on the scanty and scattered resources of the Porte. Whatever is to be done must be undertaken within certain limits, and in such manner as neither to trench on the means employed against Sebastopol

nor to expose the Contingent to any trial of strength for which it is not fully prepared. Such is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, which leans, moreover, with all its weight on Trebizond, as the only true channel of relief. The commander of the French forces would see with regret the departure of Omer Pasha from before Sebastopol, especially if his Highness were attended by any portion of his troops now stationed there. The Pasha himself is ready to take the command of an expeditionary force directed on Kutais from Redout-Kalé, and he reckons for that purpose on 10,000 men from Batoom and the Circassian coast, on 17,000 from Balaklava, on 3,000 from Kertch, and on 5,000 from Bulgaria, with the necessary addition of Artillery and a small force of Cavalry. He would like to replace the 20,000 men thus proposed to be withdrawn from the Crimea by the Contingent, completed to its full amount by a draft of 10,000 men from Bulgaria. He gives as the reasons of his preference for the troops at Balaklava, that he knows them better than the battalions at Eupatoria, and that they are habituated to his command. He complains, as to Kertch, that the numbers of French and Turkish troops left in station there, were by agreement, to have been equal, and he seems to be resolved on vindicating his right by reducing his own detachment from 8,000 to 5,000 men, the deficit occasioned by its reduction having to be supplied by a proportionate increase of the French.

It is not unworthy of remark, that Omer Pasha, on whom would devolve all the risk, fatigue, and responsibility of the expedition, reckons with cheerfulness on the means of carrying it into effect, and even anticipates with confidence a successful result. According to his convictions the army, and the two fortresses, which protect the Asiatic frontier of Turkey, are in imminent danger, and their fall would expose the empire on that side to the most perilous disasters, including a heavy loss of supplies to the allied armies in the Crimea. He does not conceal his opinion that an attempt to send forward reinforcements by Trebizond would infallibly prove abortive; and that the only fair prospect of frustrating the Russian attack, would be a diversion from Redout-Kalé. He asserts, that no serious obstruction is to be apprehended to the west of the defiles beyond Kutais, where the arrival of the expeditionary force would at once compel the Russians to retire from Kars, in order to cover their vast unprotected magazines at Teflis.

It can hardly be denied that the scheme is plausible. The military authorities here, in so far as I have access to them, are decidedly favourable to it; and the French Ambassador, in bringing to my knowledge the adverse opinions of his Government and of the Commander-in-chief in the Crimea, made but a faint attempt to disguise his personal leaning towards the Turkish enterprise.

The course which I have pursued amidst so many motives to a vigorous support of the only practicable scheme of relief, and so many perplexing considerations fatal alike to every hope of realizing it in time, partakes naturally of the difficulties which I have had to encounter. I made no reserve in communicating the adverse opinions of Her Majesty's Government to the Porte; I have continued to urge the necessity of respecting the paramount interests engaged in the Crimea, and to abstain from experiments unprovided with ample means of execution. I have at the same time lent an attentive ear to all the suggestions of the Porte, and I have not repressed those hopes which sometimes ripen into views of just conception and successful issue.

An expedition composed of European forces would not only give better promise of success, but also a security against the political results of Turkish conquest. But I have yet to learn that there is any prospect of succour in that form, or any chance of relief, but what is derivable from the Sultan's troops.

It only remains for me to inform your Lordship, that several days ago I received from Fuad Pasha an official note, which, as it related in part to the Contingent, was addressed to me alone, but communicated, in copy to the French Ambassador.

I have since replied to it, though in some respects I should have preferred taking the same line as my French colleague, by waiting for your Lordship's instructions; but my position was different from that of M. Thouvenel, who had received only a copy of the note, while I, to whom the note was addressed, could not, without danger of misconstruction, leave unnoticed some passages of so important a document.

Copies of both the notes are forwarded to your Lordship herewith; and it

will be found, I imagine, on a perusal of mine, that in seeking to correct whatever was overdrawn or mistated in the Turkish note, I have studied to attain my object less by any controversial process than by offering a statement of my own, more strictly in keeping with fact and real intent.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 131.

Fuad Pasha to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Le 31 Juillet, 1855.

J'AI l'honneur de transmettre ci-joint à votre Excellence copie d'une dépêche arrivée hier de l'Armée Impériale de Kars.

Cette dépêche porte en substance que les troupes Russes qui ont marché sur Kars, ont poussé une reconnaissance jusqu'aux fortifications; qu'elles se sont retirées après quelques affaires de peu de conséquence et qu'on croit que si une affaire sérieuse n'a pas eu lieu c'est parcequ'elles attendent des renforts du côté de Revan après l'arrivée desquels leur intention est de serrer de près la place de Kars. Par cette même dépêche on prie très instamment qu'on envoye sans aucun délai les secours qui ont été demandés jusqu'à présent et qu'on demande encore.

La position de Kars est, pour ainsi dire, la clef des frontières de l'Asie; or, si cette place venait (à Dieu ne plaise!) à tomber au pouvoir des Russes, d'abord Erzeroum serait en danger, et puis toute l'Anatolie serait menacée: cela est indubitable.

Si L'Anatolie devient le théâtre de la guerre, et si l'ennemi faisait de progrès de ce côté-là, il en résulterait de très grands maux, non seulement pour la Sublime Porte, mais pour toute l'alliance. Plus encore les succès des Russes à Kars seront une défaite, qui fera dans le monde entier une mauvaise impression à l'égard de l'alliance, ce qui est évident.

D'après ces considérations la Sublime Porte a fait voir la nécessité de prendre de promptes mesures pour prévenir le danger qui est à craindre.

Si l'on envoyait directement à Kars des renforts peu considérables ces renforts ne sécuriaient dans l'état actuel des choses là bas, ne se joindre aux forces qui se trouvent dans la ville pour repousser l'attaque de l'ennemi ni agir hors de la place pour le chasser de ces environs-là; et il est clair aussi qu'ils ne pourront pas resister à l'ennemi qui voudra détruire les forces qui se trouvent à Kars, prendre cette place, et venir en avant.

Une opération énergique et sur une grande échelle a paru être l'unique moyen d'empêcher les Russes d'investir Kars, et de faire des progrès dans l'Anatolie, et de la forcer à se retirer.

L'une des deux grandes forces de la Porte se trouve en Crimée, et l'autre sur le littoral du Danube. La Porte ne juge en aucune manière à propos, attendu que la question de la Crimée est pour l'alliance une question vitale, que les forces destinées à assurer la victoire à laquelle on s'attend soient affaiblies. L'armée du Danube n'est pas en état de prendre l'attitude d'une armée envahissante, mais il faut au moins qu'elle soit là en guise de réserve, et par conséquent il n'est pas à propos d'affaiblir cette armée non plus.

Toutes ces considérations, auxquelles on a mûrement réfléchi, nous ont fait songer à un plan prompt et énergique, et propre à forcer les Russes à la retraite. Il s'agit qu'une armée de 40,000 hommes prenent pour point de départ Rédoute Kalé, se porte droit à Tiflis par la voie de Kutais. Comme moyen de mettre ce plan à exécution de manière à ne pas déranger le plan d'opérations générales, nous avons représenté qu'il était important de réunir un corps d'armée composé de 20,000 hommes de troupes Turques, qui doivent après le Traité être fournies pour servir dans l'armée Anglaise, les forces qui se trouvent à Batoum, et 5,000 hommes à prendre de l'armée de Roumélie.

Votre Excellence a admis l'importance de la mesure, et approuvé le plan en question, et elle a demandé l'ordre de son Gouvernement à cet égard.

D'après la réponse qui est venue, le fond de la question a été approuvée; seulement elle était accompagnée de l'observation suivante, savoir, que les

troupes du Contingent n'étaient pas encore dans l'état qu'il fallait, il ne convenait pas de les destiner à cette expédition: voilà ce qui a été porté à la connaissance de la Porte.

En conséquence et afin de se conformer à l'opinion de l'illustre Gouvernement de la Grande Bretagne, comme aussi pour réaliser le plan en question qui est de la plus haute importance, nous avons proposé d'envoyer en Crimée le Contingent Turc; de retirer 20,000 hommes de l'armée qui est en Crimée, pour les expédier à Rédoute-Kalé; ou bien de différer de fournir les 10,000 hommes qui, ainsi qu'il est convenu, doivent être fournis pour compléter le Contingent. Et d'envoyer en Crimée les 10,000 hommes de l'armée Impériale Turque qui est en Crimée, pour faire partie de l'expédition projetée.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse a commencé à s'occuper des mesures que cette expédition rend nécessaires; mais elle n'a pas encore reçu à cet égard la réponse officielle et catégorique qui est attendu, et c'est pour cela qu'elle n'a pas encore mis ces mesures à exécution; même les commencements des mesures qui se rattachent à cette question importante a été suspendu.

L'importance de ce qui concerne l'Asie a été longement expliquée à votre Excellence, et les avantages des opérations ayant pour point de départ Rédoute-Kalé ont été amplement développés; et cela étant, il est inutile que j'entre sur ces deux points dans des détails ultérieurs. Votre illustre Gouvernement n'est pas d'avis que le Contingent soit employé à un objet spécial; la présence de ces troupes en Crimée dans des opérations générales ne pourra que rendre plus sûr les services qu'on attend d'elles.

La Sublime Porte ne pourra trouver quant à l'Asie rien de plus efficace que le plan dont il s'agit, rien de plus capable de la rassurer, de la reparer complétement. Elle ne voit pas la nécessité de donner directement plus de force à Kars, pas même de tranquilliser les troupes qu'il y a là en envoyant des renforts. Ainsi ces délais la jettent naturellement dans une très grande inquiétude et dans un très grand embarras. La dernière dépêche arrivée de Kars fait un tableau fidèle de l'importance de la question. Nous avons fait connaître cette importance à votre Excellence, qui a communiqué à la Porte la dépêche qu'elle avait reçu de sa Cour en réponse aux communications que la Porte avait faites au sujet de cette expédition.

La substance de ces dépêches est la suivante. Le Gouvernement Anglais aussi est convaincu de la nécessité et de l'importance d'envoyer des secours à l'armée de Kars, seulement il faut que les secours soient envoyés d'Erzeroom par voie de Trébizond. Les troupes qui seront envoyés, obligés de s'arrêter un peu de tems entre Rédoute-Kalé et Kutais, se trouveront dans un endroit insalubre; au lieu d'attaquer les Russes par leurs derrières il vaut mieux fortifier les derrières de l'armée de Kars.

Il serait superflu de faire connaître comment la Sublime Porte se voit dans la nécessité de sauver Kars, et en sauvant Kars délivrer l'Anatolie. Or le seul moyen d'y parvenir c'est d'exécuter le mouvement projeté du côté de Rédoute-Kalé. En effet pour sauver Kars il faut au moins une force égale à l'armée assiégeante. Or, s'il fallait envoyer une force pareille du côté de Trébizond, attendu que les routes sont extrêmement mauvaises, à peine cette force serait arrivée au complet, avec artillerie et munitions, à Erzeroom dans trois ou quatre mois, et dans cette intervalle les Russes auraient fait tout ce qu'ils auraient à faire. Ainsi ce parti ne peut rien produire de bon.

Si l'on expédiait une petite force, elle ne saurait ni secourir Kars ni défendre Erzeroom. Il est donc certain qu'il n'est pas possible de secourir Kars par la voie de Trébizond.

La route qui conduit droit de Rédoute-Kalé à Kutais, est tout-à-fait unie et aisée; le transport de l'artillerie et des munitions est favorisé par une bonne route, et l'expédition d'une armée considérable par cette route sera prompte et exempte de difficultés. Indépendamment de cela, comme cette armée sera sur les derrières de l'armée Russe, et marchera droit sur Tiflis, qui est l'âme des Russes dans le pays du Caucase, dès qu'elle aura été un peu en avant, les Russes se trouveront évidemment contraints à abandonner Kars pour voler à la défense de Tiflis et Suram, et de se retirer de Kars.

Son Altesse le Serdar Ekrem, et tous les officiers de la Porte, sont unanimes dans leur ferme opinion qu'il n'y a pas d'autre moyen pour sauver l'Asie que celui-là. Et il est certain que les officiers des armées des Hautes Puissances Alliées seront à cet égard du même avis.

Venons à l'insalubrité des pays voisins de Rédoute-Kalé. Cette place ne sera la résidence permanente de l'armée. Considérant l'empressement qu'on mettra à faire marcher les troupes, elles feront dans ces environs-là une très courte résidence. Et puis une armée qui est animée du désir de sauver sa patrie se montrera décidée à vaincre tous les obstacles, et à braver tous les dangers. Ainsi l'observation sur l'insalubrité ne saurait mettre obstacle à l'exécution du plan.

La reconnaissance qui a été faite des côtes, par rapport de points d'opérations, donne à tous égards un résultat favorable au plan en question, c'est-à-dire, on a reconnu que, à quelques heures loins des côtes, il y a des emplacements très convenables sur le rapport de l'air pour y asseoir un camp.

En conclusion, le danger que court l'Asie est très grand aux yeux de la Sublime Porte, qui pense que le seul et unique moyen, le moyen le plus efficace pour conjurer l'orage, c'est d'exécuter le plan arrêté comme ci-dessus. Elle a conséquemment pris la résolution de prier très instamment les alliés de lui donner l'assistance et les facilités qu'elle désire avoir, sans préjudice aux opérations en Crimée, pour l'exécution de ce plan; et pour cela il faut qu'on adopte une de ces deux choses—envoyer en Crimée le Contingent, et retirer de là 20,000 hommes, pour les employer à cette expédition; ou bien différer de fournir les 10,000 hommes qu'il faut pour compléter le Contingent, et faire ce qui a été dit plus haut.

Pleine de confiance dans cette sagacité et dans le parfait jugement qui caractérisent si éminemment votre Excellence, la Sublime Porte a jugé qu'en lui représentant par écrit aussi l'importance de la question dont il s'agit, c'est tout ce qu'il faut pour elle reçoive une prompte et favorable solution.

Je saisis, &c.

(Signé) MEHMED FUAD.

Inclosure 2 in No. 131.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Fuad Pasha.

Therapia, August 4, 1855.

THE official note which the Undersigned has received from his Excellency Fuad Pasha, under date of the 31st ultimo, relates, it must be allowed, to matters requiring immediate and earnest attention.

The advices which have reached the Undersigned from Kars, agreeing in substance with those received by the Porte, leave no doubt as to the hazardous position in which the Sultan's army there has been placed by the advance of the Russian forces from Gumri. Whatever may be the sentiments with which he looks back upon the treatment experienced by that army, notwithstanding his frequent remonstrances and urgent recommendations, he is now only anxious that while there is yet time, efficient measures may be adopted, if possible, for its relief. The discussions and explanations, in which he has been for some time engaged, may be confidently appealed to in proof of his sincerity. When latterly called upon to declare the opinions of his Government, he performed that duty with a painful sense of the embarrassments which surrounded the Porte and its Ministers. The interest with which he had received their communications, and entertained the consideration of their plans, sufficiently evinced his sympathy, which, however, if taken in the most favourable light, could possess no value beyond that of a comparative and conditional assent, under circumstances warranting a more than ordinary degree of haste and risk.

The friendly counsel of an ally so cordial and disinterested as Great Britain, could have but one purpose in view, namely, that of inducing the Porte, instead of heaping one error upon another, to adopt and carry into effect such measures, as appeared at a distance most calculated to effect the desired result.

It was to be hoped that so essential an object might be obtained without prejudice to operations of equal or greater importance elsewhere: without diminishing the allied forces united in the Crimea, or compromising by premature experiments, the organization and efficiency of the Turco-British Contingent. There might not be the same object to withdrawing troops from Bulgaria. The Contingent completed by a draft from that quarter, might, perhaps, take its station in the Crimea, and occupy without imprudence a position vacated by a

part of the Turkish army now there. Though Her Majesty's Government have declared their decided preference for a more direct operation by Trebizond and Erzeroum, their objections to diversion on the side of Circassia would, in all likelihood be modified, if the force employed were of a compact and reliable character, and the dangers arising from local unhealthiness, avoided by an immediate advance into the interior, supposing at the same time that a competent knowledge of the localities and adequate arrangements for transport and supply were to come in aid of those advantages.

While thus replying in a spirit of personal good-will, to Fuad Pasha's note, the undersigned must not be understood to answer for the final concurrence of his Government. Were the Porte to announce an intention of operating, as its only resource, from the coast of Asia for the purposes and under the limitations traced out above, the undersigned, however he might wish to obtain facilities for its success, could only engage to lose no time in referring as well to his Government as to the naval and military authorities in the Crimea. One thing is unquestionable: a danger in which the whole alliance is interested in averting, impends over the Porte, and whatever measures least open to objection may reasonably be viewed as efficient for that purpose ought, if employed at all, to be employed with vigour and despatch.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 132.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 670.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 20, 1855.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 582 of the 8th instant. My various messages by telegraph and my despatch No. 630 of the 4th instant, which you will have received since the date of your despatch, will have shown you that Her Majesty's Government, in conjunction with that of the Emperor of the French, were willing that Omer Pasha should proceed to Asia to effect a diversion for the relief of Kars, and Her Majesty's Government in that case, no longer insisted on the view which they had entertained at first, that the relief should be effected by the way of Trebizond.

Omer Pasha, as commander of the Sultan's troops, will be free to direct his movements in the manner most beneficial to the common cause; and the only limitation placed by the two Governments on his proceedings, is the condition that the movement on Asia shall not lead to the diminution of the Turkish force employed before Sebastopol and Yenikale; while the Turkish Contingent under General Vivian, may be made available for filling up the room of the Turkish troops whom Omer Pasha may take with him from Eupatoria.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 133.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 673.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 23, 1855.

HER Majesty's Government have fully considered the observations offered by your Excellency in your despatch No. 577 of the 4th of August, with the view to obtain a distinct intimation as to the position occupied by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople in regard to military matters arising out of the prosecution of the war; and I have to state to your Excellency in reply that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the line of demarkation of the Ambassador's duty in regard to the matters treated of in your despatch is not difficult to be drawn.

All the military officers employed by the British Government in the Crimea and at Constantinople, and elsewhere in the East, must of course be

deemed to be under the orders of the Home Government, and must receive instructions and decisions on doubtful questions from the Secretary of State for the War Department, or in the case of Brigadier-General Williams from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

But all communications which those officers have to make, and all applications which they have to address to the Turkish Government would best be made through the Ambassador, if of sufficient importance to require his intervention.

If the Ambassador were to give orders and directions to the military officer, there would be danger of conflict between such orders and those which might be coming out from England, and much inconvenience might thus arise. In any case of such difference of views something would be done in the Levant which the Home Government might wish to have done differently, or if the instructions from home came in time to prevent the execution of those given by the Ambassador, the position of the Ambassador would not be improved.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 134.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 594.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 13, 1855.

I HAVE just learnt the contents of your Lordship's telegraphic message dated the 9th instant, and I have not lost a moment in sending them down to M. Pisani for immediate communication to the Turkish Ministers.

Brigadier-General Mansfield has written, at my request, to Lieutenant-General Vivian, informing him that the Contingent is to go immediately to Eupatoria.

The sanction given by Her Majesty's Government to the experiment of a diversion on the side of Redoute-Kalé will, I doubt not, afford the highest satisfaction as well to the Turkish Ministry as to Omer Pasha.

The disappointment occasioned by the terms of the preceding message, which appeared to favour exclusively an advance upon Kars by Trebizond, was evident; although I have little doubt that the Porte intended to persist in the expedition against Kutais, notwithstanding the respect which is professed by its Ministers for the opinion of the allied Governments.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 135.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 598.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 13, 1855.

AT my interview yesterday with the French Ambassador and Fuad Pasha, the latter repeated the assurances already conveyed to me in such decided terms through M. Pisani, of the absence of every pretension on the part of the Turkish Government to interfere with the internal administration of Circassia or in any way to impede the full enjoyment of national independence by the tribes inhabiting that country. His Excellency observed in particular, that even if the Porte had entertained the wish of founding a claim upon any jurisdiction which had ever been exercised in her name within the precincts of Circassia, the cession which she had made of the whole territory to Russia by the Treaty of Adrianople, would preclude her from attempting to gratify it. He denied that any orders had been given to the Porte's functionaries on the coast in contradiction to those which had been issued at my request. M. de Thouvenel agreed with me in proposing that an Ottoman Agent should be joined with those of England and

France for the purpose of communicating, when necessary, with the natives, and obtaining from them such assistance as they might be disposed to lend towards carrying out the common object of the war, and the adoption of such measures as might be found indispensable for enabling them to act in concert, and maintain in time of peace the obligations of good neighbourhood. In order to act throughout in consistency with such a course of proceeding, it would be necessary, we said, to confine the Turkish authorities now in Circassia to duties of a strictly military character, and it was doubtless desirable, I added, that some kind of change should take place among those who had evidently given a wrong direction, or at least a false colouring, to the policy of their Governments, and who might be justly suspected, like Mustapha and Safer Pashas, of being actuated by personal motives and local interests.

Fuad Pasha made no objection to the political part of these suggestions, but he did not appear to enter with much conviction into my views respecting the removal from office of either of the above-mentioned Pashas, and as the French Ambassador seemed rather to lean towards his way of thinking, I did not feel myself at liberty to press the matter to a decision at that moment.

On the whole, I entertain a sanguine hope of being able to obtain the Porte's concurrence in that line of policy respecting Circassia which is most congenial with the wise and liberal views of the two Western Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 136.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 599.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 12, 1855.*

FROM the conversation which I held this morning with Omer Pasha, and also from what passed at my interview, as mentioned elsewhere, with the Ottoman Secretary of State, I conclude that the Porte is firmly resolved on attempting to relieve the army at Kars by a diversion from some point of the coast near, if not exactly at, Redoute-Kalé.

Your Lordship is already apprized of the grounds on which opinions are entertained in favour of that plan. The Ottoman Commander-in-chief is fully convinced that any attempt to operate by the way of Trebizond and Erzeroom would prove abortive. Besides the want of time and difficulties occasioned by the badness of the road, his Highness argues that on no military calculation could he reckon upon being able to meet on equal terms the Russian army now engaged in besieging Kars and advancing on Erzeroom.

The Porte is to hold a Council this afternoon, and Omer Pasha is to be present at its deliberations. The decision, whatever it may be, at its close, will be communicated to the two Embassies, and the principle of abstaining from any mode of action calculated to impede or discourage the general operations of the alliance appeared to meet with the full admission of Fuad Pasha.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 137.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August .)

(Telegraphic.) *Before Sebastopol, August 26, 1855.*

THE numerous telegraphs having caused uncertainty, I request to be informed definitively and immediately here whether Omer Pasha may take Turkish troops, in whole or in part, from Balaklava, provided they be replaced by others of the same numerical force; and whether General Vivian's Contingent is, in that case, at liberty to take possession before Sebastopol instead of going to Eupatoria. Omer Pasha is expected from day to day. He makes his

expedition conditional on the power of acting as above. He has stated plausible reasons for this. If transports can be spared by us [ ] may land, it would seem, at Redoute Kaleh in about a month. The Russians who threatened Erzeroom have retired by the road to Kars. The Turkish army there is stated to have nearly two months' provisions early in August. Prince Gortchakoff is supposed to be preparing another attack, beginning with the Turks and Sardinians.

No. 138.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 10. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, August 21, 1855.*

I HAVE obtained from a private and most secret source communication of a despatch lately addressed by Prince Gortchakoff, at Vienna, to his Government. It commences by stating that the greatest skill and caution must be observed in the relations of Russia towards Austria; that one false move at the present moment would entirely destroy the fruits of a whole year's labour; that it required "une main de velour;" and that, more especially, the greatest care should be taken to consult the feelings of the young Emperor, and not to wound his susceptibility.

It refers, in terms of great satisfaction, to the success already obtained, in having brought Austria to "lower the flag of the enemy;" and at having thereby annulled an army of 300,000 men at so small a sacrifice to Russia, treating the evacuation of the Provinces and the occupation by Austria as being rather of advantage than a loss, and referring to the concessions made with respect to the Danube, as not being more than what previous Treaties had provided for. It further states that thus much had been gained by skilful management at a time when Austria, although in a state of bankruptcy, could not have been restrained ("ne se serait point laissée arrêtée") from cooperating with the Western Powers. It expresses great satisfaction that, through the instrumentality of Prussia, the German Diet had not bent to the wishes of Austria, in expressing an approbation of her policy which would have amounted to a "concurrence" with it ("qui aurait valu son concours"), and that in this respect it was highly advisable that Germany should make no further advance, or take fresh engagements. It was this policy which he sought to impress on the German Representatives at Vienna; and he considered that Frankfort was now the great and important point.

He then remarked that on no account should any outward expression of triumph be given vent to, and that too much care and precaution could not be taken to prevent any falling back of Austria towards the Western Powers. He added that the success which had been so far obtained was not due to his exertions, but to the protection which God vouchsafed to holy Russia.

The foregoing is but a very imperfect report of the text of this despatch, which was of considerable length, and drawn up with consummate skill and dexterity. It was read to me in so hurried a manner that I could merely retain its general substance and the impressions which it conveyed.

En résumé, I may state to your Lordship that the general tone of this despatch seemed to exhibit great satisfaction at the result so far obtained, in detaching Austria from an active alliance with the Western Powers, and, in inculcating the great necessity of acting with skill and precaution, some latent fears are apparently entertained that Austria may still be forced to make common cause with the enemies of Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 139.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 25.)

My Lord, *Berlin, August 25, 1855.*

IN my despatch No. 12 of the 21st instant, I stated to your Lordship that Baron Lederer, the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, had privately informed Baron Manteuffel that the Austrian Cabinet did not intend to insist on the invitation which they had lately addressed to the Prussian Government, to accept the four points in the same light, and to place themselves, in respect to them, on the same basis with Austria. I have since been informed by Baron Manteuffel that this communication was made by Count Buol through Count Arnim at Vienna. Count Buol on this occasion expressed the wish of the Austrian Government that this question should be closed, and that the discussion should not again be renewed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 140.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 601.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 15, 1855.*

THE course pursued by Major-General Beatson is a cause of increasing embarrassment and anxiety to me, as well as to those who are acting under my instructions at the Dardanelles; instead of employing the means which I have placed at his disposal for maintaining his troops in a proper state of discipline, and protecting the inhabitants of the neighbourhood from their irregularities, he asserts, in contradiction to the statements and evidence derived from other responsible sources, that the preventive measures recommended for his adoption are both unnecessary and injurious, nor does he scruple to act in such a manner as to impede the course of justice, and to make his corps an object of alarm and disgust, to those who have most reason to desire its success.

I forward some additional correspondence, which will enable your Lordship to test the correctness of these remarks.

Among the documents which are inclosed in copy herewith, is a despatch addressed by me on the 13th instant, to the Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's army in the Crimea, for the purpose of requesting that an officer of sufficient rank may be immediately sent to supersede Major-General Beatson, in the command of the Irregular Cavalry.

Having no authority to set him aside myself, and having exhausted all available means of bringing his conduct into harmony with the public interests, at the same time that I am anxious to spare Her Majesty's Government the mortification of disbanding that corps, I have no alternative but to apply to Lieutenant-General Simpson for support and relief, until the pleasure of Her Majesty's Government could be made known by telegraph.

Meanwhile, I have sanctioned the enforcement by the civil authorities, of those preventive measures, which I had vainly recommended to the adoption of Major-General Beatson, and I am waiting anxiously for the report of the Commission of Inquiry, and the decision of the Commander-in-chief.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 140.

Lord A. Loftus to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Berlin, August 18, 1855.*

IN conversation yesterday with Baron Manteuffel, I referred to a reported communication which had lately taken place between the Austrian and Prussian Cabinets on the Oriental question. His Excellency informed me, that it was true a note had been lately addressed by the Austrian Cabinet to that of Berlin, but that he did not consider it of any importance, and that in reality it was mere phraseology, and meant nothing.

He then told me that in this communication Count Buol informed him that the Austrian Cabinet had received a declaration from France, which had been concerted between London and Paris, stating that the Western Powers considered those Articles of the Treaty of December as still valid which had been in apparent abeyance; and secondly, that the Western Powers still maintained the four points as the minimum of their terms, reserving to themselves full liberty to make any additional demands which they might judge necessary, according to the eventualities of the war.

Count Buol, in apprising the Cabinet of Berlin that the maintenance of the four points was thus recognized by the Western Powers, seeks to induce Prussia to accept the four points in their totality, and to appropriate them in the same manner, and to place herself with respect to them on the same basis as Austria had done.

I am given to understand that a civil but vague and declinatory answer has been returned by Baron Manteuffel, and I am confidently assured that there is no intention on the part of the Government to enter into any fresh engagements with Austria, with respect to the Oriental question.

Baron Manteuffel evidently considers that this invitation was not made with any seriousness on the part of Austria. He seems rather to think that Count Buol is anxious to allow the matter to remain for the present in suspense.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 140.

Lord A. Loftus to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Berlin, August 21, 1855.*

I AM informed that Baron Tederer, the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires at this Court, has been privately instructed by Count Buol to inform Baron Manteuffel that the Austrian Cabinet does not intend to insist on the invitation which they had lately addressed to the Prussian Government, to accept the four points in the same light, and to place themselves in respect to them on the same basis with Austria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 141.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 605.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 15, 1855.*

REFERRING to your Lordship's despatch No. 569 of the 14th ultimo, I have the honour to state that Fuad Pasha, to whom I communicated the contents of that despatch, declared, through Mr. Pisani, the readiness of the Porte to authorise the Turkish ambassador in London to enter into the engagements

contracted by England and France in the Convention of the 10th of May, 1854, and to accede to the declaration signed at Paris on the 16th July, 1855, as soon as the Sultan's sanction shall have been obtained.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 142.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received August* 29.)

(No. 607.)

Therapia, August 16, 1855.

My Lord,

THE Ottoman Council was assembled yesterday for deliberation as to the most effectual means of succouring the beleaguered army at Kars. M. Pisani having been suddenly taken ill, and Fuad Pasha not having attended at the Porte, I am still in ignorance of the decision, if any, which may have been taken by the Council. The Porte's intention, beyond a doubt, is to operate a diversion by Kutais, and the question is now with what troops, and in what manner that intention may best be carried out. The Government and Omer Pasha alike acquiesce in the condition that the number of the Turkish troops in the Crimea shall not be diminished, and that the Turko-British Contingent shall make no part of the expeditionary force; but the Pasha objects most positively to the plan, transmitted from London by telegraph, of stationing the Contingent at Eupatoria, and he is not prepared to assume the responsibility of commanding the expedition unless the Turkish troops before Sebastopol be allowed to form part of it.

I am indebted to Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons for a memorandum containing the whole of his Highness's suggestions, together with the reasons on which they were bottomed. It is inclosed herewith for your Lordship's more complete information.

I have also received from Brigadier-General Mansfield a series of remarks corresponding in a great measure with the views of the Ottoman Commander-in-chief, and I feel myself bound in duty to recommend the contents of both these papers to the serious and dispassionate consideration of Her Majesty's Government. I cannot presume to offer a personal opinion on matters of this kind, but neither can I conceal my impression that a disregard of Omer Pasha's advice would expose the success of a very important and unavoidable enterprise to the most perilous chances.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—The Council came to no conclusion yesterday, and meets again to-day.
S. DE R.

Inclosure 1 in No. 142.

Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons.

August 15, 1855.

Substance of a Draft of Note addressed by Omer Pasha to the Seraskier, to be submitted to the Porte, relative to the measures to be taken to relieve the army at Kars.

ALL the misfortunes which have happened to the army in Asia are to be attributed to faults in its composition, and the fact that its Chief was not invested with full powers.

Every army in a similar condition must necessarily become demoralized.

To renew the "morale" of any army in such a condition, the only remedy is to be found in energetic measures undertaken by an adequate force.

For this reason the Pasha considers it necessary to make the following observations relative to the proposal arrived by telegraph from the Cabinet of London.

1. The troops now at Eupatoria, are composed of different materials, Turks and Egyptians, and are deficient in the means of land transport. In case the means of transport should be taken from the Ottoman troops before Sebastopol, these troops will be reduced to a similar condition. It is evident, therefore, that the troops from Eupatoria are not capable of taking the field and of manœuvering.

The troops at Eupatoria have in stores in that place, provisions for four months, both for men and horses, 60,000 chekis of firewood, and a large quantity of reserve ammunition and baggage. The Turkish fleet will not suffice for the transport of these stores; and even if the allied fleets lend their aid, there will be great loss of time as well as of provisions in moving them.

Moreover, at the camp before Sebastopol, the Turks have no port or wharfs, no store-houses for provisions, or magazines for ammunition; they have no hospitals; and in case the Egyptians should be taken to the camp before Sebastopol, in order to allow of the Turks being taken thence to Asia, being without huts, the Egyptians without being utilized for the war, would, before the spring, perish of cold.

If the Egyptians were to go to Asia, as it will be necessary to keep the field during the commencement of the winter, coming as they do from a hot climate, and being without the means of transport; they could not perform the necessary manœuvres; and the army being composed of different materials, there would be but little chance of success in the great and important operation to be undertaken.

By the execution of this project, the unity of the Ottoman as well as of the English army will be destroyed, and it is to be observed that much of the energy, if not the existence of an army in warfare depends upon its unity.

From the above observations it is evident that any General who would undertake the contemplated operation under the proposed conditions, would not only lose his reputation, but would place the alliance in great difficulties.

As the Pasha has the sacred desire of being of service to the alliance, as also of maintaining his military honour, and as, if he accepted these conditions, by temporarily relieving the three Cabinets of their responsibility, and taking it upon himself, he would bring a greater responsibility upon the same Cabinets at a later period, and cause them greater embarassments, he feels it necessary to make the following proposal, the execution of which will not endanger any operations already undertaken.

He proposes that the troops at Eupatoria should remain where they are, thus avoiding the difficulties above indicated, and that the Anglo-Ottoman Contingent should occupy Balaklava and Kerteh.

In both places the troops of the Contingent will be within fortified lines, and will be separated from other influences, and being from the same army, they will no doubt render as good service in those positions as the troops which now occupy them.

He proposes that the Contingent shall be completed by the troops now at Kerteh, and that any deficiency in numbers after these troops have joined them shall be made up from the troops now before Sebastopol.

He proposes that the troops for the expeditionary force for Asia shall be taken from Bulgaria and from before Sebastopol.

By these operations all difficulties will be removed, and the unity of both the British and Ottoman armies will be maintained.

The Pasha observes that as every General in warfare ought to coniders beforehand the most difficult circumstances in which he may be placed by the events of war, and to provide as far as possible against misfortune, he supposes the case, that the army of Kars is destroyed before his arrival in Asia, and that the Russians have advanced beyond that place, and states that in such a case, being with an army composed of different materials, in which he could not place entire confidence, he would find himself with his army in similar difficulties to those in which the army of Asia is now placed, and would thus not only cause great danger to the Turks, but also to the whole alliance

The Pasha further observes that every General to whom an operation is confided ought to consent to the operation and its mode of execution, in order that he may be held responsible for its conduct, and adds that if the conditions he proposes are accepted, and full powers given to him for their execution, then trusting to the goodness of God, he will take the entire responsibility of the operation upon himself.

Inclosure 2 in No. 142.

Points of Consideration relative to the Orders of Her Majesty's Government conveyed in the Telegraphic Despatch dated August 9, 1855.

OMER PASHA and the Seraskier strongly oppose the breaking up of the army accustomed to the command of the former.

Permanent arrangements have been made by the Seraskier, for the supply of the garrison at Eupatoria.

That garrison is composed of mixed troops, that is, Egyptians, Arabs, and Turks.

The Contingent if supplied with its full complement from the detachments about to be drafted from Bulgaria and from Kertch, will be almost equal in numbers to the divisions belonging to Omer Pasha, excepting Eupatoria.

As far as the numbers of the allied army before Sebastopol, therefore, are concerned, there need be no diminution, if the views of Omer Pasha are acceded to; advantages to ourselves are:—

That General Simpson will be strengthened in council if he appears as the immediate commander of 50,000 men instead of 30,000.

There will be more unity of command, and the Turkish soldiers under British officers are sure of protection from oppression on the part of either British or French, a thing otherwise by no means certain in the absence of Omer Pasha, of which we have already had experience.

If the Contingent go to Balaklava, the affairs of its commissariat become simplified at once. At present, no arrangements having been made, it is clear from the conversation and official letters of the General, that unavoidable delay must ensue if absolutely new establishments have to be organized.

As a question of military organization, it is not very desirable that both the officers and men of the Turkish Contingent should have the benefit of example and contact with our British regiments and system generally.

If Her Majesty's army have to winter in its present position before Sebastopol, will it not be a great advantage to it to have 20,000 Turks to share its duty?

Unlike the French and Russian armies, ours has never yet had any relief from siege duty. The Contingent after being for some time at Balaklava, could be so used according to the pleasure of the Commander of the Forces.

In other quarters mischief has already arisen from want of centralized authority, according to the rule of military command; although such deplorable circumstances cannot be anticipated under such an officer as General Vivian; still there cannot be a doubt, that as regards supply, ammunition, military chest, discipline, the adaptation of the various principles of rank, newly brought into play in the mixed service of these armies, and the right assimilation of the Turks in our pay to our purposes, much will be gained by its taking its regular place immediately under the eye of the Commander of the Forces.

The Turks, at first, will not be exposed at Balaklava, indeed it is believed, not so much as at Eupatoria, until General Simpson should feel inclined to bring them up.

(Signed) W. R. MANSFIELD,
Brigadier-General.

No. 143.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 608. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 16, 1855.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 607 of this date, I have to remark that other considerations beside those put forward by Omer Pasha appear to recommend Balaklava as preferable to Eupatoria for the location of General Vivian's Contingent.

Paid and officered by Her Majesty's Government that corps, if stationed at the former place, would necessarily form part of the British command; and, in that point of view, would contribute to the influence and moral weight in council of the British Commander-in-chief.

The Contingent might also be expected to derive advantage from its vicinity to the British army, also from the habitual intercourse which it would naturally keep up with the officers, and, to a certain degree also, with the privates, of that army.

Your Lordship's attention need not be called to the direction in which those advantages practically point. It is evident that in proportion as the Contingent makes progress in organisation and fitness for active service, it acquires an increasing claim to confidence, and bids more fairly, with seasonable extension, to prove an effective organ of military improvement and sound political connection for this Empire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 144.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 100.)

My Lord, *Frankfort, August 27, 1855.*

THE recess of the Diet leaves me very little of interest to communicate to your Lordship from hence.

The efforts which are being made by the Austrian Government to obtain adhesion to the four points, are not, as far as I can learn, successful.

The rejection which the proposal has encountered at Berlin, is no doubt known to your Lordship, and although if the question should be brought before the Diet, Austria would no doubt have several votes, it seems as yet doubtful whether she could securely reckon on a majority.

It is not very easy to calculate, what direction the future policy of Austria would take, if she succeeded in obtaining the support of the Diet to her view of the terms of accommodation which it is desirable to propose to Russia, but I apprehend we have no good reason to build upon its being one that would coincide with the way of judging the questions in dispute entertained by Her Majesty's Government and by that of the Emperor of the French.

Austria would, as I imagine, be more likely to use the strength which such support would give her, in endeavouring to impose terms of peace which should be more favourable to Russia than those we are striving to obtain; and in this view of things the dissidence still existing between the two great German States, which, as long as it lasts, will prevent unison in the Diet, is not to be considered as so prejudicial to the Powers allied against Turkey, as it would be if Austria could be reckoned upon with certainty, as sharing their views as to the mode of taking security against Russian aggression for the future.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 145.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 678.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August 30, 1855.*

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of an instruction which Lord Panmure addressed to Major-General Beatson by the mail of the 25th instant, from which your Excellency will perceive that General Beatson's corps of Irregular Cavalry will, in future, be placed under the orders of Lieutenant-General Vivian.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 145.

Lord Panmure to Major-General Beatson.

Sir, *War Department, August* 25, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 5th instant, and in reply to acquaint you that I have seen with much vexation and regret the disturbances which have occurred in the force under your command.

It appears to me, that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, acting on such information as he could procure at a distance from the scene of action, and under unusual and difficult circumstances, showed becoming zeal in sending regular forces and contingent instructions to you, with officers to aid you with their counsel and assistance, and a conditional recommendation to repair to the capital to confer personally with his Lordship and the Seraskier.

Although willing to make considerable allowances for imperfect discipline in a corps such as you are endeavouring to bring into subjection, it is impossible for me not to condemn in the strongest terms the acts of violence and the contempt of all control which have been exhibited by some portion of the men under your very eyes.

I am willing to admit, in part, the excuse that you have not been provided with a sufficiency of officers; but this has arisen from your own irregular proceedings in not sending proper returns of your force, by which I could be guided in my views as to the number of officers which should be attached to you.

Your own fitness to command must consist much more in your power over your men in the field, and capacity to lead them against an enemy, than in the judgment which your correspondence with Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople exhibits, or the temperance of the general orders to your force.

In the conviction that these defects spring rather from momentary irritation than from any determination to set authority at defiance, and considering the zeal which you have displayed in getting this force together, I have resolved not to accept the resignation of your command tendered by you to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe—a course which at first appeared to Her Majesty's Government as best calculated to give a chance of securing efficiency to the force.

In order to avoid any conflict between civil and military authority in future, I have resolved to place you and your corps under the superior military command of General Vivian, and shall therefore attach you to the Turkish Contingent. You will immediately and in future report yourself to that officer, and send through him your military communications.

You will also hold your force in immediate readiness to move so soon as you may receive orders to that effect from General Vivian.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PANMURE.

No. 146.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 31, 1855.

THE Government have decided that the Turkish Contingent should go immediately to Balaklava: arrangements must be made for their transport and reception there. Orders to this effect are sent to Constantinople and Balaklava. Inform General Vivian.

No. 147.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 1.)

(No. 1,148.)

My Lord, *Paris, August* 31, 1855.

I HAVE furnished the Emperor with a copy of Colonel Simmons' report No. 42 of the 20th instant to your Lordship, and have had some conversation with His Majesty on the matter of it. His Majesty deplores the state of affairs in Asia Minor, and is quite sensible of their gravity, but he will not admit that the relief of Kars is to be put in the same scale with the capture of Sebastopol; and he insists that if any of the Turkish troops before that place are relieved, they shall be replaced, not only by others of equal numerical strength, but of as good a quality. His Majesty will not admit that General Vivian's Contingent answer this requirement, and he grounds his opinion on a conversation which M. Thouvenel reports he has had with that officer, who, he says, declared that the troops under his orders were not fit to take the field.

The Emperor, however, still leaves the decision of this question to the allied Generals.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 148.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 966.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 3, 1855.

I INCLOSE for your Excellency's information a copy of a despatch from Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, respecting the communications which he has recently had with the Porte on the subject of Circassia, and copies of two despatches from Mr. Longworth, giving an account of the state of affairs in Circassia, and of the conduct pursued by the Turkish Agents in that country.

I also inclose a copy of an instruction which I have addressed to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe on the matters referred to in the two inclosed despatches, and I have to instruct your Excellency to communicate the whole of these papers to Count Walewski, and invite him to send to M. de Thouvenel similar instructions to those which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 149.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 695.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 3, 1855.

HER Majesty's Government approve the instructions which your Excellency gave to M. Pisani on the 2nd and 6th ultimo, with the view of eliciting from the Porte a distinct declaration as to its pretensions in regard to Circassia. The answer which M. Pisani received from the Turkish Ministers would be satisfactory, if the acts of the Turkish Agents in any way corresponded with the declarations of the Turkish Government. But such is very far from being the case, according to the reports of Mr. Longworth, and your Excellency should bring clearly before the Porte the acts of its Agents, as represented by that gentleman, and especially the hostility shown to the allies by Mustapha Pasha, Sefer Pasha, and others of the same class, and you should demand specific explanations on the subject.

Your Excellency will state to the Turkish Ministers that things cannot remain in their present state, for Her Majesty's Government cannot see with indifference the engagements of the Porte violated by Turkish Agents, who, if the Turkish Government is sincere, have no power to act in Circassia; nor will Her Majesty's Government allow the policy of the allies to be misrepresented to the Circassians by those Agents, who appear to carry their hostility to the point of stopping the supplies required by the army in the Crimea.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 150.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 637.)
My Lord, *Therapia, August 23, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to state that I propose to embark for the Crimea this afternoon, in execution of Her Majesty's commands conveyed to me by your Lordship. The steamer appointed by Sir Edmund Lyons to receive me and the gentlemen by whom I am to be accompanied, is under weigh, and I hope to be on board in less than an hour.

Omer Pasha has been detained beyond his apparent intention, and the badness of the weather has prevented his coming up the Bosphorus to see me. I am led to hope that he will embark to-morrow, and that he will reach the Crimea while I am there. His plans will not be definitively settled before he has held an official consultation with the other Commanders-in-chief.

M. de Thouvenel, with whom I have communicated on the subject, does not feel himself at liberty to concur with me in stating to the Porte that provided no diminution of the Turkish forces takes place before Sebastopol, or at Kertch, the allied Governments have no objection to the proposed expedition into Asia. The preparations continue meanwhile, and I presume that Lieutenant-General Vivian is also preparing to follow out Lord Panmure's instructions, so far as the prevailing uncertainty allows.

The Russians having retreated from before Erzeroom, and having been foiled, according to Turkish accounts inclosed herewith, in a partial attempt on the defences of Kars, there is still room for hope that a diversion may not impossibly be effected in time.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 150.

Vassif Pasha to Vely Pasha.

(Translation.) *August 4, 1855.*

AT 7 o'clock this morning the Russian army moved from its position and attacked Ramli Battery with all its force. By the help of God it was resisted, and after a cannonade on both sides which lasted two hours, the enemy, unable to resist our fire, was beat back, and retired in confusion. Besides the dead horses and the men which the Russians were able to carry off, a hundred bodies remained on the field, according to the last account.

A General, indeed, was killed, and a gun destroyed. Upon our side, God be praised! not one man was hurt in repulsing the enemy, and thanks are given to the Almighty for this proof of the eventual success of the Imperial army.

I see by the communications from Erzeroom that you had been instructed, after the late battle before Kupri-Ruy, to retire to the fortifications of Déné Boyni. This proceeding on your part is fully consistent with good tactics. The troops sent by the Russians in that direction are thirteen battalions of foot, withdrawn by them from this place. The Cavalry and Artillery are small in proportion to this force, and they have no siege-guns with them. We are aware,

that inspired with your well-known valour, you are making your best endeavours in this matter.

You will, with the help of God, beat back the enemy and save Erzeroom. You will act according to your instructions, and keep me informed of events.

No. 151.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 31. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, September 1, 1855.*

I ASKED Baron Manteuffel to-day, in a casual way, if he knew whether the Russian Government would have accepted either of the Austrian proposals for the settlement of the third point discussed at the Conferences at Vienna. His Excellency replied that he was quite ignorant of what would have been the Russian decision on this subject.

I inquired whether the Prince of Prussia had obtained any information on this subject during his stay at St. Petersburgh. He replied by stating that the Prince might have done more than he did, but that he was no diplomatist, and had spoken out freely his own views and opinions in lieu of seeking to discover those of the Russian Government.

I have been, however, recently informed that his Royal Highness did put the question to Count Nesselrode, who merely replied, "that if these proposals had been accepted by the Western Powers, Russia would have been placed in a most embarrassing position."

It appears likely to me that Russia may have wished to conciliate Austria by declaring, as reported in Mr. Elliot's despatch No. 75 of 22nd August, that she would have accepted her second proposal, whilst she may wish to withhold this avowal from Prussia and Germany, in the hopes that at a later period she may represent her future acceptation in the light of a sacrifice and "concession" in behalf of peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 152.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 33.)
My Lord, *Berlin, September 1, 1855.*

A STATEMENT having appeared in the German papers, that a fresh circular has been addressed by the Russian Government to their Legations at Foreign Courts, I took occasion to inquire from Baron Manteuffel to-day whether he had received communication of any such paper.

His Excellency replied, that he had received no such communication very lately; but that about a fortnight ago Baron Budberg had read to him a despatch from his Government, of which no copy had been left in his hands.

His Excellency stated, that it contained a repetition of the pacific disposition of Russia, but that she could only accept an honourable peace. It cited the efforts she had made in this sense at the Conferences at Vienna, and that their result had proved that the Western Powers were intent in carrying on the war at all price, and that on them rested this heavy responsibility.

There were evidently other passages in this circular, in addition to the very hackneyed phraseology reported to me by Baron Manteuffel, which led me to ask whether it contained any proposals to the Prussian Government. His Excellency replied in the negative, and he did not seem to treat the paper as being of any interest or importance, although I am informed that his Excellency stated to another person that there were certain points of this circular directed against Austria, which was probably the reason why no copy of this document was given to him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 153.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 83.)

My Lord, *Vienna, August* 29, 1855.

BARON DE BOURQUENEY has received a despatch from Count Walewski in which the hope is expressed that the engagement which binds the Governments of England, France, and Austria not to enter separately into negotiation with Russia, may be strictly carried out.

Count Walewski, after making all due allowances for the position of Austria towards a Power with which she still maintains diplomatic relations, points out the inconvenience of the course which Count Buol had conceived himself at liberty to follow by the communication made to the Russian Government after the rupture of the late negotiations.

M. de Bourqueney informs me that Count Buol received this communication in a very good spirit, and assured him he might rely on the Austrian Government acting literally up to their engagement of not entering into any negotiation with Russia. That if the Russian Minister came to him with a proposition which did not appear sufficient, he should not consider himself at liberty to discuss it or mould it into a shape to render it acceptable; but in the case —which he was far from foreseeing—of a proposal being brought which fully comprehended all the demands of the allies, he conceived that the course for him to adopt would be to transmit it to the Governments of England and France, without expressing to the Russian Minister any opinion on its merits, or in any way committing himself in its favour.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 154.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 85.)

My Lord, *Vienna, August* 29, 1855.

I HAVE reason to believe that Prince Gortchakoff is continually endeavouring to impress upon Count Buol the danger to the rest of Europe which will result from the too close alliance of England and France, and to point out that the true interests of Austria should prevent her from doing anything which may advance the alarming preponderance of these two Powers.

That some impression may have been produced by Prince Gortchakoff's arguments seems very probable, though it has certainly not been of the nature desired by him: for to a Power like Austria, so habitually addicted to allying itself to the strongest side, all representations of the strength of the allies serve as a warning to avoid the danger there would be to her in separating from them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 155.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 87.)

My Lord, *Vienna, August* 29, 1855.

I HAVE inquired of Count Buol what answer he had received to the last communication he had made to the Prussian Government.

His Excellency said that his communication had been made more wit the intention of recording the views of Austria with respect to the maintenance of the four points as essential to any negotiations than with the expectation of obtaining the adherence of the Prussian Government, and that the answer Count Arnim had received was to the effect that the Prussian Government did not see the necessity for making any fresh declaration upon the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 156.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 14.)

(No. 1,220.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 13, 1855.

I HAVE not failed to represent to Marshal Vaillant, as directed by your Lordship's telegraphic despatches, the desire of Her Majesty's Government that the late success at Sebastopol should be vigorously followed up before the Russians could recover from their panic, as also their wish that Omer Pasha should now be allowed to take the troops he deemed fittest for his expedition to Asia Minor.

These matters were discussed in Council before the Emperor yesterday. It was decided that General Pelissier should be desired to send immediately to Paris his future plan of campaign, in order that it might be discussed by the two Governments.

With respect to the Turkish troops, the Emperor persists in his refusal to send any orders on the subject. He maintains that it is a question which appertains exclusively to the allied Generals.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 157.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 720.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 15, 1855.

I HAVE to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government consider it desirable to urge the Porte to take advantage of the present moment to prepare and propose to England and to France a new organization of the government and constitution of Moldavia and Wallachia, so that the Sultan might, with the previous consent of England and France, establish by his own act and authority a good system of government for those Provinces. Such a course of proceeding would dispose beforehand of the first point, and might render unnecessary the formal guarantee of the five Powers, which would give to Russia and Austria jointly greater power of interference in the Provinces than have hitherto been claimed and exercised by Russia alone.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 158.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 17.)

(No. 1,223. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 16, 1855.

COUNT WALEWSKI has received confidential information that Baron Budberg, the Russian Minister at Berlin, has asked M. de Manteuffel whether the Prussian Government would undertake to mediate between Russia and the Western Powers for the establishment of peace. Baron Budberg proposed, as a

basis, that the first two of the four points should be considered as settled by the Conferences at Vienna; that the third should be taken as a matter of fact (résolu de fait); and that the fourth should be left for discussion.

M. de Manteuffel, before giving a decided answer, appears to have asked for further information from St. Petersburgh, particularly as to the sense to be attached to the words "résolu de fait." Did they apply to the future, as well as to the present moment? In the meantime he informed the Austrian Government of the overture made to him, with a view of ascertaining whether the Cabinet of Vienna would accept the mediation of Prussia. He was informed that Austria would not separate herself from the Western Powers, and that any overtures for peace must come directly from Russia herself.

I conceive, however, that there must be some error in the latter part of this information, because Count Buol was not at Vienna when the communication from Prussia must have been made, and it is not likely that an answer would have been returned in his absence. Be this as it may, Count Walewski has profited by Count Hatzfeldt's asking him whether Prussia would be admitted to any future Conferences for peace, to go into both questions with him.

In the first place he has told Count Hatzfeldt that neither the French nor English Governments will hear of any further Conferences. Russia must be prepared to come forward with clear and direct propositions on which preliminaries of peace can be signed. The part which Prussia may take in any discussions following the signature of such preliminaries must depend partly upon her own conduct.

Secondly. With regard to the mediation of Prussia, France and England would accept no mediation or employment of good offices on the part of any other Power. They would treat directly with Russia herself. In saying this much, however, Count Walewski added that he did not wish to convey the idea that if Prussia was commissioned by the Russian Government to inform the Western Powers that Russia desired to treat for peace, the message would not be received and replied to.

In giving me this information, Count Walewski stated that he had been careful to let Count Hatzfeldt understand that he was only offering his own opinion. He had, however, had an opportunity since then of speaking to the Emperor, who had approved the language which he had held.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 159.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 726.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, September 17, 1855.*

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL VIVIAN has forwarded to Lord Panmure copies of his despatches to your Excellency of the 8th, 19th, and 22nd of August, respecting the importance of measures being taken to induce the Porte to maintain the Turkish Contingent under his orders at the full amount stated in the Convention, not only by completing the force at once up to the specified numbers, but also by making provision for filling up any vacancies which may occur by casualties or desertions.

It is perfectly true that there is no express stipulation in the Convention for supplying vacancies so occurring; but in its absence the general engagement to assign over to the British Government the full number of 20,000 men must be taken to imply an engagement to keep the force up to that amount.

Accordingly I have to instruct your Excellency to request that measures may forthwith be adopted by the Government of the Sultan for placing at the disposal of Her Majesty's Government not only the number of troops stipulated for in the Convention, which the Porte has hitherto omitted to do, but also for replacing all the casualties which may occur in the force; and your Excellency will urge this matter with the greater earnestness on the Porte on the ground that the force, when duly organized, may be expected to be of the greatest permanent benefit to the Government of the Sultan.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 160.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 660.)
My Lord, *Therapia, September 3, 1855.*

I LEARN from Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons that Omer Pasha was to leave the Bosphorus on Saturday the 1st instant, for the Crimea; and, I believe, the steamer, in which his Highness had embarked, passed me in the dusk as I entered the Bosphorus. I have the honour to inclose herewith a copy of Colonel Simmons' letter.

It is strange that the Pasha should have remained here so long. During ten days he postponed his departure from day to day. He announced his intention of calling upon me before he started for the Crimea. He never came, excusing himself on the score of weather. His prolonged absence from the theatre of war, especially during the Russian attack, was much regretted in the allied armies. Neither he nor Colonel Simmons have given me any information of the state in which the preparations for a diversion in Asia are left. I saw at head-quarters a letter from Colonel Simmons, announcing the Pasha's intention of going into Asia before he went to the Crimea. Nothing of the kind was stated to me in reply to my urgent representations that the Pasha should lose no time in returning to his army, and settling his plans in concert with the other Commanders-in-chief. I am now informed that his Highness is gone to Sizeboli, though Colonel Simmons in his letter to me states that he was going to the Crimea.

I have grounds for apprehending that Omer Pasha's visit to Constantinople has been made the occasion of much intriguing, and I shall probably deem it my duty to return to the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 160.

Lieutenant-Colonel Simmons to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Pera, September 1, 1855.*

OMER PASHA leaves this evening in the Turkish steamer "Sheh-per" for the Crimea, whence he proposes proceeding with as little delay as possible to Asia.

He has just taken his leave of the Sultan. He asked me to accompany him, and I had the honour of being presented to His Majesty, who presented me with a snuff-box in brilliants as a "small token in remembrance of the services I have rendered to Turkey."

I thanked him, saying that I was glad that in performing my duty to my Sovereign I had been able to render service to Turkey, and meet with the approbation of His Majesty.

I write this to your Lordship as I embark, in case your Lordship should have left the Crimea before my arrival.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. L. A. SIMMONS.

No. 161.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 1,244.)
My Lord, *Paris, September 19, 1855.*

ALTHOUGH I have not written to your Lordship on the subject of the instructions which you are desirous that Count Walewski should address to the French Ambassador at Constantinople in regard to the affairs of Circassia, I have

not neglected the subject. I have had more than one conversation with his Excellency with reference to it, but it was only the day before yesterday that he informed me that the French Government was much puzzled how to act, both in regard to the instructions to be sent to the French Admiral in the Black Sea, and to the French Agent in Circassia. If there was any one recognised authority in Circassia, the task would be comparatively easy, but with such a variety of tribes to deal with, he despaired of doing any good.

Under these circumstances he was inclined to desire the French Agent to remain at Soukoum Kalé, and, unless necessity called for it, to interfere as little as possible in the internal affairs of the country.

I remarked that what your Lordship particularly desired was, that the Porte should be requested to prevent its Agents in Circassia from acting in contradiction to the promises made by itself at Constantinople.

Count Walewski said that he could have no difficulty in instructing M. de Thouvenel to that effect.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 162.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 1,245.)
My Lord, *Paris, September 19, 1855.*

COUNT WALEWSKI has been informed from Berlin that a communication, having for its object the reestablishment of peace, is on its way from the Prussian Government to those of Paris and London.

I said to Count Walewski that I trusted he would refuse to entertain any communication of the kind, unless it came at the request of the Russian Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 163.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 670.)
My Lord, *Therapia, September 6, 1855.*

HAVING seen Aali Pasha the day before yesterday I took occasion to make inquiry, according to your Lordship's wishes, relative to the part which he had taken at Vienna on the occasion lately referred to by Lord John Russell in his place in the House of Commons, and brought under my notice by your Lordship's instruction No. 663 of the 16th ultimo.

The Grand Vizier replied that he had been present at a Conference with M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Lord John Russell; that the former had opened the question on the Austrian ultimatum, recommending it on the ground of its tending to detach the Court of Vienna from Russia; that Lord John Russell had thereon expressed his persuasion that there was "étoffe pour la paix" in that idea, and that he, coming next, had admitted the advantage of securing the Austrian connection, but referred to his Government for an opinion on the whole subject; and later, that he had been directed by the Porte, without entering into the merits of the question, to follow in the track of France and England, the impolicy of separating from her allies being the Porte's motive for taking that line.

It would seem that the Ottoman Plenipotentiary did not refer to his Government by means of an official despatch, and consequently that the answer was returned in a private form.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 164.

Lord Straiford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 672.)
My Lord, *Therapia, September 8, 1855.*

I HAVE the satisfaction to inform your Lordship that, in company with the Seraskier Pasha, I attended to-day a review of the Turkish regiments commanded by General Vivian.

It was a pleasing and very interesting sight to me, though I cannot presume to offer an opinion of the troops in a military point of view, or of their fitness for active service. Their general appearance was good; the word of command was obeyed without hesitation or embarrassment. They went through several evolutions with promptitude and good effect. New clothes and accoutrements would not be misplaced; the horses of the Cavalry looked small, and some of the companies of Infantry were deficient in number.

I understood that about 7,000 men of all arms were on the ground. Only two out of four batteries of artillery, attached to the corps, were in the field.

The movements of the soldiers were characterized by cheerfulness and alacrity. The Seraskier expressed his satisfaction, and repeated his previous assurance that the Contingent, on reaching Balaklava, would be completed to the Conventional number of 20,000.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 165.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 24.)

(No. 107.)
My Lord, *Vienna, September 17, 1855.*

I UNDERSTAND that on the account arriving here of the fall of Sebastopol, the language of Prince Gortchakoff was to the effect that this event necessarily closed the lips of Russia, but did not close her ears; and he conveyed to the persons most in his confidence the belief that Russia would gladly listen to overtures from the Western Powers.

Prince Gortchakoff will, it is stated, go to meet the Emperor Alexander a Warsaw.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 166.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 24.)

(No. 73.)
My Lord, *Berlin, September 21, 1855.*

AT an interview I had this day with Baron Manteuffel, and in reply to certain inquiries which I addressed to him, his Excellency informed me that he had lately made a communication to the Cabinets of London and Paris expressing the ardent hope of His Majesty that as the first act of the drama was over, the moment would be judged a favourable one for renewing the endeavours to restore peace. He said that this had been the constant aim of His Majesty, and that in submitting this question again to the serious reflection of the two Cabinets, His Majesty was desirous of renewing his offer and of expressing his readiness to contribute his efforts in any way which might be conducive to the general good.

Baron Manteuffel stated that, as their position towards Austria was a different one, he had simply notified to the Cabinet of Vienna the steps which he had

taken in London and Paris. He further remarked that in taking these steps there could be no idea of any "common action" with Austria, giving me to understand that their object and policy was to act a separate part.

His Excellency said that this appeal in favour of peace to the Western Cabinets had been thus hastily taken before it was possible that they could have had any communication with St. Petersburgh, in order that it might not be supposed that they had acted at the instigation of Russia, and he further observed that he had only that very morning told Baron Budberg of the steps he had taken.

I told his Excellency that I had learnt that Baron Budberg had specially addressed himself to him on the subject of peace, and had even entered into an explanation of the terms which might form a basis of negotiations. His Excellency denied the truth of this intelligence, observing, however, that Baron Budberg had expressed a hope that peace might now be attainable.

I then said to his Excellency that without having any official knowledge, I was personally disposed to think that any proposals for peace must emanate direct from Russia in a positive and precise form, and that no mediation or good offices would be of avail or likely to meet with success.

His Excellency replied that some third party would be necessary as an intermediary. It was very evident from his Excellency's language that the King of Prussia is in ardent expectation of playing the part of "mediator."

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 167.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 24.)

(No. 74.)
My Lord, *Berlin, September 21, 1855.*

I INQUIRED to-day of Baron Manteuffel whether he had any knowledge of the cause which had led to the sudden change in the Emperor's intended plan of visiting Warsaw. His Excellency said that he had learnt from St. Petersburgh that it was on account of the cholera, which was raging in that capital. All he knew for certain was, that the Emperor was to go to Moscow, and he did not seem to think that his visit to Nicolaieff was positively decided upon.

I have, however, good reason to believe that His Imperial Majesty and the Grand Dukes will repair from Moscow to Odessa and Nicolaieff. On the other hand, it is very much doubted whether His Majesty will continue his journey to the Crimea, as announced by the newspapers.

Various rumours are afloat as to the reasons which have induced this change in the Emperor's plan, but they can only be conjectures: amongst them I may cite to your Lordship as the most probable, the absence of the King of Prussia at this moment from Berlin, whose presence at Warsaw might have been expected and sought for.

Baron Manteuffel further told me that he had received no late intelligence from St. Petersburgh, and that Baron Werther had only written him a few lines on receiving intelligence of the fall of Sebastopol, but he was not then able to report the impression which that event had produced.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 168.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 42.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, September 25, 1855.*

HER Majesty's Government approve the language which your Lordship states, in your despatch No. 73 of the 21st instant, that you held to Baron Manteuffel with regard to the anxiety of the King of Prussia to take a prominent part in negotiations for peace, and you will continue to discourage the belief that the mediation of Prussia is desired, or would be accepted.

No communication has been made to Her Majesty's Government, as stated by Baron Manteuffel.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 169.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 90. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, September 29, 1855.*

M. DE WILDENBRUCH, the Prussian Representative at Constantinople, left Berlin yesterday, to return to his post.

During his stay here he has been constantly with the King; and I am privately informed that, in his reports to His Majesty on Eastern affairs, he has spoken with much interest and impartiality in support of Turkey, and has strenuously represented the importance of maintaining the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

I am also privately informed that His Majesty has charged him with a letter for the Sultan, in which His Majesty is represented to have strongly urged the necessity of peace. His Majesty is further stated to have counselled the Sultan to exercise his own independence in the selection of his Ministers, without undue bias from his allies; and to have expressed an opinion, if it did not even assume the form of advice, that any prolonged occupation of his territory by the allies would be a matter of grave inconvenience.

It is impossible for me to vouch for the truth or accuracy of this information, but it is my duty to report it to your Lordship in the shape in which it reached me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 170.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 1.

(No. 95.)
My Lord, *Berlin, September 29, 1855.*

IN the absence of Baron Manteuffel I waited yesterday on M. Balan, the Acting Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and expressed to him my astonishment that no communication had been made to your Lordship of the nature which Baron Manteuffel had represented to me in my last interview with his Excellency, as reported in my despatch No. 73 of the 21st instant.

M. Balan replied, that very possibly Count Brandenburg had forwarded his reports to His Majesty direct to Coblentz, as the latest despatch received from him was of the 20th instant, in which he acknowledged the receipt of these instructions, and stated that he should take the earliest opportunity of commu-

nicating them to your Lordship. These instructions were dated, I believe, the 13th, but they were not finally dispatched from here till the 17th instant.

It is somewhat remarkable that the "Kreuz Zeitung," and other Berlin newspapers, have strenuously denied the statement (which first appeared in the "Independance Belge") that any advances of a pacific nature had been made by the Prussian Government to the Cabinets of London and Paris; and I have reason to think that Baron Manteuffel somewhat regrets having acted with such precipitation in this matter.

I have the honour to forward to your Lordship an article from the "National Zeitung" of this day, which is evidently from an official source. It seeks to reject, for the Prussian Government, the responsibility of their own act, and to give to this initiative on their part the character of a simple desire for an exchange of opinions between the respective Cabinets.

I further inquired from M. Balan whether any reply had been received to the communication made to the Austrian Cabinet. He informed me that Baron Werner had said that no official reply could be given until the return to Vienna of the Emperor Francis Joseph and of Count Buol; but he gave Count Arnim to understand that he did not think the present moment favourable for any proposals of mediation. M. Balan further stated that Count Georges Esterhazy, the Austrian Minister at this Court, had expressed himself in a similar sense.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 170.

Extract from the "National Zeitung" of September 20, 1855.

THE statement of an application having been made by Prussia to Paris after the fall of Sebastopol is denied indeed; but it appears only to require correcting in the form of expression. As to the fact itself, semi-official correspondents of many journals spoke lately as follows:

"It would be going too far—it would be false, to say that no exchange of opinions had taken place with reference to the events of the 8th of September between the Prussian Ministers at London and Paris and the respective Cabinets. It is far more probable that confidential inquiries were made by Counts Hatzfeldt and Bernstorff, as indeed could hardly be avoided after such an event as the fall of Sebastopol, as to the ulterior objects of the Western Powers, and the eventual wishes for peace of the Governments concerned. Conversations of this nature between diplomatists are not inspired by the Government, in each special case, and no official character is to be attributed to them."

No. 171.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 121.)
My Lord, *Vienna, September 27, 1855.*

I HAVE inquired from Baron Werner whether it was true that a communication had lately been made to him by the Prussian Government, with the view of coming to some understanding as to the policy which could at present be most advantageously followed by the two Governments, and by which their united influence might be exerted in the interest of peace.

Baron Werner replied that he had very unexpectedly been spoken to on the subject by Count Arnim, but that the communication was of so very vague a nature that it was nearly impossible for him to convey a proper impression of it.

Count Arnim had not been instructed to make any formal proposition, or even to communicate a despatch of his Government, but had been directed generally to express their wish that an understanding might be come to which should advance the interests of peace.

His efforts had, in fact, apparently been limited to preparing the ground for some more formal communication, which, I should infer from Baron Werner's language, he is not disposed to think improbable. He assured me that nothing like a mediation on the part of Austria and Prussia had been suggested by Count Arnim, who, he added, must be aware that such a proposal would be so contrary to the engagements which already bind Austria to the Western Powers that neither the good faith nor the prudence of the Imperial Government would for a moment allow them to entertain it; but the position of Prussia was, he said, so different from that of Austria, that he did not see that she would be open to reproach for endeavouring to bring about a more united policy.

I replied that, before acquiescing in the justice of his observation, it would be necessary exactly to know the nature of the proposal which might be made; but that any suggestion by Prussia of a course involving the breach of the engagements of Austria towards the allies would, I apprehend, be manifestly insulting to the Imperial Government, as implying a doubt as to how far they intended to adhere to those engagements.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 172.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 133.)
My Lord, *Vienna, October 3, 1855.*

BARON WERNER informs me that he has already forwarded to Count Karolyi, for communication to your Lordship, a copy of the answer he has returned to the late communication of the Prussian Government. It is unnecessary therefore for me to allude to this document further than to state that Baron Werner said the unwillingness shown to meet the views of the Prussian Government in a manner which might be distasteful to the Governments of England and France, would, he hoped, be taken as a proof of the importance attached by the Imperial Government to the maintenance with them of the harmony and good understanding which they so much desire.

I told Baron Werner that Her Majesty's Government were without any very precise knowledge of the nature of the proposal to which he had just replied, as they had received no communication from the Prussian Government on the subject, but that I understood the Cabinet of Berlin professed more anxiety to maintain their independent action than to enter into concert with Austria for the combined action of the two Powers, and I asked whether this was the construction he would put upon the despatch read to him by Count Arnim.

Baron Werner expressed much surprise at learning that no communication had been made to Her Majesty's Government, which was certainly stated by Baron Manteuffel to have been done both in London and Paris.

With respect also to any independence of action which the Prussian Government might affect to wish to retain, he could only observe that if the Imperial Government had adopted their views, it would have become necessary to instruct the Austrian Representatives in London and Paris to lend the weight of their support to the proceedings to be adopted by the Prussian Minister; that, moreover, it was suggested that an attempt should be made to induce the other States of the Confederation to adopt a similar policy, and as this could only be done by the concerted influence of the two Great German Powers, he considered that the cooperation of Austria had certainly been invited by Prussia, however obscure might be the language in which she had veiled her proposal, or however vague might be that proposal itself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 173.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 139.)

My Lord, *Vienna, October 3, 1855.*

COUNT BUOL returned to Vienna on Saturday last, after an absence of about three weeks.

Upon my waiting on his Excellency at the Foreign Office, he said he must take that first opportunity of expressing to me his gratification at the great events which had taken place in the Crimea during his absence from Vienna, the intelligence of which had caused him the greatest pleasure; and he begged me to convey these sentiments to your Lordship, with the assurance of their entire sincerity.

It was not, however, only his own feelings which he wished to express to your Lordship, but he was anxious Her Majesty's Government should be made aware how entirely they were in conformity with those of His Majesty the Emperor Francis Joseph.

His Majesty had received the intelligence of the fall of Sebastopol with the most lively satisfaction, and the pleasure he had derived from hearing of the brilliant exploit of the allied armies was increased by the hope that a step had thus been made towards the attainment of that solid peace which he longed to see established.

In His Majesty's name, therefore, as well as in his own, he requested me to convey these feelings to the knowledge of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 174.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 142.)

My Lord, *Vienna, October 3, 1855.*

COUNT BUOL remarked to me yesterday that the success of the allied armies in the Crimea had already been so brilliant and so great, that he hoped the two Governments would think it advisable to come to an understanding on the terms on which they considered peace might be made. He entirely disclaimed, on the part of the Imperial Government, the slightest desire to interfere or mediate between the belligerent parties, as might be seen from the answer they had lately returned to the Prussian Government, but he merely wished to suggest that the allies should be prepared with the terms of peace they might intend to offer.

I said this was a matter on which I had not received any instructions from Her Majesty's Government, but I had no hesitation in stating it as my own individual opinion that they had no intention whatever of offering any terms of peace; that when Russia was really desirous of peace, she would make known the conditions upon which she was willing to conclude it, and that these conditions would then receive from Her Majesty's Government, in concert with that of His Majesty the Emperor of the French, all the consideration which might appear to be due to them.

Count Buol remarked that he did not think it would be practicable to adhere to this course; if, for instance, the Russian Government were to say, "The allies have had a great success, and we are anxious for peace; let us know the conditions on which we can have it,"—how, he persisted, would it then be possible to refuse to state them?

I replied that in this case I apprehended the answer would be, that as the objects for which England and France had entered upon the war had been openly declared, if the Russian Government were desirous of peace, they should

state the means by which they proposed that those objects should be carried into effect.

I repeated, however, that in expressing this opinion I was in no wise authorized to give it as that of Her Majesty's Government.

Count Buol also stated that in suggesting what he considered might be the course of the Russian Government, he must not be understood as having any knowledge of their intentions, as he was entirely without information on this point; and, indeed, he had not even seen Prince Gortchakoff since his return to Vienna.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 175.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 104.)

My Lord, *Berlin, October 5, 1855.*

ON waiting upon Baron Manteuffel this morning, his Excellency informed me that he had just received a visit from Baron Brunnow, late Russian Envoy at Her Majesty's Court.

In answer to my inquiry as to what impression he had received from Baron Brunnow with regard to the present feelings and views of the Imperial Cabinet, his Excellency replied that at this moment, in consequence of the absence from St. Petersburgh of the Emperor and the Court, there had been a stagnation in political affairs. I could gather, however, from his general observations, although conveyed in very vague and mysterious language, that there was, on the one hand, a great desire to terminate the war, and a feeling of anxiety to escape from the arduous difficulties and dangers which threatened the safety of the Empire; while, on the other hand, there evidently interposed a feeling of determined obstinacy to make no concessions or terms which should be humiliating to the honour and national pride of Russia.

Baron Brunnow remarked to Baron Manteuffel that it must not be supposed that affairs were carried on now at St. Petersburgh in the same way as under the late Emperor, whose iron will suffered no dictation. It appears that Baron Brunnow represented the Emperor Alexander as being mild, moderate, and anxiously disposed for peace, but at the same time he admitted the great obstacles which often interposed, and which rendered his own will subservient to that of others.

Baron Manteuffel told me that the Grand Duke Constantine had left Nicolaieff to join the army in the Crimea, and that the movements of the Emperor were undecided, but that it was supposed that he would return to St. Petersburgh.

I could elicit no information from his Excellency as to any determinations with respect to the Crimea, or other military matters.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 176.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 105.)

My Lord, *Berlin, October 5, 1855.*

AT an interview I had this day with Baron Manteuffel, I read to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch to me No. 49 of the 2nd instant, relating the communication made to your Lordship by Count Brandenburg, conveying the King of Prussia's offer of "mediation" between the belligerent Powers.

On my pronouncing the word "mediation" his Excellency immediately stopped me to remark that there was no mention of "mediation" in the instructions which he had forwarded to Count Brandenburg, but that they had merely

conveyed an expression of the readiness of His Majesty to offer his good offices if they could be of any avail.

I told his Excellency that I had learnt that Count Brandenburg had only made a verbal communication to your Lordship, to which Baron Manteuffel replied that he had received orders to read his despatch to your Lordship if you had wished it.

I then read to his Excellency that part of my despatch No. 73 to the phrase which terminates with reporting that "he had only that very moment told Baron Budberg of the steps he had taken," and his Excellency acknowledged that I had most accurately reported to your Lordship the terms he had used.

When on this subject his Excellency said that it appeared likewise that there had been some misrepresentation at Vienna of the nature and intentions of the Prussian communication, and although he considered the matter now at an end, he intended to address a despatch to Count Arnim at Vienna to explain the views which had dictated the step he had taken, and he further added that it should be communicated to the Cabinets of London and Paris.

Baron Manteuffel avowed to me that he had originally proposed that His Majesty should address himself to St. Petersburgh, and that he should have first required from Russia the terms she was prepared to offer for peace before taking any steps in London or Paris, but that His Majesty had thought that any previous application to St. Petersburgh (where he had already met with rebuffs) would have given an appearance of complicity on his part in favour of Russia.

He further stated that he had consented to make these proposals to the Cabinets of London and Paris, as His Majesty, after the victorious successes of the allies in the Crimea, was most desirous of making a fresh attempt to reconcile the contending parties, and that he did not conceive that he could refuse to His Majesty a proposal which in no way compromised the position of Prussia.

I then repeated to his Excellency that he might be assured that neither England nor France were desirous of continuing the war one hour after that the objects for which it had been undertaken were obtained; but I said that naturally, in our present position, the offers for peace must emanate from Russia. He then inquired of me why we could make no advances? I replied to him that we had laboured for peace with Prussia for a certain time, and without her at the late Conferences, and that Russia alone had been the obstacle to its attainment. Under present circumstances he must clearly understand that it was not possible for us to state the terms on which peace could be concluded, without thus enabling Russia to weigh the chances of war against the value of the concessions required by the allies

His Excellency acknowledged the truth and justice of my reasoning.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 177.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 8.)

(Secret and Confidential.)

Berlin, October 5, 1855.

My Lord,

BARON MANTEUFFEL after some hesitation, and requesting that I would consider his communication as being made in the strictest confidence, informed me to-day that he had learnt that the Russian Government had some intention of sending a confidential agent to Paris to treat for peace.

Baron Brunnow having only just left his Excellency previous to my interview, I conclude that his Excellency either received this information from him, or in a private letter from Baron Werther, of which Baron Brunnow was the bearer.

I lost no time in transmitting this important information to your Lordship by telegraph.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 178.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 121.)

Berlin, October 12, 1855.

My Lord,

I ENDEAVOURED to extract from Baron Manteuffel this evening with what view Baron Brunnow had made so long a stay at Berlin, and whether he had been charged with any special communication to this Government. His Excellency said that Baron Brunnow had not been charged with any mission to the Prussian Government; that he had called upon him on his arrival here; but that he had received no official communication from the Imperial Cabinet through him. Baron Manteuffel stated that he had insisted on seeing the King, and had been invited to-day to dine at Sans Souci; but that the King had held no political communication with him beyond replying to Baron Brunnow when he expressed the desire of the Emperor of Russia for peace, "that he was fully convinced of it, but the allies were equally desirous of bringing the war to an end, and that Russia should, therefore, take the initiative in submitting the terms on which she was prepared to treat."

Baron Brunnow appears to have hinted to Baron Manteuffel that on the return of the Emperor of Russia to his capital, after his journey to the south, His Imperial Majesty may see things more clearly, and may be more inclined to peace; and from a remark which Baron Manteuffel made use of to Baron Malaret, the French Chargé d'Affaires, there is reason to suppose that overtures for peace will shortly be made by Russia.

Baron Manteuffel considers that the Russian Government are most anxious for peace, notwithstanding the various assertions to the contrary, and the impressions which they seek to spread abroad that they are fully prepared for future campaigns. Their great difficulty lies in proposing such terms as would be acceptable to the allies without being derogatory to their national vanity, more especially as they have no clue to the additional demands which may be exacted from them by the Western Powers.

Baron Manteuffel mentioned that Baron Brunnow had likewise repeated the expression attributed to Prince Gortchakoff, "Que la Russie était muette, mais pas sourde," and Baron Manteuffel states that the language of Baron Brunnow was generally pacific.

Baron Brunnow will leave Berlin to-morrow for Frankfort and Darmstadt.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 179.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 127.)

Berlin, October 13, 1855.

My Lord,

I AM informed by a person lately arrived from St. Petersburgh, that early last spring General Perowski set out from Southern Russia with an army of 40,000 men under his command for Khiva. This expedition has been undertaken with the utmost secrecy. The officers on leave at St. Petersburgh were ordered to join their respective corps without knowing what direction the army was to take, and the reports of General Perowski are addressed direct to the Emperor without passing through the Ministry of War.

The object of this expedition would appear to be, to gain possession of Khiva, and from thence to menace Persia. The difficulties of this campaign are already known (by the failure of General Perowski's expedition in 1840) to be very great; but if it should prove successful the gain to Russia will be very important, inasmuch as if Persia once becomes a tributary of the Russian Empire, the Turkish provinces of Asia Minor, which are constantly in revolt, will fall an

easy prey to the invader. Russia, if thwarted in her march to Constantinople by the Balkan, may form expectations of arriving there, at some future day, by a more circuitous but more certain route through Asia Minor.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 180.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 148.)
My Lord, *Vienna, October 10, 1855.*

IN reply to a question I put to Count Buol, respecting the nature of the reports he received as to the present disposition of the public at St. Petersburgh, he informed me that, at the date of his last accounts, there was no appearance of any pacific feeling prevailing there.

The loss of Sebastopol had been felt as a severe blow, but the general impression was in favour of a continuance of a vigorous and energetic resistance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 181.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 122. Secret and Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, October 12, 1855.*

I AM informed, from a very secret and confidential private source, that Austria is using every endeavour to gain over Prussia, and that proposals have been made to this Government to conclude an Offensive and Defensive Treaty, combining with it a guarantee by Prussia of the whole Austrian territory. I am told that these proposals have been declined, and that on the communication of this reply by Count Arnim, Count Buol showed great irritation and violence of temper.

Not having received this intelligence from an official quarter, I cannot of course vouch for its authenticity, but I have great faith in the private and confidential source from whence I derived it, and which I have hitherto found to be correct, and I therefore feel it to be my duty to report it to your Lordship, with the request that it may be considered as secret and confidential.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 182.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 124.)
My Lord, *Berlin, October 13, 1855.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship a translation of the note addressed by Baron Manteuffel to Count Arnim, the Prussian Minister at Vienna, on the 13th ultimo, inviting the Austrian Cabinet to support the steps which the King of Prussia had taken in London and Paris for the reestablishment of peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 182.

Baron Manteuffel to Count Arnim.

(Translation.) *Berlin, September 13, 1855.*

THE telegraph has brought us from time to time the news of the capture of the Malakhoff Tower; of the retreat to the north side of Sebastopol; and of the destruction of the Russian fleet. We do not yet know the particulars of these events; we do not yet know what impression they have made either in St. Petersburgh, in London, or in Paris; but we believe not to be mistaken in supposing it will cause a great influence on the general situation of things. We hope that it may possibly bring about an understanding between the belligerent Powers. This hope is based on the reflection of those circumstances on which the closing of the Vienna Conferences followed. What was it that caused the rupture of negotiations? Without regard to the principal point—merely the refusal of Russia to limit her fleet to a fixed extent, and on the side of the Western Powers the conviction that the solution proposed by Russia and Austria was not of a nature to cause a suitable balance of power in the Black Sea between the contending Powers—the Western Powers saw a perpetual danger to the independence of Turkey in the disproportion between the Russian and Turkish fleets. Now, indeed, this disproportion exists no longer. The fate of the Russian fleet was sealed the moment the south side of Sebastopol fell into the hands of Russia's opponents. With this act the former propositions of the allies appeared in a new light. No one will deny that even before this the maritime power of Russia was shut out of the Black Sea, and that therefore no important change will take place; for the Russian flag was prevented, even before the fall of Sebastopol, from showing itself in that sea, but it demanded a continual expenditure of force on the part of the allies to produce this result. To-day the position is different. The English and French fleets can leave the Black Sea without abandoning the Porte to an overpowering opponent. If it was formerly the object to limit the preponderance of Russia, it only rests now to prevent the fresh continuance of such a superiority. If it was judged necessary to limit the Russian ships to a certain number in the first instance, now it can only be necessary for Russia to promise not to increase her fleet above a certain extent. We do not know whether Russia will consent to enter into such an agreement, for, as above remarked, we have no news as to the impressions which the late events on the field of battle have caused in St. Petersburgh, still less has the Russian Court informed us upon what conditions it is ready to enter upon fresh Treaties for peace. Whatever it may be, we are disposed to admit that an engagement of this kind would at present be useless, in order to obtain that object which the Western Powers have inscribed upon their colours. It is true that if Russia does not agree to an engagement of this kind she will be able to build a new fleet, stronger and more dangerous than the one destroyed. In the meantime will they, in the event of such a possibility, continue a strife which has already cost such sacrifices and brought such deep wounds to the prosperity of the people? We do not believe it, for though it is possible it is not probable. Without doubt the present war has exhausted Russia's financial powers to the last degree; it is therefore not to be supposed that she will soon be in a position to retrieve her losses.

Turkey, on the other hand, inasmuch as she reserves to herself the right of opening the Straits to her allies when she considers her independence to be threatened, finds herself in a position at any moment to put a stop to a menacing attitude of the Russian fleet. And Russia, even if she possessed all the materials for the speedy reconstruction of her ships, would guard herself from defying the unanimous voice of Europe, and, by aspiring for the command of the Black Sea, from counting among her enemies those Powers who to-day believe in the sincerity of her peaceful intentions. We will never dispute the sanctity of Treaties. We will not recall to our memory the words of a Russian despatch which quotes the possibility of the force of circumstances compelling Russia to agree to the conditions of her opponents. But we doubt that stipulated agreements will weigh heavier than actual deeds, and we believe that force of circumstances, as long as they appear lasting, is more binding than an Article of Treaty. Therefore we think that the present moment is auspicious for the renewal of

negotiations, and we consider it to be the duty of those Powers not taking part in the strife to offer their good services in favour of peace. It would give us the greatest satisfaction if Prussia, in common with Austria and Germany, were to express their readiness to lay before the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh the conditions of peace of the Western Powers. Such a joint work of peace has always appeared to the King to be the aim of our policy, and His Majesty regrets that the obligations which Austria has contracted towards the Western Powers places him in a different position to that of his German allies. Nevertheless, the last months have proved that our mode of looking at things is more in accord with that of the Imperial Cabinet than it appeared to be at first, and we may therefore hope that the unity of Prussia, Austria, and Germany may be proved, if not by a common, still by an unanimous mode of proceeding. At all events, we deem it necessary to inform the Imperial Cabinet of our views and our intentions. Your Excellency will therefore confidentially communicate to the *ad interim* Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs that Counts Hatzfeldt and Brandenburg have received orders to express the foregoing opinions. It will be of great interest to us to hear what kind of reception this communication has received at Vienna.

(Signed) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 183.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 73.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 15, 1855.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch No. 124 of the 13th instant, inclosing a copy of a note addressed by Baron Manteuffel to Count Arnim on the 13th ultimo, expressing the desire of Prussia, in concert with Austria and Germany, to act as mediator between the allies and Russia.

The real object of this note is to feel the ground for a league between Austria, Prussia, and the Diet, in order to exercise the pressure of United Germany upon the Western Powers, and to induce them to make a peace which would relieve Russia from her present difficulties; but the Prussian Government will be disappointed in its endeavours to force upon England and France a mediation which has not been invited and will not be accepted.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 184.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Elliot.

(No. 114.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 15, 1855.

WITH reference to your despatches Nos. 121 and 133 of the 27th and 30th ultimo, I inclose, for your information, a copy of a despatch* from Baron Manteuffel to Count Arnim, which has been communicated to me by Lord Augustus Loftus, relative to the desire of the King of Prussia, in concert with Austria and Germany, to act as mediator between the allies and Russia.

I likewise inclose a copy of a despatch† which I have addressed to Lord Augustus Loftus thereupon.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* Inclosure in No. 182.

† No. 183.

No. 185.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 1,346.)

My Lord, *Paris, October* 15, 1855.

M. DE HURNER has been charged to convey to the Emperor the congratulations of the Emperor of Austria on the fall of Sebastopol, and on the results which it must entail.

Count Walewski informs me that the terms of the despatch addressed to M. de Hübner are most friendly and complimentary to the Emperor. M. de Hübner has asked permission of His Majesty to deliver the message in person, but although the request was made eight days ago, no day has been fixed for his reception. I should observe further, that M. de Hübner was not invited to the dinner and party given at St. Cloud, on Saturday, in honour of the Duke and Duchess of Brabant, although the Duchess is an Austrian Princess, and the Turkish Ambassador, the Sardinian Minister, and myself were present. I mention these circumstances, as they prove that the Emperor has neither forgotten nor forgiven the conduct of Austria.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 186.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 1,347. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, October* 15, 1855.

M. BOUDI, a gentleman attached to the King of Sweden's Court, arrived here a few days ago, the bearer of His Majesty's picture for the Emperor.

Admiral Virgin, who, as your Lordship knows, was for some time Swedish Minister in London, is likewise shortly expected, with the order of the Seraphim, for His Imperial Majesty.

Count Walewski has stated to me confidentially his conviction that the King of Sweden is ready to enter into any engagements which the allies may propose to him. He says that the mission above mentioned has been confided to Admiral Virgin from his known inclinations in favour of the Western Powers, and on account of the intimate relations which existed between the Admiral and himself, while the former was in England.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 187.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 775.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 4, 1855.

I HAVE communicated with the French Ambassador on the subject of your Lordship's instructions respecting the infliction of punishment on persons changing their religion in this country. His Excellency said that although he had not yet received any special instruction from his Government on the subject, he should have no difficulty in cooperating with me under his general instructions, for an object of so much interest and utility. Your Lordship needs not to be assured that it will afford me the highest satisfaction to carry out Her Majesty's pleasure in that respect.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 188.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 1,363.)

Paris, October 17, 1855.

My Lord,

I SUBMITTED some days ago to Marshal Vaillant the resons which induced Her Majesty's Government to think that the docks at Sebastopol should be immediately destroyed. The Marshal promised to take the Emperor's orders on the subject.

This morning I had an opportunity of speaking to His Imperial Majesty myself. His Majesty said that there were good arguments both for destroying and preserving the docks; and if it was certain that they could be destroyed at the last moment, he should prefer letting them continue in their present state, since their destruction would be looked upon by the Russian Government as showing an intention on the part of the allies to restore the Crimea eventually to Russia. On the other hand, His Majesty felt that to destroy them after negotiations for peace shall have been renewed, would not, perhaps, be a dignified proceeding on the part of the allies. On the whole, therefore, he agreed with Her Majesty's Government that it was desirable to undertake the work of demolition at once.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 189.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Mugenis.

(No. 41.)

Foreign Office, October 18, 1855.

Sir,

AS considerable delay has unavoidably taken place in resuming the question of a Treaty with Sweden, it will be convenient to recapitulate what has passed on the subject.

I stated to you in my despatch No. 21 of the 28th of June, that, "with reference to the attempts which have of late years been made by Russia to obtain a footing in Norway, which attempts Russia, so far from abandoning, is evidently intent upon pushing forward at the first convenient opportunity, as is sufficiently proved by the coercive measures she has put in force against Norway, in consequence of the refusal of the latter to accede to the repeated demands of Russia for the concession of more extended fishing-rights on the coast of Norway; with reference also to the fortifications, commenced with so much secrecy, and upon a scale so vast, at Bomarsund, which leave no doubt that the ambitious designs of Russia are as menacing to the safety and independence of Europe in the north as they have been proved to be in the south, and that in a few years her power, if unchecked, would become most dangerous; Her Majesty's Government, taking these facts into consideration, and being earnestly desirous to prove the friendly feelings by which Her Majesty is animated towards her ally the King of Sweden and Norway, and to render him any assistance in resisting the demands which, at the conclusion of peace, will, no doubt, again be addressed to him by Russia, will be prepared to enter into an agreement by which the King of Sweden and Norway shall declare his intention to make no concession to Russia, whether of fishery-rights, or pasturage-rights, or of territory; and the Queen of Great Britain shall engage, should any attempt be made by Russia to obtain any such concessions by force, to come to the assistance of the King of Sweden and Norway, with such an amount of naval force as may be necessary for the purpose of repelling any aggressive act on the part of Russia.

It appeared from your reports of your communications with the Swedish Government on these matters, that it had not escaped their notice that much danger would result to Great Britain if Russia should succeed in obtaining a port in Finmark, especially in the Warenger Fiord, where the sea never freezes, and

where there exists every capability for making it the Sebastopol of the north, which it would speedily become in the hands of Russia.

It further appeared that notwithstanding the urgency of the Swedish Government to induce the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh to settle at once a question touching rights of fishing, that Cabinet had evaded doing so on the ground that when Russia was engaged in so great a war it was impossible to attend to so trivial a subject—a proceeding which the Swedish Government considered as justifying suspicion of the ulterior intentions of Russia; and it also appeared that the Swedish Government looked upon the overture which you were instructed to make to it, as the most important event which had occurred for the policy of the north of Europe since the commencement of the present war, being of opinion that if the ambitious designs of Russia were checked in the south, she would endeavour by increased activity to obtain in the north a compensation for that check; and this consideration appeared to weigh with the Swedish Government as an inducement to come into such an arrangement as that which you were instructed to lay before it.

The result of the communication which your French colleague had with the Swedish Government, served to show that that Government was of opinion that the object which England and France had in making such an overture as that which you had laid before it, and which had also been submitted to it by the French Minister, could only be obtained by a defensive Treaty extending to all the Swedish and Norwegian possessions, and the Swedish Government was therefore desirous that the proposed defensive Treaty should extend to both of those kingdoms; the object being to strengthen and support Sweden in establishing a barrier against Russian aggrandisement in the north; because if Russia were to obtain possession of Gothland, she would at once command the Baltic; and if of Landskrona, she would command the Sound.

Her Majesty's Government cannot but agree with you that such would be the result of Russia obtaining possession of these positions; and as regards Gothland more particularly, the Port of Stilo in that island being rarely frozen, Russia by acquiring possession of it would not only reap all the benefits of a commanding position in the Baltic, but would also achieve one of the great objects of her ambition, by occupying a port from which her fleets could, with very rare exceptions, put to sea at any period of the year.

Her Majesty's Government concur in your opinion that the danger to England would indeed in that case be less imminent than if Russia obtained a port in Finmark, but that it would still be considerable: and every successful aggression of Russia would increase her power, and weaken the power of resistance of Sweden.

Her Majesty's Government also concur in your opinion that a general guarantee of the Swedish possessions, though apparently involving a greater responsibility, would practically avert all future danger; since the fact of a guarantee on the part of two Powers like England and France would, when known, put a stop to any projects of aggrandizement which Russia might cherish against Sweden, whilst such a guarantee could hardly fail to bind Sweden more closely to the interests and cause of the Western Powers.

Her Majesty's Government having taken the whole subject into their mature consideration, have determined, in concurrence with the Government of the Emperor of the French, to accede to the wish of the Swedish Government that under certain contingencies the whole of the Swedish and Norwegian territories should be guaranteed by England and France; and you are accordingly instructed to propose to the acceptance of the Swedish Government the Treaty of which a draft is inclosed.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 189.

Project of Treaty.

SA Majesté l'Empereur des Français, Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, et Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède et de Norvège, désirant prévenir toute complication de nature à troubler l'équilibre

Européen, ont résolu de s'entendre dans le but d'assurer l'intégrité du Royaume de Suède et Norvège, et ont nommé Plénipotentiaires pour conclure un Traité à cet effet, savoir :

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, &c.

Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni, &c.,

Et Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède et de Norvège, &c.

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs respectifs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenues de ce qui suit :—

Article I. Le Roi de Suède et de Norvège s'engage à ne céder à Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, et à ne lui permettre d'occuper, aucune partie des territoires appartenant aux Couronnes de Suède et de Norvège. Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède et de Norvège s'engage en outre à ne céder à Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie aucune droit de pâturage, de pêche, ou de quelque autre nature que ce soit, tant sur les dits territoires que sur les côtes de Suède et de Norvège, et à repousser toute prétention que pourrait élever la Russie à établir l'existence d'aucun des droits précités.

Art. II. Dans les cas où l'Empereur de Russie ferait à Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède et de Norvège, quelque proposition ou demande ayant pour objet d'obtenir soit la cession d'une partie quelconque des territoires appartenant aux Couronnes de Suède et de Norvège, soit la faculté d'occuper certains points des dits territoires, soit la cession de droits de pêche, de pâturage, ou toute autre sur ces mêmes territoires et sur les côtes de Suède et de Norvège, Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède et de Norvège s'engage à communiquer immédiatement cette proposition ou demande à Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français et à Sa Majesté Britannique : et les dites Majestés prennent de leur côté l'engagement de mettre à la disposition de Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède et de Norvège des forces navales et militaires suffisantes pour résister aux prétentions de l'Empereur de Russie. La nature, l'importance, et la destination des forces dont il s'agit seront, le cas échéant, arrêtées d'un commun accord entre les trois Puissances.

Art. III. Le présent Traité sera ratifié, &c.

No. 190.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Magenis.

(No. 42.)

Foreign Office, October 18, 1855.

Sir,

HER Majesty's Government having determined, in conjunction with that of the Emperor of the French, to accede to the wishes of the Swedish Government, and to extend to the whole of Sweden and Norway the guarantee which they originally limited to Finmark alone, I consider it my duty to place on record the motives which have led to this determination, and which have induced the two Governments not to require of Sweden, in return for this guarantee, to enter into any engagement, present or prospective, to take part in the war against Russia.

Such an engagement would be a totally different thing, and have a totally different bearing, from the Treaty which you have been authorized to propose to the Swedish Government. It would be to ask Sweden to take a step tending sooner or later to engage her as a party in the war we are now waging, and, of course, tending to engage England and France to cooperate with Sweden; whereas the Treaty which they propose is entirely a measure of prospective precaution, and leaves untouched the condition of the present. It may be followed or not, as shall hereafter appear expedient, by an accession of Sweden to the alliance; but it will not constitute a state of hostility on the part of Sweden against Russia, and it will not, therefore, compel us to allot military forces to aid in her defence against her neighbour.

The Treaty will be the attainment by anticipation of part of the objects of the war, the main and real object of which is to curb the aggressive ambition of Russia. England and France went to war to save Turkey from falling into the hands of Russia; but as they have a strong interest in preventing the encroachments of that Power upon Sweden and Norway, they are justified in taking measures for that object; and England and France will gain greatly if they are

able by diplomacy to check the aggression of Russia in the Baltic as they are now doing by force of arms in the Black Sea.

It would be incorrect to say that Sweden may safely be left to take care of her own territory, and to call upon England and France for aid when her territory is in danger. First of all the knowledge of such a Treaty will be a powerful check upon Russia, and will prevent her from pressing Sweden as she has been in the habit of pressing Turkey, and carrying her point by a *coup de main* before application for support and assistance could be made, considered, agreed to, and complied with. In the next place Sweden, if left free to act as she liked, might have inducements held out to her which might lead her to consent to Russian demands. Russia, for instance, might propose an exchange of Aland and Bomarsund for the Warenger Fiord in Finmark, and the exchange might in some respects be a benefit to Sweden, but it would be one full of danger to England and France, and yet if there were no Treaty they would have no right to object. Her Majesty's Government are therefore disposed to regard the Treaty in question as part of a long line of circumvallation to confine the future extension of Russia, even if by the events of war her outposts should not be driven in at any part of her present circumference; and we must never forget that whatever the conditions of peace may be, the Russian Government will labour, the moment peace is concluded, to strengthen all that has been found weak; to prepare for aggression everything that has hitherto been ineffective; to redeem by encroachments on the weak the position and power which she will have lost by the assaults of the strong; and that by endeavouring effectually to confine her on all sides we shall take the best means of avoiding future collisions.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 191.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 137.)

Berlin, October 20, 1855.

My Lord,

I AM informed that since the Council of War, held on the Emperor of Russia's first arrival at Nicolaieff, some change has apparently taken place in the decisions then taken. General Baron Lieven, Chief of the Etat-Major of the Russian army, has been (as I am informed) sent by the Emperor to the Crimean army, and is charged with full powers to decide whether further military operations shall be carried on in defence of the Crimea, or whether its immediate evacuation shall take place. The position of Prince Gortchakoff's army is daily becoming one of greater danger and risk. He is unable to act on the offensive, and has been vainly awaiting an attack and an advance of the allied armies; in the meantime his rear is threatened; and every day now lost is of the utmost consequence, should he find himself compelled to retreat.

Various rumours, though none of a very substantial nature, are current here of the intended evacuation of the Crimea by the Russians; but they seem to rest more on the general opinion entertained in the military circles, that this step is not only the most advisable for Prince Gortchakoff to take, but that it is indispensably necessary for the safety of the Russian army.

The Emperor's return to St. Petersburgh is indefinitely postponed; and I am informed that His Imperial Majesty, shortly after his arrival at Nicolaieff, proceeded as far as Perekop to review the Grenadiers and some militia regiments, numbering about 30,000 men, now stationed there. The prolonged stay of the Emperor in the south is attributed to his desire to await the decision to be taken by Baron Lieven and Prince Gortchakoff, and partly, also, the arrival there of the Russian army, if they determine to evacuate the Crimea.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 192.

Mr. Elliot to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 159.)
My Lord, *Vienna, October 17, 1855.*

COUNT BUOL informs me that the telegraphic communications he has received, both from St. Petersburgh and from Odessa, tend to confirm the belief that the Russians meditate the evacuation of the Crimea.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY ELLIOT.

No. 193.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 807.)
My Lord, *Therapia, October 9, 1855.*

THE French Ambassador informed me yesterday that he had been received by the Sultan the day before at an audience, of which the ostensible object was the delivery of an Imperial letter concerning Veli Pasha's recall from the Embassy at Paris. His Excellency told me that he had gratified the Sultan by informing him that Osman Pasha, who commanded and was taken prisoner at Sinope, had been exchanged for a Russian General taken by the French; and that His Majesty had given him assurances of his intention to enforce reform and to bring all classes of his subjects, if I understood M. Thouvenel right, in harmonious relations with each other.

It is to be hoped that so fair a promise will be realized without unnecessary delays. I have received so many pledges of similar purport with tardy or abortive results, that I need proof to secure my confidence. I repeated to M. Thouvenel that, in my opinion, the only real ground of hope for working out the regeneration of the Empire, was the joint concurrent action of the two Embassies, properly directed and strenuously exerted. It requires but little discernment to perceive that, without the vigorous application of such a lever, national prejudice, religious antagonism, Eastern apathy, and official corruption will frustrate every good intention and every friendly admonition.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 194.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 813.)
My Lord, *Therapia, October 11, 1855.*

SINCE I last had the honour of addressing your Lordship, I have prepared the draft of a note for presentation to Fuad Pasha, with the view of carrying into effect your Lordship's instructions on the subject of religious persecutions in Turkey, and particularly of punishment inflicted, in pursuance of law, on apostates from Islamism.

Yesterday I called upon the French Ambassador by appointment, and resumed, amongst other matters, the short conversation which I had previously had with his Excellency on that subject. On the former occasion he told me that he had not yet received any special instructions, but that he thought himself at liberty to enter upon the question under his general instructions. At our interview yesterday, he repeated that he was still without instructions authorizing him to act with me for the special object prescribed by your Lordship; and when I showed him Lord Cowley's despatch reporting Count Walewski's assent to your Lordship's proposition, and his promise that corresponding instructions

should be sent to the Ambassador forthwith, he persisted in declining to take any part in the affair, and expressed, on the contrary, opinions directly and strongly adverse to the demand which I am enjoined to press upon the Porte's acceptance. Having failed to produce any change of purpose on his part by reading such passages from your Lordship's despatch to me as best displayed the strength of argument and force of resolution which characterize that important instruction, I dropped the discussion without declaring any intention as to the course I should pursue, or communicating the draft, which I had in my pocket, of the official note prepared for Fuad Pasha.

Another mail will perhaps bring the corrective of this defect in my colleague's position; but judging from the decided manner in which M. Thouvenel expressed his personal objections, I feel how important it is that the instructions from Paris should leave no room for any essential deviation on his part from the course of proceeding, or at least from the line of argument and requisition, which I am commanded to pursue.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 195.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 864.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 24, 1855.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 807 of the 9th instant, I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government approve of the language which you held to M. de Thouvenel as to the course to be pursued by the two Embassies towards the Porte, and they entirely concur in the opinions expressed by you on this subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 196.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 1,238.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 24, 1855.*

I COMMUNICATED to Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte a copy of your Excellency's despatch No. 1,257 of the 21st ultimo, stating that Count Walewski would join Her Majesty's Government in making representations to the Government of the Porte on the subject of religious persecutions in Turkey; and I now inclose to your Excellency, for communication to the French Government, a copy of a despatch* which I have received from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, reporting a conversation which his Excellency had with M. de Thouvenel on this subject.

I am, &c
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 197.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 1,398.)
My Lord, *Paris, October 24, 1855.*

I TOOK a copy, on its passage through Paris, of Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe's despatch No. 813 of the 11th instant, to your Lordship, in which his Excellency relates the conversation which he had had with M. de Thouvenel on the subject of religious persecution in Turkey; and that Ambassador's refusal

* No. 194.

to join him in addressing the Porte to prevent the infliction of punishment on future apostates from Islamism.

As M. de Thouvenel assured Lord Stratford that he had received no instructions to act in this matter, I reminded Count Walewski of what had taken place on this subject between his Excellency and myself, and asked him how it happened that the promised instructions had not been sent. His Excellency replied that he was afraid he must admit that he had forgotten to transmit them. Upon my urging him to forward them at once, he said that he had heard from M. de Thouvenel on the subject, and that he thought there were cogent reasons for not pressing the question upon the Porte at the present moment. When he had expressed to me, some weeks ago, an agreement in your Lordship's views, he had understood the question to be limited to the abolition of the punishment of death in cases of apostacy; but he now found that it had assumed a much wider range, and that the Porte was to be asked to make a formal declaration that apostates should be visited with no punishment whatever. He did not think that, supposing it possible to obtain such a declaration, it would be prudent to risk, at the present moment, the outcry which would be raised against the Sultan for giving it, by the more fanatic portion of the Turkish population. It would, perhaps, be better to urge it when the question of religious toleration came to be discussed in the consideration of the fourth point.

If Count Walewski made any mistake as to the scope of the instructions which your Lordship desired should be addressed to the French Ambassador at Constantinople, it is his own fault; for he had read your Lordship's despatch No. 1,033 of the 17th ultimo,* stating the views of Her Majesty's Government on this subject.

Upon the general question, I observed to him that Her Majesty's Government considered that there could not be a more fitting moment to bring the matter before the Porte than the present; that I presumed he was of the same opinion as Her Majesty's Government, that no punishment should be inflicted on Mahomedans who embraced Christianity; and that I could not conceive why M. de Thouvenel should not be instructed to support any representations which Lord Stratford might make upon the subject.

Count Walewski rejoined that he assented of course to the general principle, but that he must leave to M. de Thouvenel to decide the mode and moment in which it should be pressed upon the Porte. He again adverted to the discussion on the fourth point as furnishing, in his opinion, the best opportunity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 197 *a*.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 1,033.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 17, 1855.

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, that in consequence of the representations contained in the memorial inclosed in your despatch No. 1,187 of the 7th instant, and of similar representations which have reached Her Majesty's Government from other quarters, I have instructed Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe† to call the serious attention of the Porte to the persecution to which Mahometans in Turkey who may renounce Islamism and embrace Christianity are still exposed, in violation, if not of the strict letter, at all events of the spirit of the firman granted by the Sultan in the year 1844, at the instance of Her Majesty's Ambassador, declaring that the punishment of death should no longer be inflicted on seceders from Islamism.

Her Majesty's Government doubt not that the Government of the Emperor will share with them in the conviction, that if on general principles the abrogation of such an odious practice as that of putting persons to death for changing their religion might justly be urged at any time on the Porte, the Christian Powers by whose assistance alone the Porte has been enabled to avert the

* See No. 197*a*.

† See No. 197*b*.

destruction with which it was menaced, have at present a peculiar right to press the question on the serious attention of the Turkish Government; and your Excellency will therefore suggest to Count Walewski to instruct M. de Thouvenel to join his efforts to those of Her Majesty's Ambassador to induce the Porte formally to declare that henceforth no punishment shall be inflicted on persons who may renounce the Mahometan religion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 197 *b*.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 723.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, September* 17, 1855.

THE memorial to Her Majesty of which I inclose a copy for your Excellency's information, and which is referred to in Lord Cowley's despatch No. 1,187, of which a copy was transmitted to you in my despatch No. 709 of the 8th instant, relates to a subject to which public opinion is now anxiously directed, and it will be necessary to come to an understanding with the Porte, respecting the extent to which the law inflicting capital punishment on apostates from Islamism is really repealed.

The intervention of Christian Powers has already secured for those converts from the Armenian and Greek Churches who embrace the Roman Catholic religion within the Turkish dominions, immunity from the persecutions to which such persons were formerly exposed, but some cases to which public attention has of late been directed seem to show that seceders from those churches in Turkey who become Protestants do not enjoy a like immunity, and this inequality ought immediately to be rectified.

But it is not to this particular grievance, however much it may require to be redressed, that Her Majesty's Government confine their representations. There is an evil still more urgently demanding attention which you are instructed to bring under the serious notice of the Porte. The Turkish Government assured your Excellency some years ago that the Turkish law which inflicted the severest punishment upon Mussulmans who might become Christians had been repealed. Great doubts are entertained as to the correctness of that assurance, and instances are alleged to have happened since the date of those assurances—the one at Aleppo, the other at Adrianople—in which seceders from Islamism to Christianity were punished by death.

Her Majesty's Government are aware that it may be said by the Turkish Government that in those cases the victims suffered death, not for change of religion, but for blasphemy. But such an excuse would be mere evasion, because a departure from Mahometanism and the profession of Christianity must be accompanied by circumstances which a Turk would easily represent as constituting blasphemy.

This subject is one which must be pressed on the most serious and immediate attention of the Porte. The Turkish Government cannot expect that the great Christian Powers of Europe, who are making gigantic efforts and submitting to enormous sacrifices to save the Turkish Empire from ruin and destruction, can submit to the continuance of a law in Turkey which is not only a standing insult to them, but a source of cruel persecution towards their co-religionists, which they can never consent to perpetuate by the successes of their fleets and armies.

They are entitled to demand, and Her Majesty's Government do distinctly demand, that no punishment whatever shall attach to the Mahometan who becomes Christian, whether originally a Mahometan or originally a Christian, any more than any punishment attaches to a Christian who embraces Mahometanism. In all such cases the movements of human conscience must be left free, and the temporal arm must not interfere to coerce the spiritual decision.

If the Turkish Government should plead as a difficulty preventing compliance with this just demand, that to yield to it would require a violation of the law of the Koran, the ready answer would be that the Turkish Government can mould the law of the Koran as it pleases when it suits its convenience to do

so; and your Excellency might allege as an instance of this, that although Her Majesty's Government do not for a moment place the act of borrowing money on interest, and the punishment of men for changing their religion, upon a footing of similarity, yet, nevertheless, the borrowing of money on interest is as much and as directly forbidden by the Koran, as the change from Islamism to another faith; but the Turkish Government, when pressed by the exigencies of the service, and obliged to raise a loan for carrying on the war, has found means to overcome the obstacle erected by the prohibition in the Koran; and they could doubtless find in the precepts of the Koran itself good and sufficient grounds on which to rest an abolition of the barbarous law which inflicts punishment for changes of religion.

You will inquire into and make a detailed report respecting the cases said to have occurred at Aleppo and Adrianople.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 198.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 29.)

(No. 832.)

Therapia, October 16, 1855.

My Lord,

THE French Ambassador continuing to declare that no instructions similar to mine on the subject of punishment for apostacy had hitherto reached him, notwithstanding the assurances given in that respect to Lord Cowley by Count Walewski, and communicated to me by your Lordship, I have not felt myself at liberty to bring the question forward in as formal and decided a shape as I might otherwise have done, with a view to producing the necessary effect; but neither could I reconcile it with my sense of duty to keep your Lordship's representations in a state of abeyance until the result of a reference to London could be known at this distance. Instead, therefore, of presenting an official note, or demanding a conference, I called, without notice, on Fuad Pasha, and subsequently on the Grand Vizier, for the purpose of making inquiry as to the present state of the Turkish law concerning apostacy, and of making known to each of those Ministers the sentiments and expectations of Her Majesty's Government.

Having these objects in view, and guided by your Lordship's instructions, I entered into conversation with the Ottoman Secretary of State, who received my remarks and suggestions with much courtesy of manner and liberality of expression. He assured me that he had not heard of the executions at Aleppo and Adrianople; that the intentions of his Government were opposed to such acts of mistaken severity; and that, far from yielding to a spirit of religious persecution, or even of religious proselytism, himself and those who thought with him, did all in their power to dissuade Mahometan converts from carrying out their purpose, and to save apostates—whether originally Mussulmans or not—from punishment. He made no distinction between the two cases. He would not admit that Protestants were viewed with less favour than other religious classes in Turkey, but asserted, on the contrary, that the principle of Protestantism was one which the Porte found it her interest to encourage. If the Protestants really had reason to complain, their vexations were not attributable to the Turks so much as to their fellow-Christians of the Church they left. The Porte's system was essentially tolerant; the abolition of the haratch, and the admission of Christian evidence, had removed the principal grievances; those which remained were the effects of an imperfect administration, operating quite as much on the Mussulman as on the Christian. The Government was anxious to improve its administrative system, but so great a work could only be brought about gradually, by the introduction of successive reforms, leading to a total change. The only punishment to which offenders were liable on the score of religion, was that inflicted on persons guilty of blasphemy, by which was meant the offence of publicly disparaging the Prophet of Mecca, or either of his inspired precursors, Moses and Our Lord.

Such was, in substance, the language of Fuad Pasha, who, in the course of discussion, fully acknowledged the claims of Great Britain and its Christian

allies to the gratitude of the Porte, and also the necessity in which the latter was placed, of putting itself in harmony with the Powers of Christendom. He ended by remarking, in proof of his Government's sincerity, that while the Porte was urged only to treat its Christian subjects with equity, measures were in progress for investing them with a share of administrative power.

The Grand Vizier, whom I visited at a later hour, held much the same language as his colleague. Some shades of difference were, however, observable, arising perhaps from difference of position, or, it may be, from difference of character and opinion in the individuals. There was the same declaration as to religious tolerance, administrative reform, and the necessity of European connection; the same acknowledgment of benefits derived from the alliance; and the same assertion that blasphemy alone of religious offences, was now, in practice, liable to capital punishment. But there was by no means the same clear admission of the extent which I felt myself at liberty to give to the Sultan's promise and to the Porte's engagements of March 1844. The Vizier professed ignorance of the religious executions alleged to have taken place at Aleppo and Adrianople; he said that the penal laws were still unaltered, but that, in practice, the Government took care to prevent their application in cases of apostacy on the part of Christians. He was not disposed to favour conversions to Islamism, but, on the contrary, he had ever done his best, as occasions offered, to discourage individuals who professed a change of creed. He intimated, nevertheless, that the law was stubborn, if not unalterable; that the Christians among themselves were more intolerant and acrimonious than were the Turks towards them; that if liberty of conscience were to be generally established, there were countries in Christendom—such, for instance, as Tuscany—where improvement was more to be required than in Turkey; and that, considering the ignorance and fanaticism which still prevailed in parts of this Empire, it was more prudent, and perhaps in the end it would prove more effectual, to let the law become obsolete, as sometimes occurred even in England, than to shock the national prejudices by repealing it at once.

In reply to both Ministers, I employed the arguments which obviously occurred; and I read such passages of your Lordship's instruction as were best calculated to place our demand in its proper light, and to show with what conviction and serious, though friendly, determination Her Majesty's Government are prepared to urge its acceptance by the Porte. They would not admit that in making a loan they had departed from the law of the Koran, which, according to them, forbids only to take, but not to give, interest. The distinction, whether correct or otherwise, is of little consequence, as the Porte, in abolishing haratch, tore out a leaf, as Fuad expressed it, from the sacred volume. They know well, as I have often told them, that the regeneration of this Empire is, humanly speaking, impossible, while the principles and forms of legislation applied to administrative and judicial matters are invested with the inflexibility of Divine truths.

It has been found necessary to ascribe a suspending or dispensing power to the Head of the State; and in the exercise of that prerogative lies a principle of vitality capable of imparting fresh vigour under new forms to the most decayed institutions. Soliman the Magnificent departed as much from the established maxims of the Koran, when he made his first durable Treaty with France, as Sultan Abdul Medjid would do in setting his seal on the perpetual abolition of penal enactments against apostacy. That great and glorious Monarch perceived the necessities of his Empire in their very germ; and, with the foresight of genius, laid the first stone of that broad causeway over which the Western nations were in due season to advance to the succour of his descendants, not only with the pomp and powers of war, but yet more effectually with the arts of peace and the miracles of science.

When Aali Pasha made the invidious remark that much remained to be done in Christian countries for the emancipation of the human conscience, I reminded him of the total want of analogy which existed between the relations of those countries towards each other, and their common relation towards the Ottoman Empire, especially under the present circumstances of undeniable weakness on the one side, and of sacrifices not to be exaggerated on the other. I claimed, moreover, for England, however it might be with other States, the right of pleading her own example in support of the representations which I was instructed to make, not only as to freedom of conscience in spiritual matters,

but as to the removal of civil disabilities on grounds of religious difference, and the benefits derived from a comprehensive system of government. I undertook to obtain more positive information with respect to the executions before alluded to, and I drew attention to the harsh treatment, independent of penal infliction, experienced in many instances by those who were charged with religious offences in some provincial town or district, particularly by Protestants, who were not sufficiently protected by the Turkish authorities.

Redress will, I trust, be obtained in the latter respect. The former complaint was met with an excuse, which it is dangerous to accept. The confinement of accused individuals, their removal to a distance for trial, and their temporary exile, were treated as means employed of necessity by the Government to evade the violence or to deceive the bigotry of an exasperated populace.

Upon the whole, my proposals were received with fewer appearances of irritation and repugnance than I had ventured to expect. I was careful not to excite those feelings by any premature insistance or attempt to carry my points by surprise. I recommended the demands of Her Majesty's Government to the serious and immediate consideration of the Porte; and I agreed, at the Pasha's request, to send in a note, *pro memorid*, explanatory of their extent and the grounds on which they rested. Objections and difficulties are to be expected in a later stage; but I am willing to believe that firmness and perseverance will ultimately prevail, if not to obtain the formal repeal of established laws, to remove all uncertainty from the intentions of the Porte, and to obtain the practical cessation of punishment and minor kinds of persecution in the case of every seceder from a religious creed. It is most desirable that Christian and other spiritual dignitaries exercising authority over the Rayahs, should be comprised in the intended renunciation.

I presume that the interruption of public worship, or any grave and scandalous offence against the Deity, involving a breach of the public peace, would, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, be justly abandoned, on due conviction, to the rigour of the law, when brought within reasonable and well-defined limits.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 199.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 29.)

(No. 836.)
My Lord, *Therapia, October* 18, 1855.

I APPRIZED the Grand Vizier and Fuad Pasha, when I saw them the day before yesterday, that Count Walewski had declared the concurrence of his Government with our views in the matter of religious persecution, and that the French Ambassador—though I was by no means authorized to speak on his behalf—would, no doubt, express himself in a similar sense, as soon as he received his instructions.

I have since informed M. Thouvenel of my interview with the Turkish Ministers, and on his inquiring how my communication had been received by them, I said that it had been taken much better than I expected.

His Excellency is still without instructions on the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 200.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 1,254.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 29, 1855.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 1,398 of the 24th instant, reporting a conversation which you had had with Count Walewski, on learning that instructions to M. de Thouvenel to press the Porte to prevent the infliction of the punishment of death on future apostates from Islamism had been omitted to be sent to him, and giving Count Walewski's reasons for this omission. And I have to state to your Excellency that I have learnt the decision of Count Walewski with much regret, as there can be no doubt that the present moment, when England and France are rendering such great services to the Sultan, and imposing upon themselves such great sacrifices for his cause, is the fitting one for demanding the abolition of a law which is an outrage to humanity and to the Christian religion.

Her Majesty's Government are now placed in a position of some embarrassment, for, relying upon the assurance that Count Walewski would send to M. de Thouvenel instructions similar to those which were addressed to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Her Majesty's Ambassador will have already acted upon his instructions, and have advised the Porte to abolish the existing law and practice, and he must either withdraw his application, and thereby give the sanction of Her Majesty's Government to the continuance of a practice which is revolting to the feelings of the people of England, or he must find himself, by no fault of his own, in direct antagonism with the French Ambassador, whose advice being in consonance with the fanaticism of the Porte, will naturally be preferred by the Turkish Minister to that of his colleague.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 201.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 29.)

(No. 1,415.)
My Lord, *Paris, October* 28, 1855.

COUNT WALEWSKI informs me that instructions respecting the abolition of punishment in cases of apostacy in the modified sense mentioned in my despatch No. 1,399 of the 24th instant, were sent on the 23rd instant to M. de Thouvenel.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 202.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 892.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 30, 1855.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 889 of the 29th instant,* I inclose, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a further despatch† from Lord Cowley, as to the instructions which the French Government have addressed to M. de Thouvenel, respecting the punishment of apostacy in Turkey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* Inclosing copies of Nos. 197 and 200. † No. 201.

No. 203.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 893.)

Foreign Office, October 30, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 832 of the 15th instant, in which you report your interviews with Aali and Fuad Pashas on the subject of religious executions in the Turkish dominions; and I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve your proceedings and language on these occasions.

The subject should not be permitted to drop, and should, in a friendly spirit, be pressed on the attention of the Porte, as often as your Excellency thinks it expedient, as a question which involves the true interests of the Porte, and one which the Christian Powers have a just right to expect should now be finally set at rest.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 204.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 1,427.)

Paris, October 31, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 1,254 of the 29th instant, I have the honour to state that Count Walewski has read to me the instructions which I informed your Lordship, in my despatch No. 1,415, he had sent to M. de Thouvenel in regard to the abolition of punishment in Turkey in cases of apostacy. These instructions occur incidentally in a despatch enjoining M. de Thouvenel to endeavour, with his English and Austrian colleagues, to come to some arrangement with the Porte for the settlement of what are now called, in diplomatic language, the first and fourth points. Count Walewski states, that having learnt from me that Her Majesty's Government were desirous that the French Ambassador at Constantinople should aid Her Majesty's Ambassador in the representations the latter had been desired to make to the Porte in this matter, M. de Thouvenel was to do so in the measure he might think proper; but Count Walewski records the opinion that the best moment for mooting the question will be during the discussion of the fourth point.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 205.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 1,267.)

Foreign Office, November 2, 1855.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government learn with satisfaction from your Excellency's despatch No. 1,427 of the 31st ultimo, that instructions have been sent by Count Walewski to the French Ambassador at the Porte, on the subject of religious executions in Turkey.

It appears to Her Majesty's Government that there are facilities now for settling doubtful and difficult questions beyond what could be expected when negotiations for peace are recommenced, and that by advancing or finally arranging such questions, the future labours of negotiation will be rendered more easy.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 206.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 160. Confidential.)

Berlin, November 3, 1855.

My Lord,

IN conversing with Baron Manteuffel on a late occasion, I profited of an opportunity which occurred, to inquire from his Excellency whether he had received any intelligence from St. Petersburgh which might give hopes that wiser and more conciliatory counsels were operating on the Imperial Cabinet, and that the Emperor would be induced to offer terms of peace; his Excellency replied that both the Emperor and Count Nesselrode were undoubtedly desirous for a pacific arrangement, but that he could perceive that the difficulties to obtain this end were very great. He read to me some extracts from a private letter from Baron Werther, in which these opinions were clearly expressed: Baron Werther stated that the subject of Baron Manteuffel's communication had not been "responded to on the part of Count Nesselrode," who had observed that, however desirous they were for peace, still they were at a loss to discover the form, as well as the nature, of the proposals to be submitted, and that they therefore felt that there was nothing left but to continue the war with perseverance, for they would never consent to a dishonourable peace. I inquired from Baron Manteuffel of what nature was the Prussian communication to which Baron Werther adverted. His Excellency replied that he had lately addressed a despatch to Baron Werther for communication to the Imperial Cabinet, informing them of the result of the last pacific attempt made by His Prussian Majesty in London, Paris, and Vienna; and that he had on that occasion urged on the Imperial Cabinet the necessity of their making direct and suitable proposals for peace to the Western Powers; that it was this invitation to which Count Nesselrode's reply referred.

Count Nesselrode likewise observed that he was unable to take the initiative during the Emperor's absence; but he thought that on the Emperor's return something might be effected in accordance with the advice proffered by the Prussian Cabinet.

Baron Manteuffel stated, from information which had reached him, that Russia was in great difficulties, and he seemed evidently to fear some internal movement. He expressed much compassion for the Emperor and Count Nesselrode, both of whom, he said, were most desirous to bring this unfortunate war to a conclusion.

Acting in the spirit of the opinions expressed by your Lordship, I stated to Baron Manteuffel that if the King of Prussia were now to step forward, and to hold strong language to the Emperor Alexander, urging him to make the concession necessary for the attainment of peace, it would probably be the most valuable service he could render to the Emperor; and it would give His Imperial Majesty an additional excuse for peace in the eyes of his people, and would avert further disasters from his country.

Baron Manteuffel replied that he had made a proposal of this nature to the King, but that His Majesty had observed that it would be too harsh were he to cause fresh annoyance by menacing language to the Emperor at a moment when he was suffering under the weight of disaster and defeat.

Baron Manteuffel remarked that a humiliation of Russia was certainly not desirable for Europe; and he seemed to claim for the Emperor Alexander, in his present difficulty and dangerous position, some compassion on the part of the Western Powers.

I replied to his Excellency that the object of the war had not been to humiliate Russia, and that if this result was, as he seems to conceive, likely to ensue, it would be solely owing to the obstinacy of Russia, and her perseverance in resisting the moderate and just demands of the Western Powers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 207.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 169.)

Berlin, November 3, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith, in translation, a Russian ukase ordering a fresh levy of 10 men in every 1,000 souls for the whole of the Russian Empire, with the exception of seven Governments therein named, which have been already drained of their male population.

I have also the honour to forward the inclosed copy, in translation, of an address of M. Lanskoi to the nobles of the Russian provinces on his appointment as Minister of the Interior. With respect to this subject, I have been informed that some discontent had been created among the nobles in Russia in consequence of its having been reported that a promise had been made to the serfs, by M. Bibikoff, his predecessor in office, that at the conclusion of the present war they should obtain their freedom; the principal aim of the inclosed address, therefore, appears to be to calm the fears of the nobles in this respect and to assure them that their privileges will be maintained intact.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 207.

Imperial Ukase.

(Translation.)

SINCE the Emperor Nicholas divided the Empire into the Eastern and Western Districts, increasing the levies to 13 in 1,000, there has been general recruiting; before that time the conscriptions for completing the army scarcely reached 7 or 8 in 1,000.

How great the loss must have been in the last year's campaign is seen by the fact that the whole Empire, with the exception of the seven Governments which have suffered most severely, is called on to raise 10 in 1,000 souls at the next enrolment.

Imperial Decree.

We, Alexander, by the grace of God, Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, King of Poland, &c.

In consequence of the losses which our troops have suffered in this campaign, we deem it necessary, in order to complete our forces to repulse the enemy, to decree as follows:—

1. A general enlistment shall take place throughout the whole Empire, in virtue of an Ordinance sent to each Government simultaneously with this Ukase, to the extent of 10 men in 1,000 souls; the Governments of Pfhow, Pultava, Tschernigow, Charkow, Chaterinslaw, Cherson, and Tauris, alone excepted.

2. Ten Jews in each thousand capable of serving shall be taken equally with those of other classes.

The levy to begin on the 15th of November, and end on the 15th of December.

Manû Regiâ,

ALEXANDER.

The Ukase to the Senate is as follows:—

By a Decree of this day's date a universal enlistment is ordained throughout the Empire, with the exception of the Governments mentioned in the aforementioned Decree, and we ordain:—

1. The recruiting shall begin on the 15th of November, and end on the 15th of December of this year.

2. The persons charged with the recruiting are to furnish the fur garment ("Halbpelz"), and a sum for the equipment of the recruits equal to what the Commissariat has to spend for that purpose without the "Halbpelz poluschubki," that is, 75 rubles 10 kopeks.

Our Minister of War is charged with the military part of the arrangement.

We leave to the Directing Senate the care of carrying out with all speed this enlistment, and within the time specified.

Manû Regiâ,

ALEXANDER.

Nicolaieff, October 15, 1855.

Inclosure 2 in No. 207.

Address.

(Translation.)

THE "Moscow Gazette" contains the address of the Minister of the Interior to the Marshals of the Nobility of the various Governments, dated $\frac{\text{August } 20}{\text{September } 1}$:—

"I have been named by His Imperial Majesty's Decree of the 20th August, Minister of the Interior. In taking upon me, with most submissive reverence, this most gracious appointment of our beloved Emperor's, I can but be proud that to the post of Minister of the Interior is joined the high obligation of representing before the throne the high-minded Russian nobility which, from all ages, has been known by its devotion to the Imperial House and its ardent love for our fatherland, and which has now, in times of difficulty, shown itself to be animated by the same sentiments.

"Our Most Gracious Sovereign has commanded me to maintain intact the privileges of the nobility granted by his ancestors.

"I esteem myself happy in making known this act of Imperial favour; at the same time I assure you, with gratifying consciousness, that I have always been firmly convinced that the nobility are most important cooperators, and the firm support of the fatherland. With this conviction I expect from you the zealous fulfilment of all the duties of Government, and cordial cooperation in carrying out the orders of the authorities, and I hope that I shall find no other rivalry than that which consists in aiming at the same object, the common welfare.

"You well know how much depends on the choice of fit nobles for service, what obligations are imposed on them, and how closely the fulfilment of these duties are connected with the repose and well-doing of private individuals; and one may, therefore, with propriety hope that appointments to elective offices may fall on men who not only bear the title of nobility, but who are noble by their intellects and hearts.

(Signed) "LANSKOI."

No. 208.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 5.)

(No. 82.)

Stockholm, October 29, 1855.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches from No. 41 to No. 45 inclusive, together with their several inclosures, by the messenger Ball, yesterday.

I lost no time in conferring with my French colleague as to the course we should pursue. I learned from M. Lobstein that he had not received his instructions, nor had any intimation reached him, excepting Lord Cowley's telegraphic despatch to your Lordship of the 18th instant, inclosed in your Lordship's No. 44, which I communicated to him, that they were about to be forwarded to him. He thinks it probable that they may come by the next Stettin steamboat, which is due on the 1st of next month. We agreed, however, that it was advisable to lose no time, and I accordingly apprized Baron Stierneld that my messenger had arrived, and that I had a communication to make to him; his Excellency proposed calling on me this morning, and has just left me.

I commenced by communicating to him Lord Cowley's telegraphic despatch, stating that the French Government approved of the instructions your Lordship had prepared for my guidance, and would send off to M. Lobstein in a day or two similar instructions. I then read to him and gave him a copy of the draft of Treaty which I was instructed to propose to the Swedish Government, observing to him, that although short, it was highly important to this country, as it contained a general guarantee by Great Britain and France of His Majesty's Swedish and Norwegian possessions against any aggression on the side of Russia, in return for which we required alone that His Majesty should neither cede any portion of those territories, nor any right of pasturage or fishery, to that Power. I read slowly over to his Excellency the project of the Treaty in French, and he thus assured himself that the copy which I had put into his hands was correct. The only observation which he made was, that he was desirous that the naval and military forces which the Contracting Parties engaged to place at the disposal of the King of Sweden, in case of necessity, should be specified in the Treaty.

I answered that the qualification of "sufficient" was far more advantageous to the Swedish Government, than if we specified any particular number of troops and ships; that two Governments, such as those of Great Britain and France, would not compromise the safety of any expeditionary corps they might send to the aid of Sweden, or endanger their national honour by sending an inadequate force, and by not duly supporting and reinforcing it, till the object they sought was attained. Baron Stierneld added, it was more to satisfy public opinion and the Chambers than from any doubt of the force of my reply that he had stated this objection.

His Excellency then promised me to forward immediately the project of the Treaty to the King, who is still at Drottningholm, an hour from this capital, and I urged him to move His Majesty to give him his full powers to treat; adding that I had received, by the messenger, Her Majesty's, and that I had no doubt M. Lobstein would very shortly receive his. His Excellency promised me that no time should be lost, and as soon as M. Lobstein's messenger arrives we can enter on negotiations.

I send this despatch to Berlin by a servant who is leaving my service, and for the present I shall detain the messenger.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

No. 209.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 1,437.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 5, 1855.*

ALTHOUGH your Lordship has probably received the same intelligence yourself, I may as well mention that Count Walewski has been informed from Berlin, that Count Nesselrode has expressed himself to Baron Werther as exceedingly anxious for peace. The Russian Government, the Chancellor says, is ready to make great sacrifices to obtain it, but there are three things which the Emperor will never do, however long the war may last: cede an inch of territory; undertake not to restore Sebastopol; agree to such limitation of his power in the Black Sea as would be derogatory to his sovereign dignity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 210.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 1,442.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 5, 1855.*

REFERRING to your Lordship's despatch No. 1,267 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to state that I do not apprehend that there is any material difference of opinion between Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor respecting the necessity of obtaining from the Porte, before the recommencement of negotiations for peace, the settlement of all doubtful and difficult questions relating both to the treatment of the Christian subjects of the Porte and to religious matters in general.

Count Walewski has written more than once lately to M. de Thouvenel in the most pressing terms to urge the immediate consideration by the Porte, and by the two Embassies, of the best means of attaining the objects contemplated by the first and fourth points, to the principles of which the Porte has assented. His Excellency states that the Austrian Government is anxious to join the Western Powers in this work of humanity; and he thinks that the best means of obtaining the objects which all have in view, will be by laying down general rules for the future protection of the Sultan's subjects of all denominations, rather than by attempting to obtain the open repeal of an odious law, which no Turkish Government now dare to enforce.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 211.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 915.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 7, 1855.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 889 of the 29th ultimo, I inclose for your Excellency's information a copy of a further despatch[a] from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris respecting the views of the French Government as to the best means of securing religious liberty in Turkey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 212.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 85. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Stockholm, November 1, 1855.*

I HAD yesterday the honour to receive an invitation to dine with the King at Drottningholm, and after dinner I had a long and very satisfactory conversation with His Majesty on the subject of the Defensive Treaty.

His Majesty having taken me into a room where we were alone, invited me to sit down with him on a sofa, and informed me that he had carefully examined the draft of Treaty which I presented to Baron Stierneld on the 29th ultimo. He expressed generally his satisfaction with that project, and added that he had few and unimportant alterations to propose.

His Majesty then said, with great frankness, that he had directed Baron Stierneld, who is to be his Plenipotentiary, to endeavour to come to an understanding with my French colleague and myself, with respect to the change in the draft which he desired, but not to make its adoption a *conditio sine qua non*. His Majesty observed, that it was always his wish to be courteous (courtois), and

[a] No. 210.

to avoid giving unnecessary offence, when it did not weaken his own cause. He desired, then, that "la Russie" should be substituted for "l'Empereur de Russie" in the draft of Treaty. His Majesty disclaimed any wish to avoid this difficulty by substituting "à une Puissance quelconque," thus omitting even the mention of Russia. He frankly stated the Treaty was and could be directed against Russia alone, and that it would be absurd to suppose that Great Britain and France should be called on hereafter to assist Sweden, if at war with Denmark or Holland; and he desired alone from the motives I have mentioned, to avoid naming "l'Empereur de Russie," and to substitute "la Russie." Such a substitution would, His Majesty observed, avoid personal offence, and that he was fully justified in concluding a Treaty such as we had proposed to him; it was purely defensive; if Russia made no aggressions on his territories it was still-born (né-mort); if she did, his precaution was fully justified, and the past history of Sweden was an open book, in which the world might read that every act of precaution against Russia was warranted on the part of a Sovereign of Sweden.

I observed, that I supposed the terms "l'Empereur de Russie" had been adopted because that Monarch was the incarnation of government and power in that country, and that if any Sovereign could truly use the words of Louis XIV, "L'Etat c'est moi," it was His Imperial Majesty. I confessed I thought "la Russie" would fully express the object we had in view, and I promised to report to your Lordship this proposed alteration, and to ask your instructions, which I have done by telegraph this day, in a cyphered despatch.

It was, however, impossible in a despatch by telegraph, to do more than hint at the reasons which make me think it advisable that we should accept His Majesty's suggestion, and I will now more fully advert to them.

It appears to me, in the first place, that the substitution of "la Russie" for "l'Empereur de Russie," in no way alters the sense or spirit of the Treaty; on the contrary, it makes it more comprehensive; it would apply with equal force, whether the Ruler of that country was an Emperor or an Empress, and your Lordship will recollect, that since the death of Peter the Great, in 1725, there have been no less than four ruling Empresses of Russia. The alteration would also be equally applicable whatever the form of Government of that country might be; whereas if His Swedish Majesty only stipulated to make no concession or exchange of territory with the Emperor of Russia, a quibble might possibly be raised in the two alternatives which I have put forward.

I may further add, that His Majesty is somewhat justified in asking for this alteration, because in all his conversations with my French colleague and myself, he has invariably spoken of Russia, and not of the Emperor of Russia; and when proposing to M. Lobstein a general, instead of the partial, guarantee which we had offered, His Majesty's words were: "Pour ma part je prendrai l'engagement à ne céder à la Russie, &c.;" and finally, that it was the late, and not the present Emperor, who made the attempts to gain a footing in Finmark, which have led to the present Treaty.

Such are the reasons which lead me to think it will be advisable to adopt the alteration in the draft of Treaty which His Majesty desires. I have reason to know that his Ministers would have preferred omitting all mention of Russia, and turning the difficulty by the general terms of "à une Puissance quelconque;" a proposal which I should have strenuously opposed, and we have been saved that difficulty by His Majesty's candour and firmness. I think, too, it would be a satisfaction to His Majesty if we adopt his suggestion, and I candidly confess that his straightforward conduct on this question appears to me to deserve any concession which we can make, when unattended with a sacrifice of principle.

At the end of our conversation His Majesty said that there was another part of the draft of Treaty which required fuller explanation, namely, that at the end of the IInd Article, which states: "la nature, l'importance, et la destination des forces dont il s'agit, seront, le cas échéant, arrêtées d'un commun accord entre les trois Puissances," should be added, "il est bien entendu que l'entretien de ces forces reste aux frais des Puissances qui les auront envoyées." His Majesty added, I must recollect, that he was concluding a Treaty for the future as well as the present; and he was unwilling that it should be said hereafter he had been unmindful of the future interests of his country.

I answered, I could not believe it was ever intended that any auxiliary force, which might, in virtue of this Treaty, be sent to protect Sweden, should

be at the expense of that country, and that I anticipated no difficulty in giving him that assurance. It might, however, be inconvenient to state so in the Treaty; and I inquired whether, in that case, His Majesty would be satisfied if the assurance he desired was given in a Secret Article, to which I said might be added, that His Majesty, on his side, engaged to give every facility to his allies in procuring provisions, &c.

The King replied at once, it was quite the same to him whether the assurance was given in the body of the Treaty, or in a Secret Article.

I must here observe, that I think this latter assurance was required by His Majesty, not so much because he thought it ever had been the intention of his allies that Sweden should maintain the forces which they might send to support him, and that it was consequently necessary to guard against such a contingency, as that it offered him the opportunity to disclaim a most unreasonable pretension, which has been insinuated in other quarters, namely, that we should, in that case, subsidize Sweden, for His Majesty added, "comme de raison, je ne désire pas des subsides pour défendre mes propres territoires," to which I had made no sort of allusion. What leads me to this supposition is, that, having heard of the above pretension, though it never was put forward to me, I at once protested very energetically against it; and I have reason to know that my language was reported to His Majesty, who then, as in the conversation which I had the honour to hold with him, disclaimed any such pretension.

In conclusion I must observe, that if Her Majesty's Government, and that of the Emperor of the French, should consent to these two alterations, I anticipate no further difficulty to the immediate conclusion of the present Defensive Treaty with Sweden.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

No. 213.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 92.)
My Lord, *Stockholm, November 5, 1855.*

INone o f his recent despatches, I think of the 23rd ultimo, General Nordin, the Swedish Minister at St. Petersburgh, reports to his Government that he lately had a conversation with Count Nesselrode, whom he had rarely seen since the Emperor's departure for the south of Russia.

The Chancellor admitted to him that Russia was suffering from the effects of the war, and would willingly make peace. He added, that Prussia, without the Emperor's knowledge, had sounded Her Majesty's Government and that of France on the subject, and that her overtures had met with no success. Russia, his Excellency said, could not make the first proposals, and he concluded the war would go on; its pressure on Russia he admitted, but it must at the same time cause great sacrifices to her enemies; and Russia was in a state to bear the burden which it imposed for many years to come.

I think it worth while to report this conversation to your Lordship, though it contains but little. Notwithstanding General Nordin's long intimacy with the Russian Chancellor, it is hardly probable that the latter would express himself with entire frankness to the Swedish Minister, for doubts, at least, must be felt at St. Petersburgh as to the future policy of his Court.

The Russian Government are about to send to Stockholm, M. Glassenap, a naval officer, as naval attaché to their mission here. There has always been a military attaché in the person of General Bodisco, but never a naval; and the selection of one at a moment when the Russian navy plays so inglorious a part in the war, seems rather with the intention of watching the movements and preparations of the Swedish navy, than of gaining information which may be of use to their own.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

No. 214.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 1,315.)

Foreign Office, November 15, 1855.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government learn with great satisfaction, from the contents of your Excellency's despatch No. 1,442 of the 5th instant, that the Government of the Emperor concur with them in opinion as to the necessity of obtaining from the Porte, before the recommencement of negotiations for peace, the settlement of all doubtful and difficult questions, relating both to the treatment of the non-Mussulman subjects of the Porte, and to religious matters in general.

Your Excellency will again bring under the consideration of Count Walewski the instruction which, if the French Government had concurred in it, would in May last have been addressed to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and you will state that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, it comprises the principal points upon which difficulties are likely to arise, and the settlement of which, without the intervention of Russia, appears to be of urgent importance.

Your Excellency will consult Count Walewski as to any amendments or additions which he might desire to introduce, and you will suggest that no time should be lost in instructing the two Embassies formally to bring the whole subject under the consideration of the Porte.

Her Majesty's Government would have wished to decline the cooperation of Austria in these matters: first, because that cooperation was probably offered with reference rather to the settlement of the first point than of the fourth; and, secondly, because it does not seem politic to allow Austria to enjoy the advantages of being a belligerent, without bearing any of the burthens of that condition. She has not placed herself in the same line with England and France, and does not take part in the war, and as she does not share in the sacrifices and exertions, she is not entitled to share in the fruits which those sacrifices and exertions may produce.

Her Majesty's Government will not press their own opinion upon this subject, as Count Colloredo has read to me a despatch from Count Buol, by which it appears that Count Walewski has expressed to Baron Hübner the readiness of the French Government to accept the Austrian offer of cooperation upon the fourth point; but the intervention of Austria with respect to the settlement of the first point, is open to grave objections.

We have already had ample evidence that the arrangements desired by Austria are inconsistent with the welfare and good government of the Principalities; that in fact she aims at transferring to herself the power hitherto exercised by Russia over the Principalities, or, at least, of sharing that power with Russia; and England and France could not, with any regard to justice or humanity, be parties to an arrangement which would deprive the Principalities of all hope, by consigning them to a yoke more grinding and oppressive than that which they have hitherto undergone.

It would seem expedient, therefore, that in the first instance the two Embassies should communicate confidentially with the Turkish Minister upon this important subject, and invite the Porte to draw up a plan for the future administration of the Principalities, which scheme should be submitted for the consideration of the English and French Governments.

Your Excellency will further state to Count Walewski that Her Majesty's Government are convinced that no improvement in Wallachia is possible so long as Prince Stirbey continues to govern that country, and their desire is, that the Porte should be enjoined not to reappoint the Hospodar when his turn of office shall expire next spring, and moreover not to nominate his son in his place.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 215.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 945.)

Foreign Office, November 16, 1855.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 452 of the 13th of June last, I inclose for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch* which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris respecting the recommendations to be made to the Porte in favour of its Christian subjects.

Your Excellency will find a copy of Lord Cowley's despatch No. 1,442, to which the paper I now inclose is an answer, in my despatch No. 915 of the 7th instant.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 216.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 97.)

Stockholm, November 19, 1855.

My Lord,

GENERAL CANROBERT, having concluded his special embassy to this Court, left Stockholm, after a residence of a fortnight, this morning, for Copenhagen.

His Excellency, during his stay here, has been treated with the most marked attention by the King and the Court, and he received, from His Majesty's hands, on the 17th instant, the Grand Cross of the Seraphim. I am told there was a question of giving him the First Class of the Order of the Sword, of which there is at present but one, Count L. Walmoden; but it was thought that such an honour, conferred on a French General for his success against Russia, would be too open a declaration for the present moment.

The reception which General Canrobert has met with from the public has been equally warm and flattering; and if it is to be interpreted as a proof of sympathy for the cause of the Western Powers—which it undoubtedly in part was—nothing could be more gratifying. Crowds of people thronged his passage wherever he went; and the only time he appeared in the theatre he was received with the warmest cheering, and the French national air was played. He had arrived previously to the Royal Family; and upon the King's entry, His Majesty was greeted with still greater warmth, and the General was invited into the Royal box.

General Canrobert, with great judgment, has avoided as much as possible these public ovations, and declined a banquet, which the merchants of this place wished to invite him to. It is now proposed to forward to France, for the benefit of soldiers wounded in the war, what the dinner would have cost.

The General travels by land to Helsingborg, in Royal carriages, accompanied by an Aide-de-camp of the King; and he is to see, at each of the places where he stops, a portion of the Indelta army quartered in the neighbourhood. He has made himself intimately acquainted with the military resources of this country, and has had every facility offered to him in the attainment of that object; and he cannot fail to have learned His Majesty's views and intentions, should the present war continue next year.

I have reason to believe that General Canrobert's mission was rather to make inquiries than proposals, and rather to treat the military than the diplomatic question; and his Excellency expressed himself to me in the highest terms of satisfaction with its results.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

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* No. 214.

No. 217.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 98.)

My Lord, *Stockholm, November 19, 1855.*

IN one of his last despatches to his Government dated the 8th instant, General Nordin, the Swedish Minister at St. Petersburgh, reports the Emperor's visit to the Crimea, and adds that he had learned from unquestionable authority that His Imperial Majesty would return to St. Petersburgh on the 18th instant.

General Nordin says he has good grounds for believing that the Russian army under the orders of Prince Gortchakoff, occupying the position from the north side of Sebastopol to Baktchi-Serai, amounted to 115,000 men, of which force from 85,000 to 90,000 were Infantry.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

No. 218.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 99.)

My Lord, *Stockholm, November 20, 1855.*

I HAD to receive, on the evening of the 18th instant, your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of the preceding day, in reply to my telegraphic despatch, which I may add was dated the 12th, though possibly the date was not transmitted by the telegraph. As my French colleague did not receive the instructions of his Government till the evening of the 19th, I did not mention to Baron Stierneld, at the usual conference on that day, that I had received your instructions, but merely observed that the delay appeared to me to offer grounds for supposing that objections were felt by the British and French Governments to the alteration proposed by the King, and that I thought His Majesty would do well to consider, supposing my apprehensions proved correct, whether he could not accept the wording of the end of the IInd Article which he had already proposed.

M. Lobstein and myself having informed Baron Stierneld that we had received the answers of our respective Governments, his Excellency appointed us to meet him this day at the Foreign Office. We had previously agreed upon the common language which we should use, and though M. Lobstein's instructions, of which I inclose a copy, gave him a greater latitude than I conceived I had from your Lordship's, and though he had in consequence at first intended to say, that if His Majesty made the maintenance of the words, "to place at the disposal of His Majesty," &c., a *conditio sine quâ non*, he would inform his Government, and if he received no contrary orders, would be prepared to sign the Treaty with those words on the 24th instant, yet at my suggestion he at once consented not to make this statement.

We agreed to say, and as M. Lobstein is my senior here, I consented that he should be the spokesman, that it was true the draft of Treaty originally proposed contained the expression "to place at the disposal of His Majesty," &c., but His Majesty had thought the "rédaction" required further explanation and had proposed an addition to it. That our respective Governments, when considering His Majesty's proposal, had come to the conviction that the commencement of the clause, which was susceptible of the interpretation that the King of Sweden should have the supreme command of any auxiliary forces which might be sent in virtue of the Treaty, was in contradiction with the end of the Article, which stated that "the description, number, and destination of such forces was to be determined by the common consent of the three Powers," and they had in consequence proposed the alteration already in his hands; that no doubt every deference would be paid to the opinions of a King of Sweden at the head of his army, defending his own territories, but that we could not consent to

his having absolute command over our forces; and we pointed out the possible misuse which such a power might entail. We added, that if His Majesty made the maintenance of the words "to place at the disposal of His Majesty," &c., a *conditio sine quâ non*, we requested he would be pleased to state his reasons, as well as the sense which he attached to those words, and whether he conceived they implied that the King of Sweden was to exercise the supreme command over the auxiliary forces.

Baron Stierneld admitted the apparent contradiction which we had pointed out, and then proceeded to enlarge on the dangers and difficulties of a divided command. He asked whether the contradiction might not be avoided by the omission of the end of the Article, which we at once declared to be impossible, and he candidly allowed that such a stipulation was customary in all defensive Treaties.

I then stated, that I was instructed to adhere to the form already proposed, and that if His Majesty persisted in maintaining the words which we wished to omit, I would refer to my Government, and report His Majesty's reasons. I could not promise that they would be accepted, but at all events delay would ensue, and it was the evident interest of the three Contracting Parties to conclude the Treaty with as little loss of time as possible. I said I had looked over the numerous Treaties concluded by Great Britain in 1813; that I had found in one alone the expression "place at the disposal," and that in that one with Prussia it was not troops, but subsidies, that we placed at His Prussian Majesty's disposal.

I added, that when we were willing to incur the heavy responsibility of guaranteeing the possessions of His Majesty, it was clear we felt it to be our interest to do so; we wished to draw a line of circumvallation to Russian ambition: if, then, the case arose, both the interests of their country, and the common danger, would produce concert between the auxiliary and Swedish forces.

Baron Stierneld's tone, during the whole of our conference, was more favourable than I had expected, and he promised us to lay our observations and requests at once before the King, and to acquaint us as soon as possible with His Majesty's decision.

I received this evening a letter from Baron Stierneld, of which I inclose copy, informing me that His Majesty had endeavoured to find a modification of the terms "to place at the disposal," &c., which would be acceptable, and that he thought the term "fournir" offered a solution. His Excellency added, that "the King had ordered him not to conceal from us that this was the last concession which he could make," &c.

I lost no time in communicating Baron Stierneld's letter to my French colleague, and we were both of opinion, that under all the circumstances of the case we ought to agree to the proposed modification, and we have in consequence informed Baron Stierneld that we accepted it, and it is not impossible the Treaty may in consequence be signed to-morrow.

I venture to hope that my acceptance of the proposed modification may meet with your Lordship's approval. I think it avoids the objections justly felt to the former "rédaction," and, in conjunction with Baron Stierneld's explanations, removes those difficulties, while it expresses nothing more than we had proposed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 218.

Telegraphic Despatch addressed to M. Lobstein.

18 *Novembre*, 1855.

NOUS ne comprenons pas pourquoi le Roi insiste sur les mots "mettre à la disposition;" tachez d'obtenir qu'il y renonce. Si toutefois il persistait malgré vos observations, acceptez la rédaction proposée par votre dernière dépêche télégraphique, en déclarant qu'elle n'implique nullement l'idée de conférer à la Suède le commandement des troupes auxiliaires.

Inclosure 2 in No. 218.

Baron Stierneld to Mr. Magenis.

Mardi 20.

Mon cher Mr. Magenis,

LE Roi s'est occupé à trouver une modification au terme "mettre à la disposition," &c., acceptable aux deux Parties Contractantes, et Sa Majesté s'est arrêté au terme "fournir," qui n'implique en aucune manière ce que vous voulez éviter ou le commandement-en-chef éventuel et la disposition arbitraire des forces auxiliaires, surtout lorsque la fin de l'Article stipule le concert à établir pour les opérations militaires. Nous proposons donc au lieu de, "s'engagent à mettre à la disposition," &c., "fournir" à Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède et de Norvége.

Si vous agréez ce changement, je suis autorisé à conclure; dans le cas contraire vous voudrez bien demander des instructions.

Le Roi m'a au reste ordonné de ne pas vous cacher que c'est la dernière concession qu'il puisse faire, parcequ'il trouve le mot "coopérer" seul trop vague, et qu'assumant une haute responsabilité au nom de ses peuples, il tient à leur prouver que rien n'a été négligé pour assurer leur avenir.

Veuillez me dire ce que vous et M. Lobstein en pensent et si vous écrivez par le télégraphe. Je serai demain à vos ordres au Cabinet toute la matinée et dès onze heures.

Tout à vous,

(Signé) STIERNELD.

No. 219.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 100.)

Stockholm, November 21, 1855

My Lord,

I HAVE the satisfaction to inform your Lordship that the Defensive Treaty between Great Britain and France on the one part, and Sweden on the other, was signed this afternoon by the respective Plenipotentiaries of those countries at the private residence of the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs; and I have the honour to transmit herewith my counterpart of that Act, together with certified copies of the full powers of the French and Swedish Plenipotentiaries; the full powers of the latter are in copy and translation.

The King of Sweden is desirous that the ratifications should be exchanged as quickly as possible, and, until that is done, that the Treaty should be kept secret. The secret has hitherto been wonderfully kept; and though suspicions may have been awakened, and conclusions drawn, from the late embassy of General Canrobert, I have no reason to believe that any one beyond the few initiated, is aware of what has been doing.

As M. Lobstein forwards his counterpart of the Treaty by an Attaché to his Mission, direct to Paris by way of Lubeck, I am unwilling that mine should travel by the circuitous way of Copenhagen. I have in consequence decided to dispatch the messenger Ball by the Lubeck steamboat to-morrow morning, and I have apprised Mr. Buchanan, by telegraph, to forward any despatches he may have for your Lordship to the Consulate at Hamburgh, where the messenger is directed to call.

I cannot avoid offering my sincere congratulations to your Lordship on the conclusion of this important Treaty, which has been under discussion nearly five months. It affords a strong proof of the foresight of Her Majesty's Government, and while it guards us, as I believe it will, against a great and possible future danger, it can hardly fail at once to increase considerably the sympathies of the United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway for the cause of the allied Western Powers.

In conclusion, I have great pleasure in bearing testimony to the cordial,

loyal, and zealous assistance which I have met with from my French colleague, M. Lobstein, not only in the negotiations which have led to the conclusion of the present Treaty, but on every occasion since my arrival in Sweden, when the interests of our respective countries have been concerned.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

No. 220.

Mr. Magenis to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 101.)

Stockholm, November 21, 1855.

My Lord,

AFTER my French colleague and myself had fully agreed with Baron Stierneld this morning to sign the Treaty in the course of the afternoon, his Excellency stated that he had a "somewhat puerile" objection to make to us, namely, that when the present Treaty was submitted to the Diet, some member might say that the expenses of any auxiliary force sent to assist Sweden would be at the cost of the latter. He inquired then, whether we should object to reply to a note, which in that case he would address us, stating that it was intended that such forces should be at the expense of the Government which sent them.

We both replied that we had no objection to do so, and his Excellency, in the course of the day, addressed us a note, of which I inclose a copy, as well as that of my answer.

I am sure it never could have been contemplated by Her Majesty's Government, that the expenses of any auxiliary British force which might be sent to assist Sweden in virtue of the present Treaty, should be borne by Sweden; but in addition to that conviction, your Lordship instructed me by your telegraph despatch of the 9th instant to abide by the instructions which my French colleague would receive on this subject; and the final paragraph of M. Lobstein's instructions is as follows:—"Du reste nous avons toujours entendu que nos troupes devraient être entretenues par nous-mêmes."

I have, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 220.

Baron Stierneld to Mr. Magenis.

Stockholm, le 21 *Novembre*, 1855.

Monsieur,

L'ENTRETIEN des forces navales et militaires que, par l'Article II du Traité signé aujourd'hui, Sa Majesté Britannique s'engage, le cas échéant, à fournir à Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède et de Norvège ne s'y trouvant pas mentionné, je dois vous demander, Monsieur, si vous êtes autorisé à me déclarer que les frais qu'il entraîne seront à la charge de l'Etat qui est appelé à fournir ces forces navales et militaires.

Je vous serais obligé, Monsieur, si vous vouliez m'adresser une réponse à cet effet, et je saisis, &c.

(Signé) STIERNELD.

Inclosure 2 in No. 220.

Mr. Magenis to Baron Stierneld.

M. le Baron, *Stockholm, November* 21, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note which your Excellency addressed to me, dated this day, in which you inquire whether I am authorized to declare that the maintenance of the naval and military forces which Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland engages, by Article II of the Defensive Treaty signed this day, to furnish to His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway, the case arising, should be at the expense of the British Government; and I have no hesitation in replying to your Excellency that it has always been understood by Her Majesty's Government that such naval and military forces should be at the expense of the British Government alone.

I avail, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.

No. 221.

Treaty between Great Britain, France, and Sweden, signed at Stockholm, November 21, 1855.

SA Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, et Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède et de Norvége, désirant prévenir toute complication de nature à troubler l'équilibre Européen, ont résolu de s'entendre dans le but d'assurer l'intégrité des Royaumes Unis de Suède et de Norvége, et ont nommé Plénipotentiaires pour conclure un Traité à cet effet, savoir:

Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, le Sieur Arthur Charles Magenis, Ecuyer, Son Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède et de Norvége;

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, le Sieur Charles Victor Lobstein, Officier de l'Ordre Impérial de la Légion d'Honneur, Grand-Croix de l'Ordre Royal de l'Etoile Polaire de Suède, Commandeur de l'Ordre du Christ et Chevalier de celui de la Conception de Portugal, Son Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède et de Norvége;

Et Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède et de Norvège, le Sieur Gustave Nicholas Algernon Adolphe Baron Stierneld, Son Ministre d'Etat et des Affaires Etrangères, Chevalier et Commandeur de Ses Ordres, Grand-Croix de Son Ordre de Saint Olaf de Norvége, &c., &c.;

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs respectifs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus de ce qui suit:—

ARTICLE I.

Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède et de Norvége s'engage à ne céder à la Russie ni à échanger avec elle, ni à lui permettre d'occuper, aucune partie des territoires appartenant aux Couronnes de Suède et de Norvége. Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède et de Norvége s'engage, en outre, à ne céder à la Russie aucun droit de pâturage, de pêche, ou de quelque autre nature que ce soit, tant sur les dits territoires que sur les côtes de Suède et Norvége, et à repousser toute prétention que pourrait élever la Russie à établir l'existence d'aucun des droits précités.

ARTICLE II.

Dans le cas où la Russie ferait à Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède et Norvége quelque proposition ou demande ayant pour objet d'obtenir soit la cession ou l'échange d'une partie quelconque des territoires appartenant aux Couronnes de

Suède et de Norvége, soit la faculté d'occuper certains points des dits territoires, soit la cession de droits de pêche, de pâturage, ou tout autre sur ces mêmes territoires et sur les côtes de Suède et de Norvége, Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède et de Norvége s'engage à communiquer immédiatement cette proposition ou demande à Sa Majesté Britannique et à Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français; et leurs dites Majestés prennent, de leur côté, l'engagement de fournir à Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède et de Norvége des forces navales et militaires suffisantes pour coopérer avec les forces navales et militaires de Sa dite Majesté, dans le but de résister aux prétentions ou aux agressions de la Russie. La nature, l'importance, et la destination des forces dont il s'agit, seront, le cas échéant, arrêtées d'un commun accord entre les trois Puissances.

ARTICLE III.

Le présent Traité sera ratifié, et les ratifications seront échangées à Stockholm le plus tôt que faire se pourra.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signé, et y ont apposé le cachet de leurs armes.

Fait à Stockholm, le vingt-un Novembre, l'an de grace mil huit cent cinquante-cinq.

ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.	V. LOBSTEIN.	STIERNELD.
(L.S.)	(L.S.)	(L.S.)